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Abstract 
World politics is characterised by challenges to effective multilateralism with 
repercussions across several areas such as trade, the environment and nuclear proliferation. 
This research investigates the impact of international organisations under contemporary 
conditions of globalisation and does so using the International Labour Organization (ILO) as 
an instance of this wider issue. Economic integration can result in negative social externalities, 
the responsibility of which cuts across state lines and requires cooperation at the international 
level. However, states are often reluctant to assign organisations concerned with human rights 
the necessary authority to fulfil their mandates. For the ILO, this has meant a reliance on powers 
of persuasion to achieve its goals; because compliance rates vary and because the organisation 
is without legal or economic means of enforcement, it has gained a reputation for being 
irrelevant and toothless. As a result, observers tend to explain variation in labour standards 
across states as being caused solely by differences in their domestic politics. 
This thesis seeks to refine the domestic politics argument and to challenge the 
conventional wisdom on enforcement. In doing so, it illustrates not only whether and how the 
ILO makes an impact but draws attention to the fragmented policy environment in which it 
must operate. Here, some organisations work in support of the ILO e.g. global trade unions; 
but the norms diffused from others such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World 
Bank and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) often 
challenge it. Using the comparative case of Czechia and Slovakia, the proceeding chapters will 
argue that the ILO does make an impact and does so via its ability to provide monitoring, 
supervision and technical/legal assistance. However, the research further finds that the extent 
to which the ILO is successful in this regard depends to some degree on the ways in which 
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Chapter I 
The Impact of International Organisations and the ILO 
 
“From the 19th century, it was a free market approach…and there were very strong 
economic and social conflicts. Had it not been for the war, the ILO would not have been 
created in 1919. Do we need another high conflict situation to bring about a change for the 
better again?” (Former Senior ILO Official Werner Sengenberger, 2019).   
 
1.1 Thesis Overview  
 
Globalisation magnifies the pressures for cooperation to address common problems, 
but the adoption of international solutions remains inconsistent. Labour rights is one area that 
has emerged as particularly challenging in this regard; the conventions of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) are widely ratified, but there is significant divergence in 
compliance rates between its member states. For many observers, the ILO is considered to be 
ineffectual (Block et al, 2001; Neumayer & De Soysa, 2005; Hoffer, 2014; Helfer 2008, p.655; 
Elliott & Freeman, 2003; Blanton & Blanton, 2016, p.185) and so scholars tend to explain  
compliance variation  between states as being caused principally by differences in their 
domestic politics e.g. regime type, the quality of democracy or the relative power of national 
workers’ and employers’ groups. Consequently, the predominant view in the literature is that 
external actors such as international organisations (IOs) do not play a role in whether states 
comply with their international commitments (Stallings, 2010; Cook, 2010; Burgess, 2010; 
Caraway, 2010; Cammett & Posusney, 2010; Neumayer & De Soysa, 2005; Mosley, 2011).  
However, while this thesis finds much support for the domestic politics argument, it 
also finds several inconsistencies within the literature raising questions both about its dismissal 
of the international realm and the appropriateness of the methods being used. The opening 
chapters find three specific flaws in this regard. First, because the literature quantifies and 
compares domestic level variables, it oversimplifies these spaces and misses some of the 
important qualitative differences that can exist between state level factors across different 
national contexts - most notably, the ways in which they mediate IOs. Second, in order to test 
the ILO’s influence, much of the available literature uses ‘compliance’ and ‘ILO ratification’ 
as its primary dependent and independent variables respectively. In doing so, it overlooks some 
of the organisation’s key tools and the ways in which they impact on states despite such states 
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not achieving full compliance. Finally, there is a lack of attention to the issue of competing 
norms and how such policy competition at the international level can undermine the ILO’s 
work. For example, while some scholars have drawn associations between decreasing labour 
standards and International Monetary Fund (IMF)  or World Bank programmes - organisations 
whose policy prescriptions often favour business over that of organised labour - extensive work 
illustrating the incompatibilities that exist between these organisations and the ILO, as well as 
the ways in which policy divergences between them manifest, is lacking.  
The aim of this thesis, therefore, is to refine and augment the domestic politics argument 
by bringing IOs back into the debate and in doing so, the work here asks, ‘under what 
conditions does the ILO influence the working standards of its member states?’ Accordingly, 
the study makes three distinct conceptual contributions. First, instead of the predominant 
emphasis on compliance, it puts forward the notion of “impact” as an alternative dependent 
variable.  Impact, as properly defined later in this chapter, shifts the focus away from 
compliance and captures the ILO’s direct influence by identifying instances where the 
organisation has positively altered a domestic outcome (Raustiala, 2000). Second, the issue of 
regime fragmentation is considered. There is no consensus on the precise definition of 
fragmentation in the literature, but it is defined here as “the degree and character of 
convergence or divergence with a central regime actor”. This definition aligns with previous 
work which conceptualises fragmentation as being fluid and assumes neither a positive nor 
negative quality in regard to its consequences for regime impact (Bierman et al, 2009; Zürn & 
Faude, 2013, p.119; Raustiala & Victor 2004; Pattberg et al, 2014). For the purposes of this 
research, fragmentation is best understood as a condition associated with regime complexes - 
themselves defined as a network of “partially overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions 
governing a particular issue-area” (Raustiala & Victor, 2004). The definition I employ here 
emphasises degree and convergence/divergence because regime complexes can be more or less 
fragmented depending on the extent to which the individual actors that make up the network 
converge on indicators such as policy, constituency and institutional type e.g. public or private. 
Whether fragmentation contributes to or impedes a regime’s ability to make an impact depends 
secondly on the character of fragmentation which can also vary e.g. the policies of some actors 
may be cooperative while others may conflict (Bierman et al, 2009). 
Deploying this understanding of fragmentation to the governance of international 
labour standards helps not only to bring out new dynamics regarding the global labour rights 
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regime, but it also facilitates a third conceptual contribution which is this thesis’ development 
of the ‘regime sub-constellation’. Accordingly, an argument is made that the degree and 
character of fragmentation varies not just across regime’s (e.g. the environmental regime versus 
the regime for intellectual property), but that such characteristics can vary between institutional 
sub-sets belonging to the same regime operating across different countries. As will be 
illustrated throughout, this notion of ‘country specific regime complexes’ helps not only to 
explain some of the reasons why the impact of the labour rights regime varies, but it also 
illustrates the ways in which the relationships between institutions within the same network 
can shift depending on location.  
The ILO operates in an increasingly fragmented governing architecture where 
interactions can be both cooperative and conflictive (Bierman et al, 2009; Raustiala & Victor, 
2004); as such, the organisation and its tools – this thesis’ independent variable – will be 
analysed by looking at the ways in which competing configurations of actors, both domestic 
and international, facilitate or impede its work (see Alter & Meunier, 2009). While some 
external actors and organisations support the ILO’s mandate (for example, regional and global 
trade union confederations), norms diffused from several other influential organisations, such 
as the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD often challenge ILO standards. In that sense, these 
actors often serve as “challenger IOs” (henceforth referred to as CIOs) in the domestic policy 
contexts that the ILO operates in.1 Since the 1980s especially, these challengers have penetrated 
further into countries’ economic and social policy realms; guided by a neoliberal policy 
paradigm, this generally involves mass privatisation, cuts to wages and employment in the 
public sector and an erosion of workers’ rights (Hagen, 2003, p.11; also see Sengenberger, 
2005, p.8,9). While these organisations have, in recent years, taken steps towards policy 
convergence with the ILO (Blanton et al, 2015, p.324; Murphy-Gregory, 2014), evidence 
revealed here illustrates how the adoption of CIO policy is nevertheless directly associated with 
violations of the ILO’s conventions. Such rival organisations therefore continue to compete 
 
1 Despite not being an established IR term, “Challenger IOs” and the associated acronym – CIOs – is used 
throughout to refer to the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). While it is necessary within this thesis to refer to these organisations as 
a single group, it is not possible to do so with existing terminology e.g. the term ‘international financial 
institutions’ (IFIs) is not suitable because it cannot include the OECD. In addition to the acronym CIOs, this 
grouping of IOs will also, where possible, be referred to as either “contenders”, “rivals” or “challengers”. The 
aforementioned organisations have been categorised in this way to capture instances of their incompatibility with 
the ILO. The terms that have been chosen to describe them are no way suggesting that these IOs are somehow 
challenging the status quo of economic global governance.  
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with and undermine the organisation’s work decreasing its impact in countries where they are 
active.   
Overall, this is a story about when and how the ILO fulfils its mandate - successfully 
diffusing international labour standards (ILS) onto the domestic realm. However, it is also one 
that takes into account the fragmented and often competitive context within which the 
organisation must operate. This environment hosts a range of both domestic and international 
actors who interact with each other, form alliances, and then battle for domestic policy space – 
the ILO and its allies e.g. international NGOs (INGOs), domestic unions and left-wing 
governments; versus the challenger IOs and theirs e.g. employers’ groups, ministries of finance 
and right-wing governments (Sengenberger, 2005). 
Findings and Main Argument  
The research finds that domestic conditions do play a significant role in mediating the 
influence of international actors, but in contrast to the claims in the literature, they do not on 
their own sufficiently explain IO impact. Domestic factors instead act as a gate - opening and 
closing access to the external realm; when this gate is open, the ILO can and does make an 
impact influencing policy content, implementation practices and by acting as a mediator 
between social partners. It is also at this gate - where the national and the international meet - 
that the consequences of fragmentation begin to play out. Here, varying configurations of 
competing international actors (e.g. the ILO, international trade unions, the IMF, World Bank 
and OECD) diffuse norms onto the domestic realm and in doing so, reinforce that same 
competition between national groups e.g. between unions and employers and/or left and right-
wing parties (Sengenberger, 2005). As noted by a senior ILO official in Geneva: 
 “we’re coming at it from different positions. The World Bank engages with different ministries than 
the ILO e.g. the Treasuries, whereas we’re dealing with the department of works and pensions - we’re 
engaging from very different points of view…” (ILO Staff Interviewee G, 2018).  
The relative impact of these competing IOs on states then is partially determined by the 
relative and sometimes shifting influence of the competing domestic groups within them. For 
the ILO, its influence is heavily reinforced by the presence of labour friendly governments and 
active unions; absent these conditions, states might not only exhibit decreased responsiveness 
to the ILO (i.e. in terms of compliance and correcting violations); but, they may at the same 
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time,  increase their receptivity to the CIOs - adopting and implementing policy advice which, 
as will be illustrated in the final chapter, can further undermine the ILO’s work.  
This thesis will illustrate these dynamics using the cases of Czechia and Slovakia. 
Across both of these countries, and in the Central Eastern European (CEE) region more widely, 
IOs operated with some intensity especially during the immediate post-communist period. As 
such, they provide fertile ground for an investigation into the effects of policy fragmentation. 
As a senior ILO official noted:    
“I was in charge of the [ILO] team in Budapest that looked into the countries of CEE…There, the 
international financial institutions should have been our main collaborators but they were more 
rivals…because they pursued a very tough market model and neoliberal policy measures…so they went 
for deregulation. Of course, they had the advantage of being financially powerful, they offered money 
the ILO couldn’t offer...the ILO offered just advice. Most states quickly followed their line, getting 
funding from them and so that was the situation we faced, it was not a very pleasant one… (ILO Staff 
Interviewee S, 2019).  
Throughout I find that due to historical, political and cultural conditions, the ILO’s 
impact is facilitated to a greater degree in Slovakia than in Czechia whereas the reverse is true 
for the organisation’s challengers – the IMF, OECD and World Bank. While the consequences 
of fragmentation have played out across both countries, the ILO more successfully overcomes 
these dynamics in Slovakia than it does in Czechia where its path to affect change is blocked 
by a host of competitive domestic and international contenders. 
Contributions  
The investigation makes several contributions to the literature on the ILO and IOs more 
generally. Firstly, this thesis challenges the notion that the  ILO is ‘toothless’: having celebrated 
its centenary in 2019, the organisation stands as one of the oldest surviving IOs of its kind; but, 
it is also considered by many to be one of the most ineffective with critics pointing to its lack 
of  enforcement powers as its primary deficiency (Peksen & Blanton, 2017; Sengenberger, 
2005, p.9; Hoffer, 2014; Vogel, 2010; Murphy, 2014; Charnovitz, 2000; Brown, 2000; 
Langille, 1997). This thesis rejects the conventional wisdom regarding enforcement (see 
Langille, 2005) and instead, much support is found for the managerial school of rationalism as 
a more useful theoretical predictor to explain when and how the ILO has an influence.  
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A related finding in this regard has to do with the issue of fragmentation and assessing 
the relative institutional strength between the ILO and IOs such as the World Bank, IMF and 
OECD. Often, the argument is made that these organisations are far more influential than the 
ILO because of their ability to force domestic change through loan conditions.2 Because neither 
Czechia nor Slovakia have significantly participated in such programmes, a unique opportunity 
exists to assess the relative impact of the ILO and the CIOs under conditions where the latter 
are not advantaged by asymmetrical institutional strength. In doing so, further insights are 
provided into (1) the ways in which domestic spaces mediate competing external actors and (2) 
the tactics – other than enforcement - used by IOs to influence policy. By investigating the 
impact of the CIOs in relation to the ILO, the thesis also creates a new database which captures 
country responsiveness to CIO policy suggestions over a twenty-year period and provides 
methodological insights into the ways in which patterns of policy adoption behaviour can be 
identified. 
Secondly, the work here borrows from the literature on regime complexes in order to 
help capture and operationalise the competitive and cooperative dynamics of fragmented policy 
networks (see Bierman et al, 2009; Raustiala & Victor, 2004; Morse & Keohane, 2014; Kelley, 
2009; Bernstein & Cashore, 2012; Keohane & Victor, 2011; Widerberg, 2014; Bierman et al, 
2009; Orsini et al, 2013).3 In doing so, conceptual and methodological insights are offered into 
the ways in which these dynamics can be mapped, measured and compared across different 
domestic settings. For example, a ‘regime complex’ refers to the overall global governing 
architecture; but not all institutions that make up the regime complex operate nor interact 
equally in all domestic locations. This research proposes instead that across countries, there 
exists unique networked configurations of international actors that vary in two ways: firstly, in 
levels of fragmentation and secondly, in the extent to which they exhibit cooperative or 
conflictive properties (Bierman et al, 2009). Because variation in this regard may contribute to 
variation of the ILO’s impact across states, the concept ‘regime sub-constellation’ (Hayes, 
2017) is created in order to capture these country specific institutional subsets while their 
interactions are empirically modelled using social network analysis (SNA). Essentially, this 
 
2 Note. The OECD is not an international financial institution and therefore does not administer loans with loan 
conditions. However, its policy prescriptions are nevertheless influential as domestic alignment with them sends 
a strong signal to international markets and multinational companies (Blanton et al, 2015; ILO Staff Interviewee, 
L, 2019).  
3 Note - there is literature on the utility of private governance but not on policy conflict/regime complexity as it 
relates to the ILO (see Abbott & Snidal, 2009; Alston, 2004; Baccaro & Mele, 2012; Bartley, 2007; Utting, 2002; 
Fransen, 2011; Berliner & Prakash, 2015; Locke, 2014). 
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part of the research will assess the extent to which other actors in a particular network defer 
(see Pratt, 2018) to the ILO, versus the number of actors that compete with it; it will compare 
variation between states/networks in this regard and assess the extent to which this dynamic 
mediates the ILO’s influence.  
Finally, this research critically analyses and then dismisses the literature’s use of 
country compliance data as a useful outcome with which to measure the ILO’s influence; 
instead, it synthesises work by Meyer (2014), Raustiala (2000), Weisband (2000) and Landy 
(1966) to develop the dependent variable ‘impact’ – denoting changes in behaviour - as a more 
appropriate indicator to assess the ILO’s effects (Raustiala, 2000, pp.393-4). 
Overall, two broader arguments will be made: (1) IOs, even those that appear weak, do 
matter for global governance (2) the negative consequences of fragmentation can be a 
significant restraint both for individual IOs such as the ILO, as well as for the coherence of the 
multilateral system more generally. The findings of this research will be crucial not only for 
understanding the politics of the international labour regime, but they will also have wider 
analytical applicability for policy areas such as the environment and global health where 
designated IOs similarly lack institutional strength.  
Methods  
 The methodological approach has been developed by first identifying discrepancies and 
inefficiencies within the literature on ILO impact itself. Here, few robust studies exist (Peksen 
& Blanton, 2017, p.76) but scholars who have attempted this task have done so by asking why 
compliance rates vary between states who have ratified identical ILO conventions. However, 
whether they employ the use of Large-N regression techniques, or medium-N regional case 
study work, scholars find no effect for the ILO and instead point to a range of domestic factors 
to explain state variation.4 These studies are critically analysed in chapter II where 
discrepancies with their conclusions are identified. Through an application of the method of 
differences, several cases are found where variation on the outcome variable remains despite 
these cases exhibiting similarities across all of the literature’s key explanatory variables. This 
 
4 See the following for Large-N analysis (Baccini & Koenig-Archibugi, 2014; Toffel et al, 2015; Kim, 2010; 
Strang & Chang, 1993; Marx et al, 2015; Peksen & Blanton, 2017; Neumayer & De Soysa, 2005; Blanton & 
Blanton, 2016). See the following for medium-N regional case study work (Stallings, 2010; Cook, 2010; Burgess, 
2010; Caraway, 2010; Cammett & Posusney, 2010).  
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creates a gap for the effects of the ILO to be re-tested and to do so, Czechia and Slovakia are 
selected for comparison.  
As noted above, a key contribution of this research is its development of alternative 
independent and dependent variables with which to identify and assess the ILO’s influence: 
the independent variable (the ILO and its tools) is analysed through the framework of 
fragmentation while the dependent variable ‘impact’ assesses the extent to which the ILO can 
identify and correct state compliance problems. These two variables will be operationalised 
using a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods. First, this research employs the use of 
within and cross case analysis to trace events on the ground in order to isolate instances of ILO 
impact (George & Bennett, 2004). In doing so, the dynamics and effects of fragmentation on 
the ILO are identified and compared across Czechia and Slovakia. Second, the ‘regime sub-
constellation’ structures will be mapped and measured using social network analysis (SNA): 
SNA offers several metrics which allows the researcher to identify and empirically measure 
the varying levels of influence and interaction between nodes in a network structure (Orsini et 
al, 2013; Steketee et al, 2015; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). For example, ‘closeness centrality’ 
will measure the extent to which other actors in the network defer (see Pratt, 2018) to the ILO’s 
standards while ‘betweenness centrality’ assesses how disruptive organisations such as the IMF 
are to the ILO’s work. The purpose of attempting to empirically map and measure these 
dynamics is to develop a diagnostic tool which can be applied on a large-N scale - the ILO’s 
centrality measure could be included as a variable in a regression analysis to help understand 
not only the degree to which other IOs defer to it (Pratt, 2018) but also the significance and the 
role such varying levels of deference has in contributing or impeding it’s work on a global 
level. SNA’s usefulness in this regard will be assessed towards the end of this thesis in light of 
the findings produced by the proceeding empirical chapters.   
Empirical Foundations 
The regime complex structures were originally built for an MSc thesis in 2017 (see 
Hayes 2017) and done so using information primarily from the Yearbook of International 
Organizations (UIA, 2017). The empirical outputs and predictions of these graphs are brought 
to life in chapters III-VI which process trace (George & Bennett, 2004, pp.6-7) events on the 
ground guided by IMF Article IV Reports; World Bank Doing Business Reports; OECD 
Economic Surveys; compliance and auditing reports from the Center for Global Workers 
Rights (CGWR) and documents from several of the ILO’s supervisory bodies - the ILO’s 
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Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR); 
the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS); the Committee on Freedom 
of Association (CFA) and meeting minutes from the annual International Labour Conference 
(ILC) held in June. Further analytical insights were drawn from semi-structured elite interviews 
with staff from across departments at the ILO, regional labour law experts (e.g. research 
institutions and academics) as well as domestic institutions such as ministries of finance, labour 
and national union confederations. For many of these interviews, I travelled to Geneva and 
spoke directly with staff in face-to-face meetings while for others – particularly those in 
Czechia and Slovakia – meetings were conducted remotely via the internet.   
Wider Context  
Is global governance necessary? Is it possible? This research sits within the wider 
context of globalisation and its governance in general and does so within a liberal 
institutionalist and transformationalist framework.5 That is, it upholds the view that 
governments are very much in control of the shape that globalisation takes but recognises that 
contemporary interdependencies impact states in ways that can alter their domestic politics and 
policy making processes.6 As such, multilateralism through regional or global institutions 
becomes a necessity not only to solve transnational issues but to achieve domestic goals too  
(see Zürn et al, 2012; Lenz et al, 2014; Scholte, 2005, pp.186-9; Zürn,2012; Held & McGrew, 
2007, pp.7-8; Held & McGrew, 2003, p.13; Rodrik, 2000). However, despite the demand for 
global governance, effective cooperation between states is difficult to achieve and there is a 
growing pessimism with regard to the ability of existing institutions to deliver on their 
mandates. The most visible and recent failure was the economic crash of 2008, this example 
helps illustrate the necessity of global governance well because it revealed not only how 
vulnerable and ungoverned the global financial system was, but also how interconnected the 
fates of citizens across different continents have become (Held & Schütze, 2017, p.5). ⁠ The 
negative social impacts of this crisis were of such magnitude that its consequences have 
manifested into a popular backlash against globalisation and a resurgence of right-wing 
 
5 See Keohane & Nye, 1977; 1989; Held et al, 1999; Zürn, 2012; McGrew, 2017; Held & McGrew, 2003; Keohane 
& Nye Jr, 2000; Held & McGrew, 2007; Koenig-Archibugi, 2004; 2007.  
6 Note – this idea has been inspired by a lecture delivered by Mathias Koenig-Archibugi October 2016 (Koenig-
Archibugi, 2016). For debates regarding the impact of external forces on states, see the following arguments by 
Hirst & Thompson, 1999; Krasner, 2004; Mearsheimer, 1994; Kriesi et al, 2006; McGrew, 2017, p.22; Held & 
McGrew, 2003, p.4; Held & McGrew 2003, p.13; Koenig-Archibugi, 2007, pp.46-7; McGrew, 2017, p.27.  
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nationalism (Falk, 2018; Neville, 2016; White, 2016; Best, 2018; Colgan & Keohane, 2017; 
Ikenberry, 2017).  
Such public disillusionment should not be surprising to domestic policy makers, 
observers of political economy have long cautioned against the myth of the self-regulating 
market (Polanyi, 1957; Munck, 2002) and the dangers of a dis-embedded economy (Ruggie, 
1982). For Karl Polanyi, such “utopian economic liberalism” results in “counter-movements” 
which can be either democratic or fascist (Smith, 2017), the latter of which characterised the 
first half of the 20th century and can be understood as a response to the ungoverned 
interdependence of 19th century globalisation  (Keohane & Nye Jr, 2002, p.203). That scholars 
(e.g. Smith, 2017) have drawn parallels between Polanyi’s analysis and today’s political 
climate means that governments must now, more than ever, coordinate their policies to avoid 
future disasters (Held & McGrew, 2003, p.13;  Hale et al, 2013; Nayyar & Court, 2002; 
Keohane, 2002, p.245; Munck, 2002, p.59; Colgan & Keohane, 2017, p.38); as noted by Garrett 
Hardin (1968), self-interested behaviour by individual nations “brings ruin to all” (Hardin, 
1968, p.1244), it serves not only to deplete the “commons”; but paradoxically, makes it harder 
for governments to achieve their domestic goals too (Held & McGrew, 2003, p.13).  
Is global governance possible? Despite these lessons however, governments remain 
hesitant to pool the necessary sovereignty required to achieve effective global governance. For 
example, even after the devastating impacts of 2008, and despite recent IMF warnings that 
another collapse is imminent (Inman, 2018), states refuse to transfer any fiscal or monetary 
sovereignty to a global financial regulator that could prevent another meltdown (Sheng, 2010, 
p.11; Watson, 2017, pp.450-1). While there is certainly no shortage of global institutions that 
governments could work through, their inability - or refusal - to do so has raised the demand 
for global governance, but decreased its effectiveness (Hale et al, 2013, p.226) and as a result, 
contemporary global governance is considered to be in a state of “gridlock” (Hale et al, 2013, 
p.223), complexity (Raustiala & Victor, 2004; Abbott & Snidal, 2009, p.501; Hurrell, 2017) 
and crisis (Payne, 2016).  
These challenges have repercussions for our environment, living standards and security 
(Lamy, 2013); as such, it demands researchers to confront the notion that institutions provide 
nothing more than a “false promise” or that they are merely epiphenomenal to the power 
politics of states (Mearsheimer, 1995). As noted by several scholars (Raustiala & Slaughter 
2002, p.553; Mitchell, 2009; Keohane, 2000, p.246), if it can be theoretically and empirically 
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shown that institutions are capable of having influence, it allows us to gain some insight into 
how we can create, design or reform the structures of global regulation to tackle some of 
today’s most pressing issues (Keohane, 2001; Keohane & Nye Jr, 2002; Keohane, 2002; 
Keohane, 1998; Colgan & Keohane, 2017; Lawson, 2017, p.11; Lissner & Rapp-Hooper, 2018, 
pp.15-16; Ikenberry, 2018).  
A study of the ILO provides us with a perfect testing ground with which to make 
inferences to the above: born in the aftermath of one of the most destructive wars in history, it 
is propelled by the normative belief that “…universal and lasting peace can be established only 
if it is based on social justice” (ILO, 2018a). In line with Polanyi’s framework, it endeavours 
to re-embed the global economy through its formulation and implementation of international 
labour standards (ILS). It is not only one of the oldest IOs in existence, but it is also one whose 
mandate remains relevant. As income inequality grows both within and between states (World 
Inequality Report, 2018), the ILO’s concern with the social dimension to globalisation infuses 
it with the potential to serve as part of a wider counter-movement in a global economy that is 
still very much guided by neoliberal ideology (Munck, 2002).  
At the same time however, the ILO is frequently criticised: first, for failing to 
accomplish its goals and second, for lacking the sufficient “teeth” to impact state behaviour 
(Tapiola, 2018; Salem & Rozental, 2012; ⁠ Standing, 2008; Block et al, 2001; Neumayer & De 
Soysa, 2005; Helfer, 2008; Hoffer, 2014; Elliott & Freeman, 2003; Blanton & Blanton, 2016, 
p.185).⁠  Blame is often placed on the conditions surrounding the ILO’s design: that when 
governments created it, barriers to cooperation - in the form of sovereignty concerns - resulted 
in a compromise that left the organisation without any powers of enforcement to ensure 
compliance (Elliott & Freeman, 2003, p.102). For much of its history, the ILO has been 
perceived as being in a state of inertia; this has led to a plethora of alternative institutional 
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Plan of the Thesis  
             The remainder of this chapter identifies the most useful theories that will guide this 
research’s investigation of ILO impact. Section 1.2 first develops a definition of ‘impact’ 
before examining several theoretical perspectives which predict whether and how IOs achieve 
it. The following related issues are discussed: IO design, survival, reform, the autonomy of 
staff and the issue of fragmentation. These theories are then applied to the ILO’s creation and 
history in section 1.3; here, a brief look at the organisation’s dynamics over time is required to 
(1) provide a functional explanation for why the ILO has no powers of enforcement (2) reiterate 
the necessity of the organisation to contemporary conditions of globalisation (3) to draw out 
the most relevant theories that will guide this research’s investigation into how the ILO makes 
an impact.  
         Overall, the remainder of the chapter produces three foundational points: first, that an 
enforcement mechanism applied to the ILO would undermine its legitimacy and be 
counterproductive to its goal of achieving globally recognised standards – states would either 
be deterred from joining or they would bargain ILS down to the lowest common denominator 
(Maupain, 2013). Second, that the ILO’s crowded operational space means that the issue of 
fragmentation must be considered when assessing the organisation’s impact; and finally, that 
the managerial version of rationalism as well as constructivism are the most relevant theories 
to explain when and how the ILO has an influence. Chapter II then reviews the empirical 
literature on whether the ILO makes an impact before developing the methodological 
framework within which this research’s independent and dependent variables will be 
operationalised.  
          Chapter III draws out historical social, political and economic qualitative differences 
between Czechia and Slovakia. The purpose here is to identify cross-country variation between 
the domestic level variables said to mediate IOs; in doing so, this chapter finds significant 
differences between the power of organised labour and the political will of left-wing parties. 
These findings help not only to overcome the discrepancies found in the literature but also, in 
later chapters, provide a clearer picture of whether and why IOs are penetrating these spaces.   
           Chapters IV and V build on these findings to illustrate the ways in which the ILO and 
the CIOs make an impact and to assess the degree to which their impact varies. In doing so, 
chapters III – V essentially determine the extent and character of fragmentation across the two 
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networks representing Czechia and Slovakia. Here, much support is generated for the SNA 
graphs in chapter II which predict the ILO to make a greater impact in Slovakia than Czechia 
whereas the reverse is true for the ILO’s challengers. Chapter IV is crucial because it responds 
to this thesis’ first question (does and how does the ILO make an impact?) by illustrating when 
and how the ILO matters for states’ labour standards. Its main finding is that while domestic 
factors determine whether the ILO makes an impact, the chapter illustrates how the 
organisation nevertheless changes outcomes from what they would have been in its absence 
and does so by providing technical/legal advice and mediating between social partners.  
         Chapter V on the CIOs however plays an equally important role because it reveals how 
IOs such as the IMF, World Bank and OECD make an impact on states - by influencing very 
specifically the content of policy reforms. Because neither Czechia nor Slovakia have taken 
loans, there is a lack of data assessing the impact of these IOs across the two countries. Chapter 
V therefore sheds light on the ways in which the impact of these organisations can be 
determined when they are unable to leverage their influence via loan conditionality. 
Understanding whether and how the CIOs influence states under these conditions is essential 
prior to examining the consequences of fragmentation which the proceeding chapter (chapter 
VI) does – if these organisations made no impact at all, then the issue of fragmentation would 
be inconsequential.  
            Chapter VI builds on the findings above to demonstrate the consequences of policy 
fragmentation: here, the ways in which the ILO and its rivals, together with their respective 
international and domestic allies, compete for policy space is analysed. With a focus on ILO 
convention #98 (collective bargaining), the chapter traces the evolution of several instances of 
non-compliance in order to assess the significance and the role that policy advice from the IMF, 
World Bank or OECD played in causing the violation; it then determines whether and the extent 
to which the ILO was able to correct it. By sketching out the competitive and cooperative 
interactions between these alliances, the chapter illustrates how and why fragmentation 
manifests differently in Czechia than in Slovakia; in doing so, it argues that the unique 
configuration of international and domestic factors facilitates ILO impact in the latter whereas 
those in the former impedes it. Chapter VII concludes. 
 
Page 23 of 369 
 
1.2 Theoretical Perspectives on the Impact of International Organisations 
Do IOs impact state behaviour? In what ways are they most effective? Much of what 
determines the answers to these questions is dependent on (1) an IO’s design features e.g. 
decision-making rules, delegation of authority and tasks, scope of membership  (Mitchell, 
1994, p.67; Koremenos et al, 2001) and (2) the domestic conditions and politics of the IO’s 
target country e.g. regime type; governing capacity; the success with which international 
agreements are transposed into domestic law (Dimitrakopoulos, 2001) and (3) the extent to 
which an IO can remain relevant over time. However, there are several diverging theoretical 
explanations regarding whether IOs have any influence on states and what design features are 
most effective in achieving it (Simmons, 2000, p.819; Mitchell, 1994, p.72). This section 
covers four areas: first, a definition of ‘impact’ is proposed by analysing the differences 
between compliance, effectiveness and implementation. Second, the ways in which 
institutional design contributes to impact are explored; in doing so, the expectations of realism; 
rational institutionalism (both the enforcement and capacity versions) and constructivism are 
compared and contrasted. Guided by several variants of these theories the section moves on to 
explore issues of IO stagnation and reform; it looks at reasons for why inefficient IOs survive 
over time and whether staff are sufficiently autonomous to increase an IO’s impact when design 
features become limiting. The section concludes by exploring the ways in which impact can be 
achieved under conditions of fragmentation.   
Overall, the section argues that determining the utility of an IO to an issue area requires 
researchers to go beyond evaluating levels of compliance and instead to measure whether the 
treaty resulted in behavioural changes (Raustiala, 2000).  The use of theory helps us to 
understand the causal mechanisms behind those changes and to therefore determine which 
design features are most conducive to impact. Because IOs can often survive in an inefficient 
state of inertia, any study of impact must consider two additional considerations (1) the extent 
to which staff are sufficiently autonomous to evolve the IO from within, and (2) whether the 
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Defining Impact 
Defining impact requires analysis across three interacting variables. (1)  Compliance: 
which identifies “whether the actual behaviour of a given subject conforms to the prescribed 
behaviour” (Joachim et al, 2008, p.6) (2) Implementation: “the [domestic processes] of putting 
international commitments into practice” e.g. passing legislation or the monitoring and 
enforcement of rules (Raustiala, 2000, p.392). (3) Effectiveness: “[the measure of an] 
observable desired [change] in [state] behaviour” (Raustiala, 2000, pp.393-4).7 As noted by 
several scholars (Raustiala, 2000; Meyer, 2014; Thomann, 2011; Bernstein & Cashore, 2012) 
compliance on its own is not sufficient to demonstrate the efficacy of an agreement; perfect 
compliance might be indicative of institutional impact (Meyer, 2014) but, cooperation 
problems between states often lead negotiations to converge upon rules that already match 
domestic behaviour – The Kyoto Protocol and international whaling treaties (Raustiala, 2000, 
p.392) are good examples of such ‘shallow cooperation’ (Downs et al, 1996). Furthermore, 
confounding variables may produce coincidental compliance; for example, the Soviet Union 
complied with several environmental treaties but only after economic hardships incidentally 
forced many of its industries to shut down (Raustiala, 2000, p.393). In both instances, 
compliance is high, but IO impact low – no implementation was required, nor was it a result of 
changed behaviour (Raustiala, 2000). Likewise, low compliance does not automatically denote 
low impact (Meyer, 2014); states may fail to meet their target, but international and domestic 
efforts might nevertheless push them within acceptable margins of the desired outcome 
(Chayes & Chayes, 1993) – national speed limits highlight this well (Raustiala, 2000. p.393).  
Identifying impact therefore requires us to look at synergies between the three variables 
identified above; to compare a state’s behaviour before and after the adoption of an agreement, 
and to identify causal links which allow us to attribute domestic performance to external 
influence (Raustiala, 2000, p.397). Borrowing from the above, this research proceeds with the 
following definition of impact: a change in state behaviour that can be attributed to the 
adoption of a treaty or policy recommendation and its associated implementation processes. 
This definition allows us to (1) account for the spurious nature of compliance (Raustiala, 2000, 
p.393) (2) isolate influence (Mitchell, 2009; Simmons, 2000, p.819) and (3) determine under 
 
7 Note* ‘Effectiveness’ is also understood in regard to whether the institutional rule (e.g. reducing CO2 emissions) 
contributes to solving the problem that first led to cooperation (e.g. climate change) (See Young & Levy, 1999 
cited in Raustiala, 2000; Thomann, 2011; Joachim, 2008).     
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what conditions IOs are most successful. Below, several theories that highlight whether and 
how IOs make an impact are explored.  
How Do IOs Make an Impact? 
Realism. For the most part, realists argue that IOs are designed by and for powerful 
states to pursue their own geopolitical goals and as such, the external balance of power is 
generally reflected in the rules e.g. weighted voting or veto capability (Mearsheimer, 1995). 
IOs do not make an impact; as noted by Ronald Mitchell (2009), if states’ ‘pre institutional 
interests’ are perfectly embedded into the design, then we cannot say that the IO has an 
independent influence on their behaviour (Simmons, 1998, p.79; Mitchell, 2009, p.68). This is 
evident in the fact that IOs can do little to solve enforcement and distribution concerns when 
the rules and decision-making structures become too constraining. States are driven by relative 
gains concerns under anarchic conditions, when national interests dictates, they will ignore 
their international commitments or solve distributional conflicts informally (Mearsheimer, 
1995); for example, negotiations and outcomes in the WTO are heavily dominated by the 
economically powerful despite the institution’s unanimous decision-making structure 
(Steinberg, 2002). 
Rational Institutionalism. Like realists, rational institutionalist scholars recognise the 
centrality of the state and the cooperation problems inherent to an anarchic international system 
(Waltz, 1979); indeed, issues of trust, enforcement (Keohane, 1984, pp.67-9) and distribution 
(Koremenos et al, 2001, pp.775-6) are depicted well by Game Theory’s modelling of the 
prisoners’ dilemma and battle of the sexes (Keohane, 1984, pp.243-5; Koremenos et al, 2001, 
pp.775-6).8 However, where rational institutionalist scholars deviate is by arguing that 
appropriately designed treaties can overcome cooperation problems and guide states towards 
better collective outcomes (Keohane, 1984, p.245; Mitchell, 1994). IO impact depends on 
design (Mitchell, 1994; 2009; Simmons, 2010) which, in-turn, is dictated by the perceived 
severity of the enforcement and distribution issues at the time; because of this, features such as 
issue scope, membership rules, voting procedures and levels of delegation can vary. For 
 
8 Issues of trust refers generally to the fear that commitments will not be honoured which often prevents 
cooperation from being achieved. Enforcement and distribution concerns relate to The uneven costs and benefits 
associated with policy coordination - e.g. the transition to cleaner technologies will be more costly for some than 
others – alternative agreements may be preferred but the problem of bargaining and determining who gets what 
concessions can prevent a final deal from being reached (Keohane, 1984, p.245). 
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example, where preference heterogeneity is high, restricted membership eases the process of 
decision making; or, where membership is open, states may delegate higher levels of 
monitoring and enforcement to overcome issues of trust (Koremenos et al, 2001, pp.761-788; 
Keohane, 1984, pp.243-5).  
While scholars in the rational institutionalist camp generally agree that IOs can make 
an impact, the ‘managerial’ (Chayes & Chayes, 1993) and ‘enforcement’ (Downs et al, 1996) 
schools of rationalism are divided over which design features will most effectively achieve it 
– the issue of non-compliance, and what IOs can do about it, drives this debate. Chayes & 
Chayes (1993) argue that states generally comply with their commitments and that cases of 
non-compliance can be explained by (1) capacity problems whereby states lack the technical 
knowledge or resources to implement their agreements and (2) the ambiguity of treaties which 
can leave the question of compliance vague and open to different interpretations. Because of 
this, institutional design should emphasise mechanisms such as effective dispute settlement to 
deal with treaty ambiguities and capacity building operations to help strengthen technical and 
bureaucratic institutions of implementation (Chayes & Chayes, 1993). This argument has 
resonance with some of the ILO officials I spoke to in Geneva:   
“To be frank, you’re dealing with ministries that are not always well financed, you have issues of 
knowledge about what the ILO is asking for and what they can deliver. There are certain capacity issues 
on that level, so it’s difficult to go to some countries and say you need to be doing [xyz] when the 
reporting group of the ministry would fit on this couch…or they only have a handful of computers, 
these are the realities that you deal with sometimes (ILO Staff Interviewee G, 2018).  
“My personal feeling is that most non-compliance is a combination of lack of capacity and quite simple 
ignorance. The problem is not recognising a problem. On the global report which brought…attention 
of the presence of child labour in southern Europe…[the countries in southern Europe] they were not 
amused, let’s put it that way. The governments and the foreign ministries and the diplomats…they were 
surprised (ILO Staff Interviewee Kari Tapiola, 2018).  
Downs et al (1996) take a different view. These authors argue that good compliance is 
often suggestive of shallow cooperation (Downs et al, 1996, p.383) and that deviant non-
compliance is likely when agreements require costly changes at the domestic level; here, states 
are said to be guided by a ‘logic of consequences’ – calculating the benefits of cheating as 
compared with the costs of detection. For Downs et al (1996), such freeriding can only be 
avoided by delegating to the institution strong powers of monitoring and enforcement; these 
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measures simultaneously increase both the likelihood and cost of detection while removing the 
barriers to deeper cooperation (Thomann, 2011 pp.28-30). There are ILO officials who also 
support this view:  
“Sometimes you see [violations] on a repeated basis that’s where you start getting questions about 
where’s the enforcement here” (ILO Staff Interviewee G, 2018). 
“I don’t think it’s only a lack of capacity… it depends where you put your priorities, if countries decide 
to have a huge budget for a police force and military and then they say oh sorry we don’t have any funds 
for implementation of labour standards, I think that’s the wrong prioritisation. In the case of the least 
developed countries that may be the case but medium income countries I think it’s different priorities. 
Some developing countries deliberately don’t implement the labour standards effectively because 
they’re concerned about competition. I work on collective bargaining and freedom of association so as 
soon as you introduce collective bargaining you might end up with higher wages, which might 
encourage them to take a decision not to do this further in those countries… So, I wouldn’t patronise 
them too much saying they can’t do it” (ILO Staff Interviewee V, 2018).  
 Constructivism. Like rationalism, constructivism recognises that design choice 
determines whether and how institutions will impact state behaviour - that voting and 
bargaining processes alter the structures within which states pursue their preferences is an area 
where the theories converge. Where constructivism departs however is from rationalism’s 
assumption that preferences are fixed and exogenously determined (Risse, 2004, pp.288-9). 
Institutions do not just affect how states pursue their goals, but through processes of 
socialisation, they play a significant role in defining those goals (Simmons, 2010, p.278). In 
other words, institutions shape behaviour not only by “changing [incentive/constraint 
structures] but by changing minds [too]” (Simmons, 2010, p.278); here, compliance is said to 
follow a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (see March & Olsen, 1989; Risse, 2004, pp.293) because it 
is the result of internalised beliefs and values rather than of calculated cost/benefit 
consequences (Raustiala & Slaughter, 2002, p.540). Socialisation is achieved in two ways: the 
first is social influence – where a state’s reputational concerns are manipulated (Kelley, 2004, 
pp.428-9) via social rewards and punishments e.g. back-patting or naming and shaming. (Risse, 
2004) Here, large memberships help to maximise the impact of naming and shaming (Johnston, 
2001, pp.499-510) while majority decision making rules creates a “herding effect” 
(Sedelmeier, 2016) and additional pressures to conform. This is a strategy mobilised by ILO, 
as noted by a staff member at the organisation’s headquarters:  
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“When the ministry has to come here, and they’re at the CEACR meeting sitting in front of everybody, 
and they’re being told... ‘sorry not acceptable’ it’s kind of uncomfortable, and sometimes it is the 
minister of labour who has to sit and deal with it. There is a moral group pressure – you’re sitting in 
front of people who are your peers, the Committee may be saying you know, we have some dirty laundry 
here – everybody’s got dirty laundry, but when you’re having to defend why in front of a group it can 
be uncomfortable. So, there is a certain moral suasion in that type of environment which might have an 
impact…” (ILO Staff Interviewee G, 2018)  
The second form of socialisation is persuasion - considered to have a deeper impact 
because it changes attitudes (Johnston, 2001, p.497; Simmons, 2010, pp.278-9) through 
processes of arguing; unlike bargaining - which engages strategies of threats and concessions 
- it aims to reach a consensus through reason (Risse, 2004, pp.295-6). Design features most 
conducive to persuasion are small exclusive memberships to enhance the effect of group 
identity and unanimous decision making to achieve greater legitimacy of rules (Raustiala & 
Slaughter, 2002, p.541; Johnston, 2001, p.510). For some ILO officials, this form of 
socialisation is preferred to that of ‘naming and shaming’; the former Deputy-Director General 
Kari Tapiola is quoted as saying he would like to consign the practice of ‘naming and shaming’ 
to the “dustbin of history” (Tapiola, 2018, p.95). Indeed, in conversation with Mr. Tapiola, he 
noted: 
“I was trying to say you can of course talk about union rights, you can use all the examples and you can 
take all the bad things and say, ‘this is not what should happen’. But actually, if we really want to see 
how we should deal with that, you need to develop the argument for why it makes sense for people to 
be organised, and why it makes sense for people to have a negotiated solution rather than unilateral 
managerial or government decision” (ILO Staff Interviewee Kari Tapiola, 2018).  
IO Survival, Evolution and the Autonomy of Staff 
 The theories above help us to identify why states make the choices they do and when 
IOs matter; however, shifting circumstances (e.g. domestic preferences or external 
disturbances such as financial crises) can drastically alter the institution’s operating landscape 
and diminish the utility of the original design (Helfer, 2006). When impact declines over time, 
rationalism predicts that states will review the costs, benefits and utility of the institution to its 
new environment, if it continues to fulfil the functions it was created for, they will preserve it; 
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if not, it will be dissolved or reformed.9 However, diverging preferences and entrenched voting 
procedures can often impede reform leaving the institution to persist despite visibly prolonged 
periods of inertia; here rationalism has a hard time explaining impact because it assumes that 
change is always exogenously driven by member states (Curtis & Taylor, 2017, pp.328-335). 
Scholars of neofunctionalism and sociological institutionalism have challenged this 
assumption by emphasising the ability of staff to evolve the institution from within (Haas, 
1964, p.139; Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; 2005).  
Neofunctionalism predicts that domestic groups (e.g. trade unions and sectoral business 
groups) will connect with supranational staff to achieve policy goals that they cannot 
accomplish at the national level; staff – aware that direct cooperation will be beneficial – work 
in tandem with these groups to pressure member states for an increase to the IO’s authority and 
tasks. At first, this revolves around technical issues but eventually spills over into the political 
realm deepening cooperation and improving institutional impact (Helfer, 2006, pp.664-5). In a 
similar vein - but with a focus on staff rather than the spill-over effects of integration - Barnett 
& Finnemore (2005) argue that IOs are powerful international actors in their own right with 
the ability to drive institutional change and deepen impact when design features become too 
constricting. As bureaucracies, they derive their power from control over information and from 
the fact that clients perceive them to be acting rationally and impartially (Joachim, 2008, p.11; 
Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, p.707; 2005, pp.170-1). The legitimacy that flows from these two 
sources of power allows staff to expand their autonomy because they are relied upon not only 
to define categories and problems but also to provide the solutions. For example, by defining 
the meaning of development, staff can determine the content and number of conditions attached 
to IMF loans (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, pp.719); in doing so, the institution reaches further 
into the borrower’s domestic politics circumventing sovereignty and impacting the behaviour 
of a wider spectrum of actors e.g., central banks, political opposition or industrial sectors 
(Barnett & Finnemore, 2004, pp.49-62; Woods, 2006).   As noted by a policy researcher at the 
ILO: “a lot of what happens within these institutions is very individual driven, sometimes you’ll 
look at historical developments within ILO documentation… sometimes you find that there’s 
these initiatives…and they’re really good work” (ILO Staff Interviewee G, 2018).  
 
9 E.g. the League of Nations was replaced by the United Nations with reforms such as veto rights for great powers; 
the WTO replaced GATT with a more legalised approach which members thought would improve compliance 
(Zangl, 2008).  
Page 30 of 369 
 
On the other hand, Barnett & Finnemore emphasise that such expansions of autonomy 
do not always lead to deeper political integration but instead can result in pathological and 
dysfunctional behaviour (Helfer, 2006, p.668). Staff respond to problems by interpreting their 
mission more broadly (Stone, 2008, p.592) which explains why failed IMF programmes are 
associated with an increase of conditions both in scope and number (Barnett & Finnemore, 
2004, pp.49-62). Moreover, as a bureaucracy, staff prefer to fall back on standard operating 
procedures which can sometimes have disastrous consequences; for example, the IMF’s 
response to the Asian crisis (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, pp.715-721) or the UN’s handling of 
Rwanda (Park, 2017, p.324; Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). 
The assumptions of both neofunctionalism and sociological institutionalism have been 
challenged by ‘principal agent theory’ (a variant of rationalism) which objects to the notion 
that change can be driven endogenously (Helfer, 2006, p.663) or that staff can expand their 
autonomy and pursue preferences separate from member states. These scholars argue that states 
assign agents the necessary resources and autonomy in order to efficiently accomplish specific 
tasks. If such agents are kept on too tight of a leash, the gains from delegation would be 
reduced, and if and when agents move too far away from state preferences, they will reign them 
back in (Hawkins et al, 2006, pp.9-14).  
Impact and Regime Complexes 
In addition to the dynamics above, a key issue affecting the impact of contemporary 
global governance is that of fragmentation: the combination of inter-state cooperation problems 
combined with institutional stagnation often results in alternative arrangements which are 
increasingly of both a public and private nature (Abbott & Snidal, 2009). As noted by several 
scholars (Bernstein & Cashore, 2012; Raustiala & Victor, 2004; Kelley, 2009), the literature 
on IOs often fails to account for this growing density and as a result, misses some key dynamics 
related to the conditions under which IOs must perform.  
Rather than a single IO governing an issue area, states create new institutions either to 
(1) solve cooperation problems by trying new designs or (2) because inertia has led the primary 
institution to become unsatisfactory (see Morse & Keohane, 2014). However, a build-up of 
institutions which seek to address the same problem can fragment global governance and cause 
rules to overlap, interconnect and conflict. Because these fragmented global governance 
architectures lack hierarchy (Raustiala & Victor, 2004), regime complexes create opportunities 
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to forum shop (Murphy, 2013) allowing governments to break away from more stringent 
regulation and search for preferred alternatives (Breen et al, 2019, p.2). As a result, it can 
significantly hinder the adoption and implementation of international legislation (Raustiala & 
Victor, 2004, pp.277-296; also see Alter & Meunier, 2009) and thus undermine the 
effectiveness of a regime. On the other hand, the availability of multiple actors can also help 
states overcome cooperation problems where decision making has become stalled (Keohane & 
Victor, 2011; Kelley, 2009). 
Judith Kelley’s (2009) study of the regime complex for international election 
monitoring illustrates well how fragmentation can have both negative and positive 
consequences. With regard to the former, she uses the example of Kenya’s 1992 election where 
president Moi invited only the institutions that were agreeable to him. Because the international 
election monitoring regime lacks hierarchy, this perpetuated the existing corruption 
surrounding Kenya’s elections process and undermined the impact of the international regime 
in this instance. The case of South Africa 1994 provided a very different outcome. Here, the 
presence of multiple organisations improved the regime’s effectiveness because it helped to 
expand coverage and legitimise the result. Kelley notes that increased levels of coordination 
between agencies and the fact that they all agreed on the election’s result contributed to this 
success (Kelley, 2009, pp.59-63).   
Because it is becoming increasingly necessary to analyse the effectiveness of a regime 
with consideration of the above, questions of fragmentation and regime complexity have been 
applied to an ever-expanding selection of issue areas e.g. climate change (Widerberg, 2014; 
2016; Bierman et al, 2009) global health and aid  (Han et al, 2018; Koenig-Archibugi, 2015) 
EU economic surveillance (Breen et al, 2019) cyber security (Nye, Jr, 2014) and migration and 
refugee patterns (Hoffmann & Gonçalves, 2020). As the following section will illustrate in 
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1.3 The International Labour Organization 
“The bitterness of war is not yet allayed… Yet at the same time the economic interests of 
nations are more than ever interdependent…The International Labour Organisation is a 
necessity…whatever resistance opposes it, it will live” (First Director- General of the ILO 
Albert Thomas, 1921, p.19) 
“The ILO has been around forever, but also has done nothing forever, so…is not terribly 
interesting” (Helfer, 2006, p.655) 
The ILO will now be situated within the wider context and theoretical insights 
illustrated above via two questions: why was the ILO designed without an enforcement 
mechanism? If it is so ineffective, why has it survived so long? Recall the bigger themes being 
tackled by the thesis – the question of whether global governance is necessary and effective; 
this section’s purpose is to investigate the ILO’s utility in regard to the former. In doing so, this 
section applies the theories in section 1.2 to determine not whether the ILO makes an impact – 
that is the task of proceeding chapters - but rather, to understand under what conditions it is 
most likely to do so and to reiterate the necessity of the organisation to contemporary conditions 
of globalisation.  
Three key revelations emerge from arguments found in the literature which guide the 
remainder of the research: (1) globalised production puts downward pressures on workers’ 
rights (Held & McGrew, 2007, p.2) and the ILO is a necessary counterpart to these social 
injustices of global capitalism (Munck, 2002). (2) The ILO is most likely to make an impact 
through its abilities to provide capacity assistance and socialise relevant actors into compliance 
– an enforcement mechanism applied to the governance of labour rights is neither possible nor 
desirable. (3) The activities of the ILO are now embedded into a complicated web where 
authority can overlap and conflict (Raustiala, 2000); because of this, it is necessary to assess 
the ILO’s impact within a framework that takes policy fragmentation into account.   
The section begins by briefly illustrating some key design features before providing a 
rational explanation for why the organisation was designed to rely on powers of persuasion 
rather than enforcement (Maupain, 2013, pp.7-8) - here, governments were concerned with 
ceding sovereignty to a supranational entity and so rather than assigning the ILO material 
sanctioning power, the creators chose tripartism in order to boost the organisation’s legitimacy 
while at the same keeping it subordinate to the power of states (Maupain, 2013). Guided by 
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Helfer’s (2006) ILO study which examines whether and how IOs change (Helfer, 2006), the 
section then moves on to examine the organisation’s survival and the extent to which staff have 
been able to evolve the organisation endogenously. In doing so, it illustrates how design 
decisions taken at the organisation’s founding contributed to the ILO’s reputation for inertia 
(Maupain, 2013). The key point made here is that throughout the ILO’s history, staff have 
worked to adapt and evolve the organisation from within; however, their autonomy does not 
exceed that of a principal agent relationship and as a result, this dynamic is omitted from the 
rest of the investigation into whether and how the ILO makes an impact.  
The second half of this section then briefly demonstrates how the ILO’s perceived 
paralysis has fragmented the labour rights regime and why it is therefore important to consider 
assessing its dynamics within the framework of a ‘fragmented policy network’. The section 
concludes by noting the difficulties with current suggestions for reform such as equipping the 
ILO with an enforcement mechanism or including ILS into multilateral trade agreements. As 
such, the research proceeds on the expectation that the ILO’s impact will best be explained by 
its ability to provide capacity support and socialise actors into better compliance.   
Design Overview 
The ILO was designed for two main functions: to create international labour standards 
(ILS) and to oversee their implementation – ILS take the form of ‘conventions’ (legally binding 
treaties) or ‘recommendations’ (non-binding guidelines). The organisation is characterised by 
global membership, inclusive decision-making procedures and a significant delegation of tasks 
to its administrative bodies (ILO, 2018a). Its most unique feature is its tripartite voting structure 
where labour and employers’ groups can vote alongside – and indeed against - states. While 
the ILO’s design gives it independent actor-like qualities, governments retain full control; 
members are under no legal obligation to ratify conventions nor are they subject to the kinds 
of enforcement mechanisms found in other institutions such as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) or European Union (EU). Instead, the ILO relies on tools of persuasion, technical 
assistance (Abbott & Snidal, 2009, pp.536-7) and the assumption that states will implement 
ILS because doing so improves their own welfare (Charnovitz, 2000, pp.171-2).  A brief 
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description of the ILO’s terms and procedures used throughout the thesis can be found in the 
attached footnote.10 
Conventions 
“Are legal instruments drawn up by the ILO’s constituents (governments, employers 
and workers) setting out basic principles and rights at work…which are legally binding 
international treaties that can be ratified by member states” (International Labour Organization, 
2018, p.18). Note* Conventions are referred to using the ILO’s abbreviation – C#. E.g. 
Conventions 87 & 98 are written as C087 and C098.  
Monitoring and Enforcement 
Through Article 22 of the ILO’s Constitution, governments are required to submit 
reports on the application of ratified conventions to the organisation’s monitoring and 
supervisory mechanisms (Thomann, 2011, p.59). As a tripartite organisation, social partners 
(national workers and employers associations) can submit comments on these reports directly 
to the ILO or through their own governments (Koliev & Lebovic, 2018, p.438). 
The ILO has two primary mechanisms to monitor compliance with ratified conventions:  
(1) ‘The Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations’ 
(referred to throughout as the CEACR or the Committee) - an independent body of lawyers 
 
10 Additional Information on ILO Design and Procedures: Bargaining and Negotiation of ILS. ILS are labour 
standards that take the form of ‘conventions’ (legally binding treaties) or ‘recommendations’ (non-binding 
guidelines) that members are expected to implement in their domestic constituencies. However, before they are 
officially adopted, proposals must go through a rigorous scrutinization process involving governments, workers 
and employers’ groups along with participation from three ILO organs: ‘The Governing Body’  - its executive; 
‘The International Labour Office’ IL(Office) - its secretariat; and finally ‘The International Labour Conference’ 
(ILC) - its legislative body. The decision-making process is known as ‘double discussion’ and is illustrated in 
Figure 1 below (Thomann, 2011, pp.53-4).  
Voting Procedures. The ILC’s voting procedures are unique: although it shares some characteristics with other 
international legislative bodies e.g. majority voting; its tripartite system allows for non-state actors (NSAs) to 
vote alongside states (Alcock, 1971, p.28). Four votes are assigned to each member: two for governments and 
one each to an official worker and employers’ group (Koenig-Archibugi, 2002, p.59). Because standards are 
adopted by two-thirds majority, the 2-1-1 vote system compels states and NSAs to compromise (Thomann, 2011, 
p.52) with the aim of legitimising decisions by balancing the interests of stakeholders (Maupain, 2013, p.7).  
ILO Oversight. The ILO’s second task is to oversee implementation in the national setting for which it has been 
equipped with several tools. (1) ‘Monitoring and reporting’: where governments are required to submit regular 
reports detailing the progress with which conventions are being implemented (Elliott & Freeman, 2003, pp.95-
6). (2) A ‘complaints mechanism’: which allows governments, workers and employers groups to report violations 
(Elliott & Freeman, 2003, pp.102-3). (3) Socialisation mechanisms: here, the ILC can mobilise peer pressure 
against non-compliant states by publicly airing their poor performance (Elliott & Freeman, 2003, pp.96-99). (4) 
Technical assistance to aid with capacity issues (ILO, 2018b). 
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tasked with reviewing government submissions (Koliev & Lebovic, 2018, pp.436-8); (2) ‘The 
Conference Committee on the Application of Standards’ (referred to throughout as the CAS) 
“a tripartite political committee made up of governments, workers representatives and 
employers representatives” (Koliev & Lebovic, 2018, p.438).  
The Committee performs an impartial and technical review of the reports submitted 
by governments and social partners. Where it deems a country to be in full compliance, no 
action is taken. In other cases, the Committee will issue either an ‘observation’ or a ‘direct 
request’. Observations are raised when the violation is serious whereas direct requests are 
more technical in nature (Thomann, 2011, p.59). When a violation is detected - whether in law 
or in practice - the Committee includes in its report the ways in which the country has failed to 
comply and the required steps the member should take in order for their laws or implementation 
practices to better align with the convention in question. When violations persist, the 
Committee can apply additional pressure by including a ‘double footnote’; double footnotes 
are requests for the government to reply to the Committee (usually by asking country 
authorities to “report in detail” or “supply full particulars”) earlier than would be required by 
the  usual reporting cycle communicating the seriousness and urgency of the matter at hand  
(Landy, 1980, p.643).  
The CAS then discusses the observations and double footnotes provided by the 
Committee in order to prepare a short-list of member states whose violations are to be publicly 
discussed at the International Labour Conference (referred to throughout as the ILC) - the 
ILC is the ILO’s annual conference held in June bringing together all member governments 
and their national workers and employers associations; in addition to adopting new standards, 
the ILC - led by the CAS - discusses specific cases of non-compliance (Thomann, 2011, p14) 
thus airing  a state’s ‘dirty laundry’ in front of all other members. In this way, the CEACR 
‘names’ the countries that are offenders while the CAS selects those who are to be ‘shamed’ 
(Koliev & Lebovic, 2018). While the preferred approach of the ILO is technical and legal 
assistance, naming and shaming is mobilised when there is a need for more forceful measures. 
States who are selected for ‘shame’ are also included in a special paragraph in the CAS’s 
summary report of that year’s ILC.  
Where states do respond to the Committee, it is acknowledged as a ‘Case of Progress’. 
Cases of Progress are given when states change their legislation or adopt new implementation 
practices to ensure better alignment with a given convention; in such situations, the Committee 
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notes the progress in its report either ‘with satisfaction’ indicating that the case is closed (ILO, 
2019b, p.108) or ‘with interest’ denoting a weaker form of progress and where further action 
is required to correct the violation in question (Thomann, 2011. p.261).   
Additional monitoring and supervisory mechanisms (Complaints Procedures)  
Article 24 - allows workers and employers associations to submit complaints directly 
to the ILO’s Governing Body separately from the comments they make on government 
submissions through Article 22. The Governing Body raises a ‘representation’, discusses the 
problem through an ad hoc committee and decides whether to close the case or refer it to the 
CAS who can escalate the issue through a ‘commission of enquiry’ (Thomann, 2011, p.60). 
(*Note throughout, the word ‘complaint’ is used to describe negative comments made by social 
partners via Article 22; where reference is made to complaints through Article 24, the term 
‘representation’ will be used instead.  
The Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) - a tripartite body to examine 
violations of freedom of association and collective bargaining specifically. The CFA examines 
observations transmitted by governments and the complaints lodged against them by social 
partners (ILO, 2018, p.1).  
Article 26 - a member state may lodge a complaint about another member state who 
has ratified the same convention.  
The Creation of the ILO: Balancing Institutional Legitimacy with State Sovereignty 
The proceeding paragraphs provide an account of the ILO’s creation and design with 
reference to Keohane & Nye’s (1977) theory of interdependence – in doing so, it is guided by 
the following three questions: (1) did states choose to institutionalise cooperation motivated by 
conditions of interdependence? (2) What barriers did they face? (3) Does the ILO’s design 
reflect an effort to overcome those barriers?  
Interdependence. In 1919, governments regarded policy convergence on labour 
standards as absolutely necessary for two fundamental and interacting reasons: first to 
overcome regulatory competition and second, to quell potential social unrest (Alcock, 1971). 
Industrialised governments all had an interest in returning trade to pre-war levels but were 
concerned about the potential ‘race to the bottom’ in labour standards this would cause. Unless 
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similar standards were applied everywhere else (Alcock, 1971, pp.19-20), the UK worried that 
its wartime concessions to labour would no longer be sustainable (Hoffer, 2014, p.3); France 
wondered whether it would be able to compete with Germany – whose reparations programme 
required it to rebuild its industry on a massive scale - while Germany wanted to avoid its 
population being turned into slaves under the weight of its new debt (Thomas, 1921, p.19). 
Avoiding these domestic impacts on labour was of top priority for policy makers in western 
Europe who, at this time, rightly feared a Bolshevik inspired communist revolution - national 
labour movements had already begun to mobilise, become more extreme and organise 
internationally into bodies such as the Second International and IALL (Rodgers et al, 2009, 
p.5). As noted by a senior ILO official, the ILO was created when “David Lloyd George wrote 
a letter to Clemenceau…in the beginning of 1919 saying - listen the whole Europe is in a 
revolutionary situation, what can we do to save capitalism?” (ILO Staff Interviewee S, 2019).  
Governments needed to coordinate their polices in order to capture the gains from trade 
and diffuse any potential rebellion (Helfer, 2006, p.679). The institution would therefore need 
to be designed as an agent under multiple principals (Stone, 2009) - simultaneously acting in 
states’ interests while legitimately addressing the concerns of workers. It was here, in a bid to 
quell the immediate threat of revolution (Rodgers et al, 2009, p.5), that governments co-opted 
labour by granting to them the task of design (Haas, 1964, pp.140-1); they instructed their 
national labour delegates to form an international commission and convene at the Paris Peace 
Conference (PPC) in Versailles (Alcock, 1971). 
Barriers to Cooperation. The commission decided the basic institutional framework 
early on e.g. the need for a legislator – the International Labour Conference (ILC); a secretariat 
- the International Labour Office IL(Office); and an executive – the Governing Body. But, the 
coordination of labour standards presented both distribution and enforcement problems which 
needed to be hashed out. With regard to the former, it was recognised that for ILS to work, 
common policy needed to be applied universally; but, varying levels of capacity meant that it 
would be costlier for some to implement than others; to solve this issue, the commission agreed 
that conventions should be flexible to suit different national settings. However, overcoming the 
enforcement issue would prove more of a challenge: states - some still enemies - lacked trust 
and it was highly anticipated that everyone would cheat in order to gain a competitive 
advantage (Helfer, 2006, p.674). The major obstacle here was striking the right balance 
between the organisation’s legitimacy and the protection of state sovereignty. This resulted in 
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fierce disagreements particularly over whether legislative decisions were to be binding, and if 
the organisation should be equipped with an enforcement mechanism (see Alcock, 1971, pp.20-
32 & Haas, 1964, p.140 for a fuller description of these events).   
To resolve the tension between legitimacy and sovereignty, the commission agreed on 
a compromise that would see workers gain unprecedented access to policy making but, at the 
same time, serve as a focal point for the organisation’s critics for decades to come. Legitimacy 
was achieved by granting labour the right to vote alongside states (Rodgers et al, 2009, pp.5-
6) - this decision was controversial and is not one that governments have ever repeated (Helfer, 
2006, pp.722-3). However, in order to protect sovereignty, the design ensured that all final 
outcomes lie with governments and that neither labour nor staff could ever take decisions 
against their interests (Haas, 1964, pp.142-3). For example, the commission agreed that 
decisions would be taken by majority; but they weighted governments votes double to that of 
labour and employers’ groups. This 2-1-1 system means that on issues where labour and 
employers’ groups disagree, decisions require 82.5% of governments approval to get through 
the ILC (Hoffer, 2014, p.4). In the unlikely event where conventions are passed against the 
wishes of states, they have nothing to fear because decisions taken by the legislator are not 
binding (Alcock, 1971, p.32); governments are only obliged to submit such legislation to 
national parliaments for ‘consideration’ (Thomann, 2011, p.54). Finally, it was decided that 
the organisation would have no legal powers of enforcement; this for some exacerbates the so 
called ‘prisoners’ dilemma’ and reduces the ILO’s impact because governments who misreport 
their compliance records will not face sanctions (Thomann, 2011, p.81). 11  
However, binding legislation, a centralised enforcement mechanism and the possibility 
that states could be outvoted would have resulted in one of two outcomes: (1) legislation would 
be bargained down to the lowest common denominator or (2) it would deter many states from 
joining altogether who would then be free to engage in unfair competition (Maupain, 2013, 
p.15). Governments knew that for the organisation to be effective, it needed universal 
membership - “a rationally designed IO includes all actors that can influence cooperation in a 
particular issue area” (Helfer, 2006, p.673) - a point that the founders made clear in the 
preamble to the constitution “…the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour 
 
11 The founders did equip the ILO with a WTO style enforcement mechanism: under Article 33 of the Constitution, 
states are authorised to take “measures of an economic character” against members who are not in compliance; 
but it was never intended to be used except as a last resort (Elliott & Freeman, 2003, pp.102-6).  
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is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own 
countries” (Helfer, 2006, p.673).  
In sum, institutionalised cooperation was necessary to diffuse potential social unrest 
and to build trust between states so that international trade could resume. The ILO was designed 
to guide this process by adopting treaties that reflected conditions of the time and to encourage 
universal participation (Rodgers et al, 2009).  However, while these design features would 
remain static, external conditions soon shifted and presented challenges to the ILO’s ability to 
pursue its mandate (Helfer, 2006; Maupain, 2013). The next section explores staff’s efforts at 
overcoming these challenges and provides an account of their attempts to reform the ILO 
endogenously. 
Stagnation and the Internal Struggle for ILO Impact 
A key question relevant to the study of ILO impact is if the organisation has been so 
ineffectual, why does it survive? Indeed, its very existence has been called into question on 
several occasions by governments, private actors and scholars alike. Drawing on Helfer’s 
(2006) study of IO change, and guided by the theories of institutional survival and evolution 
outlined earlier, the next part of this section traces staff’s efforts to overcome new challenges 
by attempting to evolve the ILO endogenously. However, as will be shown throughout, the 
organisation’s evolution can be explained by principal agent theory: this is because the ILO 
survives a useful political tool for states regardless of whether it fulfils its original mandates 
(Maupain, 2013). Three areas are covered: (1) the interwar years (2) the Cold War and (3) the 
post-Cold War period.  
The Interwar Years. The first decade following the ILO’s creation is widely considered 
its most successful: tensions within and between nations had eased (Alcock, 1971, p.49); 
worker radicalism had declined (Hoffer, 2014, p.6; Alcock, 1971, p.66; Helfer, 2006, p.722) 
and by the mid-1920s, international trade returned to pre-war levels (Rodgers et al, 2009, p.28). 
For Helfer (2006), the ILO’s success in this period aligns with neofunctionalism: here, staff 
managed to exploit ambiguities in the constitution to expand both their law making and 
monitoring authority to deepen political integration (Helfer, 2006, pp.681-2). A major driving 
force in this period was Albert Thomas; as the ILO’s first Director General, he was motivated 
by the organisation’s ideological principles (Haas, 1964, pp.143-6) and understood the 
limitations that the ILO’s design placed on staff (Maupain, 2013, p.67). Thomas reached over 
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governments to forge relationships directly with national unions and in his first year, he 
managed to pass 16 conventions and 18 recommendations that were designed to increase the 
power of workers over that of employers (Haas, 1964, pp.144-6). Staff worked in parallel with 
Thomas and increased their own autonomy too: for example, using the justification of 
alleviating the prisoners’ dilemma, they encouraged states to ratify new treaties and convinced 
them to create the CEACR – an independent administrative and technical body that that would 
review compliance reports on ratified treaties (Helfer, 2006, pp.684-9).  
However, the extent to which the organisation’s success in this period was due to the 
staff’s ability to influence state behaviour is questionable (Haas, 1964, pp.146-7). While 
Thomas did manage to push through legislation that reflected his own vision, most of these 
treaties were aimed at specific industries and designed to glide easily through the decision 
making and ratification processes (Maupain, 2013, p.23). Furthermore, the ILO’s membership 
at this time was homogenous and consisted of mostly advanced industrial economies; while 
staff may have eased the ratification process, members were eager to ratify conventions to show 
their domestic populations that they were acting on the promises they had made at the 
institution’s founding. Finally, when staff waded into sensitive political areas of immigration 
policy, the quest to expand their authority was abruptly halted (Haas, 1964, pp.146-7).  
The external environment remained favourable to the ILO in its first decade (Rodgers 
et al, 2009, p.28) but, it soon shifted into the depression which exposed the weaknesses in the 
ILO’s design. Ratifications had decreased, and members showed no interest in using the ILC 
to develop a solution to ease the crisis. States had ten years earlier sought cooperation to 
improve both their domestic and international relations under the notion that social justice 
would secure universal peace; now, the ILO could do little but watch as members reverted to 
beggar-thy-neighbour policies and eventually war (Hoffer, 2014, pp.5-6).  
The cold war. In this period, the ILO gained its reputation for inertia; its operating 
environment had been altered and it is here where staff behaviour can be described as 
pathological and bureaucratic (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; Helfer, 2006, pp.692-4). Towards 
the end WW2, the ILO’s future was in question: The League of Nations - with which the ILO 
had been associated - was being replaced by the United Nations and was gearing up to perform 
both its’ and the League’s functions in more efficient and integrated ways (Maupain, 2013, 
pp.2-3). In an effort to retain policy ground, the organisation relaunched itself with The 
Declaration of Philadelphia; here staff aimed to interpret the ILO’s mission more broadly by 
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including issues of human rights and economic policy into their mandate (Haas, 1964, pp.155-
6).  As Haas (1964) notes, the Declaration of Philadelphia was essentially a bid at post-war 
leadership (Haas, 1964, pp.155-6) and an effort to position itself as a coordinating and 
counterpart agency to the new Bretton Woods institutions (Maupain, 2013, pp.69-70).  
Governments in the ILC voted through the Declaration of Philadelphia unanimously 
(ILO, 1998) but, they had no intention of assigning the ILO a central role - economic and 
financial matters were too politically important to be subject to a legislator with tripartite 
decision making. Instead, they entrusted this responsibility to the newly created ‘Economic and 
Social Council’ (ECOSOC) (Maupain, 2013, p.70) where decision making was subordinated 
to the UN general assembly (Curtis & Taylor, 2011, p.316). The reason governments voted 
overwhelmingly to pass the Declaration of Philadelphia was for much of the same reason they 
created the ILO in the first place: as a gesture to those returning from war (Maupain, 2013, 
p.70). They needed to ensure that workers and employers had a voice in the post-war order to 
aid the reconstruction effort, restore trade and diminish the risks of social unrest in those 
countries that had been structurally devastated (Maupain, 2013, p.3-23). 
Further to the above, external dynamics soon shifted in ways that strained the ILO’s 
original design features and called into question its ability to make an impact. The first of these 
was new membership:  decolonisation brought a host of new members with varying domestic 
problems and political systems (Helfer, 2006, pp.694-6); that the ILC was no longer dominated 
by industrialised democracies undermined the ILO’s tripartite system  (Maupain, 2013, p.3) as 
many of the new workers’ and employers’ groups were answerable only to their government 
(Standing, 2008, p.360). Here, staff fell back on standard operating procedures and began to 
churn out a plethora of conventions designed to alleviate problems of national difference such 
as poverty, forced labour and freedom of association (Rodgers et al, 2009, p.184). However, 
these efforts proved inefficient and dysfunctional - treaties began to overlap and conflict and 
because technical issues such as shipping certifications, were subject to the same level of 
monitoring as conventions concerned with human rights e.g., freedom of association, it 
encouraged governments to selectively ratify conventions that were easy to implement and 
ignore those that required more costly adjustments (Helfer, 2006, pp.696-8). Moreover, as the 
cold war set in, the organisation’s two superpowers used it to advance their own vision of social 
justice, dividing the legislator’s heterogenous membership into two opposing blocs where 
interdependence and workers’ rights would take a back seat (Maupain, 2013, pp.23-5). In 
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addition to all of this, the ILO found its work was being undermined further by organisations 
such as the World Bank and IMF (Maupain, 2013) – IOs whose activities often resulted in 
negative social consequences (Stiglitz, 2002). Any effort by staff to counter this proved 
ineffective because of the difference in institutional strength between the two regimes (Rodgers 
et al, 2009, p.180).  
Post-Cold War. While the end of the cold war was a victory for the ILO’s corporatist 
model over that of Soviet communism; it simultaneously threw its ability to navigate the new 
political and economic climate into question. Triumphant governments soon began to view 
market-based economies and liberalisation as paths to development which led to heavy 
deregulation, a decline in union power and an expansion of global trade to unprecedented levels 
(Maupain, 2013, pp.28-31). At first, the ILO’s role appeared obsolete because tripartism and 
labour standards were seen as impediments to economic progress (Helfer, 2006, pp.705-6). As 
noted by a senior ILO official:  
“It was a big problem, after 1990, the employers became more adverse to the ILO, arguing we don’t 
need the ILO anymore…they referred to Fukuyama…now we have a new world…the East-West 
conflict was a driving force…needed on both sides [to maintain] a minimum loyalty to workers, this 
disappeared after the cold war” (ILO Staff Interviewee S, 2019).  
However, it soon became clear that the promises of unfettered global capitalism had 
resulted in huge inequalities both within and between countries (Maupain, 2013, pp.28-31) 
raising concerns of a new race to the bottom (Helfer, 2006, pp.705-6). Aware of the ILO’s 
paralysis in recent decades, governments in advanced industrial economies proposed that 
labour standards be governed by the WTO which had the institutional strength to ensure 
compliance. However, this was rejected in 1994, and again in 1998 by developing countries 
who feared that ILS would be used as protectionism by the north and who insisted instead that 
it be the sole domain of the ILO (Charnovitz, 2000, p.158; Brown, 2000, p.40).   
Because it was facing another serious challenge to its existence, the ILO got to work 
on a series of reforms. Having absorbed the lessons from the previous 25 years; staff worked 
to discard redundant and overlapping treaties and in 1998, broke through with a major 
innovation - the ‘Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work’ (Henceforth the 
Declaration) - which identified four standards as core: freedom of association and collective 
bargaining (henceforth FACB); the elimination of forced labour; abolition of child labour and 
non-discrimination of employment. Most significantly, the Declaration applies to all members 
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whether they have ratified the conventions or not and includes a ‘follow-up’ mechanism that 
reviews member performance (Helfer, 2006, pp.708-22). Here, ILO staff member Kari Tapiola 
noted that the Declaration, would finally give the ILO its “teeth” (Tapiola, 2018).  
As with the Declaration of Philadelphia in 1944, the 1998 Declaration was championed 
by many governments and employers (Baccaro & Mele, 2012, p.25); delegates to the ILC 
conference that adopted the Declaration expected it to herald the ILO into the new era of 
globalisation (ILO, 1998). However, critics (Alston, 2004) argue that it was a move by staff 
merely to stave off criticism - window dressing that enhances the perception of ILO impact, 
but which avoids intrusion into sensitive political areas of domestic politics where the 
organisation would face certain backlash. This is because the Declaration removed the burden 
of having to comply with precise definitions in the ILO conventions and instead indicates 
principles and goals; here, progress is measured against a baseline the country sets for itself. 
This ambiguity allows countries to define and choose how they implement the Declaration’s 
core standards (Baccaro & Mele, 2012, p.204) and as a result, compliance could be very high, 
but the ILO’s impact low.  
The Fragmentation of the Labour Rights Regime 
The dynamics highlighted above have earned the ILO a reputation of being in a 
perpetual state of paralysis; as a result, the regime has become fragmented and complex as a 
plethora of public and private actors have emerged seeking to fill this governance gap. At first, 
this revolved around multinational companies (MNCs) engaging in voluntary ‘corporate self-
regulation’ (CSR); but persistent scandals linked to well-known firms severely damaged the 
credibility of these efforts (see Utting, 2002; Bartley, 2007 and Koenig-Archibugi, 2004). More 
recently, there has been a move towards ‘multi-stakeholder initiatives’ (MSHIs) which bring 
together - in various combinations - firms, NGOs, unions and states. MSHIs grew out of the 
frustration with the lack of progress in the intergovernmental arena (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004, 
p.254) and to address the failings of CSR: for example, they increase participation in decision 
making by including all affected parties; they aim to coordinate standards and finally, they 
stress the importance of independent - rather than internal - monitoring (Utting, 2002).  
The activities of the ILO are now embedded into this dense and incoherent web of 
policy making where authority often overlaps and conflicts; because of this, it is increasingly 
necessary to assess the ILO’s impact within a framework that takes this fragmentation into 
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account; as noted earlier, the availability of multiple actors can function to improve or impede 
the ILO’s work. For example, on the one hand, Utting (2002) notes that MSHIs are hailed as 
the best alternative in helping to overcome the obstacles of both state led and CSR governance 
(Utting, 2002, p.4); the 1998 Declaration even encourages member involvement with these 
actors because they have the potential to expand coverage with regard to monitoring and 
provide capacity assistance with implementation (Baccaro & Mele, 2012, pp.200-6).  However, 
while MSHIs may extend the ILO’s reach and bolster its implementation efforts; there are 
institutional concerns which must be taken into account; in relation to NGOs, an ILO official 
noted:  
“NGOs sometimes may be informative; we have a mixed relationship with NGOs. To some extent we 
can work with them but we have to be careful, the employers and workers groups may have issues 
engaging with NGOS, some are viewed as stirring the pot, but they may have a lot of local knowledge 
that we don’t have, there are countries where we don’t have a physical presence, so it’s important to 
engage with the NGOs to get a sense of what’s going on. But our ability to do that has to be very 
cautious because of institutional concerns, if you talk to the WTO, the WHO they all have that kind of 
issue. NGO’s may attempt to appropriate the institution, and they’re not representing the institution 
they’re representing themselves…” (ILO Staff Interviewee G, 2018).  
Moreover, Alston (2004) argues that decentralised governance in this sense encourages 
collaboration with actors that marginalise both the ILO and its standards (Alston, 2004, p.509). 
Indeed, there is a substantial literature on MSHIs which highlights how they disproportionately 
represent corporate over societal interests and as a result are also unwilling to properly monitor 
and uphold FACB rights (See Bartley, 2007; Utting, 2002; Fransen, 2011; Locke, 2014; 
Berliner & Prakash, 2015). As noted by an ILO staff member: 
“The problem is that there is a proliferation of them [MSHIs] and they come up with their own 
interpretations of ILO standards that are not official ILO positions. Some of the initiatives want the 
ILO’s input because they want to do things properly; others will just give their advice, and then we’ll 
hear oh we were told by the social responsibility group that we hired that this is what the ILO says… 
and we say, no this is not our advice…So that has impact in terms of how these mechanisms sometimes 
will play out at the national level” (ILO Staff Interviewee G, 2018).  
Moreover, the work of the ILO is often in direct competition with those institutions 
responsible for governing the global economy e.g. the IMF, World Bank, WTO and advisory 
organisations such as the OECD; the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ reports for example 
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reward countries based on greater levels of labour deregulation. When visiting ILO 
headquarters in Geneva, the issue was raised by multiple staff members:  
“There’s always a big discussion about the Doing Business report here…they say, the lower the labour 
standards the better the business climate” (ILO Staff Interviewee V, 2018).    
“At the moment there is a very strong free market push in many countries, we have other IOs giving 
advice that’s very different from the ILO’s position. The World Bank, the IMF, sometimes we have 
some agreements on some issues, but they have a different point of view. Doing Business is an inverse 
relationship - the less regulation you have, the better you’re rated. The World Bank’s policy position is 
that regulation is problematic…” (ILO Staff Interviewee G, 2018).  
The Enduring Necessity of the ILO 
The dynamics above depict an organisation out of step with contemporary conditions 
and one who must now operate in an increasingly crowded institutional environment. 
Moreover, because labour abuses remain prevalent, scholars and policy makers have begun to 
criticise the regime’s reliance on “volunteerism” (Berliner & Prakash, 2015; Vogel, 2010) and 
suggest that the governance of labour rights be shifted into institutions that are equipped with 
enforcement mechanisms.12 For example, Hoffer (2014) calls for states to voluntarily bind 
themselves to labelling requirements protected by international law; Vogel (2010) argues that 
labour standards should be enforced via WTO trade agreements; and finally, Murphy (2014) 
calls on the IMF and World Bank to work more closely with the ILO so that the latter can elicit 
compliance through loan conditionality.  
However, enforcing ILS in the ways described above may be counterproductive: many 
developing countries oppose using trade sanctions as a corrective for labour violations citing 
(1) their potential use for protectionism and (2) the negative effect such measures have on 
whole economies when, it is often the case, violations are occurring only in a handful of firms 
(IBRD, 2002, p.163).13 Linking social standards through the WTO will not work because unlike 
retaliatory trade tariffs - where states benefit - it is not in a state’s self-interest to apply them 
for non-compliance with labour standards. The ILO evoked Article 33 in 2000 against 
 
12 See the ILO’s CEACR and CFA reports which show labour rights abuses remain widespread (Anner & 
Carraway, 2010, p.162). Also see Marx et al (2015) who reveal a thirty-year downward trend in compliance with 
FA-CB 
13 The fear of protectionism is real, according to a senior staff member, even the ILO with its ‘soft powers’ is 
accused of picking on some countries more than others with the effect of furthering the interests of industrialised 
economies at the expense of developing ones (ILO Staff Interviewee V, 2018). 
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Myanmar and most governments ignored this request (Elliott & Freeman, 2003, pp.102-6). 
Furthermore, recent events - see US, China and EU trade disagreements (Donnan, 2018) – are 
a reminder that there is little the WTO, or any IO can do when states exert their sovereignty.  
The European Union (EU) can also be controversial in this sense. On the one hand, the 
EU serves to facilitate ILO impact: a requirement of accession is the ratification of core ILO 
conventions, once such conventions are enshrined into domestic law, violations can be brought 
to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) which has powers of enforcement not available to the 
ILO. The EU has further supported the ILO’s work outside of Europe where it grants or 
withdraws special trade privileges depending on whether core ILO conventions have been 
ratified (see Burgess, 2010, p.208). However, as will be discussed throughout the following 
chapter (and illustrated in chapter VI section 6.1), distinctions need to be made between de jure 
and de facto compliance and the extent to which the EU effectively enforces the latter. 
Moreover, within Europe, the ECJ has often been found to rule in favour of business over that 
of organised labour (CMKOS Interviewees H & J, 2020).  Commenting on this issue, a senior 
ILO official noted:  
“There are two approaches, some who want to change everything before ratification and other countries 
who will make their laws compliant to the convention afterwards, in the latter case that is not always 
done straight away, sometimes it takes ten years before a convention is discussed at parliament and then 
it may take another long time before it is transposed into national law. In between, they have to report 
to the ILO, a lot of countries may have not fully implemented the convention by this time” (ILO Staff 
Interviewee V, 2018).  
Finally, while the IMF and World Bank have increased cooperation with the ILO in 
recent years (Murphy, 2014, pp.400-6) they cannot be relied upon to uphold the ILO’s 
standards because their modus operandi is guided by neoliberalism  (Güven, 2012; Murphy, 
2014) – as will be illustrated in later chapters, these organisations often push for reforms that 
undermine the ILO’s work (also see Anner & Caraway, 2010, pp.162-5). 14  
Overall, the ILO was born of necessity to alleviate conditions of interdependence and 
almost a century later, it stands as the preeminent organisation with which to tackle some of 
the social issues associated with contemporary globalisation. That its design features have 
 
14 See the following which outline the ways in which competing IOs undermine the ILO’s work (Blanton & 
Blanton, 2016; Blanton et al, 2015; Anner & Caraway, 2010; Sengenberger, 2005; Maupain, 2013; Hagen, 2003, 
p.11-14; Caraway et al, 2012) 
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remained static despite shifts to its external environment (Maupain, 2013) has created 
challenges to the organisation’s legitimacy and threatened its credibility. While staff have 
worked to provide innovative solutions, their efforts have in some cases added to the 
organisation’s dysfunction while in others they’ve been side-lined by states unwilling to assign 
the ILO too much authority – dynamics surrounding the Declaration of Philadelphia 
highlighted this well. That member states retain tight control over the organisation impedes 
staff’s ability to fulfil the social mandate that members set for them at its founding. As a result, 
the ILO is subject to much criticism and it is now accompanied by an extensive network of 
private regulatory schemes along with calls for labour standards to be governed using more 
coercive means. However, private regulation remains controversial and it is doubtful whether 
workers’ rights can be improved via enforcement mechanisms such as those familiar to some 
of the international financial institutions (IFIs). The ILO must make an impact using its original 
design features – technical assistance (the managerial version of rationalism) and persuasion 
(constructivism) – and it must do so in an increasingly crowded and competitive environment. 
Conclusions 
Global governance is necessary, but whether it can be effective depends on the ability 
of existing IOs to navigate through intergovernmental cooperation problems, shifting external 
circumstances and an increasingly fragmented and complex governing architecture. Identifying 
when and how IOs make an impact should be the priority of policymakers and researchers 
concerned with alleviating the strains of economic integration on domestic constituencies and 
in addressing a wide spectrum of global problems. IOs are created to alleviate the negative 
consequences of interdependence but whether and how they can change state behaviour is the 
subject of much theoretical and empirical debate. That cooperation problems continue to 
impede progress on effective international policy making will likely exacerbate issues 
associated with globalisation and contribute to the complexity and fragmented nature of the 
governing architecture.  
This chapter has provided both the backdrop and theoretical background which 
underpins the purpose of this research - to demonstrate that the ILO is a necessary counterpart 
to the social injustices of global capitalism (Munck, 2002). In covering its creation, survival 
and evolution, it has illustrated that the ILO provides researchers with the perfect laboratory 
with which to address the wider issues of globalisation and its governance in general; moreover, 
it has enabled us to isolate the relevant theories and frameworks with which to guide this 
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research’s investigation into whether and how it makes an impact – the managerial version of 
rationalism and constructivism. Chapter II reviews and critically engages recent empirical work 
that attempts to measure its impact. After revealing several flaws with existing efforts, it moves 
on to propose an alternative analytical framework that will better capture whether and how the 
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Chapter II 
Explaining ILO Impact: Fragmentation and Network Analysis 
“There is a lot of criticism about the ILO, about the weakness of the ILO and that [it] doesn’t 
have an influence… the problem of teeth; I’m so tired of this dental work issue” (ILO Staff 
Interviewee Kari Tapiola, 2018 – former Deputy-Director General)  
Does the ILO improve labour standards in countries who have ratified its conventions? 
Available literature would suggest not (Saleem & Rozental, 2012, p.63). Such conclusions feed 
into the organisation’s reputation for being “toothless” (Tapiola, 2018) and shifts the 
conversation regarding improving the ILO’s impact towards impractical solutions such as 
enforcement. In an era of dense globalised production chains, increasingly precarious forms of 
work through the rise of the ‘gig economy’, and more recent challenges to workplace standards 
brought on by Covid-19, a global organisation which upholds standards of best practice has 
never been more necessary. And yet, thorough assessments investigating the organisation’s 
impact remain few; as noted by several scholars (Weisband, 2000; Salem & Rozental, 2012), 
the key challenges researchers face are methodological in nature - disagreements over what 
constitutes the most appropriate dependent and independent variables and a “scarcity of reliable 
data” (Salem & Rozental, 2012, p.77). That little is known about whether, how, and the extent 
to which the ILO impacts states has led scholars to explain variation in compliance behaviour 
as being caused entirely by differences in domestic factors (Stallings, 2010; Cook, 2010; 
Burgess, 2010; Caraway, 2010; Cammett & Posusney, 2010; Neumayer & De Soysa, 2005; 
Mosley, 2011). 
This chapter develops the framework which will refine this domestic politics argument 
and bring IOs back into the picture. Section 2.1 begins this process by identifying several flaws 
in the literature particularly with its use of large-N regression techniques and ‘ILO ratification’ 
and ‘state compliance’ as independent and dependent variables. Through an application of the 
method-of-differences (George & Bennett, 2004, p.51), the section concludes by identifying 
several cases where variation on the literature’s outcome variable (compliance) remains, 
despite these cases exhibiting similarities across all of the literature’s key explanatory 
variables. From these examples, Czechia and Slovakia are selected for further investigation as 
a comparative case study.  
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Section 2.2 then proposes SNA as the most useful method to map and measure 
fragmentation at the international level. As has already been stated, a primary objective of this 
thesis is to assess the ILO’s influence by examining the extent to which competing 
configurations of actors facilitate or impede its work i.e. the issue of policy fragmentation is 
assessed. Because such configurations may vary from state to state, the concept ‘regime sub-
constellation’ is developed in order to capture the dynamics of these country specific networks. 
Here, SNA is used to empirically illustrate the extent of the ILO’s influence within these 
networks and does so based on a working hypothesis that the organisation’s ‘centrality 
measurement’ (a metric produced by SNA) is associated with its impact. While the utility of 
this methodological approach will be assessed in later chapters, initial expectations generated 
by the SNA outputs in this chapter suggest that the ILO should be more influential in Slovakia 
than Czechia whereas the reverse is true for the organisation’s challengers – the IFIs and the 
OECD.15 
Finally, section 2.3 proposes that the concept of ‘impact’ – rather than compliance – 
(see chapter I) functions as the dependent variable and then proceeds to outline the ways in 
which it will be identified i.e. by determining what actions the ILO took and whether such 
actions changed state behaviour ex post. It then moves on to discuss how within and cross-case 
analysis (George & Bennett, 2014) will guide the investigation and the advantages that such 
approaches have over statistical research. 
The following sections – and the remainder of this research – will focus only on the 
ILO’s impact via its supervisory mechanism i.e. its ability to detect and correct compliance 
problems. Outside of this realm, staff are engaged in a plethora of activities aimed at promoting 
social justice across a spectrum of issues all of which provide fruitful areas for impact 
assessment.16  
 
15 The SNA graphs (as well as their associated data and appendices) were created for an unpublished MSc thesis 
submitted in 2017. While the concepts developed in this chapter (e.g. ILO centrality and regime sub-constellation) 
- as well as the material throughout sections 2.1 and 2.2 more broadly - draw heavily from the 2017 thesis, they 
have been significantly reworked in order to develop the most appropriate framework applicable to the research 
presented here (see Hayes, 2017).  
 
16 Three examples stand out: (1) ‘the End Poverty’; ‘Green’ or ‘Women at Work’ initiatives (ILO, 2019a);  (2) the 
ongoing efforts of the research department which ensures attention is paid to changing trends such as governing 
the ‘gig economy’ and dealing with ‘global supply chains’ (ILO Interviewee G, 2018)  (3) the ways in which staff 
- via their direct links with country delegates – are able to encourage structural domestic reforms e.g. in convincing 
Oman to allow trade unions and Saudi Arabia to set up an official workers’ committee  (ILO interviewee Kari 
Tapiola, 2018). These examples represent only a fraction of the many ways in which the ILO could be making an 
impact. 
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2.1 The Impact of the ILO: A Review 
This section evaluates several studies which measure compliance with two ILO 
conventions: C087 on ‘Freedom of Association’ and C098 ‘The Right to Organise and 
Collectively Bargain’. Freedom of association and collective bargaining rights (FACB rights) 
enable workers to determine outcomes such as wages, hours and pensions (Neumayer & De 
Soysa, 2005, p.32); they are the focus of this research and are especially relevant here for two 
reasons. Firstly, because they strengthen internal democratic processes and are therefore 
politically sensitive (Rodgers et al, 2009, p.50) and secondly, because unlike conventions such 
as those on child or forced labour, FACB rights are often ignored to a greater extent. For 
example, by governments concerned with economic competitiveness (Marx et al, 2015); by the 
ILO’s challengers (e.g. the IMF, World Bank and OECD) who push for deregulation, and by 
many private governing schemes and multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSHIs) (Baccaro & Mele, 
2012; Utting, 2002; Berliner & Prakash, 2015; Locke, 2014). As noted by an ILO staff member 
“these private initiatives are very selective, most don’t cover FACB, they say they do but they 
don’t monitor it” (ILO Staff Interviewee F, 2018). A focus on FACB rights therefore helps to 
bring out some of the dynamics highlighted earlier to do with cooperation problems between 
member states and the conflicting policy goals that exist across international agencies which 
contributes to policy fragmentation. 
Section 2.1 begins by reviewing several studies which rely on the use of large-N 
statistical methods and test for the effects of ILO convention ratification on domestic 
compliance. After identifying flaws both in methodology and in choice of data, medium-N 
regional case study work offered by Stallings et al (2010) is reviewed. Through an application 
of the method of differences (George & Bennett, 2004, p.24), the section concludes by 
identifying discrepancies with the authors’ findings i.e. several of the cases continue to exhibit 
variation on the outcome (compliance) despite scoring similarly across all explanatory 
variables. This ‘compliance puzzle’ is a consequence of Stallings et al (2010) quantifying the 
inter-state differences between driving factors such as unions and government type. In doing 
so, the authors miss some key dynamics contributing to variation which this thesis later 
identifies in chapter III. 
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Missing the Target: The Ambiguous Role of Compliance  
Trade-openness pressures governments into a ‘race to the bottom’ (Mosley, 2007; 
2011) but whether and to what extent to which the ILO can mitigate these effects is unclear.17 
On the one hand, several scholars have highlighted the importance that ratification of ILO 
conventions has in creating legal obligations for states (Baccini & Koenig-Archibugi, 2014); 
they note that such obligations contribute to increases both in compliance (Toffel et al, 2015) 
and in state welfare (Kim, 2010; Strang & Chang, 1993). However, several studies have shown 
a downward trend with compliance over recent decades (Marx et al, 2015) with some scholars 
suggesting that ratification of ILO C087 and C098 appears to exacerbate this problem (Peksen 
& Blanton, 2017). That ratification is negatively associated with compliance is puzzling; the 
authors explain this finding by noting that states often use ILO membership to boost their 
international reputation without any intention of allocating the necessary resources to 
implementation. This finding was echoed by an ILO staff member who, after noting some of 
the challenges the organisation faces surrounding issues of compliance commented: “…[but] a 
lot of developing countries really want to be part of these institutions, it is part of their 
international prestige; they don’t want to be left out…” (ILO Staff Interviewee G, 2018). 
Finally, other scholars show no effect for ILO ratification at all; instead, they attribute 
compliance variation solely to domestic factors e.g. democracy levels, regime type, union 
density (Neumayer & De Soysa, 2005; Mosley, 2011).  
While this creates a bleak picture of the ILO’s ability to make an impact, there are 
several problems with the preceding conclusions. Firstly, while some studies differentiate 
between violations in law and those in practice (see Blanton et al, 2015, p.328), the studies 
above (Mosley & Uno, 2007; Marx et al, 2015; Neumayer & De Soysa, 2005) combine both 
the de jure and de facto indicators into one dependent variable and because of this, it is unclear 
whether the coded violations represent legislative issues (e.g. deregulation of labour law) or 
 
17 There are diverging opinions about whether economic globalisation negatively or positively impacts states sates 
(see Bhagwati, 2004; Mosley, 2011; Blanton & Blanton, 2016; Neumayer & De Soysa, 2005;). However, Mosley 
& Uno (2007) along with Mosley (2011) evolve these arguments by making an important distinction between FDI 
and trade-openness (i.e. trade that is sub-contracted to the informal economy). FDI often brings with it a concern 
for the protection of assets and therefore multinationals will seek to ensure that there is a strong rule of law and 
quality of labour force. However, a major consideration when it comes to subcontracting within the global supply 
chain is cost; here, the mobility of capital forces regulation down as governments and local factories compete for 
contracts (Mosley & Uno, 2007, pp.923-39). These findings on ‘trade openness’ have been challenged by but, 
Mosley (2008; 2011) successfully refutes these scholars by highlighting the limitations of their research design 
and by providing further evidence via a qualitative case study of Costa Rica (see Mosley, 2008, p.689 & Mosley, 
2011, p.113). 
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poor compliance (see Berliner et al 2015 who raise this point). Second, the FACB measures 
used completely omit ‘outcome rights’; as a result, the indicators do not include laws governing 
agreements on issues such as ‘hours of work’ or ‘wages’ nor whether those agreements are 
monitored and enforced in practice (Berliner et al, 2015, pp.196-7; also see Neumayer & De 
Soysa, 2005, p.32). That the data suffers from such ambiguity means that policy prescriptions 
or future research building on it runs the risk of doing so based on unclear causal connections. 
For example, good compliance scores could be masking widespread violations of specific 
outcome rights; at the same time, poor compliance scores would give no indication of the type 
of abuses that are occurring. See figures 2.1 and 2.2 provided by Berliner et al (2015) which 
illustrates the causal directions that labour law follows.  
Figure 2.1 Labour Legislation and Outcome Rights 
 
Figure 2.2 Labour Legislation and Outcome Rights (Causal Direction)  
  Source: (Berliner et al, 2015, pp.195-6) 
Another problem lies with the sole use of ratification as the independent variable with 
which to test the effects of the ILO. This indicator is a weak representation of the organisation’s 
influence; as noted by scholars such as Weisband (2000) and Landy (1966), much of the ILO’s 
work occurs after a violation has been uncovered e.g. in cases of non-compliance, the 
supervisory system (CEACR) will make ‘observations’, ‘recommendations’ or increase its 
monitoring and technical support. Once the country in question corrects its behaviour and 
implements the ILO’s suggestions, it is noted in the CEACR’s reports as a ‘case of progress’ 
(see chapter I section 1.3). Because of this, the ILO’s influence ex post is left uncounted for 
i.e. where impact is made despite full compliance not having been achieved. Moreover, because 
states often engage in ‘shallow commitments’ (Downs et al, 1996) i.e. choosing to ratify 
conventions that already align with domestic practice, the positive associations between 
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ratification and compliance found by Toffel et al, (2015); Kim, (2010) and Strang & Chang, 
(1993) are potentially spurious (Salem & Rozental, 2012, p.71).   
Finally, while the use of large-N regression techniques is helpful in uncovering broad 
trends, they limit the causal connections we can make because this methodological approach 
can sometimes miss important qualitative differences between the same variables across 
different countries (Mosely, 2008, p.679). Moreover, while some scholars have examined the 
issue of countervailing influences such as those that emanate from the IFIs or OECD (e.g. see 
Blanton et al, 2015; Sengenberger, 2005; Hagen, 2003), extant work seeking to understand 
whether and how the ILO makes an impact often excludes this dynamic.  
A Compliance Puzzle 
Several scholars (Stallings, 2010; Cook, 2010; Burgess, 2010; Caraway, 2010; 
Cammett & Posusney, 2010) have attempted to overcome some of the limitations noted above 
and have done so via a cross-national comparative study over four regions. First, they split de 
jure and de facto rights into separate indicators and therefore capture a more accurate picture 
of laws and compliance. Second, they cover outcome rights by including de jure and de facto 
measures of flexibility i.e. the ease with which employers can hire/fire or adjust wages and 
hours – figures 2.3 and 2.4 illustrate this by depicting labour standards for countries in Central 
Eastern Europe and Latin America as presented by these authors.18 Finally, the authors are 
specifically interested in the extent to which conflicting international norms (e.g. between the 










18 Figures 2.3 and 2.4 exhibit the de jure and de facto as well as the de jure flexibility and de fact flexibility indices 
from Linda J. Cook’s study of Eastern Europe (Cook, 2010) and Katrina Burgess’ study of Latin America 
(Burgess, 2010). Note* Higher de jure and de facto combined with lower de jure flexibility and de fact flexibility 
scores denote better labour standards. 
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In spite of the three methodological improvements noted above, the authors conclude 
that external influences are insignificant. The remainder of this section critically analyses this 
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are selected for comparison in later chapters, it is useful to examine both regions here in order 
to illustrate that the inconsistencies found are not isolated to a particular case.  
In Central Eastern Europe, Cook (2010) argues that while the ILO may have played a 
normative role – defining ILS and focusing attention on certain issues – it was the EU’s 
accession criteria that made the most impact. Part of the requirement of joining the EU is that 
a country must ratify and implement the ILO’s core conventions; this level of enforcement was 
sufficient enough to coerce potential member states into making the necessary changes and 
according to Cook (2010), explains some of the variation depicted in figure 2.3. However, 
Cook maintains that the majority of variance between states in this region is best explained by 
domestic politics – even the influence of more powerful IOs such as the World Bank and IMF 
were heavily mediated by factors such as democracy levels and unions density (Caraway et al, 
2012, pp.27-30).19  
Burgess’ (2010) study of Latin America reveals similar results: here, variation is 
explained by a country’s historical regime type which she argues reverberates and effects 
policy today. Burgess distinguishes between four categories (see Table 2.1): (1) labour 
populism; (2) pluralist welfare; (3) paternalist dictatorship and (4) conservative oligarchy 
(Stallings, 2010, p.139). These groupings run on a continuum where labour populism sees the 
best compliance rates and conservative oligarchy the worst (Burgess, 2010, pp.201-2). 
Table 2.1 Historical Regime Types 
Labour Populist         Best 
Compliance 
High union density but their ability to affect 
domestic policy is weak due to significant 
competition between them.  
Pluralist Welfare   Higher rule of law but fewer violations 
reported because of the weakness of unions 
Paternalist Dictatorship  High levels of individual worker protection 
but history of repressing organised labour  
Conservative Oligarchy Worst 
Compliance 
Economic elite dominance and policies that 
strongly favour employers  
 Source: (Burgess, 2010, pp.201-2) 
  
 
19 For more on the ways in which the EU influences legislation but falls short when it comes to ensuring 
compliance and implementation see ‘Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? The EU-15 Compared to the New 
Member States - Falkner & Treib (2008)  
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Burgess argues that the ILO has managed to encourage countries in Latin America to 
bring domestic law in line with its core conventions; however, the organisation has really only 
raised the profile on labour standards because implementation remains weak. Where countries 
have made significant changes, it is because the ILO is backed by more powerful actors; for 
example, the EU threatened to withdraw preferential trading agreements in Chile and El 
Salvador unless they improved implementation of ILO reforms (Burgess, 2010).  
While domestic factors likely play the most significant role in determining what 
international policies are adopted and the extent to which they are implemented and complied 
with, they do not always fully explain variation between states. Take for example the diverging 
compliance rates with the large body of EU regulation between the EU’s original members – 
those considered to be high capacity states such as France, Germany, UK – and the more recent 
admissions from Central Eastern Europe (the EU8). Scholars have been puzzled by the EU8’s 
higher compliance rates despite their capacity levels being much lower than that of the EU’s 
original members. Sedelmeier (2008) helps resolve this puzzle by shedding light on the role 
IOs played in this outcome and in doing so, explains the EU8’s good compliance with the 
‘managerial’ version of rationalism in combination with constructivism. For example, the EU 
helped to build up capacity in these states through technical assistance programmes prior to 
their accession in 2004 while their ‘newness’ to the situation helped facilitate socialisation via 
frequent monitoring and assessment procedures (Sedelmeier, 2008, pp.806-23).  
A closer investigation into the results provided by Cook (2010) and Burgess (2010) 
produces a similar puzzle. For example, In Cook’s study of Eastern Europe, variation is 
accounted for by EU accession date, democracy levels and trade union density. However, as 
table 2.2 illustrates, Slovakia outperforms Czechia by approximately 12 points on de jure and 
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EU Accession Date 
 
2004 2004 












De facto 83.9 71.4 
Sources: *de jure and de facto scores and EU Accession date (Cook, 2010, p.175). *Trade Union 
Density for the year 2006 (ILO STAT, 2017a). *Democracy levels for the year 2006 Slovakia (Polity 
IV, 2013a); Czechia (Polity, IV, 2013b) (also see Hayes, 2017)  
Latin America. In Burgess’ study of Latin America, both Peru and Bolivia are labour 
populist; but as shown in table 2.3, they exhibit significant gaps both in standards and in 
flexibility. 
Table 2.3 Compliance Rates: Peru and Bolivia 
 Peru – Labour Populist Bolivia – Labour Populist 
De-jure 88.6 68.6 
De-facto 62.5 54.4 
De-jure(F) 37 25.2 
De-facto(F) 54.3 50.7 
Source: (Burgess, 2010) 
Burgess argues that Bolivia’s lower standards are accounted for by the fact that its 
historically dominant labour populist regime was punctuated by paternalist dictatorships in the 
1960s/70s; however, this does not explain the implications of the flexibility scores. Following 
Burgess’ argument, countries with higher de facto flexibility should see lower de facto scores 
i.e. more violations in practice. This is because higher de facto flexibility is correlated with a 
weaker rule of law, lower enforcement capabilities and a bigger informal economy that is 
harder to police (Burgess, 2010, pp.220-2).   
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However, as Table 2.4 shows, Bolivia has a much weaker rule of law; fewer 
enforcement capabilities and a higher informal sector than Peru, and yet, a significantly lower 
number of violations in practice.20 
Table 2.4 Method of Difference: Peru and Bolivia 
  Peru   Bolivia 
Government Effectiveness 
(range -2.5 to 2.5) (2012) 
-.14  -.37 
Enforcement (2012) 20  14 
Informal Economy (2012) 69%  77% 
Unions (2012) 4.2  39 
Violations in practice 2012 16  4 
Violations in practice 2015 20  2 
Sources: *Violations (Kucera & Sari 2019; CGWR, 2019) *Government Effectiveness (World Bank, 
2018a) *Enforcement (ILO Stat, 2018b) *Unions (ILO Stat, 2018b) *Informal Economy (ILO Stat, 
2018a) 
A possible explanation for Bolivia’s better performance could be that its union density 
far surpasses Peru’s; but, Bolivia’s unions have only been able to push back on de jure 
flexibility; they have not been able to do anything about the extensive de facto flexibility that 
has taken place since the 1980s (Burgess, 2010). Furthermore, higher union density in Latin 
America is not an indication of better enforcement for three reasons: (1) governments in the 
region with higher rates of unionisation often reduce enforcement resources (Ronconi, 2012); 
(2) unions for the most part do not cover the informal economy; (3) unions in Latin America 
 
20 The violations listed in Table 2.4 are taken from the (Kucera & Sari 2019) database; they are used instead of 
Burgess’s de facto scores because they are far more comprehensive and allow for a more accurate comparison 
between countries. Unlike Burgess’s de facto scores they (1) capture frequency of violations and (2) allow for 
more violations to be uncovered because they are based on 108 evaluation criteria and 9 textual sources rather 
than Burgess’s 5 evaluation criteria and 3 textual sources (See Stallings, 2010, p.148 for their methodology).  
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are often too marginalised or co-opted to defend workers’ rights (Burgess, 2010, pp.218-22). 
While weak unions could mean that violations in Bolivia are simply going undetected, the same 
should then be true for Peru and a similar number of violations should be exhibited across both 
countries  
As Figure 2.5 shows, Slovakia and Czechia are similar on all indicators provided by the 
literature that seek to explain why labour rights vary; and yet as Figure 2.6 exhibits, the two 
show significant compliance differences.  
Figure 2.5 Czechia and Slovakia: Method of Difference 
Sources: *Democracy (Polity IV, 2012a); Government Effectiveness (World Bank, 2018a); Union 
Density (ILO Stat, 2018a); ILO Ratifications (ILO NORMLEX, 2018a); Economic Globalisation 
(ETH Zürich, 2018a). Inspector Resources (number of inspectors/million workers (ILO Stat, 2018a). 
MNC Influence (OECD Data, 2018a)21 
Figure 2.6 Czechia and Slovakia Compliance Data 
Source: (Kucera & Sari 2019; CGWR, 2019) 
 
21 Figures for ‘Government Effectiveness’ and ‘Union Density’ for figures 2.5 and 2.7 have been normalised using 
the equation y = 1 + (x-A) *(10-1)/(B-A).  
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As Figure 2.7 shows, Peru’s indicators suggest that it should see much better 
compliance than Bolivia. Apart Union Density, Peru’s capacity, democracy and government 
effectiveness are superior to Bolivia’s and yet, as Figure 2.8 indicates, Bolivia’s compliance is 
far better.  
Figure 2.7 Peru and Bolivia: Method of Difference 
Sources: *Democracy (Polity IV, 2012a); Government Effectiveness (World Bank, 2018a); Union 
Density (ILO Stat, 2018a); ILO Ratifications (ILO NORMLEX, 2018a) Economic Globalisation (ETH 
Zürich, 2018a). Inspector Resources (ILO Stat, 2018a); MNC Influence (OECD Data, 2018a) 
Figure 2.8 Peru and Bolivia Compliance Data 
Source: (Kucera & Sari 2019; CGWR, 2019) 
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Contemporary economic globalisation penetrates states and encourages governments 
into a race-to-the-bottom; whether and how the ILO counteracts this phenomenon remains 
unclear. Despite the organisation’s conventions being widely ratified, extant studies show that 
ILO membership plays an insignificant role in determining a country’s labour standards; this 
has left scholars to explain compliance variation solely through the framework of domestic 
politics. While these studies have helped to uncover regional/global trends and identified 
several important explanations, two major shortcomings have emerged (1) their use of 
ratifications and compliance as independent and dependent variables and (2) their 
quantification of key domestic variables which creates discrepancies in the findings. The 
deviant case (George & Bennett, 2004) of Czechia and Slovakia will be used to guide this 
research in a comparative study. The remainder of this chapter will therefore develop an 
alternative framework and methodology to be applied to this case study in order to more 
effectively bring out the dynamics surrounding when and how the ILO makes an impact. 
2.2 Mapping and Measuring Fragmentation 
“If [international agencies] start developing a different jurisprudence; eventually, we’ll have 
total chaos in the system” (ILO Staff Interviewee Kari Tapiola, 2018) 
“The problem is that there is a proliferation of [consultancies] and they come up with their 
own interpretations of ILO standards” (ILO staff interviewee G, 2018) 
Why do compliance rates vary between countries who exhibit similar scores across all 
explanatory indicators found in the literature? Section 2.1 has revealed discrepancies with the 
available literature on ILO impact raising questions about what variables – in addition to those 
at the domestic level - might be at play. The purpose of the proceeding chapters will not be to 
argue that the ‘domestic politics argument’ is wrong but rather to highlight that this explanation 
is incomplete (Strang & Chang, 1993). Indeed, chapter III provides a comprehensive 
examination into how and why Czechia and Slovakia diverge precisely in order to better 
understand how these domestic spaces might be mediating external actors differently. For 
example, it illustrates how Czechia leans more to the right embracing the ILO’s challengers 
(the IMF, OECD and World Bank) whereas Slovakia’s domestic context provides a clearer 
path for the ILO – findings not captured by the literature reviewed above. However, the primary 
aim of this research is to illustrate whether and how the ILO makes an impact. Because its 
influence will be analysed with consideration for the fragmented environment within which the 
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organisation operates, and because levels of fragmentation can vary across countries, it is 
important to capture these dynamics when engaging in comparative case study work.  
This section constructs the framework that will be used to map and measure policy 
fragmentation. After briefly defining the ‘unit of analysis’, the section builds on mapping 
techniques by Abbott (2012) to assemble the regime sub-constellations for Czechia and 
Slovakia before employing the use of SNA and its associated metrics (e.g. ‘centrality’) to 
produce their empirical outputs. These metrics function to predict the relative influence of the 
ILO and CIOs within and across the two countries and in doing so, the graphs shed light on 
both the extensity and character of policy fragmentation in Czechia and Slovakia. The 
usefulness of these outputs to ‘real world events’ will be determined by cross-referencing them 
with the findings from the qualitative case studies in the final empirical chapter; but, initial 
expectations created here indicate that policy fragmentation will be more of a problem for the 
ILO in Czechia than in Slovakia – the ILO’s influence being greater in the latter whereas the 
reverse is true for the CIOs.    
Shifting Focus: Introducing the Regime Sub-Constellation   
 This research proposes that the ILO’s impact is partially determined by the extent to 
which the fragmented environment within which it operates facilitates or impedes its work – a 
concept which is borrowed from the literature on regime complexes and applied here to the 
issue of labour rights. However, because the analytical unit regime complex refers to IO 
networks on a global level, it is necessary to scale down this conception to the domestic realm 
in order to facilitate cross-national comparisons. Not all institutions that make up a regime 
complex operate nor interact equally in all locations all of the time. Recall Judith Kelley’s study 
on the regime for international election monitoring (see chapter I) which revealed diverging 
outcomes in Kenya and South Africa as a result of the differences between two institutional 
sub-sets belonging to the same global network (Kelley, 2009). It is precisely the qualitative 
differences between these different institutional subsets that this research is interested in i.e. to 
what extent do the actors within one subset converge with the ILO compared to the actors in 
another subset? As such, country specific regime complexes will be identified and henceforth 
referred to as ‘regime sub-constellations’ – see figures 2.9 and 2.10 for graphical illustration 
of this concept.  
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Figure 2.9 
Regime Complex  
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The ILO as a Central Actor    
This research seeks to identify and compare the ways in which fragmentation differs 
across states as well as the consequences this has for the ILO. As illustrated earlier, 
fragmentation can increase or decrease a regime’s impact and so identifying the key drivers 
mediating this variation becomes essential to any study seeking to understand and explain these 
outcomes. Whilst there are diverging opinions in this regard (see Bernstein & Cashore, 2012; 
Raustiala & Victor, 2004; Kelley, 2009; Keohane & Victor, 2011; Abbott & Snidal, 2009; 
Orsini et al, 2013), several scholars have argued that greater impact is more likely when there 
are higher levels of deference (Pratt, 2018) to a ‘central’ actor i.e. “the acceptance of another 
IO’s exercise of authority…[to help]…resolve jurisdictional conflicts in the absence of a clear 
legal hierarchy” (Pratt, 2018, p.563) see also (Abbott & Snidal, 2009; Abbott et al, 2015; Pratt, 
2018; Bierman et al, 2009; Keohane & Victor, 2011; Zürn & Faude, 2013, p.120).  
The ILO is well suited for this role, its membership is near universal, it sets 
internationally recognised standards and benchmarks (Abbott & Snidal, 2009, pp.536-7) that 
influence national law, and which are referenced – albeit to varying degrees - by most other 
international actors such as NGOs, MSHIs, international union confederations, the European 
Union and the CIOs. Moreover, the issue of inter-agency coordination is a highly salient one 
for ILO staff; on fieldwork to its office in Geneva, all interviewees I spoke with confirmed that 
a lack of cooperation at the international level can have a major impact on whether the ILO 
accomplishes its goals (ILO Staff Interviewees V; S; G; F; M, 2018).  
Many of those same interviewees however noted that inter-agency cooperation is not a 
realistic expectation, especially between the ILO and its rival organisations such as the 
international financial institutions (IFIs) and OECD: 
“if cooperation was happening it would be fantastic, I can’t think of a single country where that 
happens” (ILO Staff Interviewee V, 2018).22   
 
 
22 An interesting side note here is that the interviewee appeared to suggest that inter-agency cooperation is possible 
but only is so when it reflects the dynamics of geopolitics. For example, after noting how cooperation between 
IOs does not happen, the interviewee noted “I’ll try to think of an example where the institutions work together…I 
think it’s mostly against the communist countries e.g. China, Vietnam, there everyone all of sudden cares about 
human rights…it seems in those countries everyone pulls on one string” (ILO Staff Interviewee V, 2018).  
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“I  recall the first consultation we had with the Bank, it was around the time of Indonesia…James 
Wolfensohn was president of the Bank at the time and we came to the question of labour standards, 
Wolfensohn started saying, ‘well now that you want us to implement your standards’…I said sorry, can 
I interrupt you straight away, let’s make one thing clear, we don’t want the Bank to implement our 
standards… what we want to do is find a way in which when we are carrying out our task of 
implementation, that we don’t work at cross purposes. That gets us to difficult areas because I’ve been 
using this example, talking with our own people, I’ve often said to them, how far are you then ready to 
accept that the Bank has a better knowledge on how to run the world economy than we have… I mean 
if we ask others to accept our jurisdiction and jurisprudence, logically we have to also accept that we 
are not the specialists in trade but that the WTO is…” (ILO Staff Interviewee Kari Tapiola, 2018).  
“It’s true there is not always coherency between the IFIs and the ILO. With regards to minimum wages, 
it’s not always the case that the IFIs say there should not be a minimum wage. But, it might be that the 
advice they give is different, it might not comply with our legal standards, for example the ILO says 
minimum wage should be consulted with social partners, but the World Bank and IMF might say okay 
reduce the rate and don’t talk to the unions anymore” (ILO Staff Interviewee P, 2019).23 
Capturing and measuring instances of cooperation between these IOs is therefore not 
only difficult but unhelpful to the purposes here.24 What can be measured though is the number 
of organisations within a regime sub-constellation that converge with the ILO’s standards 
versus the number of those who do not. Variation in this regard produces varying levels of 
‘ILO centrality’ which will have a bearing on how ‘networked’ the ILO is both internationally 
and domestically. This in-turn may facilitate to greater or lesser degrees the organisation’s 
ability to make an impact. A suitable hypothesis to be applied to these graphs therefore is that 
the ILO’s impact is associated with varying levels of ILO centralisation within a given regime 
sub-constellation. It is important to note that the IFIs do – at least on paper – recognise the 
 
23 Although rare, cooperation is possible when the interests of IO member states or staff align, as noted by an ILO 
official in the Multilaterals department:  “I’ll try to think of a positive story of cooperation…about a decade ago 
I was working in Nepal, we were virtually trying to rewrite their entire labour code. It was not long after a civil 
war between the Maoists and the government (1000s of people lost their lives)… and then there were huge 
strikes…I found that my strongest supporter was the local IMF chief, not because he believed in labour law but 
he wanted the strikes stopped which were destroying the economy… He said if you can stop the strikes, I’ll do 
whatever I can with our influence in the government to help…so there are positive times like that (ILO Staff 
Interviewee L, 2019).  
 
24 However, while the ILO is not a focus of their study, Ashwin et al (2020) do capture and illustrate instances of 
inter-agency cooperation by examining the ways in which MSHIs (e.g. the Ethical Trading Initiative) interact with 
firms and global unions (e.g. IndustriAll) to produce more effective transnational industrial relations agreements. 
In doing so, they demonstrate the importance that coordination both within and between the international and 
national realms, as well as those between private and public forms of regulation, can have for improving labour 
standards.  
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ILO’s core conventions and as a result, technically converge with its standards. However, a 
distinction must be made between de jure and de facto convergence: the ways in which the IFIs 
undermine the ILO’s work despite proclamations of adherence is demonstrated in chapter VI. 
Moreover, the method by which this ‘contradiction of convergence’ is empirically captured 
and measured is explained in the final part of this section titled ‘The Regime Sub-constellations 
for Czechia and Slovakia’.  
Social Network Analysis: Mapping and Measuring Policy Fragmentation  
 In order to test the ‘ILO Centrality’ hypothesis, we need tools to map, measure and 
compare varying levels of fragmentation (the opposite of centralisation) (Orsini et al, 2013, 
p.32) between the regime sub-constellations for Czechia and Slovakia. Widerberg (2014) 
reviews three mapping strategies applied to the regime complex for climate change: first is 
Zelli’s (2011) ‘onion model’ which identifies the ‘United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change’ (UNFCC) as the regime’s core actor but one who is accompanied and 
complemented by several others such as multilateral forums and NGOs. Second is Keohane & 
Victor’s (2011) enhancement of Zelli’s model to include various clubs and bilateral 
agreements. Finally, the ‘governance triangle’ by Abbott (2012): this attempt is not only more 
exhaustive in terms of identifying and including additional relevant agencies but it also 
categorises them by (1) function e.g. “scientific assessment; rulemaking; financial assistance” 
(Abbott, 2012, p.573) and (2) membership - identifying whether the institution is led by states, 
firms or civil society - see Widerberg (2014) for further elaboration of the above models.  
However, as noted by Widerberg (2014), the frameworks above merely identify 
relevant actors rather than examine the interactions between them; as a result, some of the 
dynamics of fragmentation are not captured. Here, Bierman et al (2009) provide a possible 
solution: these authors have established several ways in which the relationships between 
agencies may vary in order to produce three categories of fragmentation – synergistic, 
cooperative and conflictive (see Table 2.5 below which summarises the characteristics of each). 
Using these guidelines, Bierman and colleagues assess the regime complex for climate change 
and conclude that it can be categorised as ‘cooperative’ owing to the UNFCC’s central role 
within the regime (Bierman et al, 2009, pp.22-4).  
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Table 2.5 Categories of Fragmentation 
Fragmentation Synergistic  Cooperative Conflictive 
Institutional 
Integration 
One core institution with 
other institutions being 
closely integrated  
Core institution with 







Core norms of institutions 
are integrated  






All relevant actors support 
the same institutions 







           Source: (Bierman et al, 2009, p.19) 
Applied to this research then, regime sub-constellations for Czechia and Slovakia could 
be created by using the most comprehensive mapping strategies developed by Abbott (2012) 
to identify key actors. Fragmentation could then be compared and contrasted with reference to 
the indicators provided by Bierman et al (2009). However, this presents another problem 
because the typologies these authors provide do not account for variance with regards to degree 
of fragmentation i.e., they concentrate solely on character (Orsini et al, 2013). For example, 
according to table 3.5, a regime can be classed as ‘conflictive’ when it hosts two core IOs 
whose norms conflict (Bierman et al, 2009). But, while the norms of core organisations such 
as the IMF and ILO conflict, the IMF’s influence will vary between different institutional 
configurations and domestic settings – in some cases, its presence may not impede the ILO’s 
work at all. Therefore, it is important we are able to measure and not just identify conflicts and 
synergies before making any conclusions (see Orsini et al, 2013, p.32). 
Because regime complexes are network structures, social network analysis (SNA) is an 
appropriate method not only to map relevant actors but to empirically capture the interactions 
between them (Orsini et al, 2013, p.32). Indeed, Widerberg (2014) applies SNA to the climate 
regime and in doing so, produces results that differ from Bierman et al (2009); rather than the 
UNFCC functioning as an effective core, Widerberg observes that the agencies tend to cluster 
depending on whether they are governing at the regional, state or city level suggesting 
polycentric governance (Widerberg, 2014, p.17).  
Drawing from the above, this research will build on mapping techniques by Abbott 
(2012) but, it will employ the use of network analysis to analyse the interactions between the 
different institutions operating in Czechia’s and Slovakia’s regime sub-constellations.   
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SNA is an appropriate method because like regime complexes, regime sub-
constellations are also network structures albeit ones which capture dynamics as they exist on 
a state rather than global level. SNA graphically and empirically represents the characteristics 
of a network by analysing the interactions between the individual nodes – in this case, the 
relational ties that bind together various IOs, NGOs and MSHIs. SNA offers three useful 
metrics that will help identify the inter-agency relationships that this research’s hypothesis is 
concerned with: (1) ‘network centralisation’ which describes “the distribution of ties in the 
network and the overall connectedness of the network” (Steketee et al, 2015, p.465).  (2) 
‘Closeness centrality’ which captures the power and influence of individual nodes e.g. 
closeness centrality is used throughout to determine the extent to which other actors defer to 
the ILO’s norms (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). (3) Betweenness centrality’ which will depict 
whether the CIOs (IMF, World Bank, OECD or MSHIs) function as bridges (Steketee et al, 
2015, pp.461-3) or gatekeepers (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005) to the ILO’s work. For example, 
in a comparative case study, if country A’s regime sub-constellation  scores higher on network 
centralisation, ILO closeness centrality and where the CIOs score lower on betweenness 
centrality than does the regime sub-constellation of country B; it would suggest that the labour 
rights regime is better able to impact country A. This is because country A’s regime sub-
constellation would be considered more cohesive; most actors would defer to the ILO and 
finally its work would less likely be impeded by the CIOs or ‘business friendly’ MSHIs 
(Fransen, 2011). 
The Regime Complex for Labour Rights 
In order to create the separate regime sub-constellation for each country, it was first 
necessary to compile a node list which captured the regime complex for labour rights at a global 
level. Here, Abbott & Snidal’s (2009) governance triangle provided a good starting point: like 
Abbott’s (2012) depiction of the regime complex for climate change, the authors have 
constructed a labour rights regime ‘governance triangle’ (see figure 2.11 ) for which they 
provide a list of initiatives led by states, firms, NGOs and MSHIs -  see appendix 1 (Abbott & 
Snidal, 2009, p.513).  This list was then added to Issue Crawler (Issue Crawler, 2017) – an 
online platform which scans the web and creates a virtual network based on hyperlinks between 
different sites. While Issue Crawler’s outputs represent links as they exist in cyberspace, they 
are nevertheless representative of the physical interactions that occur within these networks 
(Widerberg, 2014, pp.8-13). Issue Crawler scans the web for connections to websites which 
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the user provides as a starting point; here, the websites of labour rights agencies extracted from 
the ‘governance triangle’ (Abbott & Snidal, 2009) were supplied; Issue Crawler then responded  
with a data sheet (see appendix 2) which uncovered a number of additional agencies that these 
institutions were linked to; this data sheet was then used as the ‘master reference list’ to create 
the regime sub-constellations. 25 
For illustration reasons only, the ‘master list’ was used to create an SNA graph for the 
global regime complex for labour rights and was done so using Node XL (Smith et al, 2010). 
The purpose here is to provide a useful visual contrast of how the ‘governance triangle’ can be 
transformed and enhanced using SNA by considering not only an additional number of 
agencies but also the interactions between them - see figures 2.11 and 2.12 below.26 
Figure 2.11 The Regime Complex for Labour Rights ‘the Governance Triangle’ 
                         Source: Abbott & Snidal (2009) 
 
 
25 Using Issue Crawler as a tool to embellish the governance triangle is a strategy borrowed from Widerberg’s 
(2014) work on the regime complex for climate change.  
26 For reference purposes, see appendix 3 for the graph’s metrics.  
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Figure 2.12 The Regime Complex for Labour Rights ‘Social Network Analysis’ 
 
                                     Source: (Hayes, 2017, p.31) 
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This networked version of the global labour rights regime helps to capture and illustrate 
the relative impact and interactions that exist between these institutions - dynamics that cannot 
be conveyed by the governance triangle. For example, what is immediately striking about the 
graph’s output (see appendix 3) is that influence within this network appears fairly diffuse i.e. 
closeness centrality scores do not vary too drastically.27 While the ILO does score slightly 
higher than others, the relative difference between these organisations is very small. However, 
a glance at the betweenness centrality measurements brings attention to the possibility of 
sufficiently disruptive levels of conflict between organisations within this regime. For example, 
while the graph leaves us with little doubt that the ILO is a dominant force -  scoring among 
the highest across all centrality measurements: closeness, degree and betweenness - similarly 
high betweenness centrality scores for the CIOs and MSHIs, combined with a low score for 
some of the international unions (e.g. IndustriAll and Global Unions) leaves the ILO open to 
competition with few allies to support it. The undermining of labour standards by the IFIs is 
well documented but what emerges interestingly here is the superior position of corporate 
friendly MSHIs versus the position of those which more stringently adhere to the ILO’s 
conventions. For example, the Fair Labour Association’s (FLA) betweenness centrality score 
is among the highest in the network positioning it as a potential major gatekeeper and disrupter. 
At the same time, the Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) who is highly critical of the FLA, scores 
relatively much lower. The CCC and others (see Utting, 2002; Locke, 2014; Fransen, 2011) 
have accused the FLA (as well as the Business Social Compliance Initiative - BSCI) of being 
heavily led by business interests; of overlooking violations of freedom of association and 
collective bargaining; and of allowing companies to select and pay their own compliance 
monitors. Its reputation in this regard was why companies such as Levi’s Strauss & Co left 
stricter arrangements with the Social Accountability International (SA-I) (a node which also 
scores comparatively low on betweenness centrality) to join the FLA (Fransen, 2011, pp.369-
74). 
Overall, the global labour rights regime complex appears one where the ILO, although 
influential, must compete with a range of potentially competitive actors in an environment 
where the organisation’s allies have little influence over the other nodes. While mapping and 
measuring the labour rights regime using SNA has helped shine light on the relative influence 
of these different actors as well as empirically capture and measure their interactions, the graph 
 
27 The observations made in regard to the ways in which the networked regime complex for labour rights improves 
upon the governance triangle are done using the output illustrated in Appendix 3. Note that the first ten entries of 
this output are discounted because they are outliers which are not connected to the rest of the graph.  
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assumes these dynamics to be uniform across countries. The following section therefore details 
the method for constructing Czechia’s and Slovakia’s regime sub-constellations and then offers 
some observations on their individual outputs as well as in relation to the global output 
discussed here.  
The Regime Sub-Constellations for Czechia and Slovakia  
Node lists. To date, there have been no mapping attempts that have scaled down from 
a regime complex structure to identify ‘country specific networks’; constructing the regime 
sub-constellations for each case study therefore required extensive use of ‘The Yearbook of 
International Organisations’ (henceforth UIA). UIA provides users with information on 
membership, country of operation and the relationship between agencies (e.g. partnering on 
projects) for nearly 40,000 active IOs and INGOs (UIA, 2017).28 For institutions not listed on 
the UIA, additional linkages were made via manual searches on those organisations’ websites. 
Relational Ties. Once the node list for each country was complete, the second step 
required was to determine what the relational ties would be between the different organisations. 
The criteria upon which the nodes are connected determines the outcome of the metrics 
identified earlier - closeness and betweenness centrality. ⁠ 29 Knoke & Yang (2011) offer three 
suggestions which I have mobilised here: (1) information sharing e.g. the extent to which other 
actors defer to the ILO’s conventions (also see Pratt, 2018) (2) affiliations, partnerships or 
cooperation between IOs e.g. on various projects (3) shared membership e.g. if CMKOS (the 
confederation of unions for Czechia) interacts with both the ILO and the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC), then a link between these two organisations is made in order capture 
the shared connection, this in-turn will boost the ILO’s centrality rating.30 In addition to 
domestic unions, MNCs operating in the country were also used to create ties between nodes 
representing MSHIs. For example, the Adidas groups operates in Czechia and is a member of 
both the BSCI (BSCI, 2017a) and the FLA (FLA, 2017a) – as noted above, these two MSHIs 
have been cited as better representing the interests of business than of labour (Fransen, 2011, 
p.12). As such, it is likely that the BSCI and FLA function as gatekeepers scoring higher on 
 
28 See Amanda Murdie (2013) for work that applies data drawn from UIA to SNA (Murdie, 2013, pp.13-14). 
29 The relational ties for the global regime complex for labour rights (figure 2.12) are based on shared links 
between websites as identified by Issue Crawler.  
30 See CMKOS, 2017a which provides information on CMKOS’ affiliations with ETUC, ITUC and TUAC.  
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‘betweenness centrality’ than those MSHIs which more effectively uphold the ILO’s 
conventions.31  
Appendices 4 and 6 illustrate the following information for Czechia and Slovakia’s 
regime sub-constellations: (1) a list of all institutions operating in that particular country (2) 
the links between them (3) citations regarding the sources of this information.  
The data from appendices 4 and 6 were inputted into Node XL which produced two 
SNA graphs for Czechia’s and Slovakia’s regime sub-constellations - see figures 2.13 and 2.14 
and legend table 2.6. The associated metrics (e.g. centrality and betweenness measurements) 
were generated by Node XL (smith et al, 2010) and UCINET (Borgatti et al, 2002) – see table 
2.7.32 
Table 2.6 Regime Sub-Constellation Legend (for figures 2.13 and 2.14) 
Type Shape Function Colour 
Zone 1 (State) Square Standards  Red 
Zone 2 (Firm) Solid Triangle Operational Orange 
Zone 3 (NGOs) Disk Information Green 
Zone 4-6 (Two 
Types) 
Solid Diamond Financing Blue 
Zone 7 (Three 
Types) 
Sphere  Combination Black 
Sources: Type (Abbott & Snidal, 2009, pp.13-18) Function (Pattberg et al, 2014, pp.13-14) 
 
31 Data in regard relational ties was sourced from the UIA and manual web searches on relevant web sites: for 
example, transnationale.org (Transnationale, 2017).  
32 The data in table 2.7 has been extracted from Node XL and UNCINET outputs and is used here for illustration 
purposes. The full data sets from these outputs are available as appendices – see appendices 8 -13.  
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Figure 2.13 Czechia’s Regime Sub-Constellation for Labour Rights 
 
                                                  Source: (Hayes, 2017, p.38) 
 
Figure 2.14 Slovakia’s Regime Sub-Constellation for Labour Rights 
 
                                                     Source: (Hayes, 2017, p.39) 
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Table 2.7 Social Network Analysis Outputs 
ILO and Network 
Cohesion 
Czechia Slovakia Difference Significance  Confidence 





62.05% 72.89% 10.84% T = 4.18  






76.92% 88.46% 11.54% T = 4.456  




2.04% 0.82% 1.22% T = -0.126 





21.87% 1.21% 20.66% T = -2.13 
P < 0.05 
1.63:39.69 
Sources: Network Centralisation and ILO Closeness Centrality generated by UCINET – see appendices 
8 & 9 (Borgatti et al, 2002) (also see Hayes, 2017). IMF and World Bank Betweenness Centrality by 
Node XL – see appendices 10-13. See appendix 14 for t-test and confidence interval calculations.  
 
While the graphs mainly capture dynamics as they are present at the international level 
– i.e. few domestic influences are included which dictate graph variances – the intention here 
is to test whether they (1) accurately predict in which country the ILO is likely to make a greater 
impact and (2) provide some indication of the extent to which fragmentation may be 
undermining its work.33 The graphs’ numerical outputs (as illustrated in Table 2.7) exhibit some 
interesting cross-country differences in this regard.34 The overall network centralisation is 
approximately 10% higher in Slovakia as is the ILO’s closeness centrality when compared with 
Czechia’s. Looking at the betweenness centrality scores for the IMF and World Bank however, 
the output suggests a greater influence for these institutions in Czechia when compared with 
Slovakia. Following work by Hanneman & Riddle (2005), I applied an independent sample t-
test and calculated confidence intervals in order to assess the significance of these differences: 
aside from the IMF’s betweenness centrality score, the tests produced sufficient evidence (P < 
0.001 and P < 0.05) to reject a null hypothesis – that the characteristics of these networks do 
not vary across countries. This result allows us to observe with 95% confidence that deference 
 
33 (1) A major influence on these countries - and the CEE region more widely - is that of the EU, its role is 
represented in the graphs via the ETUC and EPSU. (2) Apart from trade union confederations e.g. CMKOS, the 
interactions between domestic institutions such as ministries of finance or labour on the one hand, and various 
international actors on the other, are not included - Chapter VII deals with this issue more in-depth noting it as an 
area for future research.   
34 See appendices 10-13 for a complete version of the regime sub-constellation graphs for Czechia and Slovakia.  
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to the ILO is greater by approximately 5-15% in Slovakia than it is in Czechia – see appendix 
14 for t-test and confidence interval calculations. If diverging levels of deference to the ILO is 
associated with varying levels of the organisation’s impact, the graphs allow us therefore to 
predict with some statistical certainty that fragmentation will be more conflictive in Czechia 
than in Slovakia – the ILO consequently should make a greater impact in the latter while the 
reverse should be true for the CIOs (IMF, World Bank and OECD). Chapters IV through VI 
uphold this prediction and do so by illustrating the ways in which the numerical outputs 
produced by these graphs translate into observable qualitative differences in IO impact across 
the two countries.   
These results highlight the utility of conceptualising fragmentation as a phenomenon 
which varies across countries and the use of SNA as a method which can capture and distil 
such information into comparable metrics. The advantages of this ‘country level unit of 
analysis’ are further illuminated when we compare the regime sub-constellations to the global 
labour rights regime complex depicted earlier in figure 2.12 – see figure 2.14a below. Three 
observations can be made in this regard: first, the ILO’s influence is less diffuse at the country 
level i.e. its closeness centrality score is much higher relative to all others across both Czechia 
and Slovakia (see appendices 10-13) than it is at the global level (see appendix 3). The 
significance of these differences were assessed once again using independent t-tests: the 
difference between ILO influence in Czechia versus that globally was significant at P < 0.001; 
however, the same test comparing the organisation’s position in Slovakia relative to the global 
network fell short of reaching the P < 0.10 critical value target by just 0.25. Second, the 
closeness centrality scores of some of the ILO’s allies such as ITUC and IndustriAll also 
suggest that the influence of these institutions is more prominent relative to others at the 
country level than they are globally – such differences however are not statistically significant 
for Slovakia however – see appendix 15 for significance tests. Finally, MSHIs appear to play 
less of a role across both countries than they do globally – this is likely because such institutions 
are more active in developing countries rather than advanced industrial economies such as 








Source: Appendices 3 and 10-13.35  
 
Overall, the global network depicted in figure 2.12 helps uncover and capture dynamics 
that the governance triangle does not account for whereas the regime sub-constellations reveal 
that those dynamics can vary across countries – a function of the unique institutional 
configuration that exists there, and as later chapters will illustrate, the domestic setting in which 
each institutional sub-set must operate.  It is important to note that the regime sub-constellation 
graphs contain institutions which might not necessarily feature in the case study chapters. For 
example, Czechia’s regime sub-constellation includes – among others – the ILO, IndustriAll 
and the Clean Clothes Campaign; but, in regard to the specific events examined here, the latter 
does not play a role. However, the inclusion of such agencies in the graphs is nevertheless 
empirically important in order to create an overall picture of the international dynamics present 
in the country. A second consideration in this regard has to do with the role of the CIOs within 
the graphs. As noted above, convergence is captured by assessing the number of organisations 
that align with the ILO’s standards versus those that do not. That the IFIs claim to uphold the 
ILO’s standards on paper but often ignore them in practice presents a unique empirical 
challenge for capturing and measuring convergence/divergence. The graphs account for this by 
making a single link between the ILO and IFIs in recognition of their de jure compliance. 
 
35 Centrality measurements in figure 2.14a have been scaled in order to fit the graph: closeness has been multiplied 
by 100 while betweenness divided by 100. The FLA’s ‘global’ measurement is 787.924 but it has been capped at 
















Regime Sub-Constellations Versus The Global 
Regime
Czechia Slovakia Global
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However, the ways in which they present a challenge to the ILO is captured by the metric 
betweenness centrality which measures their power as potential bridges or gatekeepers to the 
organisation’s influence. Moreover, overall convergence is captured in the aggregate using the 
metric ‘network centralisation’ which accounts not only for whether the CIOs connect to nodes 
that align with the ILO, but also for their connections to nodes that do not. 
In sum, whether the ILO positively impacts a state’s labour standards may depend on 
the extent to which other actors facilitate or impede its work. However, because the degree and 
nature of interactions between external actors will vary across countries, it results in qualitative 
differences between the same agencies in different settings; it is therefore essential to capture 
these dynamics when engaging in comparative case study work. Section 2.2 has responded to 
this challenge through its conception of the regime sub-constellation – a country level unit of 
analysis with which to assess the ILO’s interactions with other external agencies. Moreover, it 
has identified the most appropriate methods to map and measure levels of fragmentation for 
each network. Because of this, the independent variable ‘ILO centrality’ becomes comparable 
across case studies; it captures whether the ILO’s tools – monitoring, capacity building and 
persuasion – are able to make an impact; and finally, considers the influence that policy 
fragmentation may have on its work. Section 2.3 contextualises the concept of this research’s 
dependent variable ‘impact’ as it relates to the ILO and then illustrates several steps that will 
be taken to identify and assess it.  
2.3 Identifying ILO Impact: A Framework for Analysis 
How and when can researchers conclude the ILO has made an impact? What kind of 
evidence should be looked for and what are the most appropriate methods to find such 
evidence? As illustrated earlier, scholars have thus far sought to determine the ILO’s influence 
by explaining compliance variation between states which has resulted in irreconcilable gaps in 
their conclusions. This is because good compliance is methodologically hard to unpack while 
making assumptions based on poor compliance overlooks several of the ILO’s institutional 
corrective mechanisms. Moreover, it ignores progress i.e. the legal standard may be too 
demanding and therefore not complied with, but its existence might nevertheless result in 
“desired behavioural changes” (Raustiala, 2000) that push a state within acceptable levels of 
compliance (see Chayes & Chayes, 1993, p.197). As noted by Kari Tapiola (former ‘special 
advisor to the ILO’s Director-General), ILS are not applied in the abstract and “there are 
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situations where if you start from 0, 10% is better than 0; 20% is better than 10; 50% is better 
than 20%...and nobody, absolutely nobody gets to 100% anyway” (ILO Staff Interviewee Kari 
Tapiola, 2018). A focus on ‘impact’ – as defined in chapter I – will provide for a more definitive 
account of the ILO’s significance than would a comparison of compliance rates and is therefore 
used as this research’s dependent variable. Instances of impact will be sought via qualitative 
case study methods.  
Section 2.1 identified several cases with diverging outcomes that cannot be explained 
by the current literature; section 2.2 proposed that IOs be brought back into the picture and 
constructed a methodological framework with which to do so. This section therefore details the 
context within which the dependent variable will be operationalised: after a brief illustration of 
the empirical foundations and processes that will be undertaken to identify impact, this 
research’s use of within and cross-case analysis as its primary methodology is reviewed. 
Impact: The Dependent Variable 
 To identify impact, the research will look at the interaction between compliance, 
implementation and “changes in state behaviour” (Raustiala, 2000) after a violation has been 
uncovered by one of the ILO’s supervisory mechanisms. As was highlighted earlier, impact is 
best determined by looking at the CEACR’s ‘cases of progress’ reports which illustrate whether 
and how governments are responding to compliance problems the ILO has raised (Weisband, 
2000, p.644; Thomann, 2011, p.116; Landy, 1966).36 Looking for evidence of ILO impact ex 
post will produce more robust findings than previous strategies for three reasons: first, because 
a focus on compliance alone creates the risk of arriving at spurious conclusions (Raustiala, 
2000); second, because extensive data only exists for cases where a problem has been 
identified; third, because trying to ascertain why compliance occurred (or violations did not 
occur) would require working solely with counterfactuals; as noted by Thomann (2011), such 
a narrative would not properly capture the ILO’s tools in practice (Thomann, 2011, p.244).37 
 
36 Thomann (2011) notes that there are limitations to using the CEACR’s ‘cases of progress’ to assess impact 
because they only refer to domestic legal changes. The use of the CEACR’s ‘cases of progress’ within this research 
therefore will be complimented with additional primary and secondary sources to capture implementation changes 
in practice (Thomann, 2011, p.116).  
 
37 It is important to note that if changes in state behaviour could be measured in cases where violations have not 
occurred, this too would be a fruitful area for the study of ILO impact. The problem here is methodological. 
Former Deputy-Director General Kari Tapiola raised this issue when I spoke with him in Geneva, he noted the 
following:  
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 The investigation will occur over four stages.38 First, violations both in law and in 
practice will be identified for each country sourced primarily from the ILO’s CEACR, CAS 
and CFA reports but embellished using data from the ‘Center for Global Workers Rights’ 
(CGWR, 2019) – an online platform which hosts data developed by David Kucera and Dora 
Sari  (Kucera & Sari, 2019). These data greatly improve upon similar previous efforts which 
were reviewed in section 2.1 – table 2.8 summarises these improvements.   
On recent fieldwork to the ILO, I learned of the politically contentious nature 
surrounding the Center for Global Workers Rights (CGWR) data. The database began as an 
ILO project in support of UN SDG Indicator 8 (see United Nations, n.d.). However, it was side-
lined by some governments and employers’ groups who raised objections to staff creating 
another monitoring mechanism which made violations visible to the public. During an 
interview at the organisation, an ILO official commented:  
“do you know the whole political discourse around this data? The ILO is in charge of the SDG indicator; 
and one of the indicators is FACB compliance. There was an agreement that the ILO would be in charge 
and then the employers said we don’t want you using the reports from FACB data. There was a big 
political battle… (ILO Staff Interviewee V, 2018).  
This is why the data is only available through the CGWR which is hosted by Penn State 
University rather than it being housed within the ILO itself (ILO Staff Interviewees V & M, 
2018). These dynamics highlight well some of the key issues raised earlier: firstly, in regard to 
the tensions between sovereignty and effective institutional design and secondly, concerning 
the ways in which staff use their autonomy to overcome institutional limitations (see chapter I 
sections 1.2 and 1.3). Moreover, considering the negative reaction from some member states 




“what I’ve been trying to argue is that first of all, if we measure compliance, only through problems that have 
been reported, which we normally do, we don’t get an overall picture of what the situation is in the country. 
Assessing impact is easier ex post but it would be worth trying to figure out a way to measure compliance.  I’m 
saying this because whenever we talk about compliance, I keep on thinking how much compliance is there with 
non-ratified conventions in situations when ratification has not been possible for a political or detailed reasons. I 
have said to my colleagues, you [should] find a way of measuring this…: (ILO Staff Interviewee Kari Tapiola, 
2018).  
38 These four stages of investigation follow guidance provided by Lars Thomann (see Thomann, 2011, p.44). 
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Table 2.8 Data Improvement Table 
(Stallings et al, 2010, p.146) (Kucera & Sari, 2019) Improvement  
Violations are captured using 17 
indicators and 3 textual 
sources.39 
Violations are captured using 
108 indicators and 9 textual 
sources.  
Detail, Accuracy.  
Violations are defined as such 
using several non-ILO sources. 
Violations are defined as such 
in a “manner consistent 
with…ILO conventions No. 87 
and 98” (CGWR, 2019). 
Ensures data remain 
within ILO 
guidelines. 
Provide aggregate compliance 
scores for each country.  
Provide aggregate compliance 
scores for each country as well 
as listing violations – both in 
law and in practice – 
individually.  
Detail. Facilitates 
further research.  
Specific violations are coded 
only once. 
Captures frequency of specific 
violations.  
Accuracy in regard to 
the degree of a 
particular problem.  
No information is provided in 
regard to actors involved in the 
violations. 
Each violation is accompanied 
by a descriptive text detailing 
what happened and who the 
key actors involved were e.g. 
the firm, factory, trade union, 
governments officials etc… 
Facilitates qualitative 
case study research.  
 
 
39 ‘Indicators’ depict specific violations e.g. “administrative or legal hurdles to union formation” or “murder of 
trade unionist” (Stallings et al, 2010, p.147). Textual sources refer to the specific places from which information 
about the violations is sourced e.g. CEACR and CFA reports or reports made by international trade unions such 
as ITUC.   
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Using these sources in combination with additional primary and secondary research 
materials, the second stage involves building a theoretically informed reason for why the 
violation occurred and will do so by asking whether a particular instance of non-compliance 
was the result of low domestic capacity or lack of political will.40 Here, several domestic 
indicators such as regime type, union density and the power of business versus labour will be 
examined. Guided by the SNA outputs, the role played by international actors such as the 
World Bank, IMF or OECD (CIOs whose activities have been noted to impede the work of the 
ILO) will be investigated in conjunction with domestic factors. Stage three asks what action 
the ILO took in response to that instance of non-compliance (Thomann, 2011, p.44); as noted 
earlier, the ILO’s supervisory and monitoring mechanism may engage in a range of corrective 
measures e.g. by making ‘direct requests’ or ‘observations’; by offering technical assistance 
and advice on legislative and implementation manners or through publicly ‘naming and 
shaming’ states in the ILC (see chapter I section 1.3 on the ILO’s design features). Finally, I 
will assess whether the action taken by the ILO resulted in domestic behavioural changes e.g. 
to national legislation or implementation efforts; here, the role that the competing 
domestic/international alliances played in supporting or impeding the ILO’s recommended 
changes will continue to be examined (Garcia, 2010, p.462).   
Within and Cross-Case Analysis 
 The comparative case of Czechia and Slovakia  - to which the above will be applied – 
was identified via a ‘method of difference’ in section 2.1 and as such, the case could function 
as “controlled experiment” (George & Bennett, 2004, p.24) allowing us to hold the literature’s 
explanatory indicators constant while we re-investigate the effects of the ILO. However, the 
extent to which ‘control’ is achieved here is questionable and research which proceeds from 
this point without further investigation of the existing variables would risk arriving at spurious 
conclusions (George & Bennett, 2004, pp.151-6). A major shortcoming of the reviewed 
literature is that it makes comparisons based on quantified variables (George & Bennett, 2004, 
p.51; 54) e.g. it assumes that unions in country A, would have the same effect as unions in 
country B, so long as both countries A and B score similarly on the variable ‘union density’. 
 
40 Examples of such material include – at the international level - the ILO’s CEACR, CAS and CFA reports along 
with numerous databases on its website such as ‘NORMLEX’; particular attention will be paid to ‘cases of 
progress’ to identify domestic behavioural changes. Additional primary information will be collected from the 
minutes of parliamentary sessions and via interviews with staff at the ILO as well as domestic institutions e.g. 
union confederations, employers’ organisations, labour and finance ministries.   
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As a result, the authors have missed some important qualitative differences between these 
variables as they exist across different national contexts (George & Bennett, 2004, p.19). 
Within case analysis in combination with cross-case analysis, can help alleviate these 
problems (George & Bennett, 2004, p.159-60) and it is this qualitative approach which is 
mobilised across the empirical chapters in order to identify and explain the dependent variable 
‘impact’. Within case-analysis is used to construct a theoretical and empirical historical 
narrative (See Ylikoski, 2015) of linkages between “possible causes and observed outcomes” 
(Burns et al, 2017, p.218). Because the researcher is tasked with uncovering all possible 
observations, the method can function as a heuristic device by creating the potential to identify 
variables that may have been absent in the initial assessment (George & Bennett, 2004, p.20; 
215).  
By isolating these variables for multiple individual cases, it then allows the researcher 
to investigate the qualitative differences between the same variables across different settings – 
e.g. democracy in country A versus democracy in country B – and finally, to uncover the 
necessary and sufficient conditions that explain variation (George & Bennett, 2004, p.26). As 
a consequence, the empirical chapters are organised in such a way as to allow Czechia and 
Slovakia to be examined in isolation as well as in relation to each other. In doing so, historical 
narratives are constructed for each case, the findings of which then facilitate a comparative 
analysis to draw out the similarities and differences which explain why impact occurred in one 
country but not the other – see table 2.9 below as an example.  
Table 2.9 Necessary and Sufficient Variable Table 
Country A (positive)  Country B (negative) 
X1 = unions X1 = unions 
X2 = capacity X2 = capacity 
X3 = regime type X3 = regime type 
X4 = trade openness  X4 = trade openness 
X5 = high network cohesion and ILO 
centrality 
NOT X5 (crucial necessary difference)  
Y = impact i.e. domestic behavioural change  NOT Y (crucial difference) 
                                               Source: table inspired by (Mill, 1843 cited in Koenig-Archibugi, 2017) 
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This section has illustrated the steps with which impact will be identified and has argued 
in favour of case studies over statistical methods as a more effective way to test this research’s 
hypothesis. Overall, the use of case studies should allow this research to refine and add to 
previous explanations; upon completion, further work can be done to update the statistical 
analyses reviewed earlier with the additional variables found (George & Bennett, 2004, pp.19-
20). For example, one of the independent variables being trialled here – ILO centrality – could 
be calculated for all ILO member states and included in a regression alongside several key 
domestic factors identified by the literature. Rather than using compliance as the outcome, it 
should be replaced with one that captures impact – a continuous variable calculated by dividing 
‘cases of progress’ by number of violations for each country over time (see Weisband, 2000, 
p.652). Such a task will be important to future research concerned not only with identifying 
whether the ILO was a necessary condition in achieving impact but also in assessing the 
magnitude of the ILO’s influence in relation to other variables too (George & Bennett, 2004, 
p.27).41 
Conclusions 
 Determining whether the ILO makes an impact requires going beyond analysing 
relationships between ratification and compliance. While the domestic politics and conditions 
of a state are the most important factors determining whether and how ILS are implemented 
and complied with; the discrepancies found with the reviewed literature invite researchers to 
identify additional causal mechanisms that better reflect the external influences at play. Chapter 
II has responded to this invitation: firstly, by considering the fragmented nature of the global 
governing landscape in which the ILO must operate; secondly, by developing the regime-sub-
constellation allowing for fragmentation to be compared across countries and finally, through 
its conception of ‘impact’ as the primary outcome of interest. This chapter has moreover 
selected the most appropriate methods with which to operationalise these variables. The 
framework developed here will now be applied to the case of Czechia and Slovakia. The next 
chapter begins this process by identifying the qualitative differences in domestic factors 
between the two countries in order to (1) improve upon the domestic explanation reviewed in 
section 2.1 and (2) provide a more accurate picture in regard to whether and how the ILO and 
CIOs make an impact. 
 
41 One possible limitation to this method would be capturing the changing configurations of regime sub-
constellations over time.  
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Chapter III 
Czechia and Slovakia: The Evolution of Two Diverging Policy Spaces 
“ I went to talk about trade unions in a market economy, the reactions on the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia sides were very different, and the hostility between these two was quite remarkable…so 
if you compare those two, you’ve got a lot of other factors you have to take into account. They 
are just very very difficult to measure” (ILO Staff Interviewee Kari Tapiola, 2018). 
What determines whether an IO makes an impact and why do levels of fragmentation 
vary across states? In addition to external factors (e.g. IO design features), addressing this 
question requires establishing the significance and role of the relevant mediating and varying 
domestic variables too. This chapter identifies qualitative differences between Czechia’s and 
Slovakia’s political, economic and social institutions. In doing so, several cross-country 
distinctions emerge pertaining to political culture, institutional capacity and the ability of trade 
unions to affect legislative outcomes. Not only do these findings help to improve the domestic 
politics argument reviewed earlier, but they provide a compelling historical explanation for 
why Czechia has embraced neoliberalism to a much greater extent than Slovakia. This in turn 
will provide deeper insights into why the CIOs are more successful in the former than the latter 
while the reverse is true for the ILO.  
Understanding the domestic spaces within which IOs operate is also crucial for 
explaining the consequences of fragmentation – although partially the result of conflicting 
policies between IOs, these international level factors are enhanced through domestic 
interactions. This is because the ability of external actors to make an impact is facilitated by 
competing domestic groups who ally with and seek advice from their international 
counterparts. These competing configurations of actors battle for domestic policy space 
(Sengenberger, 2005) and as a result, conflict that is present at the national level (e.g. between 
workers’ and employers’ groups) is reinforced by conflicting norms (e.g. between the ILO and 
its rivals) being diffused from the international and vice versa (Sengenberger, 2005, p.10). The 
ways in which fragmentation varies across states then is partially contingent upon the relative 
(and sometimes shifting) influence of the domestic groups within them.  
In order to illustrate these domestic level dynamics, the proceeding sections will 
identify two ‘diverging policy spaces’: (1) Czechia – a self-reliant more conservative leaning 
country where unions are fragmented and employers’ groups tend to have greater sway over 
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legislation (2) Slovakia – a left leaning country where domestic institutional development 
(although equal to Czechia’s now) lagged behind until the mid-to-late 1990s but whose unions 
have nevertheless been successful in the political realm. While such differences continue to 
impact the internal dynamics of each country today, understanding the role they play is central 
to explaining IO impact. This is particularly true in the years immediately following the Velvet 
Revolution (1989) through to EU accession (2004) – a period of post-communist transition 
where external actors played a significant role influencing policy across the region. As later 
chapters will demonstrate, this was especially true in Slovakia and was so as a result of the 
historical domestic conditions which are illustrated below.42    
That Czechia and Slovakia exhibit ‘diverging policy spaces’ is not obvious on the 
surface. They are two neighbouring and seemingly similar countries in Central Eastern Europe 
(CEE); having both joined the EU in 2004, their policies often converge across the political, 
social and economic spheres. In addition to these contemporary linkages, the regions 
comprising modern day Czechia and Slovakia have interconnected histories dating back to 500 
BCE (Kirschbaum, 2005, p.16). Such were their perceived cultural, linguistic and historical 
ties that when favourable conditions arose in the immediate aftermath of World War I, the two 
nations – keen to decouple themselves from the Austro-Hungarian empire – united into one 
state (Shepherd, 2000, pp.9-11). Over the next seventy-five years, the Czech and Slovak 
peoples would together face multiple challenges – the building of a single national identity; a 
second world war; communism; a revolution and finally, a divorce. Despite these intimate 
connections however, their shared experiences of imperial domination, unification and then 
autonomy have contrasted (Shepherd, 2000, p.4). From the mid-18th century onwards, 
conditions began to emerge which would facilitate the processes of modernisation in the Czech 
lands but impede those same developments in Slovakia (Mahoney, 2011, p.105). The cultural, 
political and economic dynamics created here would go on to shape not only the relationship 
between the two nations until their breakup in 1993; but, they would also create divergences in 
the way the two states managed their transition from communism (Shepherd, 2000 pp.3-11) 
and – as will be illustrated in proceeding chapters – their interaction with IOs.  
The chapter is organised as follows: section 3.1 provides an historical explanation for 
divergencies as they were present in the 1990s; particularly, Slovakia’s lower institutional 
 
42 Robin Shepherd (2000) argues that history matters, creating divergences in the ways Czechia and Slovakia 
transitioned from communism. His ideas have been borrowed here and will be applied to domestic dynamics post 
2000 (e.g. legislative changes) as well as in assessing each country’s response to international organisations.  
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capacity as well as for its reluctance to embrace neoliberalism. In doing so, dynamics within 
and between both nations are examined beginning with the Austro-Hungarian Empire through 
to the breakup of Czechoslovakia in 1993 (also known as the Velvet Divorce). Section 3.2 
illustrates how each country’s unique histories feeds into their diverging contemporary 
legislative decision-making processes and outcomes. Using the EU Commission’s LABREF 
database (LABREF database, DG EMPL, European Commission, 2019) it examines and 
compares legislative reforms within and across Czechia and Slovakia between 1998 – 2017. A 
key finding to emerge here is the differences between left wing parties in each country: when 
compared with their Czech counterparts, Slovakia’s social democrats are more politically 
willing and able to push back on legislation that diminishes labour standards. Section 3.3 
examines whether and the extent to which social partners (unions and employers’ groups) are 
able to influence labour market reforms; in doing so, it finds sufficient evidence to illustrate 
how unions in Slovakia are more successful in this regard.   
3.1 The Diverging Historical Experiences of Czechia and Slovakia 
 
 Despite more than seven decades together as one state, conditions in the newly created 
Czech and Slovak Republics were quite different when the two emerged after Czechoslovakia’s 
peaceful split in 1993 (Shepherd, 2000). In order to understand why this was the case, it is 
necessary to look at key patterns beginning from over two centuries ago when the imperialist 
nations of Austria and Hungary ruled over the regions comprising of modern-day Czechia and 
Slovakia respectively.43 In doing so, this section will illustrate how the Slovaks historical 
experience – from imperialism through to 1993 – has, in many ways, been one of  “domination” 
(Kirschbaum, 2005; Shepherd, pp.134-5) which in-turn impeded their cultural, economic and 
political development relative to that of the Czechs. Although this gap has long been closed, 
such an understanding is necessary not only to explain differences as they were in 1993, but 
also, to demonstrate how those experiences fed into divergences between the two republics’ 
response patterns to IOs.  
The following periods are examined: imperialism through to the creation of 
Czechoslovakia in 1918; the interwar years; the communist period (1948 – 1989) and finally, 
the Velvet Revolution (1989) through to the Velvet Divorce (1993). The section ends with a 
brief look at dynamics in each country immediately after the split (1993 – 1998) in order to 
 
43 The Austro-Hungarian Empire dates from 1867 but prior to this, the areas comprising the Czechia and Slovakia 
today were linked to Austria and Hungary respectively.  
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illustrate how these diverging historical experiences guided their immediate transition periods 
(Shepherd, 2000). 
Setting the Course: Austro-Hungary through to the Velvet Divorce 
Under the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Czechs (linked to Austria) benefited from a 
relatively inclusive political and cultural environment whereas the experience of the Slovaks 
(linked to Hungary) was one of exclusion from political life and of cultural domination through 
the process of Magyrisation (ILO Staff Interviewee Kari Tapiola, 2018; Mahoney, 2011, 
pp.115-126; Shepherd, 2000, pp.10-14). A key turning point for the Czechs came in the mid-
to-late 18th century when the Hapsburg’s abolished feudalism and began to support 
industrialisation in Bohemia. This paved the way for urbanisation and the growth of an 
educated Czech speaking middle class whose shared sense of national identity stretched across 
the territories comprising of modern-day Czechia i.e. Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. In 
addition to nurturing the development of bureaucratic and financial institutions, this growing 
economic and cultural influence would, by the late 19th century, spill-over into the political 
realm allowing for the extension of the franchise and the creation of an independent Czech 
political party (Mahoney, 2011, pp.104-123).  
Conditions in the Slovak regions were quite different. In the early 19th century, the 
processes of industrialisation were retarded by the persistence of feudalism and Hungary’s 
refusal to grant the Slovaks autonomy (Shepherd, 2000, pp.4-11). Hungarian noblemen 
moreover denied Slovaks territorial rights such as land ownership, freedom of the press, voting 
and worked to ensure that the language of higher education and that of government remained 
Magyar. As such, the Slovaks did not see a revival of national culture or the development of 
political and financial institutions in the same way the Czechs did (Mahoney, 2011, pp.110-
126).  
Despite uniting into one state, the dynamics described above would divide the Czechs 
and Slovaks in ways which would shape outcomes over the next century. As noted by an ILO 
official with specialist knowledge on the region: 
“the whole idea that they were the same country is a little bit of a myth. I used to go to Prague a lot, one 
of the first things I learned was from a Czech gentleman who had been a student in 1918 when after 
WW1 Czechoslovakia was born. He said when Slovakia was added, we said this will never work, the 
tensions between two…” (ILO Staff Interviewee Kari Tapiola, 2018).  
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For example, when Czechoslovakia was created in 1918, the diverging levels of 
economic, institutional and cultural development (Shepherd, 2000, p.15) led inevitably to the 
new state having a dominant Czech character i.e. it was centralised and administered from 
Prague (Mahoney, 2011, p.150). ⁠44 Under Hungarian rule, educational opportunities were few 
and so many of the top civil service jobs were populated by Czechs. However, even as Slovak 
human capital accrued, the Czechs continued to dominate the top positions impeding social 
mobility for the Slovak middle classes. This failure to level out economic disparities caused 
further division and ultimately the temporary breakup of Czechoslovakia during World War II 
(Innes, 2001, pp.5-7).45 
The post war communist period would not alleviate these asymmetries: in 1948, the 
Czech communist party (KSC) staged a coup (Shepherd, 2000, p.23) and despite the country’s 
recent reunification and renewed hopes for Slovak autonomy (see Innes, 2001, p.20), Slovaks 
were once again forcefully merged into a project of which they could not control – albeit one 
of socialism rather than of Czechoslovak nationalism (Kirschbaum, 2005, p.232 ⁠; Henderson, 
2002, p.16).46 
Even after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Velvet Revolution and the embrace of a 
multi-party system (Mahoney, 2011, pp.242-5), tensions re-emerged (Whitefield & Evans, 
1999, p.133; Innes, 2001, p.43; Kirschbaum, 2005, p.222). The Czech’s welcomed the changes, 
in seeking a clean break with the past, they banned former communist party members from a 
range of public employments (e.g. government, economic, military, academia and media) 
through the ‘Lustration Laws’ and ‘Screening Act’ (Mahoney, 2011, p.249) and set about 
 
44 The dominance of the Czechs was not just institutional but also cultural; Czech leaders did not view the Slovaks 
as a separate nation but rather as less developed “little brothers” (Shepherd, 2000, pp.11-12) resulting from their 
time under Hungary (Shepherd, 2000). While the factors driving unification were political (e.g. the need to contain 
Germany and the threat of irredentism - see Innes, 2001, pp.2-4) rather than cultural, there was nevertheless a 
hope that the shared histories and compatible languages would sufficiently bind the two nations together ( Innes, 
2001, pp.2-4; Shepherd, 2000, pp.9-11).  
45 Having gained traction by pointing to the centrality of Prague and the failures of capitalism for Slovak 
conditions, the Slovak Peoples Party – led by Jozef Tiso – declared autonomy (Mahoney, 2011, pp.158-69) and 
turned Slovakia into a client state of Nazi Germany (Shepherd, 2000, p.15). 
46 Not wanting to repeat the mistakes of the past, the Slovak National Council (SNC) proposed that the new state 
be a federation where central control would apply only to foreign affairs e.g. trade and defence. But, In the 
proceeding years, any movements towards Slovak autonomy - whether right wing nationalist or federalist were 
attacked not only from within the state itself but also by external forces e.g. the  Prague Spring - a reform 
movement which sought federalisation and a partial decentralisation of the economy (Innes, 2001, pp.24-28). The 
dominance of communism meant that in practice, the government remained centralised i.e. Slovak institutions 
held sway in Slovakia, but Czech institutions influenced the whole federal state (Innes, 2001, pp.24-34). 
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redesigning economic, social and political life in alignment with free market capitalism. 
Slovaks on the other hand did not exhibit the same enthusiasm for neoliberalism nor was their 
economy and institutions equipped to deal with the onslaught of rapid modernisation 
(Shepherd, 2000, pp.33-144).  
During the first few years following the Velvet Revolution, Slovakia’s living standards 
declined (Kirschbaum, 2005, p.288) and economic disparities combined with imposing reforms 
from Prague fuelled separatist feelings. These divisions were clearly reflected in the federal 
and national assembly elections of 1992: here, Czech centre right party (ODS) led by Vaclav 
Klaus won on the promise to implement radical free market reforms; Vladimir Mečiar’s Slovak 
populist nationalist party (HZDS) won on the promise to soften such reforms.47 The opposing 
nature of each leader’s election promises meant that forming a coalition was unlikely as any 
compromise would result in a loss of support. As such, neither had any incentive to keep the 
country together (Shepherd, 2000, pp.140-2) and after several rounds of negotiations, 
Czechoslovakia split in 1993 (Henderson, 2002, p.35; Mahoney, 2011, p.251).  
Charting Individual Paths in the Reflections of Shared History 
Despite their long and interconnected histories, Czechoslovakia’s split produced two 
autonomous republics with contrasting domestic conditions: the Czech Republic – a self-
reliant, conservative and neoliberal state who embraced free-market reforms; the Slovak 
Republic – a more left leaning state with lower levels of economic/institutional development 
who sought protection for its industries and rejected the radical market reforms coming from 
Prague (Regional Expert and Former ILO Staff Interviewee E, 2020). Faced with the task of 
constructing capitalist liberal democracies as well as forging new identities, the period between 
1993 – 1998 illustrates well the diverging paths each took as a result of their unique historical 
experiences: for the Czechs, this deviated little from previous years whereas the Slovaks faced 
greater challenges (Shepherd, 2000, pp.3-4). 
For example, between 1993 – 1998, the Czech government was led by the centre right 
ODS in alliance with other centre right parties the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) and the 
 
47 This situation was exacerbated by the dismantling of the arms industry in 1992 (Mahoney, 2011, pp.252-8) of 
which Slovaks relied heavily on and which was the result of a political (rather than economic) decision taken with 
the aim of distancing Czechoslovakia from industries linked to its support for the Warsaw Pact (Whittle, 1992; 
Former ILO Official and Regional Expert Interviewee E, 2020).  
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Christian Democratic Union (KDU CSL). During the immediate transition period, Klaus 
continued with the aggressive privatisation policies he had engaged in prior to the breakup 
(Mahoney, 2011, p.253), sought to further reduce the redistributive role of the state (Dyba, 
2008, pp.97-98) and worked to ensure an environment with high levels of de facto labour 
market flexibility (Dyba, 2008, pp.107-110). Having embraced modernisation early, the 
Czechs were equipped with the institutional structures and human capital to enable a relatively 
smooth transition. By the mid-1990s, unemployment was low (Dyba, 2008, pp.107-10; 
Shepherd, 2000, pp.56-58) and Czechia’s levels of democratic and economic development saw 
the country invited to participate in membership talks with both the EU and NATO (Mahoney, 
2011, pp.266-7). 
Slovakia – at this time – did not have the robust economic or bureaucratic institutions 
to facilitate a similar experience. Slovaks had earlier elected Vladimir Mečiar to counter the 
policies coming from Prague – a populist leader who, under conditions of economic disparity, 
successfully exploited socialist (Shepherd, 2000, p.154) and nationalist (Kelley, 2004, p.427) 
sentiments. After the breakup of Czechoslovakia, Mečiar ran an economic programme 
antithetical to those that most other Central Eastern European (CEE) countries were 
implementing at the time – slowing down privatisation and basing the economy on domestic 
rather than foreign investment (Kirschbaum, 2005, p.289-294). While Mečiar himself was 
driven by populism, a general reluctance to break with communism – to the extent that the 
Czechs did – permeated the Slovak peoples at large and did so as a result of their historical 
experience of external domination and the relatively lower levels of economic and institutional 
development that it created (Kirschbaum, 2005). For example, they retained more of their 
former diplomats and personnel from that period and, according to a senior ILO official, even 
welcomed individuals who were escaping the Lustration Laws in Czechia (ILO Staff 
Interviewee Kari Tapiola, 2018). As a consequence, employment regulation was designed to 
safeguard the well-being of all and was considered as being more rigid than in other market 
systems at this time (Fabo & Sedláková, 2017, p.124).  
Despite their deep historical linkages, Czechia and Slovakia emerged as two quite 
different states in 1993 (Shepherd, 2000). At a time when western capitalism had ‘triumphed’ 
(Fukuyama, 1989), the former embraced the new era of free-market liberalism whereas the 
latter sought to shield itself from its disruptive effects. That the approaches of these two post-
communist states contrasted in this way was not the result of ideological difference but rather 
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a rational response (Whitefield & Evans, 1999) to changing conditions predicated by unique 
historical experiences and diverging levels of institutional development.  
On the surface, attitudes would appear to change slightly by 1998 – shifting the Czech 
population left and the Slovaks towards the kinds of free-market reforms they had rejected 
several years earlier. Economic recession in both countries saw a win for the social democrats 
in Czechia (CSSD) while the backlash against Mečiar in Slovakia delivered victory for Mikuláš 
Dzurinda’s conservatives (SDKU) – a party which had promised intensive reforms with the 
expressed purpose of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and gaining access to IOs 
(Kirschbaum, 2005, pp.298-9). However, as the proceeding sections (and later chapters) will 
illustrate, Czechia’s and Slovakia’s attitudes towards liberalisation and flexibility of the labour 
code would remain very much tied to the historical patterns set out above. 48 As chapters IV-VI 
will later also demonstrate, this in-turn shaped their respective approaches towards IOs and 
helps to explain each countries diverging patterns of compliance and response in this regard. 
 
 
48 By 1998, the mood in both countries began to shift. Czechia was in recession, unemployment was rising, 
austerity measures were in place and the public were changing their mind about Klaus’ reform strategy (Shepherd, 
2000, pp.39-76). His failure to tackle corruption, involvement in several scandals, and inability to prevent an 
economic downturn forced him to step down in December of 1997 and paved the way for the social democrats’ 
(CSSD) success in the elections of July 1998 (Mahoney, 2011, pp.254-5)  However, Czechia would never really 
depart from the market focused policies set by Klaus in the early transitions period. While CSSD had won the 
election, it did so with a slim majority and had to strike a deal with ODS to form a minority government (Mahoney, 
2011, p.255). This was a controversial move (Mansfeldová & Lacina, 2019, p.145) and as is illustrated in sections 
3.2 and 3.3, provides an early indication that policies between the two main opposition parties in the Czech 
Republic do not conflict to the same extent as their Slovak counterparts.  
 
Slovakia during this time was on the brink of economic collapse (Mikloš, 2008, p.54) and Mečiar was facing huge 
backlash (Kirschbaum, 2005, p.295). A growing younger generation of Slovaks were especially angry with their 
international reputation as well as the country’s exclusion from the EU and other international bodies (Shepherd, 
2000, pp.162-3)  Here, Mikuláš Dzurinda (leader of the centre right SDKU party) ran a successful campaign 
announcing his intention to embark on serious reform with the main goals of attracting foreign investment and 
gaining accession to the EU (Kirschbaum, 2005, pp.298-9).  
 
Despite this turn towards policies which had been previously rejected, the labour code would become the subject 
of fierce political and social debate i.e. organised labour and the social democrat party provided a formidable 
challenge to SDKU’s promises of liberalisation and labour code flexibility - dynamics not present in Czechia. 
Moreover, an interesting development of the Mečiar years was the creation of a strong civil society and the 
eagerness of Slovaks to embrace assistance from international organisations. Driven by the fear of another Mečiar 
victory, many national civic associations began to form which would function to monitor elections and encourage 
people to vote (Shepherd, 2000, pp.162-3). These national agencies however actively looked to western NGOs 
with common cause to lend support e.g. providing them with information about the electoral process. The ability 
of civil society to organise as well as the high levels of electoral participation played a major role in pushing 
Mečiar out of power (Kirschbaum, 2005, pp.297-8). This is a great example of the country reaching out to and 
relying on external actors to accomplish domestic goals – a trend which was born of historical experience and 
continued through the transition period and EU accession process.   
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3.2 Legislative Reforms 1998 – 2017 
“Even I have problems to define what are the social democrats in Czechia, I mean what is 
their deal?” (Regional Labour Law Expert, interviewee A, 2020). 
“Fico and SMER, he really was a real social democrat…he tried to protect the workers” 
(Former ILO Official and Regional Expert, Interviewee E, 2020). 
Guided by empirical data gathered from the EU Commission’s LABREF database 
(LABREF database, DG EMPL, European Commission, 2019) this section illustrates how the 
diverging political cultures forged of the histories sketched out above are reflective in 
Czechia’s and Slovakia’s legislative reform patterns.49 The period examined spans 2000 (when 
reliable data begins) to 2017 with observations derived from changes pertaining to employment 
protection legislation (EPL), trade union rights and social welfare. Close attention is paid to 
dynamics within each country e.g. whether reforms correlate with type of government as well 
as comparisons between Czechia and Slovakia. Overall, the section finds that when right wing 
parties alter legislation in favour of business i.e. making the labour code more flexible for 
employers, left wing parties in Czechia do not challenge these reforms to the same extent as 
their Slovak counterparts preferring instead to preserve the status quo.  
Cross-Party Cohesion and the Dominant Narrative of Market Liberalisation in Czechia    
Figure 3.1 provides a visual comparison of reform patterns by successive governments 
where the CSSD and ODS represent the main left- and right-wing parties respectively. At first 
glance, these patterns correlate with whether there is a left- or right-wing coalition led 
government with CSSD consistently passing more legislation seeking to strengthen protection 
than ODS.50 However, the totals in figure 3.1 include protective legislation other than EPL 
such as those pertaining to  social welfare or active labour market policies (ALMPs); in regard 
 
49 The data gathered is compiled into two appendices (Appendix 4A and Appendix 4B) which are both referenced 
with links to the original database. This section regularly refers to specific legislative reforms and in doing so cites 
the corresponding cell in the relevant appendix. For more detailed information on individual reforms, visit 
(LABREF database, DG EMPL, European Commission, 2019). 
50The EU Commission’s LABREF database uses the term ‘Labour Market Reforms’ in reference to legislation 
regarding (1) social welfare (2) Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) (3) Employment Protection Legislation 
(EPL) and others. Within this text, the term ‘protection’ is used when referencing all three policy areas together. 
Moreover, the database depicts changes to legislation in terms of ‘increasing’ or ‘decreasing’ a particular policy 
area (Turrini et al, 2015, p.6); because LABREF’s use of the term ‘increasing’ could include changes which favour 
employers (e.g. ‘increasing’ the number of years fixed term contracts can be renewed) , the terms ‘strengthening’ 
and ‘weakening’ are used instead as a substitute to capture whether changes to EPL specifically benefit labour - 
‘weaken’ denotes the opposite. Whether a reform is considered to strengthen or weaken protection is based on the 
framework in the ‘User Guide’ provided by the EU Commission (see ‘User Guide’, pp.8-9 at LABREF Database, 
2017) 
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to EPL specifically, CSSD have not managed to alter the programme very drastically from the 
one introduced in the early to mid-1990s. Table 3.1 illustrates this by listing how successive 
reform attempts by CSSD have been permanently softened or reversed. 
Figure 3.1  
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Table 3.1 – CSSD Reforms Reversed or Softened   
Year Reform Description Outcome 
2000 
Appendix 
4A – cell 
6 
Collective Dismissals  “Aligning collective dismissals and 
related obligations for employers 
with EU legislation” 
Implementing EU Legislation 
2000 
Appendix 
4A – cell 
8 
Notice and Severance 
Payments 
“Compulsory severance pay 
limited to two months…” 
Softened  
2011 – ODS reduce severance 
liability by making it 
dependent on tenure 
2000 
Appendix 
4A – cell 
9  
Wage Setting “Introducing indirect coverage 
through administrative extensions 
of wage agreements…” 
Reversed  




4A – cell 
14  
Definition of fair 
dismissal  
“Making more onerous the 
notification of dismissal and 
compensation of employees” 
Softened 2011 
Defining areas which are 
legally considered for fair 
dismissal rather than leaving 
it to collective bargaining 
2004 
Appendix 




“Introduction of a legal definition 
of collective dismissal” 
 




4A – cell 
31  
Maximum duration of 
fixed-term contracts  
“Introduction of a limit of two 
years to the maximum total 
duration of temporary contracts” 
Softened 2011 
Extended to three years with 
the option of repeating the 
cycle twice (9 years) 
2005 
Appendix 
4A – cell 
46  
Wage Setting “Possibility to broaden the scope of 
application of higher collective 
agreements …” 
Left untouched but already 
weakened by CCC  
2006 
Appendix 
4A – cell 
49  
Definition of fair 
dismissal (part of new 
labour code 262/2006)  
“Increasing the level of 
employment protection and 
strengthening the role of trade 
unions…” 
Softened 2011 
Defining areas which are 
legally considered for fair 
dismissal rather than leaving 
it to collective bargaining 
2006  Labour Code 262/2006 “Expanding the power of trade 
unions regarding the conclusion of 
collective agreements…”. 
(Eurofound, 2008) 
11 Provisions repealed by 
constitutional court 
Eurofound, 2008) 
                             Source: (LABREF Database, n.d.)  
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During its first term (1998 – 2002), CSSD did tighten the rules on dismissals, notice 
periods, severance pay (Appendix 4A. Cells 6-8) and strengthened the position of unions by 
allowing for extensions of collective bargaining agreements (Appendix, 4A, Cell 9). However, 
as table 3.1 exhibits, apart from those that were requirements of EU accession, none of these 
reforms survived nor were any attempts made to restore them when the party regained power 
in 2013.51 Before the end of its second term (2002 – 2006),  CSSD (with the help of the 
communist party KSČM) did enact a new labour code (Act No. 262/2006) (Kadavá et al, 2005) 
which further strengthened some union rights (Appendix, 4A, Cell 49; Cook, 2010, pp.179-
80). However, according to an official at the Czech Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
(Czech MPSV); the 2006 labour code did not depart too greatly from many of the changes that 
had been made previously (Czech Ministry of Labour Interviewee C, 2020). In other ways, it  
actually served to increase flexibility rather than decrease it: the new principle upon which the 
code rest was that “everyone may do anything which is not forbidden by law” (Gregorová, 
2008, p.283) whereas the previous code stated that “if it is not allowed [by the code] then it is 
forbidden” (Czech Ministry of Labour Interviewee C, 2020). The fact that the labour code was 
not detailed enough introduced a vagueness which improved bargaining leverage for employers 
and risked threatening an increase in labour disputes (Gregorová, 2008, p.283). Owing to the 
high cost of legal representation, this development, combined with a decrease in union density 
hurts workers as legal representation is a key service that unions provide.   
Despite this significant level of flexibility, when ODS re-entered office in early 2007 
(OECD, 2008, p.10), they promised to decrease the regulatory burden on business (Dyba, 2008, 
pp.103-4).  Although the new administration did not turn their attention to EPL until its second 
term (2010 – 2013), the Czech Constitutional Court (CCC) in March 2008 struck down eleven 
of the 2006 labour code’s provisions with the effect of further restricting the power of trade 
unions (Eurofound, 2008a; also see Appendix, 4A Cells 73, 74) – the case had been lodged by 
employers groups and right wing parliamentarians in late 2006 (Eurofound, 2006a).52  It is 
 
51 While the law concerning extensions of wage agreements remains, it does so in a weaker form after the Czech 
Constitutional Court (CCC) declared the original legislation void in 2003 (Appendix, 4A, Cell, 22). As of 2005, 
wage agreements can only be extended to the wider sector only if there is agreement between the largest union 
and employers’ association involved (Appendix, 4A, Cell 46). Moreover, very few sectors are covered e.g. 
construction and textiles; and in any case, extensions are not applicable to firms employing less than twenty people 
(ETUI, 2020). For the most part, wage negotiations in the Czech Republic remain at the firm level which increases 
the bargaining power of employers relative to organised labour (Burgess, 2010, p.213) 
52 These provisions included (1) removing the obligation for an employer to sign a collective agreement with the 
largest trade union involved (in case of disagreement between unions) and (2) eliminating unions’ right to carry 
out inspections to ensure compliance with collective agreements (See Appendix, 4A Cells 73, 74). 
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worth noting here that the CCC has a tendency to lean on the side of employers and 
conservative parties; many of the judges between 1993 – 2003 were individuals who, during 
the years prior to 1989, had been opposed to the communist regime and imprisoned for political 
reasons (European Commission, 2015). Its ideological composition changed very little in 
2003/4 when President Vaclav Klaus (former leader of ODS) was able to select nine new judges 
(Kühn, 2017, p.209) forming a court that was seen by many as receptive to “business interests 
at the expense of citizens’ [sic] rights” (Klvana , 2004, p.211).53   
In ODS’ second term, the 2006 labour code received a second blow as the government 
sought to amend some of its provisions – increasing the maximum duration of fixed term 
contracts, reducing severance and making dismissals more flexible for employers (Appendix, 
4A Cells 86;87;88). In addition to this,  it instructed the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
to make strikes more administratively complicated (Clauwaert, S. & Schömann, I, 2013, p.6) 
and introduced new regulations on ‘representativeness’ thus making it harder for trade unions 
to operate in some companies (Appendix, 4A, Cell 96). 
CSSD regained power in 2013 with a slim majority but during its term (2013 – 2017), 
it did not pass any legislation which pushed back on the flexibility for employers that ODS had 
created in the five years prior. Apart from a slight wage increase for the public sector 
(Appendix, 4A, Cells 135;149;150), much of the legislation focused on social welfare policies 
e.g. housing benefit (Appendix, 4A, Cells 133;134), and sickness schemes (Appendix, 4A, 
Cells 147; 148). In regard to EPL, several bills were passed which created a stricter 
environment for employers of temporary agency workers (Appendix, 4A, Cells, 
127;128;142;143); however, as noted by a researcher and regional expert, these policies reflect 
a continuity with ODS’ programme which did not disrupt the status quo (Regional Labour Law 
Expert Interviewee A, 2020). Following a rise in temporary agency workers after the 2008 
financial crisis (see figure 3.2), it was employers’ groups who actually pushed to strengthen 
EPL in the area of temporary agency workers in order to level out competition. Trade unions 
on the other hand opposed such legislation for fear that temporary workers would replace 




53 Note* Court appointments run on a ten-year cycle and have tended to coincide with presidential terms allowing 
each to shape the court in their own image (Kühn, 2017, p.209).  




Source: (ILO Stat, 2020)  
Slovakia’s Social Democrats: An Effective Counterweight 
The Slovak political cycle is important for determining degrees of flexibility in regard 
to EPL (Regional Labour Law Expert Interviewee B, 2020). As figure 3.3 illustrates, legislation 
seeking to strengthen protection is passed in far greater numbers by left wing party SMER than 
its right-wing counterpart SDKU. Unlike the situation in Czechia, this observation holds even 
when focusing specifically on EPL – table 3.2 exhibits how SMER and SDKU battle over 
policy each reversing the previous governments legislative changes throughout their successive 
terms.  
Figure 3.3  
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2006 – 2010 
SDKÚ-DS 
2010 – 2012 
SMER 
2012 – 2017 
Collective Dismissals 
 
Relaxing rules/valid reasons 
for collective dismissals 






redundancy as well 
as wages during the 
notice period 




Making more flexible 
the rule under which 
collective dismissals 
can occur (Appendix 
4B, Cell 73) 
Collective Dismissals 
 
No Action.  
Fixed Term Contracts 
“Increasing the maximum 
overall duration of fixed term 













increased to 3 years 
from 2 years”. 
(Appendix 4B, Cell 
74) 
Fixed Term Contracts 
Maximum duration of fixed 
term contracts reduced to 
two years (Appendix 4B, 
Cell 91) 
Fixed Term Contracts 
“The maximum number of 
renewals of fixed-term 
contracts was increased to 3 





number of renewals 
(can be done only 
once in three years) 







increased to 3 years 
from 2 years” 
(Appendix 4B, Cell 
74)  
Fixed Term Contracts 
Reversing the previous 
legislation – only two 
(instead of three) renewals 
are possible. (Appendix 4B, 
Cell 91) 
Notice and Severance  











cost by “way of 
abolishing the 
cumulation of paid 
notice period with 
severance pay” 
(Appendix 4B, Cell 
74) 
 
Notice and Severance 
 
“Reintroduction of … 
salaried notice period and 
severance pay…” (Appendix 
4B, Cell 91) 
 






        





2006 – 2010 
SDKÚ-DS 
2010 – 2012 
SMER 
2012 – 2017 
Wage Setting 
 
“Making the ministerial 
extension of sectoral wage 
settlements…conditional upon 
written consent of non-
participating firms” 




” introducing the 
possibility to extend 
a sectoral collective 
agreement to other 
companies in the 
sector without the 
consent of the 
companies” 





to opt out of sectoral 
extensions of wage 
agreements (Appendix 
4B, Cell 67) 
Wage Setting 
 
“Extension of the binding 
character of higher collective 
agreements, that apply 
automatically to any company 
employing more than 20 
people, regardless of whether 
the company has consented to 
the agreement or not” 
(Appendix 4B, Cell 126) 
Wage Setting 
 
No Action  
Wage Setting  
 
No Action  
Wage Setting  
 
Introducing a 30% 
representativeness 
quota for union before 
they can operate in a 
firm (Appendix 4B, 
Cell 80) 
Wage Setting  
 
“Trade Unions must no 
longer prove that they 
represent at least 30 % of 


















from 3 to 6 months. 
“Under collective 
agreements the 
probation period for 
an executive 
employee can be 
raised to a maximum 
of nine months” 




“Probationary periods may no 
longer be extended in 
collective agreement” 
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As noted in section 3.1, conservative leader Dzurinda came to power in 1998 on a 
mandate for reform in order to attract FDI and gain membership to IOs. Not only did he 
accomplish this but in the process, he turned Slovakia into one of the reform leaders in the 
region boosting its international reputation far from that of the Mečiar days (Mikloš, 2008, 
p.56). During its first term however (1998 – 2002), the government coalition included left wing 
parties and as a consequence, EPL remained fairly stringent – the legislation that was passed 
actually strengthened protection e.g. increasing notice periods (Fabo & Sedláková, 2017, 
p.124) and harmonising law with EU Directives on working time, parental leave and dismissals 
(Cook, 2010, pp.189-90; Eurofound, 2002). These changes were soon attacked by employers’ 
groups and in response, amendments were made to relax EPL across several areas. Despite 
these adjustments, unions were still generally satisfied with the labour code while employers 
continued to protest (Eurofound, 2002).  
By Dzurinda’s second term (2002 – 2006) however, the government was more 
homogenous and as such, embarked on a radical deregulatory reform programme (Mikloš, 
2008, p.57; Cook, 2010, p.189) targeting areas such as notice and severance (Fabo & 
Sedláková, 2017, pp.124-5) fixed-term contracts (Appendix, 4B, Cell 17), overtime (Mikloš, 
2008, p.74) and hiring and firing (Havlat et al, 2018, p.8). In an attempt to reduce further the 
collective bargaining scope and reach of trade unions (Regional Labour Law Expert 
Interviewee B, 2020), the administration also removed automatic sectoral extensions of 
collective bargaining agreements (Appendix, 4B, Cell 19).  
Not only were unions unsurprisingly opposed to these changes, but so too did the public 
begin to grow wary of the pro-market reforms (Fabo & Sedláková, 2017, pp.123-4). Despite 
having repaired Slovakia’s international reputation and placing it on the map as a favoured 
destination for FDI, Dzurinda faced huge backlash (Anderson, 2006). This made room for 
Robert Fico’s social democratic party SMER to run a campaign which promised to decrease 
the flexibility of EPL and strengthen the power of unions (Mikloš, 2008, pp.81-2) – when Fico 
was elected in July 2006, that is exactly what he did.  During his first four years in power, 
SMER reversed most of Dzurinda’s reforms (see table 3.2) and introduced new legislation 
increasing the power of unions.54 After the 2008 financial crash, employers’ groups and 
 
54  E.g. on fixed term contracts; dismissals; reintroducing the extension of sectoral bargaining agreements (See 
Appendix 4B, Cells 37-43). He further empowered workers via legislation obliging employers to sign agreements 
with the union representing the largest number of employees – preventing smaller unions from blocking 
negotiations in the case of disagreement (Appendix 4B, Cell 43). 
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conservative parties began to demand a return to a more flexible labour code, but the Fico 
administration did not budge (Fabo & Sedláková, 2017, pp.128-9). 
After the elections of July 2010, SMER failed to form a coalition despite coming in 
first place and as a result, SDKU regained power (Mahoney, 2011, pp.263-4). The new 
administration – led by Slovakia’s first female prime minister Iveta Radičová – returned 
legislation to its pre-Fico form (Fabo & Sedláková, 2017, pp.129-30). The ‘Big Labour Code’ 
reform of 2011 not only reversed much of Fico’s policies e.g. on sectoral extensions of 
collective bargaining, extending fixed term contracts and on notice and severance (see table 
3.2) but sought to further reduce the power of trade unions by implementing a 
representativeness quota i.e. trade unions now had to prove they represented at least 30% of 
employees before they were allowed to operate in a particular firm (Appendix, 4B, Cells 73-
78; 80; 84). However, after less than two years in office, the conservative party again faced a 
huge backlash allowing SMER a landslide win in the 2012 elections (BBC, 2012).  
Having run on a campaign to raise taxes on the rich and reduce the flexibility of EPL, 
Fico proceeded to successfully reverse the reforms of 2011. Although the Slovak Constitutional 
Court struck down the reintroduction of sectoral extensions of collective bargaining agreements 
(Appendix, 4B, Cell 151), the administration brought it back (albeit in a weaker form – see 
ETUI, 2019a) in 2017 (Appendix, 4B, Cell 161). The continued dominance of SMER has 
allowed these reforms to remain intact (Fabo & Sedláková, 2017, p.131).55 
In sum, the unique historical experiences of Czechia and Slovakia feeds into their 
distinct political cultures creating implications (Pierson, 1996, p.126-7) for policy norms and 
diverging patterns of legislative reforms. As this section has illustrated, Czechia prefers greater 
levels of flexibility regardless of whether there is a left or right wing government at the helm.56 
While the social democratic party CSSD have increased the rigidity of the labour code on 
several occasions, they are careful to do so within the status quo while many of their other 
efforts to protect workers have been softened or reversed by ODS. Slovakia on the other hand 
never fully embraced neoliberalism; even after the radical reforms of the Dzurinda years, 
 
55 Slovakia have recently held elections (February 29, 2020). Centre right party OLaNO (understood as being right 
wing and populist) have now entered government (France-Presse, 2020).  
56 The discontent among workers regarding the extent to which Czech authorities embraced neoliberalism during 
this time was expressed by a Czech workers’ delegate at the ILC in 2001 (See ILC Record of Proceedings, 2001, 
PDF.218).  
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observers have characterised the Slovak model as a unique brand of “social liberal capitalism” 
(Fisher et al, 2007, p.979) which successfully mixes market friendly policies with levels of 
protection much higher than some of its regional neighbours (Fisher et al, 2007, pp.979-986). 
Moreover, when EPL does become too flexible for the public, the social democrats (SMER) 
function as an effective counterweight. (Fabo & Sedláková, 2017, p.123). The role of social 
partners (unions and employers’ groups) in this regard is examined in the following section.    
3.3 The Diverging Role of Social Partners in Czechia and Slovakia 
Trade union membership in both Czechia and Slovakia has significantly declined in 
recent decades however, organised labour in the latter is much more successful at achieving its 
interests.  In order to understand why this is the case, it is necessary to look beyond quantitative 
indicators such as ‘trade union density’ and to instead judge labour’s accomplishments in the 
political realm. As membership rates have declined, so too has the ability of unions to affect 
outcomes via traditional channels such as collective bargaining, as a result, unions in both 
countries have had to refocus their efforts towards influencing legislation (Fabo & Sedláková, 
2017; Martišková & Sedláková, 2017). After a brief analysis of two indicators commonly used 
to measure and assess the power of trade unions, the section concludes by examining the role 
of unions in both countries. 
Interpreting the Quantitative Indicators  
 In the post-Soviet era, trade unions across the whole of CEE suffered a diminution of 
legitimacy (Drahokoupil, J. Kahancová, 2019); as figure 3.4 illustrates, membership rates in 
both Czechia and Slovakia have declined at a roughly equal and steady pace on par with the 






57  “A trade union is defined as a workers' organization constituted for the purpose of furthering and defending 
the interests of workers. This trade union density rate conveys the number of union members who are employees 
as a percentage of the total number of employees. For the purpose of this indicator in particular, trade union 
membership excludes union members who are not in paid employment (self-employed, unemployed, retired, etc.)” 
(ILO Stat, 2020)  




  Source: (ILO Stat, 2020) 
 
As membership decreases, so too does the ability of unions to bargain effectively for 
various outcome rights e.g. wages, employment security and working conditions (Kahancová, 
2017, p.186; Gennard, 2007, p.95) and as a result, unions in both countries have had to 
increasingly rely on their ability to influence legislation (Gennard, 2007, p.98). In a recent 
interview, a researcher and regional expert noted that one of the reasons the labour code is so 
important is that it has become one of the only ways for unions to uphold standards of best 
practice (Regional Labour Law Expert Interviewee B, 2020).  Indeed, as figure 3.5 illustrates, 
collective bargaining coverage rates decline when heavily pro-business reforms are passed (e.g. 
in Slovakia during the Dzurinda administration – 2003-2005) and appear to increase during 
periods where there is a social democrat incumbent (e.g. Czechia’s rates climb and remain 
stable  following the new labour code introduced by CSSD in 2006).58 However, legislative 
influence in this regard does not necessarily translate into increased collective bargaining 
coverage nor vice versa: as the figure demonstrates, Slovakia’s rates decline steadily despite 
SMER’s domination from 2012 onwards while Czechia’s rates increase between 2009-2010 – 
a period shortly after the CCC repealed many of the 2006 labour code’s provisions. 
 
 
58 Collective bargaining coverage rates measure “the number of employees whose pay and/or conditions of 
employment are determined by one or more collective agreement(s) as a percentage of the total number of 
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Source: (ILO Stat, 2020) 
There are several possible explanations for these contradictory observations: (1) gaps 
exist between de jure an de facto protection meaning that laws passed protecting collective 
bargaining do not translate in practice; (2) reforms are superficial in the sense that they are 
more political than substantive in nature (Fabo & Sedláková, 2017, p.140); (3) legislation 
seeking to strengthen EPL serves paradoxically to undermine the power of trade unions i.e. by 
regulating an increasingly greater number of issue areas which were once the realm of 
collective bargaining, the scope of issues trade unions can bargain for decreases (Regional 
Labour Law Exert Interviewee B, 2020).  
These discrepancies strengthen the conclusions made in chapter II in regard to using 
quantitative indicators such as union density to explain outcomes (see chapter II section 2.1). 
As the remainder of this section will illustrate, there are qualitative distinctions to be made 
which highlight how unions in Slovakia have more political leverage and influence than their 
Czech counterparts in ways that have nothing to do with the trade union density measurements 
or collective bargaining coverage rates of either country. Identifying these key differences is a 
necessary step before proceeding to chapters which investigate how these divergences mediate 
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Trade Unions in Czechia  
Trade unions in Czechia are characterised by high levels of fragmentation, internal 
conflict (Myant & Smith, 1999, p.267) and organise predominately at the firm or company 
(rather than sectoral) level (Martišková & Sedláková, 2017, pp.59-60). Approximately half of 
all unions in Czechia are members of the Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions 
(CMKOS) – the country’s largest union confederation representing workers’ interests at the 
national and international levels (Drahokoupil & Kahancová, 2019, p.308; ETUI, 2016a). 
While belonging to a confederation can provide smaller unions some additional leverage, 
CMKOS’ decision to devolve power has further contributed to the fragmented nature of Czech 
unions as well as the dominance of firm level bargaining (Martišková & Sedláková, 2017, 
pp.60-1). Firm level bargaining provides more flexibility for employers and decreases the 
power of unions because it creates impediments to developing a unified national position 
(Martišková & Sedláková, 2017, p.65; Burgess, 2010, pp.213-14). Given the political climate 
in the years immediately following the Velvet Revolution, the confederation had little choice 
but remove the associations tied to its communist past (Dyba, 2008, p.108) – as noted by a 
former ILO official and regional expert, Czech unions in the 1990s were seen in a negative 
light not only by politicians embracing neoliberalism but also by the public at large (Former 
ILO Official and Regional Expert Interviewee E, 2020).  
Throughout the post-communist period, weakened unions in Czechia have engaged in 
new strategies (Martišková & Sedláková, 2017, pp.63-5) with the most important area of focus 
being legislation. 59  However, according to regional experts, weak ties between them and their 
political allies (CSSD) often prevents success in this regard (Regional Expert Interviewees A 
& B, 2020). In conversation with a Czech ministry of finance official, the interviewee noted 
that unions are nevertheless able to exert influence and do so via the country’s ‘Tripartite 
Council’ where they can  voice their support or opposition to legislation prior to it entering 
parliament (Czech Ministry of Finance Interviewee C, 2020). However, CMKOS have, on 
 
59 In addition to  ČMKOS, some of the country’s other union confederations include OS KOVO (the metalworkers 
union) and OSZSP (the health workers union) (ETUI, 2016a). In addition to influencing legislation, several other 
strategies have been attempted: (1) adopting a policy of ‘anonymous membership’ where union representatives 
bargain on behalf of unnamed employees allowing workers to exercise their rights without fear of losing their jobs 
(Myant & Smith, 1999, pp.266-9) (2) mass demonstrations and public relations campaigns (Martišková & 
Sedláková, 2017, pp.59-65) e.g. May 2011 and April 2012 protests (see Mansfeldová, 2014) (3) representing 
temporary agency workers (this has been unsuccessful (Martišková & Sedláková, 2017, pp.59-65). 
Page 109 of 369 
 
several occasions, complained to the ILO that their views in this forum are often not taken on 
board.60  
This dynamic reflects the work of scholars who have shown that Czechia’s labour code 
is primarily shaped by a top-down legal approach rather than in consultation with social 
partners (see Agostini et al, 2016, p.42).  Moreover, when legislation is passed which directly 
conflicts with the interests of workers, unions in Czechia appear to be of little recourse. The 
reversals of the 2006 labour code; the weakening of unions in the public sector post 2008 
(Agostini et al, 2016, p.12; Martišková & Sedláková, 2017, pp.61-2) as well as the pro-business 
reforms of 2011/12 were heavily criticised by CMKOS. Unable to influence this legislation in 
their favour, unions instead staged protests and demonstrations sometimes attracting over 
100,000 participants (Martišková & Sedláková, 2017, pp.61-2) (see Eurofound, 2008a; CTK 
News Agency, 2009; Agostini et al, 2016;  Martišková & Sedláková, 2017; Clauwaert, S. & 
Schömann, I, 2013, p.6). Despite the scale and frequency of these protests however, all of these 
changes have remained intact.  
Trade Unions in Slovakia   
Slovakia’s unions have suffered post 1989 legitimacy issues due to negative public 
perception – their interests largely subordinated to those of business towards the end of the 
1990s. However, compared to their regional neighbours, unions in Slovakia are still well 
established. A key difference is that major sectors such as manufacturing, electronics, metal, 
steel and health care organise at the sectoral (rather than firm) level (Kahancová, 2017, pp.179-
82) – twenty-four of the country’s sectoral unions are members of Slovakia’s largest union 
confederation ‘Konfederácia odborových zväzov Slovenskej republiky’ (KOZ SR) (ETUI, 
2019a) who represent their interests both on the national and international stages. Negotiating 
sector level regulation is the key role of these unions with the most important issues focused 
around wages, employment security and working conditions (Kahancová, 2017, pp.179-82) – 
this kind of sectoral level bargaining exists in Slovakia where it doesn’t much in other countries 
in the region.  
 
 
60 See various observations and direct requests for C144 (Tripartite Consultation) between the years 2003-2011 
(ILO NORMLEX, various years).  
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As in Czechia, unions in Slovakia have had to adopt new strategies which focus mainly 
on allying with left leaning parties and influencing legislation (employers’ groups engage in 
similar tactics with their own political allies e.g. the ministry of finance and conservative party 
SDKU).  While their success is largely dependent on the political cycle (i.e. whether there is a 
left or right leaning incumbent government) (Regional Labour Law Expert Interviewee B, 
2020), unions are nevertheless important “political actors” (Fabo & Sedláková, 2017, p.137) 
who – unlike their Czech counterparts – often succeed in altering the labour code in their 
favour. Moreover, tripartite consultations are seen as a hugely important channel for 
influencing legislation in this regard (Fabo & Sedláková, 2017, pp.137-8).  
As a result of cooperation – particularly between KOZ SR and SMER – there have been 
few instances of demonstrations and protests with unions agreeing to abstain from such activity 
in exchange for policy influence (Kahancová, 2017, pp.180-1). For example, after several 
employers’ groups (PAS; ZPS and RUZ) successfully lobbied SDKU for increased flexibility 
in 2011, KOZ SR signed a memorandum of cooperation with SMER (Regional Labour Law 
Expert Interviewee B, 2020) and managed to roll back the changes with several amendments 
the following year (Fabo & Sedláková, 2017, pp.127-130). Other successes include 
reintroducing sectoral extensions of collective bargaining agreements (Kahancová, 2017, 
pp.180-1) as well as legislation seeking to combat ”bogus self-employment” contracts (Fabo 
& Sedláková, 2017, pp.127-130). 
Overall, assessing and comparing the relative strength and strategies of social partners 
in Czechia and Slovakia requires going beyond the literature’s use of quantitative indicators 
such as trade union density and collective bargaining coverage rates. In doing so, this section 
has revealed Slovakia’s unions to be less fragmented, more successful in tripartite discussions 
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Conclusions 
Labour markets in Czechia and Slovakia are guided by cultural, political and 
institutional forces of which have been heavily influenced by historical processes. While the 
two countries exhibit many similarities, several distinctions set them apart which drive 
divergences in labour market outcomes and legislative reform patterns. These differences 
became most visible in 1993 after the breakup of Czechoslovakia when Slovakia’s relatively 
lower levels institutional and economic capacity led initially to the country taking a very 
different path to transition (Shepherd, 2000). Although it caught up with the Czechs in this 
sense, the country’s political cultural differences meant that it never embraced neoliberalism 
in the same way; instead, preferring to place a greater emphasis on protecting workers and 
empowering organised labour.  
While understanding these differences is necessary to explain divergences in labour 
market policy outcomes, they are not sufficient. These internal dynamics do not only mediate 
relations between domestic groups, they also shape a country’s relationship with external actors 
too – determining whether and how much they will respond to and work with a particular IO. 
This chapter has sketched out two ‘diverging policy spaces’ where three key variables have 
emerged in this regard: (1) political culture (2) institutional capacity (during the early years of 
post-communist transition) (3) the power of organised labour and employers’ groups to affect 
legislation. Whether and how IOs impact the policy choices of states will be mediated by these 
forces and as such they are essential to this research’s investigation. Guided by the findings 
here, the following chapters examine, explain and compare the impact of the ILO and its 
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Chapter IV 
The Impact of the ILO in Czechia and Slovakia 
“Almost all nations observe almost all principles of 
international law and almost all of their obligations 
almost all of the time” (Henkin, 1979, p.47).61 
The impact of all IOs varies and as a result, there is much theoretical and empirical 
contestation in regard to whether and how they alter state behaviour. While the reluctance of 
states to pool sovereignty and delegate authority (Hooghe & Marks, 2015) remains a central 
focus within these debates, the ILO differs from most other organisations in that each and every 
member can determine which of the collective rules they are obliged to comply with  (Hurd, 
2011, p.163) – while conventions are adopted via majority voting, such conventions do not 
become active until they are ratified by member states of whom are under no obligation to do 
so.62 However, despite high levels of member control in this regard, stark compliance 
divergences still exist. Why and when do states comply with their international commitments? 
Can IOs, particularly those without powers of enforcement, influence national legislative or 
implementation practices? How can researchers determine whether an IO has been effective in 
this regard?   
Chapter IV addresses these questions by investigating the ILO’s impact in Czechia and 
Slovakia. First, it is important to recall that available literature for this region finds no 
association between the ILO and compliance outcomes arguing instead that divergences are 
driven solely by several varying domestic indicators (see Cook, 2010 and chapter II section 
2.1). As illustrated in chapter II, these studies have two major weaknesses: first, unexplained 
compliance variation remains and does so because the authors have missed some key cross-
country qualitative differences between variables such as union density and government type.  
The ways in which Czechia and Slovakia diverge in this regard were identified in chapter III 
and are applied to the analysis here.  
 
61 This quote is from Henkin’s book ‘How Nations Behave’ but has been sourced from Pickering (2014).  
62 To date, the ILO has adopted 190 conventions covering a range of issues with a global ratification average of 
42 conventions per member state. Notable outliers here include Spain, France and Belgium at the top end with the 
most ratifications – between 113-133; and Tonga, Brunei, Malaysia, Qatar  and the Marshall Islands with the least 
– between 1-6 ratifications (NORMLEX Database, n.d.).  
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The second weakness of the literature was that it tries to capture the ILO’s impact by 
comparing and contrasting compliance rates. This strategy is problematic. On the one hand, 
commitments can be shallow and good compliance endogenous (Downs et al, 1996) – often, 
national law and practice are already aligned with a convention’s requirements prior to 
ratification. On other hand, states may choose not to ratify but nevertheless use the contents of 
a convention to guide legislative decisions or resolve internal labour disputes (ILO, 2019b, 
p.25). In both cases, compliance data tells us very little about the impact of the ILO on state 
behaviour.  
This thesis has adopted a definition of impact (see chapter II section 1.2) which requires 
identifying “observable desired [changes] in state [behaviour]” (Raustiala, 2000, pp.393-4) that 
can be attributed to the ILO. To overcome the methodological problems associated with 
attempting to explain compliance – or why violations did not occur – the work here investigates 
the ILO’s impact after a violation has been identified; that is, it asks why violations did occur 
and then observes whether the organisation successfully influenced governments to take 
corrective action e.g. a change to legislation or implementation practices (this approach has 
been inspired by the work of Landy, 1966; Weisband, 2000; Thomann, 2011). Assessing the 
ILO’s influence in this way is a fruitful endeavour not least because it allows the researcher to 
examine documented events and therefore to make more robust causal links between the 
organisation and state practice (Thomann, 2011, p.244).  
When the ILO’s supervisory mechanism (henceforth the Committee) identifies a 
violation (referred to as an ‘observation’ or ‘direct request’), it  kick starts a process of dialogue 
between the organisation and the member state in question – the Committee often providing 
legal and technical advice in an effort to guide the state back on track. When the Committee is 
satisfied that the violation has been resolved in line with its requests – i.e. the country has 
changed legislative or implementation behaviour as recommended -  it issues the government 
with a ‘case of progress’ communicating to the member that it considers the matter closed 
(ILO, 2019b, p.108).  These interactions are recorded into the organisation’s reports and 
various archives and as a result, it has produced a huge cache of valuable empirical data 
allowing for a more robust investigation into the ILO’s impact than research concerned with 
compliance. As noted by the former Deputy-Director General of the ILO, neither the CEACR 
nor the Conference Committee make detailed reports when compliance is good and the laws 
are being observed (ILO Staff Interviewee Kari Tapiola, 2018). When investigating violations 
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however, available data makes it possible to trace the evolution of an observation or direct 
request over time, to examine the ILO’s tools ‘in action’ (Thomann, 2011, p.244) and to 
identify the necessary variables that did, or did not, lead to impact – a change in state behaviour 
acknowledged by a ‘case of progress’.  
Using the processes described above, this chapter illustrates when and how the ILO 
makes an impact via a theoretically guided qualitative comparative analysis of Czechia and 
Slovakia. In doing so, it finds the organisation to be much more successful in the latter than the 
former. Overall, the ILO’s impact is best explained via the rationalist managerial pathway 
(Chayes & Chayes, 1993); however, the extent to which the ILO makes an impact in this way 
can be explained by the findings sketched out in the previous chapter – each country mediating 
the impact of IOs in accordance with its unique policy space.  
Czechia leans more to the right, its unions are relatively less influential than those in 
neighbouring countries and its political cycle appears inconsequential i.e. compliance and 
responsiveness patterns do not vary significantly depending on whether there is a left wing or 
conservative party in power. As a result, Czechia’s relationship with the ILO can at times 
become contentious; violations mostly occur (or continue to occur) owing to a lack of political 
will. When Czech authorities are called upon by the ILO to correct these violations, the country 
tends to engage in mock compliance (Walter, 2008 cited in Woodward, 2016) or pushes back 
on the Committee’s criticisms and advice – especially on conventions which require deeper 
forms of cooperation (Downs et al, 1996) e.g. freedom of association and collective bargaining 
– C087 and C098.  
In Slovakia, a left leaning government, organised labour and the SMER 
administration’s eagerness to seek out technical assistance produced the necessary underlying 
domestic conditions for ILO influence. Where non-compliance has occurred, it has done so for 
reasons that are more diverse e.g. sometimes a problem of political will; but often, violations 
were the result of technical and legal oversights or issues of capacity – the latter isolated to the 
country’s early transition years when Slovakia was still catching up to the Czechs both 
economically and institutionally. Moreover, the political cycle matters: as will be illustrated 
throughout, there are significant differences in terms of responsiveness between Slovakia’s 
conservatives and social democrats which shape the country’s relationship with the ILO in 
ways that differ from the organisation’s interactions with Czechia.  
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While necessary, the presence of conducive domestic conditions however does not 
sufficiently explain the ILO’s impact. As noted in chapter I, domestic factors merely open the 
gate and allow access for external actors to have influence. Throughout the chapter, several 
cases are explored in which the ILO makes an impact via the managerial pathway (Bernstein 
& Cashore, 2012). Here, the organisation’s monitoring and supervisory mechanisms have 
played an indispensable role not only in identifying issues but also in their resolution through 
the provision of technical/legal advice and mediating between social partners and governments. 
The dynamics which will be outlined below align with this thesis’ definition of impact (see 
chapter I section 1.2) because they demonstrate how the ILO changes domestic legislative or 
implementation outcomes that would have not occurred in the organisation’s absence (Downs 
et al, 1996, p.380).  These findings help not only to overcome the deficiencies of the previous 
literature by demonstrating exactly when and how the ILO impacts state behaviour; but they 
begin to build support for the SNA graphs – which predicted the ILO to have a greater impact 
in Slovakia.  
To demonstrate the impact of the ILO, section 4.1 identifies variation in violation and 
response patterns between Czechia and Slovakia across all of the conventions they have 
ratified. In doing so, the section compares not only the extent to which violations occur but 
also the types of conventions which are violated most frequently. As a result, a general picture 
begins to emerge of each country’s relationship with the ILO as do some of the motivations 
driving non-compliance i.e. whether it is voluntary or involuntary. These conclusions are 
strengthened in section 4.2 by examining performance in regard to two specific conventions – 
C087 (freedom of association) and C098 (collective bargaining). Here, several violations have 
been selected and traced over time where close attention is paid to the discourse between 
country authorities, social partners (workers’ and employers’ associations) and ILO staff. 
Finally, section 4.3 draws out the key variables that help explain why and how the ILO’s 
influence varies across Czechia and Slovakia and in doing so, illustrates the conditions under 
which the ILO makes an impact.  For a review of the terms and definitions used throughout 
this chapter, see chapter I section 1.3.  
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4.1 The Diverging Violation and Response Patterns of Czechia and Slovakia  
Why does the ILO’s impact vary across two states who have signed up to roughly 
identical ILS? Czechia and Slovakia have each made similar commitments to the ILO, but their 
patterns of compliance, response and implementation differ significantly. This section 
examines these patterns across all ratified conventions between 1996 – 2019. In doing so, it 
finds the organisation’s impact to be much greater in Slovakia where distinctions can be made 
in relation to the extent of non-compliance, the types of conventions that are violated with 
regularity and the degree to which each respond to the concerns of the Committee. The central 
finding here is that Slovakia’s violations tend to be a consequence of technical/legal oversights 
or capacity. Patterns of non-compliance in Czechia however suggest that violations are more 
deviant nature i.e. where compliance demands higher domestic adjustment costs such as those 
on C087 and C098, violations persist. On conventions that are relatively easy to comply with 
(e.g. C132 Holidays with Pay), compliance and responsiveness is high. The section is divided 
into two parts – Czechia and Slovakia. Across both, empirical data is examined which has been 
gathered from the ILO’s Normlex database as well as various reports from the organisation’s 
supervisory mechanisms.  
Deviant Non-Compliance in Czechia 
Czechia has been a member of the ILO since 1919 (until 1993 as part of 
Czechoslovakia) and has ratified 73 of the organisation’s conventions including all 8 
fundamental ones.63 Between 1996-2019, the CEACR has raised 68 observations for which the 
country has received 6 ‘notes with satisfaction’ and 23 ‘notes with interest’. In addition to this, 
the Committee has also raised 245 direct requests with 41 ‘notes with interest’ (Normlex 
Database, 1996-2019). As figure 4.1 illustrates, Czechia trails behind the regional average on 
both compliance and responsiveness with the exception of progress which has been ‘noted with 
interest’.64 However, notes ‘with interest’ depict a weaker form of progress (Thomann, 2011, 
 
63 The ILO’s fundamental conventions cover issues “that are considered to be fundamental principles and rights 
at work: freedom of association and [collective bargaining]; the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory 
labour; the effective abolition of child labour; and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation” (ILO, 2019b, p.18).   
64 According to Weisband (2000), regional and global averages are useful behavioural benchmarks with which to 
judge a country’s performance. The regional average here is based on those Central and Eastern European 
countries admitted to the EU in 2004 as illustrated in Cook (2010) reviewed in Chapter III: Estonia; Hungary; 
Latvia; Lithuania; Poland; Slovenia; Czechia; Slovakia. Several countries have been excluded: Bulgaria; 
Romania; Ukraine; Russian Fed.; Belarus. This is because these countries are either non-members or late 
accession states of the EU; as such, including them here would reduce the level of control of known independent 
variables – EU membership; date of EU membership (see Cook, 2010, p.173).   
Page 117 of 369 
 
p.261)  and – as will be discussed in later sections – is indicative of the country’s tendency to 
appease the Committee without making any meaningful changes. 
 
Figure 4.1  
 
              Source: (ILO Normlex, 1996 – 2019)65 
 
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 illustrate the ILO’s impact in Czechia over time by contrasting 
violation and response data while table 4.1 provides information on the specific convention(s) 
each point refers to.66 For example, looking at figure 4.2, we can see that Czechia received 1 
observation and 0 cases of progress in 1999; as table 4.1 indicates, the CEACR raised the 
observation because of an issue with convention 155 (C155) on ‘occupational safety and 
health’.67  
 
65 Note* Response Rates are represented as a percentage and calculated using a method provided by Landy (1966) 
and Weisband (2000). Response Rate = the total number of ‘notes with satisfaction(interest) ÷ by the total number 
of ‘observations’ * 100.  
66 Inspiration to contrast compliance and response patterns as illustrated by figures 4.2 and 4.3 has been taken 
from Thomann (2011).  
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                                  Source: (ILO Normlex, 1996 – 2019) 
Figure 4.3  
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Table 4.1 CEACR Observations 1996 -2017 (Czechia)    
1996   
C111 – Discrimination  
C155 – Occupational Safety and Health 
 
1997 
C122 – Employment Policy  
General Observation 
C155 – Occupational Safety and Health 
 
1998 













C098 Right to Collectively Bargain 
C011 Right of Association (Agriculture) 
C111 Discrimination 




C098 Right to Collectively Bargain 




C098 Right to Collectively Bargain 
 
2004 
C098 Right to Collectively Bargain 
C182 Worst Form of Child Labour 
C100 Equal remuneration 




C176 Safety and Health in Mines  
C144 Tripartite Consultation 
C139 Occupational Cancer Convention 
C115 Radiation Protection Convention 
C111 Discrimination 
C161 Occupational Health Services  
C098 Right to Collectively Bargain 
 
2006 
C122 Employment Policy 
C100 Equal remuneration 
C098 Right to Collectively Bargain 
C182 Worst Form of Child Labour 
2007 
C087 – Freedom of Association 
C098 – Right to Organise 
C144 – Tripartite Consultation 
C111 – Discrimination 
 
2008 
C182 – Worst Forms of Child Labour 
C122 – Employment Policy 
C111 – Discrimination  
 
2009 
C111 – Discrimination 
C182 – Worst Forms of Child Labour 
C098 – Right to Organise 
Reports not filed for two years in a row 
 
2010 
C132 – Holidays with Pay  
C144 – Tripartite Consultation 
C161 – Occupational Health Services 
C176 – Safety and Health in Mines  
C115 – Radiation Protection  
C098 – Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining  
 
2011 
C111 – Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) 
C088 – Employment Service Convention 
C098 – Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining  
C144 – Tripartite Consultation  
C142 – Human Resources Development  
C122 – Employment Policy 
 
2012 




C088 – Employment Service 
C132 – Holidays with Pay 
 
2015 
C111 – Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation)  
C122 – Employment Policy 
C161 – Occupational Health Services  
 
2016 








                            Source: ILO Normlex (1996-2017)   
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Observing the data in this way is helpful to identify trends in relation to whether 
compliance and response rates peak or dip across particular time periods (potentially 
correlating with type of government or other factors) and in discerning whether and which 
conventions Czechia violates with regularity. As illustrated by figures 4.2 and 4.3, the country’s 
behaviour does not exhibit linear signs of improvement or decline but rather its compliance 
and response rates remain fairly consistent with violations noticeably increasing in 2005 and 
again in 2010. These patterns do not correlate with type of government i.e. whether there is a 
social democratic (CSSD) or conservative (ODS) party in power – the former incumbent in 
2005 while the latter held office in 2010. Indeed, there is little difference in the total number 
of violations each receives with the social democrats counterintuitively seeing a slightly higher 
number of both observations and direct requests – see figure 4.4.68  While this aligns with 
findings from chapter III, an additional explanation (discussed further in chapter VI) regarding  
2005 and 2010 is that these years correlate with an increase in pressure and successful policy 
diffusion from IOs such as the IMF, World Bank and OECD (see chapter V) – the first relating 
to EU accession (where these CIOs pressured states to deregulate in order to be competitive 
within the European Union) and the second in managing the aftermath of the 2008 global 
financial crash.  
Figure 4.4 
 
                          Source: ILO Normlex (1996 – 2019)  
 
68 In total, CSSD have held office for 3 years longer than ODS which would likely partially contribute to the 
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While the data above has helped to determine Czechia’s violation and response patterns 
in terms of scale, a picture of the domestic motivations driving these outcomes begins to emerge 
when we observe these same trends by type of convention. For example, observations and 
direct requests which touch on politically sensitive issues, or conflict with the neoliberal 
programme the country implemented beginning in the 1990s (see chapter III section 3.1), tend 
to be ignored and therefore persist over time. The violations which Czechia does correct in line 
with the ILO’s advice are usually those requiring fewer domestic adjustment costs (see Downs 
et al, 1996). For example, the extent to which problems with C087 and C098 persist versus the 
relatively prompt correction of violations on C132 – ‘holidays with pay’. As will be illustrated 
in section 4.2, the government’s response in regard to C087 and C098 has been minimal if not 
outright antagonistic towards the Committee.   
As figure 4.5 illustrates, several of the conventions which Czechia violates the most 
include C087 and  C098; here the Committee has, on numerous occasions, raised observations 
and direct requests in response to unreasonable obstacles to calling strikes and in regard to 
violations of trade union rights in practice (see ILO Normlex, 1996-2019).69 A third convention 
which sees recurring problems is C111 (Discrimination). Here, Czechia has been called out 
frequently for discriminatory employment practices against the Roma population (ILO 
Normlex Database, 2000) as well as on the basis of political opinion (ILO Normlex Database, 
2001). On the latter, the Committee took issue with the application of the 1991 Screening Act 
requesting that it be appealed or amended owing to its unfair targeting of individuals with ties 
to the previous communist regime (ILO Normlex Database, 2002; also see chapter III section 






69 Figure 4.5 includes only the direct requests for conventions on which Czechia has also received observations. 
In this way, the focus remains on more serious problems rather than an exhaustive and diverse list of 
technical/legal issues which would not add to the analysis here. For a full list of direct requests, see Appendix 6.1.  
 
 




                    Source: ILO Normlex (1996 – 2019) 
 
 On C111, efforts were made in 2000 to ensure that the Employment Act more clearly 
stated the “prohibited grounds of discrimination” (ILO Normlex Database, 2000)  (e.g. race, 
sex, religion, political opinion) and in 2002, measures were adopted to help tackle the 
prejudices faced by the Roma community (ILO Normlex Database, 2002). However, despite 
first raising the issue in 1992, discriminatory issues associated with the Screening Act have 
persisted. On several occasions, the government has indicated to the Committee its intentions 
to amend or revoke the Act (ILO Normlex Database, 2000) but none of its promises came to 
fruition. Over the years, numerous complaints have been filed by CMKOS and the International 
Trade Union Confederation (ITUC);  the Committee has regularly raised both observations and 
direct requests and on two separate occasions (in 2007 and again in 2009), the government was 
issued with a ‘double footnote’ illustrating the serious level to which the situation was reaching. 
(ILO Normlex Database, 2007; 2009).70 Nevertheless, an amendment on C111 was not made 
until 2016 and even then, the progress was noted only ‘with interest’ – here, the Committee 
was likely apprehensive about issuing a note of satisfaction prior to observing successful 
implementation of the legislative change (ILO Normlex Database, 2016).  
 
70 (1) Throughout, the word ‘complaints’ refers to negative comments on government submissions through Article 
22. Not to be confused with the ‘complaints’ which social partners can lodge through Article 24; these will instead 
be referred to as ‘representations’ (2) the ITUC was created in 2006 after the dissolution of the International Trade 
Union of Free Trade Unions (IFTUC). Throughout, the institution is referred to as ITUC regardless of the year in 











C011 C087 C088 C098 C100 C111 C115 C122 C132 C139 C142 C144 C155 C161 C176 C182
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As with the country’s compliance trends, Czechia’s response patterns do not appear to 
vary depending on whether the social democrats or conservatives are incumbent. As figure 4.6 
indicates, there is little difference in responsiveness rates when comparing the total time 
periods that CSSD and ODS have held office – this holds especially so for C087 & C098.  
When looking across all conventions, CSSD have received a higher number of ‘notes with 
interest’ suggesting the party has made a greater effort to respond to the Committee but that its 
progress is limited by the political cultural boundaries it operates within (see chapter III). 
Indeed, it was CSSD who finally amended the Screening Act in 2016; however, according to 
an official at the Czech Ministry of Labour, despite having little practical effect today (most 
individuals from the communist era are retired), the Screening Act is a “political emotional” 
issue for Czechia. Introduced after the Velvet Revolution to signal a clean break from the old 
regime, discussions regarding its abolition are incredibly heated and invite much criticism from 
the media and right-wing politicians (Czech Ministry of Finance Interviewee C, 2020).  
Figure 4.6 
 
Note – neither party has achieved progress ‘with satisfaction’ on C087 & C098 Source: (Normlex 
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Overall, Czechia’s compliance and response rates are below the regional average; while 
it does respond to the Committee on some issues, the country tends to ignore the organisation 
on those which require deeper forms of cooperation (Downs et al, 1996) e.g. freedom of 
association, collective bargaining and discrimination based on political opinion – all of which 
conflict with the hard-line neoliberal doctrine adopted in the immediate aftermath of the Velvet 
Revolution as illustrated in chapter III. While this is explored more in-depth in section 4.3, the 
initial patterns sketched out here suggest that non-compliance is of a voluntary nature. 
The Significance of the Political Cycle in Slovakia 
Having joined as part of Czechoslovakia in 1919, Slovakia too has been a member of 
the ILO since the organisation’s founding. It has ratified 76 conventions and achieves 
compliance and response rates above the regional average across all conventions as well as on 
C087 and C098 specifically – see figure 4.7.  
Figure 4.7 
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When examining Slovakia’s performance over time (see figures 4.8, 4.9 and table 4.2), 
we can see that after the Mečiar years, violations steadily rose and remained persistent peaking 
again in 2009/10 followed by several years of very high compliance.71 As in Czechia, some of 
these trends coincide with intense periods of reform prior to EU accession and in managing the 
aftermath of 2008; the latter period corresponds with a “stabilisation of labour law” (Fabo & 
Sedláková, 2017, p.131)  following the re-election of SMER in 2012. 
Figure 4.8 
 
           Source: Normlex Database (1996 – 2019) 
Figure 4.9.   
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Table 4.2 CEACR Observations 1996 -2018 (Slovakia)  
1996 
C087 – Freedom of Association 
 
1997 




C087 – Freedom of Association 
 
2000 
C087 – Freedom of Association 
C011 – Right of Association (Agriculture)  
 
2001 
C159 – Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment 
(Disabled Persons)  




C142 – Human Resources Development  
C098 – Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining  




C122 – Employment Policy  
C144 – Tripartite Consultation (International Labour 
Standards) 
C100 – Equal Remuneration  
 
2004 
C144 – Tripartite Consultation 
 
2005 
C100 – Equal Remuneration  
C111 – Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) 
C144 – Tripartite Consultation  
C122 – Employment Policy  
 
2006 
C144 – Tripartite Consultation 
C122 – Employment Policy 








C122 – Employment Policy 
C100 – Equal Remuneration 
C111 – Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) 
C144 – Tripartite Consultation  
 
2008 
C098 – Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
 
2009 
C100 – Equal Remuneration 
C111 – Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation)  
C144 – Tripartite Consultation  
C122 – Employment Policy  
 
2010 
C100 – Equal Remuneration 
C115 – Radiation Protection 
C144 – Tripartite Consultation 
 
2011 
C111 – Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) 
C100 – Equal Remuneration 
 
2012 
C001 – Hours of Work (Industry) 
C122 – Employment Policy 
 
2013 
C122 – Employment Policy 
 
2014 
C100 – Equal Remuneration 
C111 – Discrimination  
 
2018 
C129 – Labour Inspection (Agriculture) 
C156 – Workers with Family Responsibilities 










  Source: ILO Normlex (1996 – 2018) 
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Figure 4.10 illustrates the frequency of Slovakia’s violations by type of convention.72 
As is shown, the most prominent issues centre around C144 (Tripartite Consultation) – directed 
at the government for not consulting social partners before submitting draft legislation to 
parliament; C100 – failure to tackle gender wage discrepancies; C111 – discriminatory 
employment practices aimed at the Roma population; and C122 – in regard to regional and age 
unemployment disparities.73 For the most part, Slovakia has responded to the Committee’s 
concerns. First, it is worth noting that like Czechia, Slovakia too received a direct request in 
1995 highlighting the conflict between its Screening Act and C111 – i.e. it allowed for 
employment discrimination based on political opinion (ILO Normlex Database, 1995). 
However, the only reason Slovakia was in violation of C111 in this regard was because the Act 
automatically carried over into Slovak law after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia (ILO 
Normlex Database, 1995); once the Committee notified the country of the problem, the 
government repealed the Act without hesitation. In responding to the ILO on this issue, country 
officials stated that a decision had been taken to alter the Act owing to its incompatibility with 
the newly created Slovak Constitution and on the grounds that it did not conform with C111. 
In response, the Committee issued Slovakia a ‘note with satisfaction’ (ILO Normlex Database, 
1997) and the matter has not been raised since.  
The issue of discrimination against the Roma population has taken a different path; 
despite the Committee calling attention to the problem in 1995 (ILO Normlex Database, 1995) 
it has only once in 2005 been able to note progress ‘with interest’ after the government 
promised a series of changes through its ‘National Action Plan on Social Exclusion’. To this 
day, the Committee continues urging Slovak authorities to increase their efforts in tackling race 
based discrimination against the Roma and to improve the implementation of the associated 







72 Figure 4.10 includes only the direct requests for conventions on which Slovakia has also received observations. 
In this way, the focus is on more serious problems rather than an exhaustive and diverse list of technical/legal 
issues which would not add to the analysis here. For a full list of direct requests, see Appendix 6.2. 
73 Note* direct requests on C098 appear slightly high but four of these are the result of the issue being tied up with 
the Constitutional Court rather than a lack of response on Slovakia’s part (see Normlex Database, 2010; 2013; 
2014; 2015).  




           Source: Normlex Database (1996 – 2019) 
 
Slovakia has made progress on some of the other issues noted above: for example, in 
2009, it received a ‘note with satisfaction’ for adjusting the labour code to tackle gender based 
wage discrimination (ILO Normlex Database, 2009a). In 2009 and 2010, ‘notes with interest’ 
were given in response to the country’s efforts to strengthen institutions of tripartite 
consultation (ILO Normlex Database, 2009b; 2010b). On this particular problem – failing to 
consult social partners on legislation – there have been no further observations or direct 
requests. On issues related to C122 – regional and age disparities in unemployment levels – the 
Committee has to date, been unable to note progress. However, evidence suggests that 
problems here can be linked to capacity (Chayes & Chayes, 1993) rather than of political will 
(Downs et al, 1996). For instance, the problem was first raised shortly after the closing down 
of Slovakia’s arms industry (ILO Normlex Database, 1999); recalling chapter III, this was a 
political decision taken in Prague prior to Czechoslovakia’s split which resulted in the 
exacerbation of economic disparities and fuelled support for Mečiar’s populist nationalist party 
(Shepherd, 2000, pp.140-2; Mahoney, 2011, pp.252-8; chapter III section 3.1). In 1999, the 
Slovak government raised this point with the Committee and requested technical support from 
the ILO’s Multidisciplinary team in Budapest to help with those developing regions which 
were most affected (ILC Record of Proceedings Volume I, 1999, p.12/7. PDF p.303). Slovakia 
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various programmes aimed at levelling out the regional differences  (ILO Normlex Database, 
2005).  
Figure 4.11 organises Slovakia’s violations and cases of progress by government 
allowing for several observations to be made in regard to whether the country’s patterns of 
compliance and response can be differentiated by political party – social democrats (SMER) 
or conservatives (SDKU). As figure 4.11 indicates, fewer violations occur when SMER is in 
power compared to when SDKU are the incumbents. SMER moreover has a higher response 
rate replying to and implementing the Committee’s advice. Further distinctions emerge when 
the figures are examined by type of convention: for instance, SDKU receives a greater number 
of violation notices on C087 and C098. While the Committee did raise one observation on 
C098 during SMER’s time in office (between 2012 – 2017), it was the result of the issue being 
tied up with the Constitutional Court rather than due to a lack of response on SMER’s part. 
That SMER has avoided violation notices on C087 & C098 also accounts for why SDKU has 
a higher response rate on those same conventions.  
Problems regarding tripartite consultation (C144) especially highlight how Slovakia’s 
political cycle matters for the ILO’s impact.  For example, in 2000 – three years after the 
country ratified C144 – the Committee began requesting reports regarding the implementation 
of the convention  (ILO Normlex Database, 2000a). However, the SDKU led government 
ignored these appeals for three years despite the Committee raising several direct requests on 
the matter (see ILO Normlex Database, 2001a; 2002a). In 2003, the Committee escalated the 
problem from a direct request to an observation after KOZ SR informed the ILO that the labour 
code had been amended without proper consultation in the ‘Council of Economic and Social 
Agreement’ (CESA). While the government did respond, they chose to push back on both KOZ 
SR and the Committee claiming that “[they] did not agree with the facts as stated by KOZ SR 
and that these facts do not fall under the scope of the Convention” (ILO Normlex Database, 
2003). For several years following, SDKU continued to push back or just did not reply to the 
Committee despite numerous observations and direct requests being raised on the issue (ILO 
Normlex Database, 2004; 2005a; 2006). It was SMER who upon entering office in 2006 began 
to resolve the problem by introducing the new ‘Economic and Social Council’ which they 
created specifically to cover matters related to C144 (ILO Normlex Database, 2009c). 
Complaints from organised labour on this issue have been confined to the periods when SDKU 
were in power and have not been raised since 2010. 




Note (1) Direct requests have been scaled dividing the total number by 100 (2) Response Rate 
percentages on C087 & C098 have been scaled by a factor of 10. Source: (Normlex Database, 1996 – 
2019) 
Overall, Slovakia’s compliance and response rates are above the regional average when 
looking across all conventions and especially so on C087 and C098. Where problems have 
emerged, they have not done so in ways which suggest a calculated effort to impede the 
influence of organised labour. Instead, the most prominent issues the Committee raise tend to 
be diverse both in regard to the substance of the conventions and the reasons for non-
compliance. With the exception of discrimination against the Roma population, most violations 
are the result of technical/legal glitches or of problems to do with capacity. While some 
evidence of deviant non-compliance can be found, this appears to be a function of the political 
cycle and is confined to the period governed by SDKU.   
This initial look at the ILO’s relationship with Czechia and Slovakia has illustrated that 
the organisation has a harder time making an impact in the former than the latter. While non-
compliance exists in both countries, there are stark differences in regard to the frequency with 
which it occurs, the types of conventions that are violated and the rate as well as the character 
of response coming from each country. While the above has examined general compliance 
across both countries, the next section strengthens these initial conclusions by tracing the 
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4.2 ILO Conventions 87 & 98 
Czechia and Slovakia’s compliance and response rates do not just differ in relation to 
each other but also the regional average – the latter exceeding regional performance while the 
former falls behind. What accounts for such divergences?  As will be illustrated below, patterns 
of compliance and response neatly align with the diverging policy spaces sketched out in 
chapter III. Freedom of association (C087) and collective bargaining (C098) are typically seen 
as being two of the organisation’s more politically contentious conventions: first, because of 
their role in strengthening internal democratic processes (Rodgers et al, 2009, p.50) and second, 
because they are perceived by some policy makers and economists as introducing artificial 
distortions into the labour market, stifling competition and negatively impacting growth 
(Sengenberger, 2005a, pp.36-46). As such, countries who embrace free-market principles to a 
greater extent – as Czechia has done – may, in some instances find compliance too costly when 
compared to political cultures who’ve adopted a more social democratic model as is the case 
in Slovakia.  
As will be illustrated throughout this section, IOs must deploy tools which align with 
the reason for non-compliance (Thomann, 2011). The ILO successfully alters domestic 
outcomes when violations are of a technical or managerial nature by playing a role in designing 
legislation and ensuring standards of best practice. Where political will is lacking, measures of 
enforcement may be required in order to coerce a state into honouring its international 
commitments and it is here, when states challenge the ILO, that there is little the organisation 
can do.  
After a brief empirical comparison of compliance and response rates on C087 & C098, 
the section provides an in-depth analysis of the ILO’s impact by tracing the evolution of several 
violations of these two conventions. To do so, close attention is paid to the strategies deployed 
by the supervisory mechanisms and the ways in which each country’s government responded 
in-turn. Because the Committee has in some instances raised identical observations across both 
countries, the following provides a unique opportunity to illustrate the distinct motivations 
driving each. Overall, Slovakia tends to promptly correct violations in line with the 
Committee’s advice, often requesting technical or legal assistance to do so. Czechia on the 
other hand allows issues to persist and either engages in mock compliance (Walter, 2008 cited 
in Woodward, 2016) or pushes back on the Committee’s criticisms and advice. 
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Czechia and Slovakia: A Contrasting Picture 
As illustrated by the previous section, the ILO’s impact varies with significant 
divergences across compliance and response rates – as figure 4.12 exhibits, apart from 
responses noted ‘with interest’ Slovakia outperforms Czechia and the regional average in both 
of these areas in regard to C087 and C098. 
Figure 4.12 
 
        Source: ILO Normlex Database (1996 – 2019)  
To highlight further the stark contrast in compliance rates between the two countries, it 
is worth examining data from the ‘Centre for Global Workers Rights’ (CGWR).  Hosted by 
Penn State University, the database provides information on violations of C087 & C098 both 
in law and in practice for the years 2012, 2015, 2016 and 2017 – figure 4.13 depicts scores 
comparing both Czechia and Slovakia to the global average.74 Because the project is housed 
outside of the ILO, the creators have been able to freely collect and present data from a wider 
range of sources despite those sources having not been collectively authorised by the 
organisation’s member states – see chapter I section 1.3 for information on the controversies 
surrounding the CGWR data (Kucera & Sari, 2019). However, the criteria nevertheless align 
with the ILO’s conventions and while data is only provided for four years, the CGWR casts a 
wider net to capture violations not available to the Committee and therefore presents a more 
 
74 As noted by Weisband (2000), “global [and regional] benchmarks provide the behavioural baseline etched by 








Violations (Raised as Observations) Response Rate (Satisfaction) Response Rate (Interest)
C087 & C098 Czechia and Slovakia Comparative 
Czechia Slovakia Regional
Page 133 of 369 
 
accurate picture of compliance than the Normlex Database on its own is able provide. As figure 
4.13 illustrates, Czechia consistently hovers above the global average, but Slovakia’s 
compliance has been given the best possible score (or extremely close to it) for all four years 
the data is available.  
Figure 4.13  
 
Best Score = 0 Worst Score = 10                          Source: Centre for Global Workers Rights (2019) 
Beginning with C087 on collective bargaining, the Committee raised identical direct 
requests in both countries regarding legislative incompatibilities with Articles 2 and 3: the first 
concerning the rights on non-citizens to join workers’ associations; the second, regarding 
unreasonable obstacles to calling strikes (1996; 1996a). That both countries received identical 
violations was the result of the laws automatically carrying over from the former 
Czechoslovakia. However, the response from each republic was very different: Czechia would 
delay correcting the issue concerning non-citizens for almost a decade and has allowed the 
second problem to persist to this day. Slovakia on the other hand promptly corrected both in 
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C087 Problem 1. Article 2: The Rights of Non-Citizens 
The problem arose in 1996 when the Committee identified that in both countries, 
freedom of association was governed by Act No.83 of 1990 on Citizens Associations (Normlex, 
1996a; Normlex 1996b); the emphasis on the word citizens staff noted created potential 
compatibility problems with Article 2 of  C087 which states that  “workers without distinction 
whatsoever (whether they are national or foreigners residing legally in the country) have the 
right to establish and join associations” (Normlex Database, 1996; 1996a). As requested by the 
Committee, Slovakia responded in its next report informing them that the rights of non-
nationals in this regard are protected under paragraph 3 of the Act in question and as such fully 
complied with Article 2 of C087 (ILO Normlex Database, 1998). Slovakia had actually 
corrected the issue in 1993 shortly after independence but the Committee nevertheless sought 
clarification and closed the issue upon Slovakia’s response (see amended Act – ILO Natlex 
Database, 1993).  
This process did not go as smoothly in Czechia. First, the government did not reply to 
the ILO’s 1996 request and having not done so for two consecutive years, the Committee 
reprimanded Czechia with a ‘case of serious failure’ in 1997 (ILO Normlex Database, 1997a; 
ILO CAS, 1997) – cases of serious failure are issued when members do not fulfil their reporting 
obligations (European Commission, 2018) and in some instances, government representatives 
are invited to explain why they were unable to do so in front of the assembly at the annual ILC 
conference (ILO, n.d.).75 During the conference in 1997, a Czech government representative 
took the floor to address the issue but appeared to push back against the Committee by 
redirecting the blame towards the ILO. Here, the representative claimed that his government 
had in fact collected the information requested and was ready to submit the reports but, upon 
doing so, the Committee had inundated them with new requests and as such, they were forced 
to collect additional information before the reports could be sent (ILO CAS, 1997; ILC Record 
of Proceedings, 1997, p.19/60. PDF.774).  
 
75 Member states are obliged by the ILO’s constitution to submit reports on the application of the conventions as 
well as to reply to the comments of the Committee. The ILO takes these commitments seriously as they are crucial 
to the effective functioning of its supervisory mechanism (ILO CEACR Report, 2002, p.42). Reports must be sent 
between June and September of a given year allowing the Committee several months to identify the key issues to 
be discussed in the following ILC session in June. According to the ILO “Due consideration is given, when fixing 
this date, particularly to the time required to translate the reports, where necessary, to conduct research into 
legislation and other necessary documents, and to examine reports and legislation” (ILO CEACR Report, 2002, 
p.42).  
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When Czechia did reply to the Committee’s concerns regarding the Act on Citizens 
Associations, country authorities noted that they were preparing a new draft Act on 
Associations in line with the ILO’s requests and that it would come into force in 1999 (ILO 
Normlex Database, 1998a). However, despite being asked to do so, Czechia would fail to 
respond for another two years and in 2001, received another ‘case of serious failure’ (ILC 
Record of Proceedings, 2001, 19/2. PDF.829-831; ILO CAS, 2001; ILO CEACR, 2001, p.61). 
At this year’s ILC session, a government representative once again took the floor and pushed 
back on the Committee’s claims asserting that  “his government had already complied with its 
reporting obligations” (ILO CAS, 2001; ILC Record of Proceedings, 2001, 19/2 PDF pp.830-
1).  
While Czechia had indeed sent its reports, it had done so past the deadline and as a 
result, neither the Committee nor the CAS were able to discuss the relevant issues in 
preparation for the conference (ILC Record of Proceedings, 2001, 19/2 PDF p.833). Moreover, 
the report that the government representative was referring to merely stated that the new draft 
Act – which they had promised the Committee would be implemented by 1999 – was rejected 
by parliament and as such, the situation remained unchanged. In response to this report, the 
Committee again urged the government to make the amendment and keep it informed with the 
progress (Normlex Database, 2001b; ILO CEACR, 2002, p.303).  
Dialogue between the Committee and the government would continue in a similar 
fashion over the next several years – Czech authorities purporting to have made changes while 
staff continued to request updates. But, while compliance improved in regard to reporting 
duties, nothing substantial was ever done in terms of enacting the ILO’s advice. For example, 
in 2002, Czech authorities assured the Committee that a new draft Act was being written and 
that it would be submitted to parliament in 2004 (ILO Normlex Database, 2002b); in the spirit 
of keeping the ILO updated, it informed the organisation in 2003 that work on the Act was 
“making  progress” (ILO Normlex database, 2003a). However, when 2004 came, the situation 
changed with the government dropping the draft Act in favour of new plans to amend the 
original one (ILO, Normlex Database, 2004a). By 2005, the government switched tracks again, 
this time refusing to make any amendments in accordance with the Committee’s requests i.e. 
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to substitute the word ‘citizen’ with something more general covering all workers (ILO 
Normlex Database, 2005b).76 
According to a senior economist at the ILO, such behaviour is indicative of states who 
lack the political will required to achieve compliance:  
“I think [some] governments think of their commitment to ILS as a secondary thing, so they will push 
for reform and someone will say ‘oh this is going against the convention that we’ve ratified’…In some 
instances the governments will tell their labour [delegates] or embassies in Geneva  just to minimise 
the adverse publicity they might get out of this but not necessarily change feedback into the policy 
making process (ILO Staff Interviewee P, 2019).  
C087 Problem 2. Article 3: The Right to Strike 
Problems with Article 3 of C087 also began in 1996 and surfaced in both countries 
owing to the automatic carrying over of laws from the former Czechoslovakia. Here the 
Committee took issue with section 17 of the 1990 Act on Collective Bargaining noting how 
quorum and majority levels were set too high and as such, created barriers to strike action 
(Normlex Database, 1996; 1996a). 77  
Beginning with Slovakia, the Committee raised an observation in 1998 elaborating on 
the issue and asked the government to respond in the next reporting session (ILO Normlex 
Database, 1998). However, in this instance, Slovakia failed to comply both with its general 
reporting duties (ILO Normlex Database, 2000b) as well as to specific comments on the issue 
of Article 3 -  this was picked up by the Conference Committee (CAS) and Slovakia was invited 
to explain the situation at the ILC session in June 2001 (ILO CAS, 2001a).  
The response from Slovakia was very different from the ones that are usually given by 
Czech officials in these conferences (see above). When the Slovak representative took the floor, 
he communicated that staffing issues had been the cause of the late reply, he apologised and 
then proceeded to reassure the ILC of Slovakia’s commitment to the ILO. While he had the 
 
76 Instead of fixing the Act in accordance with the Committee’s advice, the government pointed to the country’s 
‘Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms’ which it claimed protects the rights of all persons to freely organise 
- both citizens and non. The Committee took note of the information and the issue has not been raised again (ILO 
Normlex Database, 2005b). 
77 Article 3 of C087 states “1. Workers' and employers' organisations shall have the right to draw up their 
constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom, to organise their administration and activities 
and to formulate their programmes. 2. The public authorities shall refrain from any interference which would 
restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof” (ILO, 1948).  
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conference’s attention however, he also took the opportunity to inform the Committee that 
Slovakia had listened to and implemented the ILO’s advice regarding the issues with Article 3 
and C087 – amending section 17 accordingly (ILO CAS, 2001a;  ILC Record of Proceedings, 
2001, 19 (2/3). PDF.831).  
On this issue, the ILO appears to have made a real impact in Slovakia, so much so that 
it served to unite both government and workers representatives in their appreciation for the 
organisation’s assistance with the matter. For example, later in the same ILC session, a Slovak 
workers’ delegate (Mr. Saktor) noted how the ILO was bringing real benefits to unions, 
governments and employers. He further explained how the recent amendment to Section 17 of 
the Act on Collective Bargaining was made possible not only by the ILO’s legal/technical 
experts but also its tripartite nature which allowed for the country’s ‘Railway Workers’ 
Association’ to raise awareness of the problem directly with the Committee on Freedom of 
Association (CFA) (ILO CFA, 2000; ILC Record of Proceedings, 2001, 7/30. PDF p.211). 
Mr.Petöcz (a government representative) also took the opportunity at the conference to thank 
the ILO: echoing Mr. Saktor he stated “we appreciate the technical cooperation of the 
International Labour Organization…in resolving the dispute with the Trade Union Association 
of Railwaymen regarding the exercise of the right to strike and the amendment of the act on 
collective bargaining” (ILC, Record of Proceedings,  2001, 7/20. PDF p.201).  
The above illustrates well the legitimacy that the ILO has in Slovakia as well as the 
country’s eagerness to work with and respond to the organisation when issues are raised. The 
violation itself arose only as a consequence of laws carrying over from the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia and despite a slight delay in responding to the Committee, Slovak authorities 
promptly sought the organisation’s legal/technical assistance in order to correct it. Following 
that year’s ILC session, the Committee noted Slovakia’s progress ‘with satisfaction’ and the 
issue of Section 17 has not come up again (ILO Normlex Database, 2001c).  
Problems surrounding unreasonable quorum and majority levels continue for the Czech 
Republic. Between 1996-present, the government has made numerous promises to amend 
section 17 of the Act on collective bargaining for which the ILO has administered several ‘notes 
with interest’. However, many of the government’s reassurances would never materialise and 
those that did, would not function to correct the underlying problem. As the issue regarding 
impediments to strike action has gained intensity over the years – ITUC and CMKOS both 
lodging complaints – Czech authorities on several occasions have pushed back or simply not 
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replied to the Committee. For example, two years after the Committee’s initial direct request 
(see ILO Normlex Database, 1996; 1997a; ILO CAS, 1997), the government finally in 1998 
informed staff that they  “[were] ready to transpose [the ILO’s views] into national legislation”  
(Normlex database, 1998a) for which the Committee responded with ‘interest’ and asked to be 
kept updated on the progress. Despite several reminders to do so, Czech authorities would not 
respond for three years (ILO Normlex Database, 2000c; ILO Normlex Database 2000d) 
resulting in a ‘case of serious failure’ which was noted in the ILC session in June 2001 (ILO 
CAS, 2001).  
Although the issue of section 17 itself was not discussed at the conference, the general 
problem of Czechia’s eroding labour standards was. Here, a Czech workers’ delegate – Mr. 
Falbr – took the floor to highlight the downward pressures of globalisation and noted how the 
MNCs operating in the country displayed a lack of respect for the ILO (ILC Record of 
Proceedings, 2001, 7/37. PDF p.218). Echoing Mr. Falbr’s concerns, Mr. Alan Leather – a 
representative from ‘Public Services International’(a global union federation) – pointed out 
that despite many countries pledging their support for social dialogue, in practice they 
continued to undermine it as exemplified by recent changes in Czechia which frustrated 
freedom of association and collective bargaining rights in the public sector (ILC, Record of 
Proceedings, 2001, 14/31. PDF p.462).  
In late 2001, the government updated the Committee on the issue of Section 17 noting 
that work on transposing its views was still ongoing, that social partners were being consulted 
and that new legislation should come into force by 2005 (ILO Normlex Database, 2001b). Over 
the following two years, work on the draft legislation continued, the Committee was routinely 
updated (ILO Normlex Database, 2002b; 2003a) and in 2004, the ILO commended Czech 
authorities when the Ministry of Labour informed them that the Committee’s advice had been 
taken on board (ILO Normlex Database, 2004a). However, by 2005, the draft legislation was 
still not complete and over the next couple of years, the problem began to intensify as CMKOS 
and ITUC began transmitting more and more complaints (ILO Normlex Database, 2005b; 
2007a). Finally, in 2007, Czech officials informed the Committee that the required amendment 
had been made. However, this appears to have been little more than tokenism – the government 
trying to appease the Committee without making any significant domestic adjustments. When 
the ILO’s legal team inspected the amendment, they noted that nothing substantial had really 
changed and as such, Section 17 still conflicted with Article 3 of the convention. Once again, 
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the Committee requested that the “required majority for…staging strikes [be] lowered to a 
reasonable level” and to inform them of the progress (ILO Normlex Database, 2007a).  
The government did not respond for three years (ILO Normlex Database, 2008; 2009d; 
ILO CAS, 2009) but upon doing so in 2010, refused to comply with the ILO’s requests. In its 
reply, the government stated that in their view, the quorum and majority levels were 
“reasonable since a strike is a serious measure” (ILO Normlex Database, 2010a). They went 
further to add that strikes should not be decided upon therefore by small number of workers 
considering the economic consequences they can have. The Committee pushed back: they 
reminded the government that impediments to strikes such as these do not only conflict with 
C087, but they deprive workers of one of their essential means for protecting their interests. 
Once again, they requested the legislation be amended and to be kept updated on the progress   
(ILO Normlex Database, 2010a).  
Over the next three years, the government continued to hold firm on its position despite 
numerous complaints submitted to the ILO from CMKOS and ITUC (ILO Normlex Database, 
2011). In 2013 – possibly as a result of CSSD’s re-election – the government informed the 
Committee that the Ministry of Labour had been ordered to examine legislation regarding the 
right to strike and as such, there was a new opportunity to address its concerns regarding the 
problem of Section 17 (ILO Normlex Database, 2013a). However, this work was discontinued 
in 2016 (ILO Normlex Database, 2016a) and the controversy remains (ILO Normlex Database, 
2019a). 
C098 Collective Bargaining 
Problems surrounding C098 highlight further the stark contrasts between Czechia and 
Slovakia in regard to compliance and response. Beginning with Slovakia, the Committee has, 
over the years, raised three issues pertaining to anti-union discrimination: (1) “the recruitment 
of workers on the condition of giving up trade union membership and insufficient protection 
against such acts” (ILO Normlex Database, 2005c) (2) impediments to collective bargaining 
through the introduction of representativeness quotas i.e. unions must prove they represent 30% 
of the employees before they are allowed to operate (ILO Normlex Database, 2012) (3) the 
legal changes pertaining to whether collective bargaining agreements can be extended to the 
wider sector involved (ILO Normlex Database, 2006a).  
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Regarding the first issue, a direct request was raised based on comments made by the 
ITUC and KOZ-SR in 2005; however, in this instance, the Committee noted the lack of specific 
allegations and requested both union confederations to further substantiate their claims (ILO 
Normlex Database, 2005c). Neither the ITUC nor KOZ-SR have to date fulfilled this request 
and the issue has not been brought up again nor have any further complaints been submitted 
by the workers’ associations. The second problem was corrected for the same year the 
Committee raised it – SMER won the election in April 2012 and reversed the previous 
administration’s reform (LABREF Database, n.d. Slovakia, 2012).  
Controversy surrounding sectoral extensions of collective bargaining agreements 
continues and as illustrated in chapter III, legislation on this has gone back and forth for years. 
Most recently (2017), the law was amended in favour of extensions but with several caveats in 
place after the Constitutional Court (2016) ruled the practice unconstitutional in 2016 
(LABREF Database, n.d. Slovakia, 2016; 2017). While the Slovak government has regularly 
responded to the ILO’s concerns throughout, the dynamics are not discussed in detail here but 
are instead examined in chapter VI’s investigation into the consequences of policy 
fragmentation.  
Since 2001, issues of anti-union discrimination have remained as permanent fixtures in 
Czechia with the Committee repeatedly raising concerns across two dimensions: (1) the Civil 
Service Act barring public sector employees from collective bargaining (2) anti-union 
discrimination in practice (ILO Normlex Database, 2002c) – because the former is a focus of 
chapter VI, the remainder of this section focuses on the latter.  
Issues of anti-union discrimination were first reported to the ILO by CMKOS and ITUC 
in 2001 and primarily focused on problems of implementation – although collective bargaining 
rights were protected by law, both unions noted that violations remained widespread in practice 
(ILO Normlex Database, 2002c). Not only had numerous acts of employers’ obstructing the 
collective bargaining process been documented, but further complaints had been made in 
regard to the slowness of court procedures that were meant to provide legal recourse. In this 
instance, the government tried to reassure the Committee by informing them that these matters 
had been discussed in the country’s highest tripartite body and as a result of these discussions, 
labour offices were paying much more attention to the implementation of labour law on anti-
union discrimination (ILO Normlex Database, 2002c). 
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On the surface, progress appeared to continue over the next several years. Although the 
government did not reply directly to the Committee’s request to specify the average time of 
court proceedings (ILO Normlex Database, 2003b), it did note how procedures were being 
reviewed so as to find ways of speeding up the litigation process and that draft laws were being 
prepared to help identify and prove acts of anti-union discrimination (ILO Normlex Database, 
2004b). By 2005, a new Act on labour inspection was passed which introduced a range of 
penalties for instances of union discrimination and which created a ‘third (neutral) party 
mediation’ system to replace the old ‘arbitration commissions’ – found to be the source of the 
litigation delays. The Committee noted these developments with ‘interest’ and asked for 
information on whether these legal/institutional changes were improving the situation in 
practice (ILO Normlex Database, 2005d).  
 By the following year, it was becoming evident that the legislative changes were indeed 
doing very little to improve the situation on the ground because the ILO continued to receive 
complaints from the ITUC regarding anti-union discrimination. When the Committee called 
out Czech authorities on the issue, the government’s response became hostile. For example, in 
2006 country authorities attacked ITUC claiming its accusation were unfounded and that the 
‘international’ union misunderstood the national situation. Nevertheless, authorities tried to 
reassure the Committee by noting that the companies in question were under close scrutiny by 
the labour inspectorate (ILO Normlex Database, 2006b). However, when the Committee 
relayed further complaints of anti-union discrimination in 2007 – this time from both the ITUC 
and CMKOS – the government flat out denied the allegations and declared that the labour 
inspectorate had not “registered any proven cases”  in this regard (ILO Normlex Database, 
2007b). After pointing out the huge discrepancies that existed between the government’s 
reports and those of the unions, the Committee requested once again for Czech officials to 
provide an assessment on whether and how the legal and institutional changes made several 
years prior were improving the situation in practice (ILO Normlex Database, 2007b).  
Despite numerous requests to do so, and further complaints from the ITUC and 
CMKOS (See Normlex Database, 2009e), the government did not respond to the Committee’s 
request for an assessment until 2010 and even then did not provide one choosing instead to 
communicate only that “there [had] been no changes” (ILO Normlex Database, 2010c) since 
its previous response. The Committee reminded the government that implementation is a 
necessary counterpart to legal provisions and requested once again an assessment of the overall 
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effectiveness of the new system. In an effort to assist and nudge country authorities in 
delivering the assessment, the legal/technical team provided specific instructions on what 
should be included: for example, they requested data from both employers’ and workers’ 
organisations detailing the number of complaints, the duration of court proceedings as well as 
their outcomes (ILO Normlex Database, 2010c).  
The government paid no attention to these requests; in its reply the following year, 
country authorities supplied information only on the number of labour inspectors available in 
the country (333 across eight regional inspectorates) and once again claimed that – contrary to 
the Committee’s observations – none of them had registered any proven cases of anti-union 
discrimination. In response, The Committee noted that the “absence of proven cases…does not 
necessarily imply that such acts do not occur” (ILO Normlex Database, 2011a) before repeating 
its request from 2010. These types of antagonistic communications continued for several years 
(see Normlex database, 2013b; 2016b) and the issue remains a pertinent one in the ILO’s most 
up to date reports (see Normlex database, 2019b). When asked whether anti-union 
discrimination was still a problem in the country, a CMKOS staff member commented:  
“yes, that’s still alive…there are many attempts of employers to decide solely in their power without 
any trade unions for instance. I’ve got many letters from people when they were dismissed for the reason 
of being in trade unions…there is a fear of many people to become members of trade unions because 
they are risking their positions in the company – this is a practice which is more frequent than it was 
two years ago” (CMKOS Interviewee H, 2020).  
Overall, the above illustrates well the ways in which Czechia’s attitude to the ILO 
differs to Slovakia’s. Non-compliance appears to be driven by a lack of political will and while 
the government is willing to give the impression that the Committee’s issues are being resolved, 
changes in behaviour do not occur. This is evident in the way Czechia allows observations and 
direct requests to persist over long periods of time, in some cases seeking to appease the 
committee with legislative tweaks or promises of better implementation but not doing anything 
substantial to fix the problem. This “mock compliance” (Walter, 2008 cited in Woodward, 
2016) is illustrated by the high number of notes ‘with interest’ it receives but which never turn 
into cases of progress noted ‘with satisfaction’. In other instances, Czech officials have been 
antagonistic towards the Committee, disputing its observations and advice.  Slovakia on the 
other hand, seeks to empower organised labour and as a result violates ILO conventions much 
less; when non-compliance does occur, it tends to be the result of legal/technical glitches or 
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issues of capacity. Moreover, when called upon, the government promptly corrects problems 
ensuring that it does so in alignment with the Committee’s advice – often making use of the 
organisation’s technical and legal assistance to do so.  
4.3 The Impact of the ILO: Explaining Variation Across States 
The ILO seeks to uphold ILS through the facilitation of global tripartite dialogue; close 
monitoring of compliance and by providing legal/technical assistance to correct issues of non-
compliance. In this way, the organisation is able to identify problems and contribute to changes 
in legislation or implementation practices which would not have occurred in its absence 
(Downs et al, 1996). Despite deploying these tools similarly across both Czechia and Slovakia, 
the ILO’s impact has varied significantly. What accounts for this variation and under what 
conditions can the organisation be expected to make an impact? This section provides a 
comparative assessment of the domestic and international processes which fed into these 
diverging outcomes; after briefly illustrating the two countries scores as compared with the 
regional average, dynamics surrounding the three indicators of impact – compliance, response 
and implementation – are explored.  
The section finds that the ILO’s influence is mediated differently in accordance with 
the unique policy spaces sketched out in chapter III: where political culture is conducive to 
ILO influence (as it is in Slovakia), non-compliance is more likely to be of an involuntary 
nature and it is here where the organisation makes an impact via the rationalist managerial 
pathway (Chayes & Chayes, 1993); where non-compliance is persistent and voluntary, there is 
very little the ILO can do.  
The International and Domestic Processes that Contribute to Variation 
Figure 4.14 summarise the stark contrast in compliance and response rates identified in 
the previous two sections; below explains the international and domestic process which 
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Figure 4.14 
     
              Source: Normlex Database (1996 – 2019)  
Compliance. Across both countries, the ILO deployed its monitoring and supervision 
tools in order to capture violations in law and in practice. Through its legal and technical 
expertise, the organisation analysed government submissions (i.e. the annual reports submitted 
via obligations under Article 22) to ensure that domestic laws were in alignment with ratified 
conventions and that such laws were being implemented effectively. Throughout, its 
transnational and tripartite structure allowed for social partners (workers’ and employers’ 
associations) in both countries to scrutinise these reports and to submit comments of their own 
either directly to the ILO itself or via the ITUC who then transmitted them to the Committee. 
As illustrated in the previous two sections, these mechanisms enabled the Committee to find 
numerous instances of non-compliance and provided the means for both CMKOS and KOZ 
SR to further highlight issues concerning barriers to calling strikes; anti-union discrimination 
in practice, and employment discrimination based on political opinion. These procedures 
resulted in Czechia accruing observations and direct requests in greater numbers than Slovakia. 
Response. After having made both governments aware of the issues, the ILO engaged 
several strategies available to it in an effort to correct the problems. For example, on several 
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national law and implementation practices conflicted with the conventions and what could be 
done to fix it. On others, it facilitated tripartite dialogue ensuring that governments and social 
partners were aware of each other’s concerns. When problems became more serious or where 
there was a lack of response from country authorities, representatives from both Czechia and 
Slovakia were invited to openly discuss the issues with their peers in the annual ILC 
conferences.  
For the most part, the ILO’s strategies of dealing with non-compliance did not differ 
too greatly across both countries except on two occasions when the Committee felt it necessary 
to take a harder line with Czechia. The country’s ongoing discriminatory employment practices 
combined with repeated complaints from social partners and a lack of government response 
contributed to growing frustration within the Committee. Departing from its preferred 
managerial approach, the ILO began to mobilise one of its few resources resembling 
enforcement – naming and shaming. In 2007 and 2009, the Committee set in motion the 
processes that would have led to the public airing of Czech’s poor record as well as earning it 
a ‘special paragraph’ in the annual report.  
Despite the Committee applying more pressure on Czechia, the country’s response rate 
still fell below Slovakia’s and the regional average. Slovakia on the other hand promptly 
corrected most issues that were raised, it utilised the ILO’s technical and legal assistance and 
participated in the ILC discussions in a constructive manner. As a result, the country received 
several cases of progress which were noted by the Committee ‘with satisfaction’.  Its 
commitment to ILS is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that once Slovakia corrects issues of 
non-compliance, the problems are not raised again and there appears to be few if any 
discrepancies between the government’s reports and the observations made by social partners.  
Czechia’s response patterns have taken a different path: when it does respond to the 
Committee, it engages in “mock compliance” (Walter, 2008 cited in Woodward, 2016) – 
making  legislative tweaks or promises of amendments but never adopting or implementing the 
necessary substantial changes required to alleviate the problem. On other occasions, country 
authorities have been hostile, challenging the observations of both the Committee and social 
partners and pushing back not only on the ILO’s legal/technical recommendations but in some 
cases the very norms of which the organisation seeks to uphold – issues surrounding 
unreasonably high quorum and majority levels illustrated this well. 
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These diverging patterns of compliance, response and implementation are reflective of 
the unique policy spaces sketched out in chapter III where differences can be found in regard 
to institutional capacity, the relative strength of organised labour, the importance of the political 
cycle and the extent to which each embraced free market capitalism. In the aftermath of the 
Velvet Revolution, Czechia executed a more extreme version of the 1990s neoliberal doctrine 
than Slovakia and other transitioning states in the region (Irish Times, 1996). The legitimacy 
and power of unions suffered greatly and through controversial legislation – the Lustration 
laws and Screening Act – the country sought to ensure that individuals with ties to the previous 
communist regime would be banned from a range of public employments (Mahoney, 2011). 
As noted by an ILO official with experience in the region:  
“the Czech view has been when we criticise their laws that were intended to purge the former 
communists their reaction was more like so what…whereas in Slovakia we didn’t have the same 
problem” (ILO Interviewee Kari Tapiola, 2018).  
As such, conventions which conflict with this programme (e.g. C087, C098 and C111) 
are violated with regularity because full compliance presents unacceptably high domestic 
adjustment costs (Downs et al, 1996). Recall the issue on C087 regarding the legislative 
barriers to strikes; here, Czech authorities refused to lower the quorum and majority 
requirements to align with the convention because of the perceived negative “economic 
consequences” (see ILO Normlex Database, 2010a) that strikes can produce. Although the 
Committee has issued several notes of satisfaction, these have tended to be on conventions 
which are not violated with the same regularity and do not challenge the political culture.78  
Slovakia on the other hand sought to preserve the power of labour, it did not crack down 
on members of the previous communist regime, its unions (although weakened) remained 
important political actors and the country was overall able to mix market friendly policies with 
levels of protection much higher than some of its regional neighbours (Fisher et al, 2007, 
pp.979-986). As a result, fewer violations are raised and where non-compliance does exist, 
issues tend to be the result of problems to do with capacity or simply legal/technical glitches 
 
78 Note* Czechia received a case of progress with satisfaction on C111 but this was on matters other than 
discrimination based on political opinion (see ILO Normlex Database,  2002). Notes ‘with satisfaction’ were 
issued on C132 Holidays with Pay - 2 x violations and 1 Case of progress issued 2010 (ILO Normlex Database, 
2010d). C139 Occupational Cancer Convention - 1 x violation and 1 Case of Progress issued 2005 (ILO Normlex 
Database, 2005e). C144 Tripartite Consultation - 4 x violations and Case of Progress issued 2011 (ILO Normlex 
Database, 2011b). C182 Child Labour (4 x violations and 1 Case of Progress issued 2006 (ILO Normlex Database, 
2006c).  
Page 147 of 369 
 
as the country replaced old laws from the former Czechoslovakia with ones that better 
represented the political culture of the new republic – as was the case with C111 and the 
Screening Act. Slovakia’s openness to the ILO combined with its need (in the earlier years of 
transition) for capacity support has meant that it has also relied on the organisation for technical 
and legal support on several occasions to ensure that laws and implementation practices were 
aligned with ratified conventions. While there have been instances of deviant non-compliance 
(e.g. on C144), such behaviour is not endemic but rather heavily dependent on the political 
cycle.  
The dynamics above (re: Czechia’s and Slovakia’s contrasting relationship with the 
ILO) have been echoed by several ILO officials with expertise in this region:  
“if we look at the Czech Republic…in the immediate Post-Cold War period, the mood was not that we 
need some real assistance from the ILO, because most things they believed they knew it themselves.  
Slovakia [on the other hand] was good at asking for help – whether it needed help for specifically 
wanting to increase compliance or wanting rather to have international recognition in that situation” 
(ILO Staff Interviewee Kari Tapiola, 2018).   
“the Czech Republic was pretty conservative much more from the outset, it had a closer relationship 
with Germany, even if you go back pre Soviet Union period, they always saw themselves more of a 
free market mentality and politics, so I am not surprised that one might find.. using your type of analysis 
that Slovakia has followed more ILO advice” (ILO Staff Interviewee L, 2019).  
“Slovakia was more open to cooperating with the ILO and other IOs to help with transition whereas the 
Czechia knew what they wanted and went their own way – that’s true that’s my impression” (ILO Staff 
Interviewee S, 2019).  
Managerialism and the Influence of the ILO 
While the ILO’s impact depends to a large extent on normative legitimacy, domestic 
factors alone do not solely determine its impact. Firstly, some instances of non-compliance 
would go unnoticed without the ILO’s unique supervisory and monitoring mechanisms which, 
owing to their tripartite nature, function as a system of checks and balances allowing social 
partners to scrutinise government reports and vice versa. The contradictory claims made by the 
Czech government when compared to those of CMKOS regarding problems of anti-union 
discrimination as well as the Slovak Railwaymen’s ability to communicate directly with the 
CFA highlighted this well. Moreover, evidence from Slovakia suggests that in some cases, 
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legislative or implementation practices would not have been altered (or altered as effectively) 
without the expertise of the ILO’s legal and technical experts – this was most evident on the 
issue of C087 for which Slovak officials from across the tripartite spectrum thanked the 
organisation for its assistance.  
Overall, this chapter’s findings suggest that rationalism’s managerial school (Chayes & 
Chayes, 1993) best explains the ILO’s impact: where political culture is conducive, non-
compliance is likely to be of an involuntary nature and it is here where the organisation’s tools 
are most effective; where non-compliance is voluntary, there is little the organisation can do.79 
When necessary, the ILO can switch gears, deploying tools of socialisation to publicly  ‘name 
and shame’ a state into better behaviour; however, in this case, such tools appear ineffective 
and according to one ILO official, it is in these circumstances where the issue of enforcement 
resurfaces within some ILO’s circles (ILO Staff Interviewee G, 2018).  
Conclusions 
The ILO has a significant impact on states’ legislative and implementation practices and 
as a result, plays an important role upholding ILS within the global economy. The politically 
sensitive nature of its work and its lack of enforcement powers however means that the 
organisation, for the most part, depends on soft power to accomplish its goals. For many, this 
reliance on volunteerism has led to the perception that the ILO makes no impact at all – a 
reputation further entrenched by work which uses compliance as the sole outcome variable to 
explain variation.  This chapter has moved beyond the existing literature by producing evidence 
that the ILO does make an impact and by identifying the conditions under which it is expected 
to occur. Throughout, it has been illustrated that the organisation’s managerial approach 
successfully produces ‘desired behavioural changes’ (Raustiala, 2000) and that such changes 
become observable and measurable when its influence is examined after a violation has 
occurred. Whether impact is achieved depends to a large extent on a domestic political culture 
and balance of political forces that are conducive to the ILO’s norms and rules, in such cases 
the organisation’s tools align with the reasons driving non-compliance (Thomann, 2011) and it 
is here where desired changes in state behaviour become possible (Raustiala, 2000). When 
 
79 This point is inspired by Thomann (2011) who notes an IO’s tools of correction must match the reason for non-
compliance.  
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conducive conditions are absent, the managerial approach is not effective, and the use of 
socialisation – or ‘naming and shaming’ – functions as a poor substitute.  
This thesis began with the following questions: Does and how does the ILO make an 
impact? To what extent does policy fragmentation facilitate or impede its work? This chapter 
has engaged the former and in doing so provided sufficient evidence in contrast to conclusions 
made by the reviewed literature – that the ILO is a ‘toothless organisation’ without influence. 
However, this thesis seeks not only to challenge the conventional wisdom in regard to whether 
the organisation makes an impact, but also to broaden our perspective in regard to the forces 
which are mediating it. To do so, the work here proposed that the ILO be further assessed within 
the framework of policy fragmentation and has hypothesised that the organisation’s impact is 
associated with the ways in which country specific networks configure to impede or facilitate 
its work i.e. it asks the extent to which challenger IOs such as the IMF, World Bank and OECD  
(CIOs) undermine the ILO’s work. Before examining the consequence of policy fragmentation 
for the ILO (see chapter VI), it is crucial that this research first illustrates whether, how and the 
extent to which the CIOs themselves impact these states – if the aforementioned organisations 
made no impact at all, then the issue of policy fragmentation at the international level would be 
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Chapter V 
Assessing the Impact of the ILO’s Rivals in Czechia and Slovakia 
 
How do international organisations (IOs) make an impact and why does their influence 
vary across states?  These two questions will be answered here in relation to the IMF, World 
Bank and OECD (CIOs) and in doing so, the chapter begins to shed further light on the extent 
and character of policy fragmentation in Czechia and Slovakia.  Because policy fragmentation 
can be conflictive (Bierman et al, 2009, p.19), the success of one IO can impede that of another; 
indeed, in the following chapter, the ways in which the CIOs are directly linked to a state’s 
violations of ILO conventions will be analysed in depth. However, before these links can be 
made, it is necessary to illustrate first whether and exactly how such organisations influence 
domestic policy and secondly, to identify the mediating variables that will help explain why 
these organisations are more successful in some states than others. 
Studies assessing the impact of the CIOs on states tend to focus solely on loan recipient 
countries (e.g. see Blanton et al, 2015) where sufficient data exists allowing researchers to 
make linkages between the policy preferences of IOs such as the IMF or World Bank and 
domestic legislative or implementation changes. Czechia has not participated in such 
programmes and while Slovakia has to some degree (see World Bank Group, n.d.; IMF, 
2020b), their involvement in this way does not explain the impact of the CIOs during the period 
being examined. As such, this research is presented with the additional challenge of illustrating 
influence under conditions where these organisations have been unable to enforce their 
mandates via loan conditionality. This chapter rises to this challenge and in doing so produces 
insights not only into whether and how the CIOs have altered domestic behaviour in Czechia 
and Slovakia but, in addition to this, an important methodological contribution is made 
regarding the ways in which impact can be identified, measured and compared across states. 
The observations made here are crucial to understanding the consequences of policy 
fragmentation and are indispensable to the final chapter wherein the relative impact between 
the CIOs and ILO is illustrated in depth.  
IOs such as the IMF, World Bank and OECD became increasingly active in Czechia 
and Slovakia during the early-to-mid 1990s. For the most part, this chapter finds that their 
involvement has been on an advisory basis providing policy prescriptions with the aim of 
assisting the two countries’ transition from communism; their entry into the EU; and navigating 
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through the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crash (GFC). Understanding why and how 
these organisations have made an impact requires looking at (1) the driving forces that acted 
as a catalyst for change (2) the influences that fed into the character of that change (Kelley, 
2004, p.434). In regard to the latter, the chapter reveals that the CIOs have made an impact 
influencing the timing and often the specific content of the policies adopted in both countries. 
With regards to the former, the prospects of EU membership (conditional on enacting 
legislative changes) acted as a sufficient catalyst motivating change in both countries prior to 
2004. Post EU accession however, the ability of the CIOs to make an impact depended to a 
large extent on favourable domestic conditions. 
As noted above, this chapter’s second task is to explain why CIO impact varies: here, 
observations will be made by distinguishing between ‘impact extensity’ (the number of reforms 
adopted) and ‘impact depth’ (the degree to which the policy content has been directly 
influenced by external sources). In regard to Czechia and Slovakia, this chapter reveals how 
the variation present on these two indicators can be understood as reflective of the ‘diverging 
policy spaces’ sketched out in chapter III. For instance, while CIO impact has been extensive 
across both countries (i.e. both have adopted reforms in similar numbers), it has been deeper 
in Slovakia owing to its need for economic and institutional capacity assistance (i.e. the CIOs 
influenced more directly the specific policy content of reforms in Slovakia). At the same time 
however, Slovakia also pushed back on these external pressures: on several occasions, it has 
refused to adopt advice and has even reversed legislation that was previously influenced by 
IOs such as the IMF or OECD. Czechia does not exhibit this same dynamic; as will be 
illustrated, the CIOs have less direct influence in Czechia, but their policies are more 
consistently adopted and tend to be permanent owing to the political culture and relatively 
weaker position of labour in the country.  
The findings produced here serve three important purposes: firstly, they expand on the 
domestic politics argument by providing empirical evidence in regard to whether and how CIOs 
influence state behaviour. Secondly, they facilitate this thesis’ investigation into policy 
fragmentation and its consequences for ILO impact i.e. in areas where CIO policy conflicts 
with that of the ILO’s, governments relying on expert technical advice from these organisations 
risk replicating that same conflict into domestic legislation and thus violating ILO conventions. 
Lastly, the findings here – combined with those from the previous chapter – complete support 
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for the SNA graphs presented in chapter II which predicted that the CIOs would have a greater 
impact in Czechia than in Slovakia whereas the reverse is true for the ILO.  
After briefly defining terms and providing an explanation of this chapter’s 
methodology, the impact of the organisations concerned is assessed. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 
identify and analyse CIO impact in Czechia and Slovakia respectively: each section first 
provides broad responsiveness trends and then traces the ways in which specific policy 
suggestions have been adopted into domestic legislation by successive governments. Section 
5.3 compares these findings in order to establish whether and how CIO impact varied across 
the two countries. It then draws parallels between the responsiveness patterns of Czechia and 
Slovakia and the diverging policy spaces sketched out in chapter III. 
Explaining Challenger IO Impact: A Methodological Guide 
The impact of the CIOs is illustrated by linking external policy advice to domestic 
legislative reforms with attention paid to both content and timing. To this author’s knowledge, 
there are no existing databases available which facilitate an extensive study of IMF, World 
Bank and OECD impact in Czechia and Slovakia and as such, a new database has been created 
and compiled using a unique methodology – this will be showcased throughout via the 
inclusion of several ‘impact tables’ and graphical illustrations.  
First, CIO policy advice has been extracted from country specific IMF Article IV 
Reports (IMF, 2020a); OECD Economic Surveys (OECD, 2020a); and the World Bank’s 
Doing Business publications covering the period 1998 – 2017 (World Bank, 2020a). The data 
was then contrasted with domestic legislative reforms using references to the EU 
Commission’s LABREF Database (LABREF database, DG EMPL, European Commission, 
2019); ILO NATLEX (ILO NATLEX, n.d., a) and various articles and news sources. Where 
linkages can be made between external suggestions and domestic legislative changes, it is 
regarded as impact. However, in order to better capture a detailed and qualitative picture of 
CIO influence, impact has been divided into three categories: (1) Correlation: where domestic 
policy responses match CIO suggestions in regard to ‘policy area’ – e.g. the IMF may request 
a country to reduce instances of sickness benefit but leave governments to decide the most 
suitable strategy for doing so (see Appendix 5A, cell 27). (2) Correlation*: occurs when 
domestic reforms satisfy external requests in both ‘policy area’ and in ‘specific content’ – e.g. 
if the OECD suggests reducing notice and severance pay specifically by linking it to tenure 
(OECD, 2010a, p.132), a typical domestic response in the category of correlation* may look 
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like the following: “new severance pay rules: 30 days if tenure below 1 year; 60 days if tenure 
between two and three years…” (LABREF Database, n.d., Czechia, 2011; Apppendix, 5A, Cell 
63)80. (3) Direct: this type of impact occurs when either – or both – the criteria for correlation 
and correlation* are fulfilled but where there is additional evidence of causal influence e.g. 
through examining dialogue between IO staff and country authorities.  
While the term ‘impact’ has earlier been defined as including both compliance and 
effectiveness (Raustiala, 2000; see chapter II section 1.2), it is not possible to consider the issue 
of compliance here as the units of analysis do not include legally binding international treaties. 
However, by examining the responsiveness of a country to external policy pressures, “desired 
behavioural changes” (Raustiala, 2000) are nevertheless captured and therefore align with this 
thesis’ definition of impact (see chapter II section 1.2). Finally, the data gathered was compiled 
into a master ‘impact correlation table’ for each country (see Appendices 5A and 5B) which 
are used to create in-text graphs, charts and mini correlation tables. Bibliographic references 
and links are provided throughout allowing for the replication of this database.  
While the compiled data provides a broad overview of the relationship between the 
CIOs and the two case studies, the chapter further demonstrates the associations found through 
a detailed qualitative narrative. Following Kelley’s (2004) methodological approach, causal 
linkages are made between CIO suggestions and domestic country changes by examining 
dialogue at both the national and international levels. For example, the conversations between 
country authorities and IO officials are investigated as are the inputs from domestic groups 
such as employers’ and workers’ associations. This process moreover helps begin to uncover 
how alliances form between the international and national realms (Sengenberger, 2010) 
because it illustrates the ways in which the CIOs are able to successfully represent the concerns 
of foreign and domestic employers’ groups. Important resources used here include official IO 
documents, parliamentary discussions, news reports and websites related to organisations such 
as trade union confederations. 
 
 
80 Note all legislative changes sourced from the LABREF database have been compiled into an appendices 4A 
and 4B which are referenced within the text. To search for the specific reform on the database itself, please visit 
the website https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/labref/public/result.cfm and enter the country, year and policy field of 
interest.  
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5.1 The Impact of the Challenger IOs in Czechia 
When and how have the CIOs made an impact in Czechia? Although the IMF, World 
Bank and OECD became increasingly active in the country during the early years of its political 
and economic transition; their involvement was for the most part, consigned to the advisory 
realm.81 However, these organisations were nevertheless able to employ both rationalist 
incentive and constructivist socialisation-based tactics to influence legislation and did so with 
some success. While the domestic political conditions identified in chapter III remain the most 
significant factor explaining the extent of their impact, the following finds evidence in support 
of the aforementioned theoretical approaches which help shed light on the form and character 
that impact took i.e. the timing and content of the legislation. Overall, the section finds 
Czechia’s responsiveness to the CIOs does not vary drastically by political party – 
conservatives (ODS) or social democrats (CSSD). While CSSD is slightly more reluctant to 
adopt CIO policy suggestions regarding employment protection legislation (EPL), they also do 
not reverse such policies if they are adopted by ODS. The CIO’s influence is further facilitated 
through their alliances with domestic employers’ groups whose interests they successfully 
trumpet despite push back from organised labour unions such as CMKOS and their European 
Union allies ETUC.   
The section begins by observing trends on a country level before moving on to examine 
in detail the responsiveness patterns of successive governments. Specific attention is paid to 
whether – as well as the degree to which – the interactions between staff and country officials 
produced changes in legislation. The section ends with a brief comparison between left- and 
right-wing parties followed by a theoretical explanation summarising the impact of these IOs 
in Czechia. 
Social Democrats and Conservative Response Patterns: Divergence or Continuity? 
Figure 5.1 depicts responsiveness rates to the IMF and OECD between 1998 – 2017 
while figure 5.1a represents adopted legislation guided by the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ 
indicators for the years 2006 – 2017.82 In regard to the IMF and OECD, Czechia’s response 
 
81 While the OECD was created and designed as an advisory organisation (a forum for policy discussion); the IMF 
and World Bank’s leverage is often increased by their ability to administer loans with attached policy 
conditionalities – apart from several disbursements between 1991 – 1994, the Czech Republic did not use finance 
from either of the Bretton Woods institutions (see World Bank, 2019a; IMF, 2019a 
82 Note* It is not possible to illustrate responsiveness (i.e. adoptions versus suggestions) with the World Bank. 
Unlike the IMF and OECD reports, Doing Business offers a set of guidelines aimed at all members states rather 
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rate is approximately 67% with noticeable peaks around the time of EU accession as well as 
during the conservative-led period following the financial crisis of 2008 (see appendix 5a for 
a textual descriptive breakdown of the figures).83 Although, the number of CIO guided policies 
adopted during CSSD’s and ODS’ time in office are relatively equal, there are some key 




Sources: IMF Article IV Reports; OECD Economic Surveys; LABREF Database (various years) see 
Appendix 5A for individual references and sources pertaining to legislative suggestions and adoptions. 
 
than annual country-specific policy advice. As such, figure 5.1A represents individual legislative decisions based 
on these general guidelines. See Appendix 7 ‘World Bank Reforms’ for details on legislative changes.  
83 Note: responsiveness rates are calculated by (total # of suggestions/responses) *100 (Weisband, 2000). These 
figures have been taken from the correlation table in the appendices.  
84 Note: response totals are sometimes higher than the number of suggestions in a given year e.g. 2004 and 2011. 
This is the result of a time lag between when the CIO suggested a policy and when it was adopted – see appendix 
5A for detail.  
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As figure 5.2 exhibits, the CSSD passed legislation in line with approximately half of 
the suggestions made by the OECD and IMF during its first two terms (1998 – 2002; 2002 – 
2006) – see appendix 5A (cells 1-50) for detailed linkages between CIO policy suggested, year 
adopted, and type of impact made (Direct; Correlation*; Correlation). 
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Figure 5.2  
 
Sources: (IMF Article IV Reports; OECD Economic Surveys; LABREF Database) (see Appendix 5A 
for further detail and references specific to each reform suggested/adopted) 
 
 
CSSD began their first term in the aftermath of the 1997 recession amid decreasing 
levels of productivity and employment. During this time, the CIOs (particularly the OECD) 
sought to apply pressure on Czech officials by warning them that the economic situation would 
worsen unless they reduced public spending (e.g. social welfare, pensions, and the public 
sector) and increased the flexibility of EPL for employers (appendix 5A cells 1-20 for details) 
– in their view, both were much too generous and as such, created disincentives to finding work 
and impediments to job creation (OECD, 1998, p.75, 89). However, only several of the CIOs 
suggestions were taken on board in CSSD’s first term – table 5.1 provides a snapshot 
illustrating the impact of the CIOs during this period (see appendix 5A for a comprehensive 
version).  
 
CSSD 1998 -2006 - Policy Suggestions Adopted and Type 
of Impact
Suggestions Not adopted Direct Correlaton* Correlation
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Table 5.1 – CSSD Term 1 Impact Correlation Table 
Appendix 
– Cell  
Policy Suggestion Policy Adopted/Type of Impact  
5A – 1 Reduce social welfare 









“Freezing the nominal level of the basic cash-welfare benefit 
(known as the minimum living standard, MLS), so as to reduce 
its attractiveness in real terms” (LABREF Database, n.d. 
Czechia, 2001)   
 
Adopted 2001/CSSD    
5A – 2 Tighten access to 
disability pension 
(preserving for those 
in genuine need) 





“The government has responded by tightening provisions for 
full-time disability” (OECD,2000, p.112) 
 
 
Adopted 2001/CSSD   
 
5A – 5 Design and 
implement ALMPs 
(incentivise firms to 
hire workers with 
disabilities and 
subsidies retraining 




OECD 1998  
Correlation  
 
“Subsidies for job creation and partial reimbursement of 
retraining costs” (LABREF, Database, n.d. Czechia, 2000)  
 
“Introduction of the obligation for employers with at least 20 
employees to employ at least 5% of its workforce among people 
with disabilities” (LABREF, Database, n.d. Czechia, 2000)          
Adopted 2000/CSSD                                                                                                                   
5A – 13 Reduce incentives for 
early retirement 







The OECD noted in 2001 that the government had taken steps in 
the right direction regarding this issue (OECD, 2001, p.158; 
Also see LABREF, Database, n.d. Czechia, 2001)  
 
Adopted 2001/CSSD 
5A – 14 Pension 
reform/increase 




IMF notes within the report that the government is proposing 
changes in line with the IMF’s suggestions (IMF, 2001, p.24)- 
Adopted 2001/CSSD 
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In other cases, the government passed legislation that directly conflicted with advice 
coming from the CIOs e.g. on notice periods, collective dismissals, and extensions of collective 
bargaining agreements – see table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2 – Policies adopted by CSSD which conflict with CIO advice  
Appendix 
– Cell 
Policy Suggestion Policy Adopted  











pay limited to two 
months as before; 
additional severance pay 
can be provided by 
collective agreement” 
(LABREF Database, 
n.d. Czechia, 2000) 
 
Adopted 2000/CSSD 
5A – 4 Relax law regarding collective 








dismissals and related 
obligations for 
employers with EU 
legislation” (LABREF 
Database, n.d. Czechia, 
2000)  
 
Adopted 2000/CSSD  
5A – 7 Do not allow for extensions of 
collective bargaining agreements to 











extensions of wage 
agreements…”  
(LABREF Database, 
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In response, the CIOs criticised the government on several occasions. For example, in 
2000, the OECD commented on the lack of progress with its advice from two years prior. Staff 
further noted that because employment conditions were worsening, the government should 
consider implementing their previous recommendations with urgency (OECD, 2000, pp.105-
7). In the same report, the organisation took specific issue with the changes made to collective 
dismissals even though that particular policy had been guided by an EU directive (see table 
5.4). Although the OECD did not contradict the EU explicitly, it did caution the administration 
to review options carefully “when harmonising law with EU practices” (OECD, 2000, p.118) 
in order to avoid over burdening employers. 
Throughout the remainder of CSSD’s first term,  the CIOs continued applying pressure: 
in 2001, the OECD again expressed disappointment with the absence of movement on its 
suggestions from 1998 commenting in its report that the government’s “legislation has tended 
to add to existing regulations rather than reduce them” (OECD, 2001, p.154). In May 2002, the 
IMF warned Czech officials that failure to incentivise work (e.g. through cutting social welfare 
and making EPL more flexible) would lead to declining rates of FDI (IMF, 2002, pp.22-4). In 
response to the IMF, the government (just prior to the 2002 elections) noted the political 
difficulties of passing such reforms while unions tried to push back arguing for higher wages 
as a more effective strategy to overcoming work disincentives (IMF, 2002, pp.22-4). As noted 
in the previous chapter, CSSD had come to power in 1998 upon disillusionment with Klaus’ 
reforms and it is likely that this resulted in low levels of responsiveness during this period. 
During CSSD’s second term (2002 – 2006), the government appears to have been more 
amenable to adopting CIO policy but remained somewhat opposed to implementing specific 
suggestions regarding EPL (see appendix 5A cells 23, 26, 28, 35, 41). For example, in 
consultation with IMF staff in 2003 for example, country authorities openly disagreed with the 
organisation’s prescription for increased flexibility as an antidote for unemployment (IMF, 
2003, p.21). Moreover, in 2005 it reintroduced the possibility to extend collective bargaining 
agreements (LABREF Database, n.d. Czechia, 2005; also see Appendix 4A cell 46) which 
directly contradicted the recommendations coming from the OECD at the time (OECD, 2004, 
p.135; also see Appendix 5A cell 41).86  Around 2004 however, the government did begin 
drafting versions of what would become the 2006 labour code (see chapter III) which the 
 
86 The government reworked the legislation after the CCC repealed it in 2003 (LABREF Database, n.d. Czechia, 
2003; also see Appendix 4A, cell 22)  
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OECD acknowledged as a welcome improvement. The organisation applauded the code’s 
abandonment of the principle “what is not allowed [in legislation] is forbidden” (OECD, 2004, 
p.154) which staff predicted would increase the flexibility of EPL by widening the scope of 
contractual bargaining at the firm level (OECD, 2004, p.154; OECD, 2012).  
Although there was some (albeit limited) movement on EPL, the CIOs would have a 
much greater impact on legislation related to public spending and incentivising work. As 
appendix 5A cells 21-50 illustrate, sixteen policies adopted during this period were in-line with 
advice provided by these organisations in this regard. Table 5.3 below provides a snapshot of 
appendix 5A: of particular note are cells #31 and #45 regarding the public sector; #40 on sick 
leave; #48 on pensions and #24 on reducing welfare. The proceeding paragraphs strengthen 
these links by analysing the dialogue between country authorities and IO staff during this time.  
Throughout its second term, the government made numerous promises to the CIOs 
regarding their specific policy requests. For example, in 2004, Czech officials communicated 
to the IMF that its ‘convergence plan’ would address the Fund’s concerns regarding fiscal 
issues (IMF, 2004, p.14) because it focused on trimming social spending, reforming pensions 
and increasing the retirement age (IMF, 2003, p.16). That same year, it promised further reform 
on sickness benefit and redundancy regulations – in line with requests made by the OECD 
(OECD, 2004, pp.134-5). In response to the government’s actions, the CIOs commended 
Czechia where they felt their advice had been implemented satisfactorily e.g. in 2004, the 
OECD praised the reforms on pensions (OECD, 2004, p.134). That same year, both the IMF 
and OECD noted their advice on sickness benefit had been taken on board (OECD, 2004, 
p.147; IMF, 2004, Statement by Executive Director, p.3). In 2005, the World Bank 
complimented Czech officials for introducing ‘time swaps’ – a programme which helped to 
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Table 5.3 CSSD Term 2 Impact Correlation Table  
Appendix 
– Cell  
Policy Suggestion Policy Adopted/type of impact  
5A – 24 Reduce welfare benefit system 
to incentivise work – focus on 
“school leavers” (OECD, 
2003, pp.138-9 
Direct 
“Incentives to accept publicly useful jobs or low-wage jobs. In the 
case of refusal, social assistance benefits are not provided” 
(LABREF Database, n.d. Czechia, 2004) 
“Introduction of…stricter conditions for provision of 
unemployment benefits. In particular, school-leavers…” 
(LABREF Database, n.d. Czechia, 2004) 
 
Adopted 2004 
5A – 31 Lower public sector wage bill 
and employment (IMF, 2003, 
p.16) 
Direct 
Czech executive director assures IMF staff that public sector 
wage bill has been reduced through mass layoffs (IMF, 2004, 
Statement by Executive Directors, p.3) 
 
Adopted 2004 
5A – 40  Reduce sickness benefit 
(OECD, 2004, p.133) 
Direct  
“Persons with a changed work capacity that are preparing for 
employment are excluded from sickness insurance” (LABREF 
Database, n.d. Czechia, 2004) 
The IMF notes “It is encouraging to note that the reform measures 
adopted thus far have already 
brought some positive -though limited- results. Tightening of 
eligibility for sickness benefits 
contributed to a decline of these benefits in January-May 2004…” 
(IMF, 2004, Statement by Executive Director, p.3)  
 
Adopted 2004  
5A – 45 Reduce public sector spending 
(IMF, 2004, Statement by 
Executive Directors, p.3) 
Direct 
Czech executive director assures IMF staff that public sector 
wage bill has been reduced through mass layoffs (IMF, 2004, 
Statement by Executive Directors, p.3) 
 
Adopted 2004 
5A – 48 Reform pension system (IMF, 
2004, Public Information 
Notice, p.3) 
Direct 
OECD commends progress on pensions (OECD, 2004, p.134) 
 
Adopted 2004 
  See appendix 5A for full version 
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The issue of public sector reform illustrates CIO influence and the ways in which the 
Czech government tried to appease their requests particularly well. Since 2000, the IMF and 
the OECD had been pressuring the authorities to lower wages, levels of employment (See 
OECD, 2000, p.13, 109; IMF, 2003, p.17) and to reduce job protection (OECD, 2001, pp.164-
5). In 2003, authorities noted that implementing these requests was politically difficult as they 
lacked public support and because unions had organised strikes and protests in response to the 
planned cap on public wages (IMF, 2003, see ‘Staff Report’ p.3). In an effort to reassure staff 
however, Czechia’s Executive Director Willy Kiekens noted that the government was seeking 
alternative ways to implement their advice and that they would explain to the public that such 
reforms were timely and necessary (IMF, 2003, see ‘Statement by Executive Directors p.4)87. 
In 2004, the government laid off 9000 public sector workers and that same year, Kiekens 
explained to IMF staff that while public sector wages had increased against the organisation’s 
wishes, the layoffs helped to freeze the overall wage bill thus fulfilling  their advice (IMF, 
2004, see ‘Statement by Executive Directors pp.3-4).  
 What accounts for the greater levels of CIO impact in CSSD’s second term? As 
illustrated throughout this section, the CIOs mobilised ‘normative pressure’ (Kelley, 2004, 
p.428) in an effort to both persuade and praise Czech officials to adopt their policy 
prescriptions. For example, when their advice was not followed, staff repeatedly warned of  
impending negative economic consequences – spiralling budget deficits (IMF, 2002, statement 
by…Executive Director, p.3) rising levels of unemployment (OECD, 2003, pp.35-6), or 
decreasing rates of FDI (IMF, 2002, pp.22-4). When policies were in line with CIO 
suggestions, the government was applauded. As noted by an ILO staff member, whether loans 
are taken or not, the CIOs hold sway over small economies looking for investment (ILO Staff 
Interviewee L, 2020).  
While socialisation-based efforts were indeed mobilised in the ways described above, 
an incentive-based rationalist explanation appears to fare better here because whatever leverage 
those tactics achieved, they were most certainly boosted by the prospects of EU membership. 
As figure 5.1 above illustrates, the bulk of these reforms were passed in the lead up to accession. 
When Vladimir Špidla (CSSD Premier) entered office in July 2002 (his term ending in July 
2004 shortly after accession), he did so on a mandate to put through the necessary reforms 
 
87 ‘Statements by Executive Directors’ are found at the bottom of the IMF Article IV reports. Here, consecutive 
page numbering stops and begins at #1 again.  Executive Director positions are appointed by the IMF rather than 
governments.  
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required for accession (Mahoney, 2011, p.259). While the aforementioned changes above (e.g. 
on fiscal spending) are not specified by the EU itself as pre-accession criteria, it does require 
that countries achieve  “…a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure[s] and market forces within the Union” (Philips et al, 2004, p.28): it is 
here that the CIOs provide specific legislative advice. For example, reference to EU related 
policy changes can be found in several IMF Article IV reports prior to and immediately 
following the country’s entry. In 2001 for example, staff urged Czech officials to adopt the 
necessary reforms to enable competition with other EU members (IMF, 2001, see ‘Public 
Information Notice’, p.4 – PDF.58).  In May 2004, staff further advised finance ministers to 
lower the deficit below ‘Maastricht norms’ via cuts to public spending and to bring wages in 
line with other ‘second wave accession’ countries  (IMF, 2004, p.12) by increasing the 
flexibility of EPL (IMF, 2004, see ‘Public Information Notice’ pp.3-4 – PDF. 45-6).   
The pressures emanating from these organisations and their relation to EU accession 
are taken seriously by domestic policy makers; indeed, concerns regarding effective 
transposition of EU law and the involvement of CIOs can be found in parliamentary discussion 
dating back to 1998. For example, in debate over an amendment on lotteries, MP Jaroslav 
Šedivý noted: “this is a process in which the Czech Republic [must demonstrate] its ability to 
transpose the acquis Communautaire…with the entry into force of the amendment, the Czech 
Republic could probably get into protracted administrative disputes… it cannot be ruled out 
that organizations such as the World Trade Organization or the OECD… could join these 
disputes and the Czech Republic could thus find itself under quite concentrated pressure” 
(Czech Parliament, June 18, 1998).  
2006 – 2013 ODS (Conservatives) 
During ODS’ two successive terms in office (2006 – 2010; 2010 – 2013), the CIOs 
made far fewer policy requests than they had done in previous years. Nevertheless. As figure 
5.3 illustrates, legislation passed during this time aligns with approximately seventy-five 
percent of those suggestions – appendix 5A cells 51-67 outlines which policies were adopted, 
in what term and what type of impact the CIOs had. In addition to these, ODS went further by 
implementing CIO advice that had been directed at CSSD between 2001 – 2004 but which the 
government at the time did not take on board – see appendix 5A cells 16; 37; 38; 39; 40; 42; 
44) 




Sources: (IMF Article IV Reports; OECD Economic Surveys; LABREF Database) (see Appendix 5A 
for further detail and references specific to each reform suggested/adopted)  
When ODS entered office in August of 2006, one of the first issues the CIOs raised was 
that of the 2006 labour code. At this time, the business community was calling for its revision 
particularly in regard to the ‘overly intrusive’ powers of trade unions regarding night work and 
overtime (Eurofound, 2006a).88  Although they had earlier expressed satisfaction with the code, 
(OECD, 2004, p.154; IMF, 2006, p.1), the CIOs sided with employers (IMF, 2006; 
ITUC/Global Unions, 2008) and began to apply pressure on the government to heed the 
concerns of these domestic groups. For example, in June 2006, the OECD noted how the code 
fell short of firms’ expectations in several areas and that more radical reform could have been 
made regarding dismissals and severance pay (OECD, 2006, p.29). In November that same 
year (shortly after employers had lodged a complaint with the CCC – Eurofound, 2006a), the 
IMF noted that the business sector felt the new code was a “missed opportunity” (IMF, 2006, 
p.16) to make EPL more flexible (these comments and requests were repeated multiple times 
by both organisations over the following years – see IMF, 2007, pp.20-1; OECD, 2008, p.8, 
14). Shortly after the 2006 code came into force (January 2007), the World Bank ratcheted up 
the pressure on Czech authorities by dropping Czechia in its Doing Business rankings; the 
reason, the Bank stated, was that the Code increased the burden of non-wage labour costs on 
firms (ITUC/Global Unions, 2008; World Bank, 2007, p.19). 
 
 
88 Despite the code increasing flexibility for employers, the business community felt it was still too rigid and that 
it gave overly intrusive powers to trade unions on issues regarding night-work and overtime (Eurofound, 2006a) 
ODS 2006 - 2013 CIO Policy Suggestions Adopted and 
Type of Impact
Suggestion Not Adopted Direct Correlation* Correlation
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In response, Czech officials noted the political difficulties of altering the labour code 
so soon after it had come into effect (IMF, 2007, p.13); but the Executive Director Willy 
Kiekens and his adviser Stanislav Polak informed the organisation that the new government 
was committed to implementing its advice. Despite these reassurances however, ODS were 
unable to do much in regard EPL in its first term; while it was able to create some flexibility 
for employers on the policies related to overtime and shift-patterns (OECD, 2008, p.70; table 
5.4 cell 16), greater responsiveness can be seen on issues related to social welfare programmes 
or ALMPs – see table 5.4.  
Table 5.4 ODS Term 1 Impact Correlation Table  
 
Appendix – Cell  Policy Suggestion Policy Adopted/Type of Impact 
5A – 51 Reduce employment protection 
(IMF, 2007, p.3)  
 
IMF 2007  
Correlation 
“The possibility for employers to 
sign a collective agreement with a 
trade union with the highest 
number of members in case of a 
disagreement among trade unions 
was abolished” (LABREF 
Database, n.d. Czechia, 2008)  
Adopted 2008 – Czech 
Constitutional Court ruling 




“Tightening of eligibility 
conditions for unemployment 
benefits… (LABREF Database, 
n.d. Czechia, 2008).   
Adopted 2008/2010 
5A – 53 Alleviate unemployment though 
ALMPs (IMF, 2007, pp.20-1) 
IMF 2007 
Correlation  
“New Institute of Public Service 
to stimulate work activity of 
benefit recipients” (LABREF 
Database, n.d. Czechia, 2009)                                                                                                                      
Adopted 2009 
Reforms Suggested to CSSD but Adopted by ODS in Term 1 See Appendix 5A cells 16; 
37; 38; 40 
The OECD welcomed these changes  (OECD, 2012a, p.2,8) and recognised the 
difficulties of answering its requests when the government had such a slim majority (OECD, 
2008, p.10). However, they urged the government to do what it could to go further specifically 
by making cuts to the public sector  (OECD, 2008, pp.13-14); by loosening the obligations on 
employers in regard to notice and severance (OECD, 2008, p.14, 70) and – echoing the specific 
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concerns of employers groups (Eurofound, 2006a) – requested a relaxation of the restrictions 
on night and weekend work (World Bank, 2009, p.67).  
These pressures to reduce fiscal spending and improve the environment for business 
intensified after the 2008 global financial crash (Guardiancich, 2012, p.15). In 2010, the CIOs 
made numerous policy requests and warned Czech officials that foreign demand was already 
declining. However, even under these circumstances, the government informed staff that their 
ability to make swift changes was limited (IMF, 2010, p.6, 17-18, Statement by Executive 
Director, pp.3-4); not only did they have a minority government but, domestic labour groups – 
particularly CMKOS – had been staging mass protests (May 2009) at the planned amendments 
to the labour code and changes to pensions (BBC, 2009) of which were being coordinated in 
conjunction with ETUC’s wider anti-austerity campaign across Europe – ‘Fight the crisis: put 
people first’ (ETUC, 2009; ETUC, 2009a). As illustrated in chapter III, domestic labour in 
Czechia lacks political leverage which is why it therefore relies on such protests as a strategy 
to influence.   
Things changed however after ODS won a comfortable majority in the June 2010 
elections, and after doing so, Czech finance minister (Miroslav Kalousek) announced that 
“2011 [would] be a year of radical reforms” (Lazarová, 2010). In talks with the IMF several 
months later (February 2011), country authorities assured staff that their previous suggestions 
would now be implemented specifically in regard to the public sector and on structural reforms 
to EPL (IMF, 2011, PDF.10, 57). In October, the OECD noted their approval for several of 
those proposed changes (OECD, 2011, p.15); a month later, they were adopted in parliament 
(see ILO Natlex, n.d.,b) and scheduled for implementation at the beginning of 2012 (LABREF 
Database, n.d. Czechia, 2012). Fourteen pieces of legislation guided by CIO advice were 
passed in ODS’ second term, twelve in relation to requests concerning EPL. Of particular note 
are the massive cuts in the public sector (Agostini et al, 2016, p.12-14); the linking of notice 
and severance to length of tenure (the OECD had been requesting this change for years – see 
OECD reports 2008, p.14; 2010, p.132; 2011, p.15); and the modifications to fixed term 
contracts and working time regulations (Clauwaert, S. & Schömann, I. 2013).  
Table 5.5 provides a snapshot of reforms during this period, for a more comprehensive 
picture, see appendix 5A cells 54; 56; 58; 59; 61-65; 67. Also see appendix 5A cells 38; 39; 
42; 44 for CIO suggestion made to CSSD but adopted by ODS. 
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Table 5.5 ODS Term 2 Impact Correlation Table  
Appendix 
– Cell  
Policy 
Suggestion 
Type Policy Adopted/Type of Impact 
5A – 54 Make hiring 




EPL Correlation  
“New reason for fair termination of the employment relationship” 
(LABREF Database, n.d. Czechia, 2011)                                                                                                                                         
Adopted 2011 








10% reduction in public sector wages; layoffs (Agostini et al, 2016, 
p.42) 
Adopted 2010-11 









EPL  Correlation 
Severance payments reduced (LABREF Database, n.d., Czechia, 
2011)                                                                                                                                                                             
Adopted 2011 







See several EPL reforms improving labour market flexibility at 
(LABREF Database, n.d., Czechia, 2011) 
Adopted 2011 
5A – 62 Reduce hiring 
costs (OECD, 
2010, p.132) 
EPL Correlation  
“Trial period for managerial positions increased” (LABREF 
Database, n.d., Czechia, 2011)                                                                                                                                                           
Adopted 2011 







EPL Correlation * 
Maximum duration of fixed-term contracts extended                                                                                                                                                        
(LABREF Database, n.d. Czechia, 2011) 
 
Adopted 2011 






EPL Correlation * 
 
During discussions, authorities agreed to accelerate e.g. increasing 
labour market flexibility (IMF, 2011, p.9) 
Adopted 2011 
   For a more comprehensive picture see appendix 5A cells 54; 56; 
58; 59; 61-65; 67. Also see appendix 5A cells 38; 39; 42; 44 for 
CIO suggestion made to CSSD but adopted by ODS  
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 Unions viewed these changes as “the biggest attack on employees’ rights since the fall 
of communism” (Lazarová, 2010) and staged massive protests in a ‘stop the government 
campaign’ which attracted over 100,000 participants to central Prague (Verveková, 2012, p.61; 
BBC, 2012a; Eurofound, 2012; Mansfeldová, 2014, p.8). On the other hand, the changes were 
viewed by employers’ groups as fulfilling the demands they had been making for some time 
(Verveková, 2012, p.59; Clauwaert, S. & Schömann, I. 2013, pp.3-4, 7). The CIOs too 
commended Czech authorities on several occasions (OECD, 2011, p.15; IMF, 2012, p.2): the 
IMF noted how the reforms addressed the very challenges highlighted by ‘international 
competitiveness surveys’ and OECD reports and urged the government to focus on effective 
implementation (IMF, 2012, pp.15-16). In 2013, the World Bank changed its tune and noted 
that because of the recent changes, Czechia was now rated as one of the most improved places 
for doing business (World Bank, 2013. P.99).89  
Overall, the CIOs have made a significant impact in Czechia. To understand why and 
how this impact occurred requires identifying (1) the most significant driving forces which 
acted as the catalyst for change (2) the influences that feed into the character of that change. In 
regard to the former, rationalist-based explanations help explain the extent of CIO impact prior 
to EU accession whereas post 2004, the degree to which external actors influenced policy 
varied in accordance with the shifting domestic-political landscape. When conditions for 
change were favourable however, socialisation-based methods effectively guided both the 
direction and content of the legislative choices taken. While necessary then, neither rationalist 
nor domestic-political based explanations sufficiently explain CIO impact in Czechia. As 
illustrated by the correlation tables and through the examination of dialogue between staff and 
country authorities, the CIOs successfully employed “normative pressure” i.e. social influence 
or persuasion (Kelley, 2004, p.428) to produce the final outcome.  
 
 
89 The satisfaction of the CIOs would continue despite CSSD’s electoral win in June 2013. The IMF initially 
expressed concern over the party’s ‘ideological leanings’ towards more social welfare (IMF, 2014, p.4) e.g. at the 
beginning of its report, staff commented that “the new government…is friendlier to the EU policy…however, [it 
is] ideologically diverse. Its overall orientation is toward more activist social welfare enhancing policies…”  (IMF, 
2014, p.4). However, the CIOs had little to worry about in this period because CSSD appears to have done little in 
the way of pushing back on the extensive reforms enacted earlier by ODS. This likely explains why the number of 
CIO suggestions overall, as well as criticisms of CSSD by CIO staff, decreased significantly between the years 
2013 – 2017 – see Appendix 5A cells 68-70.  
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Another crucial observation related to the effectiveness of socialisation-based methods 
is the extent to which the CIOs enjoy legitimacy across the political spectrum. As noted above, 
changing domestic-political conditions produced some variance in response rates between 
CSSD and ODS and they also created differences in the way ODS was able to respond in its 
second term (2010 – 2013) when compared with its first (2006 – 2010). However, in line with 
the findings from chapter III, CSSD do not tend to position themselves at too great a distance 
from their conservative counterparts. While they have steered away from adopting specific 
suggestions related to EPL, levels of responsiveness overall are very similar between the two 
parties. Vladimir Špidla (CSSD Premier 2002 – 2004) in particular sought to appease both the 
right- and left-wing elements of parliament with regards public finances (Cameron, 2004) and 
in doing so, opened up space for the CIOs to influence the incumbent social democrats.   
Facilitating this process further is the asymmetries in power between employers’ groups 
and unions. Recall this thesis’ proposition regarding the ways in which conflict between 
domestic actors is reinforced by external organisations (i.e. policy fragmentation and the issue 
of competing international and domestic networks – Sengenberger 2005; 2005a). Throughout 
this section, we have seen the success with which the CIOs were able to represent very specific 
policy concerns of firms when in consultation with country authorities versus the effectiveness 
of the protests organised by ETUC in solidarity with CMKOS. While the role of the ILO in 
this regard is explored in the next chapter, these initial observations help begin to create a 
picture of how the CIOs are able to gain leverage in Czechia and why the issue of policy 
fragmentation is a salient one.  
5.2 The Impact of the Challenger IOs in Slovakia 
The CIOs’ impact in Slovakia has been deeper than in Czechia and yet these 
organisations have faced a much greater degree of domestic opposition in the former than the 
latter. How and why have the CIOs been successful despite greater levels of domestic 
opposition? Like Czechia, Slovakia too was driven by rational interest to implement the 
necessary reforms in preparation for EU accession; moreover, the country was subject to a 
greater degree of loan conditionality during this period (see World Bank Group, n.d.; IMF, 
2020b). While this would have boosted the enforcement capabilities of some of the CIOs -
providing them with more leverage in Slovakia than in Czechia – this section finds that their 
impact prior to 2004 is instead best explained by the managerial version of rationalism. In line 
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with conclusions from chapter III, deeper CIO impact in Slovakia can be explained by the 
country’s lower capacity levels and Mikuláš Dzurinda’s commitment to regional integration in 
the post-Mečiar years. These driving factors saw the country being more open to, and indeed 
reliant upon external influence to assist in its economic and political transition. In the post 
accession period, managerialism (Tallberg, 2002) continues to best explain CIO impact; 
however, these external organisations became more vulnerable to shifting domestic conditions 
where left wing opposition groups effectively impeded their influence.  
The section begins by observing trends on a country level before moving on to examine 
in detail the responsiveness patterns of successive governments. Throughout, specific attention 
is paid to whether – as well as the degree to which – the interactions between staff and country 
officials produced changes in legislation.   
The Mediating Effects of Slovakia’s Political Cycle 
Figure 5.4 depicts Slovakia’s responsiveness to the IMF and OECD over time between 
1998 – 2017 while figure 5.4a represents the number of World Bank policy suggestions the 
country adopted between 2006 – 2017.90 In regard to the IMF and OECD, its response rate 
overall is 79.4% with peaks in the years leading up to EU accession and again during the 
conservative led period of post 2008 – see appendix 5B for a textual breakdown of IMF and 
OECD impact in Slovakia.91 Although there are some similarities between Slovakia and 
Czechia with respect to overall rates of responsiveness and timing of reforms, there are some 
stark differences in terms of the type of impact and the responsiveness of left-wing parties 










90 See World Bank Appendix 7 
91 Figure 5.4 illustrates not only the ratio of CIO suggestion to country response but the time lag between 
suggestion and response highlights a resistance to response in ways not seen in Czechia suggesting further that 
type of government matters for CIO impact.  




Sources: IMF Article IV Reports; OECD Economic Surveys; LABREF Database (various years). See 




Source: World Bank Doing Business Reports (various years) 
 
SDKU (Conservative Party). As figure 5.5 exhibits, SDKU passed legislation in line 
with approximately two-thirds of the suggestions made by the IMF and OECD during its first 
two terms in office – the majority of which were adopted in its second term  (see appendix 5B 
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Sources: IMF Article IV Reports; OECD Economic Surveys; LABREF Database (various years). See 
Appendix 5B for references to individual legislative reforms suggestions/adoptions. 
 
SDKU’s first term (October 1998 – October 2002) saw the CIOs become intimately 
involved with Slovakia. Having recently emerged from the turbulent Mečiar years (see chapter 
III), one of the first observations the CIOs made was in regard to whether the country had the 
sufficient institutional capacity to progress with its economic and political transition (OECD, 
1999, p.9).92  Upon this backdrop, and with a new government who embraced international 
integration, Slovakia sought close cooperation with the CIOs via an IMF structural reform 
programme; here country authorities set out their strategy in a Letter of Intent and requested 
additional assistance in regard to implementation (IMF Letter of Intent, 2001).93 The World 
Bank too provided direct support in the form of finances (IMF, 2001a, p.4; World Bank, 
2001a), technical assistance and training with the aim of improving the institutional capacity 
of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (World Bank, 2002a). Other policy suggestions 
centred around cutting social assistance, incentivising work, and making EPL more flexible– 
see table 5.6 for a snapshot of suggestions made during this time, for a more comprehensive 
version see appendix 5B cells 1-34. 94 
 
92 The OECD made specific reference to the country’s capacity challenges in terms of building a new state, 
establishing an efficient administration, diversifying the economy (OECD, 1999a, p.9) and producing high quality 
human capital (OECD, 2002a, p.104). 
93 Policies outlined by country authorities outlined in the letter of intent aligned with requests made by both the 
IMF 2001 and OECD 1999 – stricter control of sickness benefit; privatising pensions; tightening eligibility for 
social assistance; creating part-time work/temporary jobs; increasing labour market flexibility (IMF, 2001b) also 
see (IMF, 2001a, p.19).  The programme outlined in this letter also provided the framework for further reforms 
attached to a World Bank loan which was to be approved several months later (August 2001)  (IMF, 2001a, p.4; 
World Bank, 2001b). 
94 E.g. the OECD recommended streamlining sickness and disability benefit, privatising pensions raising the 
retirement age (OECD, December 1999a, p.59) while the IMF encouraged Slovak officials to create more part-
time and temporary jobs as well as to loosen restrictions on hiring and firing (IMF, 2001a) 
SDKU Adoptions Terms 1 and 2
Not Adopted Direct Correlation* Correlation
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Table 5.6 SDKU Impact Correlation Table 
Cell# IO and Year Policy Suggestion Adopted? 
Year/Party   
Policy Description/Type of Evidence  
5 IMF 2001 Incentivise job 
search (relieve 
unemployment) 









6 IMF 2001 Increase labour 
market flexibility 
(IMF, 2001a, p.25) 
Yes 
 
2004 SDKU  
Correlation  
The government made hiring more flexible 
for employers (OECD, 2004a, p.96)  









“A reform of the sickness benefit system 
shifts the cost of the first ten days of sick 
leave to employers…No further action 
required” (OECD, 2004a, p.97)  











…the benefits of able-bodied working age 
citizens…were cut” (OECD, 2004a, 
p.97)  
  










2003 SDKU  
Direct  
“Government policy is to exten[d] 
agreements only upon written consent.. 
(OECD, 2004a, p.98)  
14 OECD 2002 Relax EPL 
specifically 
regarding hiring and 
firing (OECD, 





“The amended legislation relaxes 
employment protection… (OECD, 2004a, 
p.98) 
15 OECD 2002  “Ease regulations on 
working time” 




“The amended labour code eases regulation 
on working time…no further action 
required” (OECD, 2004a, p.98) 
    See appendix 5B cells 1-34 for full version 
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In discussions with the IMF in early May of 2001, country authorities assured staff that 
they were committed to taking the necessary steps to transform the economy and enter the EU 
(see IMF, 2001a, p.19).95 While the CIOs provided advice on the content of the reforms taking 
place, the catalyst for change was not a result of a reliance on loans or the consequence of loan 
conditionality. Rather, it was the sheer political will of the Dzurinda administration who, in 
ideologically alignment with the CIOs, sought external assistance in order to push through their 
own domestic agenda (Slovak Ministry of Finance Interviewee D, 2020). 
During this time, the CIOs were used by MPs in parliament to strengthen their argument 
for reform: after attending the aforementioned meeting with the IMF in May, deputy PM Ivan 
Mikloš stood in the assembly and announced that the reforms were necessary and driven in-
part by the EU Commission’s comments from 1997 regarding the need for “more transparent 
and market-oriented policies” (Slovak Parliament, Meeting 49, May 23rd, 2001). Regarding the 
legislative steps which had been taken to achieve that goal, Mikloš noted that  “it is best to 
quote the views of the [international] institutions” (Slovak Parliament, Meeting 49, May 23rd, 
2001) after which he proceeded to communicate observations made by the OECD, the World 
Bank and the IMF; all of which – according to Mikloš – praised the current government’s 
progress and future plans. In conclusion, he stated   “[these] are not my subjective views, but 
the quotation of important respected international institutions” (Slovak Parliament, Meeting 
49, May 23rd, 2001). However, serious opposition towards the CIOs also existed in parliament 
at the time as is evident by MP J. Prokeš response to Mikloš: “you are quoting only what suits 
you, but, by the way, these institutions…have not helped anyone yet. You know, they also have 
their interests…they’re actually about dominating the economy in Slovakia, and you’re willing 
to meet them. That’s what it’s all about” (Slovak Parliament, Meeting 49, May 23rd, 2001).  
Opposition of this sort sufficiently impeded the government’s reforms strategy mainly 
because Dzurinda’s administration had only a slim majority during its first term.  SDKU were 
able to pass several policies making good on some of its promises to the CIOs e.g. increasing 
the retirement age, reforming the pension system (see appendix 5B cells 2; 4; 7) and designing 
ALMPs to assist the young and unemployed into work (LABREF Database, n.d. Slovakia, 
2000; Appendix 4B cell 5).  But it also enacted legislation which the CIOs felt increased the 
 
95 These included deputy PM Ivan Miklos; Minister of Finance Brigita Schmögnerová; Governor of the National 
Bank of Slovakia Marián Jusko (IMF, 2001b). Interestingly, Ivan Miklos later became Minister of Finance after 
his predecessor Brigita Schmögnerová left to work for the World Bank.  
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rigidity of EPL for employers e.g. by reducing weekly working hours (LABREF Database, n.d. 
Slovakia, 2001; Appendix 4B cell 9) and obliging firms to a three (rather than two) month 
notice period when dismissing employees  (LABREF Database, n.d. Slovakia, 2001; Appendix 
4B cell 6; Fabo & Sedláková, 2017, p.124).  
This invited much criticism from the CIOs whose comments were almost identical to 
those coming from domestic employers groups at the time: in June 2002, the OECD echoed 
the concerns of AZZZ-SR (one of Slovakia’s biggest employers’ associations) in regard the 
government’s decision on working time and the fact that too much power had been conferred 
onto trade unions – specifically in regard to their role in management and authority to inspect 
compliance – to compare CIO and employers’ groups comments on these two issues, see 
OECD, 2002a, p,17; Eurofound, 2002; OECD, 2002a, p.88. In addition to this, the CIOs 
provided Slovak authorities with a long list of recommendations which they explained should 
be top priority (OECD, 2002a, pp.106-7) if the country wanted to attract FDI and meet the 
criteria for entering the EU (OECD, 2002a, p.114; IMF, 2001a, p.1, 13).96 While much 
emphasis was placed on reducing social welfare and making EPL more flexible in general, the 
OECD took specific issue with Slovakia’s policy allowing for extensions of collective 
bargaining agreements to the wider sector (OECD, 2002a, p.83, 88) – see table 5.7 cell 13. 97   
In discussions with the IMF prior to elections in 2002, authorities assured staff that they 
had every intention of implementing their advice; they noted that there was now a consensus 
building around adopting such reforms and that the next government would move quickly to 
do so (IMF, 2002a, Statement by Executive Director, p.5). Indeed, as figure 5.6 illustrates, the 
second Dzurinda government (October 2002 – July 2006) embarked on a major reform 
programme (Mikloš, 2008, p.57) keeping good on its promises to the CIOs who made a 




96 These include reducing social security (pensions, sickness); limiting unemployment insurance; easing 
regulations on working time; increasing the duration of fixed term contracts; reducing severance pay; removing 
the obligation for unions to approve dismissals (OECD, 2002a); removing extension of collective bargaining 
agreements; making EPL more flexible; reducing the social safety net to incentivise work (IMF, 2002a, p.14).  
97 As noted in Chapter III, this is one of the key differences between Slovak and Czech unions… extensions of 
collective agreements empower unions – the OECD/IMF feel that agreements should better reflect changing 
conditions at the firm level (OECD, 2002a, p.83, 88)  
98 Notable examples here include reducing severance costs (table 5.7 cell 21); easing restrictions on working time (table 
5.7 – cell 15); reducing access to unemployment benefits by making them ‘activity tested’ (table 5.7 – cell 9) 
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Figure 5.6  
 
Sources: IMF Article IV Reports; OECD Economic Surveys; LABREF Database (various years). See 
Appendix 5B for references to individual legislative reforms suggestions/adoptions.  
 
Table 5.7 illustrates this impact in some detail but notable examples include the changes 
made to the health sector (guided by loans and technical assistance from the IMF and World 
Bank – see IMF, 2004a, pp.5-6; World Bank 2003a; World Bank 2003b) and those to notice 
periods (OECD, 2002a, p.102)  which were in line with exact advice coming from the CIOs 
(Fabo & Sedláková, 2017, pp.124-5). Dzurinda’s administration also responded to the CIOs’ 
criticism outlined above by eliminating the possibility for automatic extensions of wage 
agreements (OECD, 2004a, p.98; LABREF database, n.d. Slovakia, 2003; Appendix 5B cell 
13); removing trade unions’ role in management and monitoring compliance (OECD, 2004a, 
p.98; OECD, 2005a, p.76-7) and by easing restrictions for employers on working time (OECD, 
2005a, p.76). 99  
 
99 Removing trade unions’ role in management and monitoring compliance was in line with exact advice from the 
OECD. See - OECD, 2002a, p.88 
SDKU Term 2 Adoptions
Not Adopted Direct Correlation* Correlation
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Policy Suggestion Year 
Adopted    
Policy Description/Type of Evidence  








“A reform of the sickness benefit system 
shifts the cost of the first ten days of sick 
leave to employers…No further action 
required” (OECD, 2004a, p.97)  






at a…sectoral level” 
(OECD, 2002a, 
p.88) 
2003  Direct  
“Government policy is to extend agreements 
only upon written consent…” (OECD, 
2004a, p.98)  




regarding hiring and 
firing (OECD, 





“The amended legislation relaxes 
employment protection rules...no further 
action required (OECD, 2004a, p.98) 
5B – Cell 15 OECD 
2002  
“Ease regulations on 
working time” 
(OECD, 2002a, p.88) 
2003 Direct 
“The amended labour code eases regulation 
on working time…no further action 
required” (OECD, 2004a, p.98) 
5B – Cell 17 OECD 
2002 
“Revise the new 
labour code to reduce 
the excessive power 
of trade…” (OECD, 
2002a, p.88) 
2003/4 Direct 
“Accomplished by the amendment to the 
labour code…no further action required” 
(OECD, 2004a, p.98) (also see OECD, 
2005a, p.76-7). 
5B – Cell 21 OECD 
2002  
Reduce severance 
and eliminate the 
need for trade union 








“the government took a very important 
step…with the introduction of the new 
labour code in 2003. Changes include…a 
cut in severance pay; and a considerable 
easing of the conditions under which 
workers can be dismissed…” (OECD, 
2005a, p.76)  
5B – Cell 22 OECD 
2002 
Ease restrictions on 
working time 
(OECD, 2002a, p.88) 
2003 Direct 
“The amended labour code eases regulations 
on working time…No further action 
required” (OECD, 2004a, p.98) 
    See appendix 5B cells 6; 8; 9; 11; 13-28; 
34 for a complete picture of CIO impact 
during this period. 
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Further evidence of direct influence during this period can be found by looking at the 
CIOs’ responses to the measures adopted by SDKU. In May of 2003, the IMF commended 
Slovakia for policy changes which they noted were “in line with previous Fund advice” (IMF, 
2004a, p.4, 6) and urged authorities to focus on implementation (IMF, 2004a, p.4, 19, 44).100 In 
March 2004, the OECD echoed the Fund’s praise noting how the new government was able to 
pass a series of “politically demanding reforms” (OECD, 2004a, p.93) particularly in regard to 
the welfare system and labour legislation (see OECD, 2004a, pp.98, 122-3).101 In its report, it 
furthermore provided an impact assessment noting whether and the extent to which its advice 
had been followed. On issues where the OECD felt that policy recommendations had been 
sufficiently brought into legislation, it marked them with ‘no further action required’ (see 
OECD, 2004a, pp.94-99). This has been documented in table 5.7 to help illustrate the extent of 
the CIOs direct influence in this period – see cells 8, 14, 15, 17, 22.  Finally, in 2005, the World 
Bank named the country as its ‘top reformer’ for 2003 including it in the list of top 20 places to 
do business (World Bank, 2005a, pp.1-2).102 According to an official at Ministry of Finance, 
the World Bank’s rankings were and remain important in Slovakia. During Dzurinda’s second 
term especially, the interviewee commented that the Bank “introduced quite a few structural 
reforms, most of them were actually consulted and probably very thoroughly consulted with 
the World Bank, they were very much involved actually” (Slovak Ministry of Finance 
Interviewee D, 2020). 
2006 – 2010 SMER (Social Democrats). This tone of praise coming from the CIOs 
began to shift in the years following SDKU’s second term. According to the same Ministry of 
Finance official, the government during this time “didn’t solicit the [CIOs] so much, it was 
actually quite the opposite” (Slovak Ministry of Finance Interviewee D, 2020). The extensive 
pro-business reforms that had been taking place prior to 2006 led to Robert Fico’s party SMER 
being elected in July (Fabo & Sedláková, 2017, p.123) and as noted in chapter III, Fico ran a 
campaign on a promise to decrease flexibility and re-empower unions. As table 5.8 illustrates, 
many of the reforms passed by SMER in its first term directly contradict earlier advice from 
the CIOs e.g. the restoration of notice periods and severance pay in coexistence; the limits put 
 
100 IMF staff also noted the recent uptick in FDI projects as a result of the country’s responsiveness (see IMF, 
2004a, p.20)  
101 The OECD noted that the changes made aligned with their advice on dismissals (OECD, 2004a, p.122-3), 
reducing the power of trade unions and removing automatic extensions of wage bargaining agreements (OECD, 
2004a, p.98). 
102 Further evidence of direct influence can be found in several subsequent reports and consultation with country 
authorities commending Slovakia – see (IMF, 2004a, pp.5-6; IMF 2005a, p.12; OECD, 2005a, p.14, 76, 77; World 
Bank, 2004, p.38).  
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on temporary contracts; making possible again the extension of collective bargaining wage 
agreements; and the administration’s increase of minimum wage.  
Just prior to these reforms being adopted (June 2007), the CIOs expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the government’s plans to tighten EPL and took specific issue with their 
decision to extend collective wage agreements (IMF, 2007a, p.13; OECD, 2007a, p.12). The 
IMF described the proposals as “worrisome” (IMF, 2007a, p.16) and noted how “employers’ 
associations and major FDI-supported enterprises remain opposed” (IMF, 2007a, p.13). They 
further warned that such decisions would increase labour costs and worsen the business 
environment (IMF, 2007a, pp.13-15).  
Table 5.8 SMER Term 1 Counter-Reforms 2006 – 2010  
CIO Suggestions  Reference SMER Reform Reference 
Relax EPL specifically 
regarding hiring and 
firing (OECD, 2002a, 
p.17, 88).  
Reduce severance pay 
and eliminate the need 
for trade union approval 








“If an employee is entitled to a redundancy 
payment, he or she is also entitled to 
receive a wage during the redundancy 
notice period… (LABREF Database, n.d. 
Slovakia, 2007)  
“The period of dismissal notice has been 
extended from 15 to 30 days” (LABREF 
Database, n.d. Slovakia, 2007)  
Appendix 
4B cell 37 
Increase the duration of 





“Limiting the renewal of fixed-term 
employment contracts: this can be done 
only once every three years...” (LABREF 
Database, n.d. Slovakia, 2007)  
Appendix 
4B cell 40 
“Eliminate the extension 
of collective agreements 
reached at a…sectoral 




“introducing the possibility to extend a 
sectoral collective agreement to other 
companies in the sector without the consent 
of the companies’ management” (LABREF 
Database, n.d. Slovakia, 2007) 
Appendix 
4B cell 43 
Moderate wage growth 
and enhance wage 










“… In cases where social partners do not 
agree, the minimum wage will rise 
administratively by an average monthly 
wage increase”. (LABREF Database, n.d. 
Slovakia, 2007) 
Appendix 
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These warnings went unheeded, apart from two pieces of legislation (one pertaining to 
youth unemployment and the other to retirement), SMER did not adopt any of the CIOs 
suggestions and instead pressed on with tightening EPL in spite of the external criticism (see 
appendix 5B cells 35-49.  Two years later (February 2009), the OECD repeated its previous 
comments; it took specific issue with the centralised system of collective bargaining, recent 
increases to minimum wage (OECD, 2009a, p.33, 51, 54) and noted how such decisions were 
causing Slovakia to fall in the World Bank’s Doing Business rankings (OECD, 2009a, p.54). 
The IMF echoed these concerns several months later (see IMF, 2009a, pp.14-15).  
Slovakia’s relationship with the CIOs improved towards the second half of 2010 when 
SDKU regained office and made some initial changes in order to relax the rigidity put in place 
by the previous administration. In November, the OECD described the government’s actions 
as a “welcome step” (OECD, 2010a, p.11) supporting especially the reduction of employers’ 
notice and severance responsibilities and for removing the possibility to extend wage 
agreements to the wider sector (OECD, 2010a, p.11; OECD, 2010a, p.24). The following year 
in June (2011), the IMF began to push authorities to address the high levels of long-term 
unemployment and to do so through more flexibility in the labour market and increasing the 
use of ALMPs (IMF, 2011a, pp.24-25).  In response, the government noted that plans were in 
place to address these concerns (IMF, 2011a, pp.24-25) and in the month following discussions 
with the IMF, did so via the “big labour code reform” (Fabo & Sedláková, 2017) (to be 
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Table 5.9 SDKU Term 3 Impact Correlation Table  
Appendix 
– Cell # 
IO and 
Year 
Policy Suggestion Adopted Policy Description/Type of Evidence  
Appendix 
















“Return to previous legislation… Making 
collective agreement of a higher-level 
binding also for the employer who is not 
member of the employers...’ (LABREF 
Database, n.d. Slovakia, 2010; Appendix 
4B cell 67)  
Appendix 





of EPL (OECD, 







OECD Notes in 2010 that the new 
government has embarked on an 
ambitious reform agenda and will adjust 
the labour code to the lower level of 
employment protection (OECD, 2010a, 
pp.22-24) 
Appendix 





on ALMPs e.g. 
public employment 
subsidies (OECD, 






“Job creation support in form of 
investment subsidies” (LABREF 
Database, n.d. Slovakia, 2010; Appendix 
4B cell 69) 
Appendix 











Government passes ‘Big Labour Code 
Reform’ shortly after talks with IMF… 
increasing flexibility across several areas 
particularly hiring and firing (see Fabo & 
Sedláková, 2017, pp.129-30; Appendix 
4B cells 73-80) 
Appendix 












Government introduces representativeness 
threshold for trade unions… (LABREF 
Database, n.d. Slovakia, 2011; Appendix 
4B cell 80) 
 Appendix 




Decrease hiring and 








In 2011, the government made changes to 
fixed term contracts, probationary periods, 
notice and severance and dismissals 
which favoured employers (Fabo & 
Sedláková, 2017; pp.129-30; Appendix 
4B cells 73-78).  
    For a full version of the above, see 
appendix 5B cells 45; 46; 48; 49; 50; 52; 
53; 54.  
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 When SMER were re-elected in 2012, much of the previous administration’s reforms 
were (and remain) reversed (Fabo & Sedláková, 2017, p.130).103 This was done in cooperation 
with KOZ SR (one of Slovakia’s major trade union confederations) (see Goliaš & Kičina, 2007, 
p.4) and in direct conflict with CIO advice. As expected, the CIOs responded by warning 
authorities that their decisions would have a negative impact on job creation and “weaken 
business confidence” (OECD, 2012a, p.33). Despite the criticism, a year later, Fico’s 
government strengthened EPL further by reintroducing the possibility to extend collective 
bargaining agreements (LABREF Database, n.d. Slovakia, 2013; Appendix 4B cell 120).  
           Over the next few years, external condemnation continued, the CIOs citing specifically 
their desire for a return to the legislation that was brought in by the previous government 
(SDKU) in 2011 (see OECD, 2012a, p.33; IMF, 2014a, pp.12-13; OECD, 2014a, p.35, 98). 
But, SMER pushed back, during discussions in 2014, country authorities explained to IMF 
staff that they did not agree that the new labour code or other policies – such as those on 
pensions – would have adverse economic impacts (IMF, 2014a, p15, 20, 40).104 Throughout its 
term, SMER remained unresponsive and by 2017 the OECD lamented that most of its 
suggestions had not been followed (see Annex OECD, 2017a, pp.62-3). That same year, the 
IMF communicated to the government that the country was increasingly being viewed with 
caution by employers’ groups (both domestic and international) citing how a recent survey of 
foreign investors “ranks Slovakia in the bottom half in all areas of the labor [sic] market” (IMF, 
2017a, p.20).   
Overall, the CIOs were able to make a deep impact in Slovakia prior to 2004 but their 
influence waned heavily from 2006 onwards. Through technical assistance, advice and 
dialogue (Thomann, 2011, p.12), these organisations significantly influenced the character and 
often the specific content of reform choices in the country. While their influence was in no 
doubt aided by a favourable conservative government and the country’s anticipation of EU 
membership, Slovakia was nevertheless open to external assistance for purposes of capacity 
 
103 For example: reducing the number of renewals on fixed term contracts (LABREF Database, n.d. Slovakia, 
2012; Appendix 4B cell - 91); increasing notice periods and severance pay (LABREF Database, n.d. Slovakia, 
2012; Appendix 4B cell - 92); reducing the length of probationary periods (LABREF Database, 2012; Appendix 
4B cell - 93); removing representativeness quotas for trade unions (LABREF Database, n.d. Slovakia, 2012,; 
Appendix 4B cell - 107).  
104 Interestingly, a study done by Fabo & Sedláková (2017) found that unemployment in Slovakia actually 
decreased during this time when more rigidity was being introduced into the labour market despite CIO predictions 
to the contrary (Fabo & Sedláková, 2017, pp.129-30).  
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building to help guide its political and economic transition. Once this was accomplished 
however, the CIOs were highly dependent on favourable governments for access to policy 
space – apart from the years between 2010 – 2012, left wing actors have effectively shut these 
organisations out. The next section offers a brief comparison of CIO impact across Czechia 
and Slovakia asking whether and why the influence of these organisations varied across the 
two states. Conclusions drawn here will be used in later chapters where the relative impact of 
the CIOs and the ILO is assessed.  
5.3 The Diverging Impact of the Challenger IOs 
 How and why has CIO impact varied across Czechia and Slovakia? The CIOs have 
made a significant impact influencing the timing and content of legislative reforms in both 
countries but despite deploying similar mechanisms across the two, their effect was not 
uniform. The following section identifies and explains this variance; in doing so, significant 
divergencies are found in regard to (1) levels of direct impact (2) response rates in the years 
following EU accession. The section finds that while rational institutionalism can largely 
explain the extent of CIO impact in both countries, the effectiveness of managerial and 
socialisation techniques has been heavily mediated by the dynamics of the diverging policy 
spaces sketched out in chapter III.  
The first part of this section aggregates the data from several of the indicators discussed 
in the previous two sections (e.g. adoption rate, type of impact) in order to make several 
empirical observations regarding divergences of CIO impact.105 The second part interprets 
these divergences by applying the institutional theory presented in chapter I.  
Empirical Comparative Observations  
Figure 5.7 provides a comparative depiction of the total number of policy suggestions 
made by the IMF and OECD between 1998 – 2017 while figure 5.8 represents each country’s 
adoption rate as a percentage.106  When observing these totals, CIO impact does not appear to 
vary too drastically between Czechia and Slovakia with both countries receiving and adopting 
a similar number of policy suggestions over the same time period.  
 
 
105 See Appendix 5C for aggregated totals 
106 Calculated by the total number of adoptions/total number of suggestions x 100. 
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Figure 5.7                                     Figure 5.8                           
 
Sources: IMF Article IV Reports; OECD Economic Surveys; LABREF Database (various years). See 
Appendices 5A and 5B for references to individual legislative reforms suggestions/adoptions.  
 
However, stark differences emerge when we disaggregate the data above to contrast (1) 
category of impact (2) responsiveness by left/right wing parties across countries (3) type of 
legislation adopted e.g. EPL or other.  Figure 5.9 illustrates that the level of ‘direct’ impact the 
CIOs made in Slovakia has been far greater than in Czechia suggesting that these organisations 
have been more influential in terms of shaping policy content in the former than the latter.  
Figure 5.9 
 
Note figures shown as percentage of total adoptions. 
Sources: IMF Article IV Reports; OECD Economic Surveys; LABREF Database (various years). See 
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Divergencies grow wider when we compare adoption rates by political party: figures 
5.10 and 5.11 depict response totals between left- and right-wing governments within each 
country while figure 5.12 compares party type across countries. When the data is contrasted in 
this way, a clear picture emerges of the differences between the left wing in Slovakia (SMER) 
and their Czech counterparts (CSSD). These findings lend support to conclusions made in 
chapter III – that CSSD do not stray too far from the policy positions of the Czech conservative 
party and that labour in Slovakia is more successful at pushing back on legislative proposals 
which conflict with their interests.  
 
Figure 5.10                         Figure 5.11                            Figure 5.12 
 
Sources: IMF Article IV Reports; OECD Economic Surveys; LABREF Database (various years). See 
Appendices 5A and 5B for references to individual legislative reforms suggestions/adoptions.107 
 
However, this cross-national distinction between left wing parties is reduced slightly if 
we focus on type of reform because neither CSSD nor SMER appear to respond to the CIOs 
regarding EPL – although figure 5.13 indicates that the level of EPL suggestions adopted by 
both countries is fairly similar, it is predominately the right wing who are responsive in this 
regard. On the other hand, and in line with findings from chapter III, SMER do tend to reverse 
 
107 Note responsiveness figures calculated as a percentage of the total suggestions the CIOs made during each 
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EPL reforms which have been successfully diffused by the CIOs where CSSD do not. 
Moreover, the 2006 labour code introduced by CSSD was sufficiently flexible and supported 
by both the IMF and OECD a least until employers’ groups began to challenge it.  
 
Figure 5.13 Adoption of EPL Related CIO Policy Suggestions 
 
Sources: IMF Article IV Reports; OECD Economic Surveys; LABREF Database (various years). See 
Appendices 5A and 5B for references to individual legislative reforms suggestions/adoptions.  
 
 
 In sum, the CIOs have made a significant impact in both Czechia and Slovakia. While 
the extent of their influence has been relatively equal, patterns of response across the two 
countries have nevertheless differed producing some variation (1) the CIOs greater levels of 
direct influence in Slovakia (2) levels of responsiveness post 2004. The final part of this section 
applies the theory outlined chapter II to explain these divergences.  
Diverging Policy Spaces: Mediating CIO Impact  
The above has identified the ways in which CIO impact varies across Czechia and 
Slovakia, with a focus on the pre-and-post-EU accession periods, the remainder of this section 
explains this variance guided by rational institutionalism – both enforcement and management 
versions – as well as constructivism. Conclusions drawn here will not only produce the key 
international and domestic variables responsible for variation but will also contribute to this 
thesis’ explanation of the causes and consequences of policy fragmentation.  
 Prior to 2004, the extent of CIO impact (i.e. the total number of reforms adopted) is 
relatively similar across both countries. During this time, Czechia and Slovakia were both 
committed to making the necessary changes in order to gain membership as evidenced not only 
in the reforms adopted but also in the dialogue examined between country authorities and CIO 
EPL
Czechia Slovakia
Page 188 of 369 
 
staff. As such, this aspect of the CIOs impact can be explained by rational incentive driven 
behaviour – the prospects of membership motivated responsiveness. However, where impact 
varies in this period is in regard to the level of direct influence. Here the incentive/enforcement 
version of rationalism is of less help: both countries were preparing to enter the EU at the same 
time (2004) and the CIOs do not appear to have leveraged the prospects of membership in one 
country more than the other. Constructivist based explanations do not explain this either. 
Socialisation is said to be more/less effective depending on the country’s newness to the 
situation and whether there is domestic normative acceptance of the IO’s mandate (Kelley, 
2004). Accordingly, the CIOs used praise and shame in equal measure; both Republics were 
still in their transitioning phase and while normative acceptance was likely higher in Czechia, 
this would not account for the greater levels of direct influence in Slovakia. The managerial 
version of rationalism offers the best explanation: Slovakia’s lower levels of institutional 
capacity necessitated a deeper level of external involvement and as a result, authorities 
regularly requested additional support during this period which often took the form of technical 
assistance or joint initiatives. This dynamic was not present in Czechia and provided an 
opportunity for the CIOs to shape the reform process more precisely in Slovakia.    
In the post 2004 environment, variation in levels of direct influence are not as present; 
however, variation in regard to general responsiveness (the number of reforms each adopted) 
is. Incentive-based methods cease to explain this because both countries had already entered 
the EU and neither acquired loans. The managerial version of rationalism is also not helpful 
here as requests for technical assistance declined during this period. Moreover, Slovakia – for 
the most part – had closed the institutional and economic gap with Czechia (Czech Ministry of 
Labour Interviewee C, 2020) and so there was less of a need for support of this nature. Where 
variation does exist though is with the effectiveness of socialisation-based methods. For 
example, while the CIOs continued to employ persuasion and praise in order to influence policy 
outcomes, they began to have much less success in Slovakia. When a conservative government 
was in power (e.g. SDKU 2010 – 2012), socialisation helped influence the content and timing 
of reform choices; however, when SMER took office, they (along with several trade union 
confederations) provided a sufficient barrier to CIO diffusion. Successive governments in 
Czechia did not produce the same effect. 
Overall, rational choice-based methods are important tools which can serve as catalysts 
for change whereas socialisation and managerial based methods are necessary compliments 
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guiding the content and character (rather than the extent) of that change (Kelley, 2004). Absent 
enforcement or conditionality, the effectiveness of socialisation and management approaches 
are heavily dependent on the domestic spaces within which the CIOs are operating – the 
diverging policy spaces sketched out in chapter III correlate well with patterns of CIO impact 
illustrated here.  
The CIOs have had a greater degree of direct impact in Slovakia owing to the country’s 
low levels of intuitional capacity and ambitions of EU membership. Post 2004, these 
organisations were largely at the mercy of favourable governments. In Slovakia, the CIOs 
influence was effectively blocked by left wing opposition who moreover reversed much of 
their previous policy achievements. In Czechia, left and right-wing governments mediate the 
CIOs differently to some degree (e.g. in regard to EPL) but both are equally responsive, and 
changes made to legislation tends to be permanent. While the level of independent influence 
may be lower in Czechia, the CIOs synergistic relationship with the country allows for less 
impediments to policy diffusion overall.  
Conclusions 
In contrast with the findings of previous studies, this chapter has illustrated that 
incentive-based rationalism and domestic politics do not sufficiently explain CIO influence in 
Czechia and Slovakia. While rationalism and domestic politics do mediate impact in regard to 
extensity, these organisations have nevertheless been able to shape the specific content and 
character of policy reforms and in doing so, altered legislative outcomes in ways which would 
have been different absent their intervention.  The rate of success regarding this type of impact 
reflects both the interests and relative strengths of opposing domestic groups who either 
empower or impede these external influences. The cases of Czechia and Slovakia have 
demonstrated well the variation that is produced when IOs operate across diverging spaces – 
their influence being more consistent and permanent in the former than the latter.  
The findings here shed light not only on how IOs make an impact and why that impact 
might vary across states, but they are especially relevant to the issue of policy fragmentation 
and its consequences for the ILO. Where multiple IOs with conflicting norms operate within 
one space, successful policy diffusion by one can impede the impact of another. For example, 
as will be illustrated in the next chapter, the implementation of legislative content influenced 
by these organisations can result in the violation of ILO conventions both in law and in practice. 
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Thus far, the previous chapters have developed a picture of the extent to which fragmentation 
exists across Czechia and Slovakia; in line with the SNA outputs from chapter II (section 2.2), 
sufficient empirical evidence has been provided to conclude that the ILO’s impact is greater in 
the latter while the reverse is true for the CIOs – in line with this thesis’ hypothesis then, the 
consequences of policy fragmentation should be greater in Czechia. The following chapter 
provides a thorough investigation into whether and how fragmentation at the international level 
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Chapter VI 
Fragmented Policy Networks and the Consequences for ILO Impact  
Do we have dialogue? Yes. Do we have influence? Not necessarily. There have been times 
when the IFIs and ILO have tried to cooperate… the further we got into it the more difficult it 
became…We had meetings with the World Bank last week and it was don’t call us we’ll call 
you” (ILO Staff Interviewee L, 2019). 
The IMF first and foremost, whenever it advises a country, it’s… for the health of public 
finance…It will not fight for workers’ rights” (Slovak Ministry of Finance Interviewee D, 
2020) 
Unchecked economic liberalisation increases political and societal conflict threatening 
peace and stability both within and between states. While the de-regulatory policies associated 
with this outcome are often pursued by fiercely competitive governments, IOs are meant to 
help build trust, foster cooperation and contribute to effective global governance. However, the 
global institutional environment has become increasingly fragmented: across several policy 
domains, there exists the “presence of multiple and overlapping organisations where hierarchy 
and coordination are absent” (see Zürn & Faude, 2013, p.119; Bierman et al, 2009; Raustiala 
& Victor 2004). While fragmentation is not in and of itself detrimental to global governance 
(see Judith Kelley’s study on election monitoring in chapter 1 section 1.2), it is so when the 
norms of the core IOs within a regime conflict (see Bierman et al, 2009 and chapter II section 
2.2). This is the dynamic that exists between the ILO and organisations such as the IMF, World 
Bank and OECD (the CIOs) within the domain of labour market policies – the former’s efforts 
to uphold standards of best practice is often considered as impeding the effective functioning 
of the market by the latter (Sengenberger, 2005; 2005a). At the same time, other international 
actors such as the International or European Trade Union Confederations (ITUC and ETUC 
respectively) work to strengthen the ILO’s impact. Does and to what extent does this policy 
fragmentation facilitate or impede the ILO’s impact on states? How are these competitive and 
cooperative clusters of external actors mediated by the diverging policy spaces sketched out 
earlier?  
CIOs such as the World Bank or IMF claim to respect the ILO’s work when designing 
their loan conditions (Anner & Caraway, 2010, p.152; Blanton et al, 2015, p.324); but, keen 
observers have highlighted the downward pressures that these programmes have on workers’ 
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rights (Blanton & Blanton, 2016; Blanton et al, 2015; Anner & Caraway, 2010; Sengenberger, 
2005; Maupain, 2013; Hagen, 2003, p.11-14; Caraway et al, 2012; ILO Staff Interviewees V; 
M; L). However, much of the work examining this phenomenon does so on a large-N scale 
drawing correlation between loan recipients on the one hand and diminishing labour standards 
on the other. In doing so, it centres the conversation regarding policy fragmentation and 
competing international norms, around differences in institutional power and as a result, this 
work obscures some of the causal drivers that contribute to policy fragmentation when 
enforcement mechanisms such as loan conditionality are absent – as is the case across the 
countries being examined here.108 
Chapters III – V have shed light on the varying levels and character of fragmentation 
that exist across Czechia and Slovakia by demonstrating when and how the ILO and CIOs 
make an impact (see chapters IV and V respectively); and secondly, by providing a domestic 
level explanation for why their relative impact varies within and across states (see chapter III 
and the application of its findings across chapters IV and V).109 This chapter’s task is to 
determine the consequences of policy fragmentation for the ILO by linking violations of the 
organisation’s conventions to the adoption of CIO policies across both countries.  
As will be illustrated, policy fragmentation in the international system exacerbates 
domestic conflict. The ability of competing external actors to make an impact is facilitated by 
competing domestic groups who ally with and seek advice from their international 
counterparts. These networks battle for domestic policy space (Sengenberger, 2005) and as a 
result, conflict that is present between competing actors at the national level (e.g. capital and 
labour) is reinforced by conflicting norms (e.g. between the CIOs and ILO) being diffused from 
the international and vice versa (Sengenberger, 2005, p.10). It will be demonstrated that under 
these conditions, IO impact occurs in a broadly mutually exclusive context:  while CIO impact 
can cause violations of ILO conventions, the reverse is also true – when the ILO’s violation is 
 
108 Like other Central Eastern European (CEE) countries during the period, Czechia and Slovakia were both 
receiving policy advice from the CIOs; but, unlike their regional neighbours, neither were subjected to loan 
conditions which significantly impacted labour policy. This provides a unique opportunity to examine the relative 
influence of the ILO and CIOs within a context where the latter is not advantaged by asymmetrical institutional 
strength. Moreover, it helps bring to light the ways in which two seemingly similar states, mediate IOs quite 
differently and to uncover the conditions under which the ILO makes an impact when faced with competing 
domestic and international forces. 
 
109 To recap, IOs make an impact influencing the content and timing of policy reforms, the extent to which they 
are successful in achieving this depends on conducive domestic factors which determine the relative impact of 
competing IOs – see chapters III - V. 
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fixed, it presents a threat to the mandates of the OECD and IMF. Under what conditions does 
the ILO make an impact when faced with these competing international and domestic forces? 
This chapter identifies direct links between CIO policy advice and specific violations 
of ILO C098 in Czechia and Slovakia; although policy fragmentation resulted in violations 
manifesting in both countries, the findings here highlight how the ILO more successfully 
navigated these dynamics in the latter. This outcome is best explained by the policy spaces 
sketched out in chapter III and the managerial version of rationalism: the unique configuration 
of actors in Slovakia provided access to the ILO while keeping the CIOs out. Because of this, 
the ILO was able to guide Slovakia’s policy making and implementation processes; serve as 
an important ally to unions and members of parliament; and through its technical/legal 
expertise, the ILO brought about legislative and implementation changes that made a real 
impact. The necessary domestic conditions conducive to ILO impact were not present in 
Czechia and as a result, the CIOs and their allies (employers’ groups and conservative 
governments) much more successfully dominated the policy sphere. 
Sections 6.1 and 6.2 perform a within case analysis of the events surrounding the 
violations of C098 in Czechia and Slovakia respectively.  Following the methodological 
guidance set out earlier, these sections trace the evolution of the violations by taking into 
account the interactions between, and influence of, competing policy networks. In doing so, it 
identifies the necessary combination of international and domestic actors responsible for the 
violations’ occurrence, as well as those that facilitated or impeded the ILO’s ability to correct 
them. Section 6.3 examines the relevance of the SNA model to the empirical findings thus far. 
In doing so, the strengths and weaknesses of network analysis as a method for mapping and 
measuring policy fragmentation are assessed. The section closes with a brief comparison of the 
two countries to summarise the conditions under which the ILO makes an impact when 
operating in a fragmented context.  
6.1 Fragmentation and the Battle for Public Sector Policy Influence in Czechia 
The CIOs do not explicitly call for the disempowering of workers and yet their policy 
prescriptions often result in further eroding the power of organised labour (Burgess, 2010, p.2; 
Caraway et al, 2012; Blanton et al, 2015). Issues surrounding collective bargaining in Czechia’s 
public sector highlights this well: here, violations have been raised with some consistency over 
the past two decades – often becoming more intense during periods of transition or economic 
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crisis. During these times, IOs have become increasingly active in attempting to influence 
domestic policy across several spectrums: government spending; the processes involved in 
aligning national laws/practice with the acquis; and in seeking to uphold the country’s 
commitments to ILS. The following examines the ways in which external CIO pressure to cut 
public spending resulted in the undermining of social dialogue and repeated violations of C098. 
It then assesses the effectiveness with which the ILO and its domestic and international allies 
were able to intervene and uphold standards of best practice.  
The section is divided into three parts. First, the dynamics surrounding the 2002 Civil 
Service Act (CSA) are examined – this Act was meant to regulate parts of the public sector and 
was a requirement of EU accession. However, aspects of it ended up being in violation of ILO 
C098 and were so as a result of CIO pressure to cut public spending. Secondly, the ways in 
which the CIOs impacted public sector social dialogue post 2008 are demonstrated; here, the 
battle for domestic policy space intensified owing to the global financial crisis and mounting 
CIO pressures for labour market flexibility. Finally, the role of the EU in pushing Czechia into 
better compliance with the ILO post 2014 is examined. Overall, the section finds that despite 
varied and multiple attempts by the ILO and its allies to improve public sector social dialogue 
and to correct for violations of C098, the CIOs, together with their domestic allies 
(governments, finance ministers, bank presidents), dominated policy to a far greater extent.  
The 2002 Draft Civil Service Act and the Violations of C098 
Concerns regarding social dialogue in the public sector first arose in 2001 as a result of 
the controversial bargaining limitations that the 2002 Civil Service Act (CSA) placed on the 
rights of civil servants. As a part of EU accession conditionality, prospective Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) members were required to create and implement a professional and 
depoliticised civil service (Jančařík, 2013) – the expressed aim being to minimise corruption 
and to create structures that would be able to effectively implement the Union’s directives 
(Jančařík, 2013). As a result, the CSA needed to also regulate working conditions separately 
from the rules laid out in the labour code. However, decisions made by authorities in this regard 
came under heavy criticism for conflicting with ILO C098 and undermining rights of civil 
servants in several ways: the draft CSA excluded all public servants (not just those in top 
positions) from collective bargaining; it barred trade unions from concluding legally binding 
agreements with government employers; and finally, it retrospectively made existing collective 
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agreements void and therefore threatened many of organised labour’s hard won battles (EPSU, 
2001). 
It did not take long for the ILO and its international allies to call attention to the CSA’s 
implications for workers’ rights in Czechia. At the ILO’s annual conference (ILC) in June 
2001, Mr. Leather, a spokesperson for ‘Public Service International’ (PSI) – a global union 
federation for public service workers – lambasted the “ideologically driven attacks on the 
public sector” (ILC Record of Proceedings, 2001, p.14/31. PDF. 462)  and called out the Czech 
Republic’s recent reforms for “[curtailing] the basic rights of public servants to take part in free 
collective bargaining” (ILC Record of Proceedings, 2001, 14/31; 14/32. PDF.462-3). In a 
separate statement, and in solidarity with Czech trade unions, the ‘European Public Service 
Union’ (EPSU) called on the government to withdrawal the Act citing its incompatibility both 
with the ILO’s core conventions as well as with Article 6 of the European Social Charter 
(EPSU, 2001).110 Several months later (October, 2001), the issue was reported directly to the 
ILO’s Committee by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) (Normlex Database, 
2001d; 2002c).  
What led the Civil Service Act to conflict with one of the ILO’s core conventions and 
ignite such backlash from some of the organisation’s key allies in the international system? 
The driving forces were both internal and external: regarding the former, the reduction of 
collective bargaining functioned to help control fiscal spending as it related to the remuneration 
of civil servants and other public sector workers.111 Indeed, if implemented, the CSA would 
have introduced a remuneration system (Špaček & Nemec, 2018, p.197) that would have 
ensured entitlement to job guarantees and several retirement bonus schemes for public sector 
employees (Public Sector Union OSSOO Interviewee R, 2020).112 As noted by a lawyer at one 
of the country’s largest public sector unions “the concern was that the public sector would 
become too independent and also that it would be too expensive for the budget” (Public Sector 
Union OSSOO  Interviewee R, 2020). Such concerns were salient enough that MPs were 
 
110 Note - the EPSU refers to the ‘Public Service Act’ (312/2002) rather than the ‘CSA’ (218/2002). But the ILO 
refers to both interchangeably regarding the observation on civil servants and collective bargaining (Martišková 
& Kahancová, 2016, p.471)  
111 While base wages are themselves regulated through government decree (subject to tripartite social dialogue 
discussions), employees can negotiate a range of bonuses, benefits and conditions in addition to salaries 
(Martišková & Kahancová, 2016, p.474; Eurofound, 2014) 
112 A new remuneration system was one of the requirements the Commission communicated directly to the 
government - “the Act should ensure a true and just system of remuneration with a transparently defined 
performance component of the salary.” (EU Commission, 2014, p.68; Špaček & Nemec, 2018) 
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raising the issue in parliament – as noted by MP Jaroslav Štrait during this time  “the EU was 
pushing the country into the Civil Service Law which would be a great strain on mandatory 
spending” (Czech Parliament, November, 15, 2001).  
External Influences. While the ILO and its allies were calling out the government for 
their attack on social dialogue, the CIOs were, at the same time, diffusing a very different 
message and one that conflicted with the concerns that had been raised by organised labour. 
Feeding into the government’s decision-making processes regarding the public sector during 
this period were organisations such as the IMF, World Bank and OECD – the IMF at one stage 
describing Czechia’s public finances as “worrisome” (IMF, 2001, PDF.63). More specifically 
however, the CIOs, on multiple occasions, raised the issue of the high cost of public sector 
remuneration while simultaneously urging a scaling back of social dialogue. During this time, 
the World Bank had in fact been providing technical assistance to Czechia on issues of fiscal 
sustainability and in its follow up report (the ‘Public Expenditure Review’) (IMF, 2001, 
PDF.46), the organisation specifically called out civil service wages as being a huge strain on 
the budget – “by far the largest quasi-mandated item is the payroll of the civil service 
accounting for 21.6 percent of mandated and quasi-mandated expenditures in the 2001 budget” 
(World Bank Country Study, 2001, p.95). The OECD too took issue with rising public sector 
wages warning authorities to “exercise restraint when negotiating with its employees” (OECD, 
2000, pp.108-9; 51); to remove the Ministry of Labour’s ability to extend collective agreements 
to the wider sector (OECD, 2000, p.108-9; 51) and in the following year, whilst public sector 
reform was being discussed in parliament, staff warned against the unnecessarily high levels 
of job security the draft Act afforded to civil servants (OECD, 2001, p.164).   
The CIOs suggestions appear to have made a greater impact on Czech authorities’ 
policy decision making than the ILO and its allies were able to. As noted above, the Committee 
raised an observation on the issue in 2002 challenging the government’s position on the matter 
and requesting a copy of the draft Act so it could provide further guidance (ILO Normlex 
Database, 2002c); but, national authorities ignored this request until 2004 (ILO Normlex 
Database, 2004b).113 Their response to the CIOs however was quite different. Indeed, Stanislav 
Gross (then Minister of the Interior)  announced to parliament several months after the OECD’s 
2000 report that it was important the country listened to the organisation in regard to upcoming 
 
113 Note, the Czech Government justified its position on the grounds of C098 article 6 – which exempts collective 
bargaining for ‘civil servants engaged in the administration of the state’. The Committee took the position that 
Czech’s interpretation of those in that category was too wide (ILO Normlex Database, 2002c).  
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public sector reform  (Czech Parliament, September 14, 2000). In meetings with the IMF during 
the summer of 2001, the Ministry of Finance assured staff that it planned to implement cuts 
guided by the World Bank’s review (IMF, 2001, PDF.22) and agreed to work with both 
organisations to do so (IMF, 2001, PDF.63). It was also after these meetings that proposals to 
the draft Act were made by MP Miroslav Kalousek which, if implemented, would have resulted 
in both a reduction of salaries and benefits for civil servants in line with the CIOs requests 
(Czech Parliament, November, 15, 2001).114 As noted by Czech economist and former ILO 
official, the IMF and OECD were present in several public sector policy related discussions 
and their advice on this issue was taken on board (Former ILO Official and Regional Expert 
Interviewee E, 2020). 
 The openness of Czechia’s policy makers to the CIOs during this time was, according 
to several observers, not uncommon for countries across the CEE region. This is because 
implementing CIO advice (and in particular IMF Article IV and the World Bank’s Doing 
Business recommendations) carried reputational importance in regard to a country’s 
attractiveness for FDI i.e. it functioned as a signal to international markets that the post-
communist reform process was credible (See Siwiñska, 1999, p.21; Blanton et al, 2015, p.325; 
ILO Staff Interviewee  L. 2019).115 As two senior employees at the Czech Ministry of Finance 
noted:  
“Doing Business is…taken very seriously because it somehow creates an image of the country…Every 
year, we assess the evaluation of Doing Business very carefully and usually send a higher level response 
to the World Bank…in order to get a better score and ranking” (Czech Ministry of Finance Interviewees 
Q & Y, 2020).    
Moreover, it would not have been the first time that CIO recommendations found their 
way into Czechia’s public sector policy making processes: shortly after the currency crisis in 
1997, discussions between the CIOs and country authorities regarding the wage bargaining 
system’s implications for public sector spending were had as were budget cuts and wage 
 
114 Miroslav Kalousek belonged to KDU-CSL and was Minister of Finance between January 2007 – May 2009 
and again between July 2010 – July 2013. As will be discussed later in this section,  Kalousek met with IMF staff 
on two separate occasions after the 2008 global financial crisis and was instrumental in designing and 
implementing public sector budget cuts in response during which time he was named “Minister of Finance of the 
Year’ by Emerging Markets Journal (Štucbartová, 2020).  
115 Failure to meet IMF obligations results not only in damage to a country’s reputation but also “the threat of 
being shut out of international capital markets” (Khan and Sharma, 2001, p.8 cited in Anner & Caraway, 2010, 
p.161).  
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freezes made based on IMF advice (Myant, 2010, p.60; also see IMF Working Paper, 1997; 
OECD 1998, p.17). 
While the CIOs were successfully diffusing their preferred policies, the ILO continued 
pressing Czech authorities on the issue of public sector reform with little progress. The 
Committee had not received a response from the government in regard to the observation it 
raised on C098 and in 2003, staff ratcheted up the pressure by adding a ‘footnote’ to that year’s 
observation (ILO Normlex Database, 2003b; for information of ‘footnotes’ see ILO design 
features chapter I section 1.3). In doing so, the ILO was communicating to the government that 
the matter was being taken seriously and that the process of ‘naming and shaming’ had 
begun.116 When the government finally did respond in 2004, it appears to have dodged the issue 
at hand: echoing the responsiveness patterns highlighted in chapter IV (behaviour which is 
reminiscent of mock compliance), the government’s response failed to properly address the 
Committee’s specific concerns regarding the CSA. Instead, Czech officials merely provided 
general information on the collective bargaining systems that were already in place. The 
Committee had to once again repeat its request (see ILO Normlex Database, 2004b).  
The issue of the CSA would soon drop off the Committee’s radar, not because the Act 
had been amended to align with C098, but because it never came into force despite passing 
through parliament in April 2002. As it turns out, the ILO was not the only organisation that 
Czechia was side-stepping during this time; according to several observers including staff at 
the Czech Ministry of Finance, the country manged to “trick the EU” too (Jančařík, 2013; 
CMKOS Interviewee J, 2020) – fulfilling civil service accession criteria on paper, but 
perpetually avoiding implementation despite persistent EU pressure (Jančařík, 2013; Regional 
Labour Law Expert Interviewee A, 2020; Czech Ministry of Finance Staff Interviewees Q & 
Y, 2020; Špaček & Nemec, 2018). Interviewees at a public sector union and the Ministry of 
Finance point to a lack of political will and unacceptably high domestic adjustment costs for 
this outcome (Public Sector Union OSSOO Interviewee R, 2020; Czech Ministry of Finance 
Interviewees Q & Y, 2020). In addition to concerns regarding public sector remuneration, 
another sticking point for Czech authorities was that compliance with EU requirements 
 
116As noted in chapter IV, the ILO’s ‘footnotes’ function as signals to the government that the issue has now been 
flagged for potential discussion at the annual conference in June – setting into motion the ‘naming and shaming’ 
process (Landy, 1980; Koliev, 2018; Thomann, 2011, p.14). 
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regarding the CSA would have made it harder to assign political appointees into the civil 
service (Jančařík, 2013; CMKOS Interviewee J, 2020). 
Although issues with the CSA had (albeit temporarily) subsided, the battle for public 
sector policy influence only intensified in subsequent years. Despite massive backlash from 
organised labour, the outcomes tended to fall in favour of the CIOs and their domestic allies. 
Shortly after the July 2002 elections, in which the social democrats formed a minority 
government with the centre right KDU-CSL (EURACTIV, 2003), conversations with the IMF 
regarding public sector cuts began (IMF, 2002, Public Information Notice, pp.3-4). In these 
meetings, staff stressed that market confidence depended on the credibility of the government’s 
plan to reduce the deficit via public finance reform; the government as well as officials from 
the Ministry of Finance, assured staff that improving public finances was their “main policy 
objective” (IMF Mission Concluding Statement, 2002) and noted that investor confidence as 
well as quick entry into the eurozone were their primary motivation. Staff welcomed the 
government’s commitment and noted they would be offering some specific suggestions to help 
accomplish it (IMF Mission Concluding Statement, 2002) which, in the following year, 
included cutting public employment and limiting the wage bill.  
The government responded by drawing up a draft budget containing wage freezes for 
most of the public sector in 2003 (IMF, 2003, p.16; staff report p.3) and in 2004, a further 
reduction of the wage bill was achieved by laying off 9000 public sector workers – IMF staff 
welcomed the progress (IMF, 2004, Statement by Executive Directors, p.3). However, 
organised labour did not. Vladimir Špidla (leader of CSSD) faced a massive backlash not only 
from opposition parties (EURACTIV, 2003)  but also two of the country’s biggest trade union 
confederations (CMKOS and ASO) who responded by  threatening strikes and assembling over 
20,000 people in mass protest against the government’s reforms and lack of social dialogue 
during the process (ISA, 2003). The issues of domestic labour soon caught the attention of their 
international ally ITUC who, in 2005, reported to the ILO that there was a resurgence of 
problems regarding collective bargaining in the public sector (ILO Normlex Database, 
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2006b).117 ITUC’s concerns in this regard would go unanswered (ILO Normlex Database, 
2006b).118 
These events illustrated above, highlight well the declining power of domestic trade 
unions in the face of transnational capital and as illustrated in chapter III, their increasing 
reliance on strategies other than collective bargaining to affect outcomes (Martišková & 
Sedláková, 2017). While the CIOs themselves did not, in this instance, specifically advise 
authorities to disempower unions, the pressure to reduce spending resulted in an undermining 
of social dialogue, wage cuts and job losses in a sector which tends to see high rates of 
unionisation (see Blanton et al, 2015, p.327).119 Moreover, as a staff member at a public sector 
union noted: “when the government decides to cut down the jobs, many times they cut down 
the jobs of trade union members….then you have the trade union being smaller and 
smaller…unions back then were very weak, it was one of the worst times” (Public Sector 
Union OSSOO Interviewee R, 2020). Indeed, despite the amendment to the labour code 
opening opportunities for social dialogue, the events described above were only foreshadowing 
what was to come in the post 2008 labour market environment.  
 Austerity, Social Dialogue and Collective Bargaining Post 2008  
Before examining issues surrounding social dialogue in Czechia post 2008, it is first 
useful to take a brief look at the ways in which policy incoherence manifested across the EU 
more broadly so that parallels can be drawn. During this period, several countries were in need 
of bailout packages which often came attached with harsh austerity measures that undermined 
labour and conflicted with ILO conventions. Although Czechia did not require international 
loans, and was therefore not subjected to the same conditionality, the Czech government chose 
 
117 ITUC as well as other international actors were raising additional and related issues at this time too: e.g. 
problems to do with essential public sector services striking see (ILO Normlex Database, 2006d); the European 
Committee of Social Rights (EPSU/ETUI, 2019); and the US Department State (CGWR, Czechia, Violation 86, 
2017).  
118 ITUC did concede in the following year that the 2006 labour code had opened opportunities for public sector 
collective bargaining (ILO Normlex Database, 2007b) but these hopes were soon dashed after the 2008 global 
financial crisis and renewed CIO interest in the country’s economic policies. 
119 The ‘knock on’ effects of IFI influence on public spending has been found not only to reduce the power of 
unions, but also contribute to social and political instability (see Addo et al, 2010; Abouharb, M. R., & Cingranelli, 
D. L, 2006; Vreeland, 2003). Moreover, As a senior ILO official noted: “the IMF will say there needs to be a cap 
on public spending and a reduction of the total wage bill…some of these wage cuts will lead to social conflicts 
e.g. Burundi – the advice was to cut public sector pay but this generated strikes by medical doctors, you can 
imagine what happens when doctors strike… people die…A feeling of inequality in the public sector can result 
in strikes and can degenerate into conflicts beyond the work place e.g. in Burundi the ethnic dimension is included 
in these types of issues” (ILO Staff Interviewee  P, 2019).  
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to mediate external policy advice in such a way that the outcome echoed much of what was 
going on in the countries that did.  
By 2009, austerity was a top priority for the CIOs and within Europe more specifically 
for the Troika (IMF, European Commission and the European Central Bank) where pressure 
was put on countries to freeze public employment, salaries and to slim down government 
spending through outsourcing and privatisation – in many cases, governments adopted these 
policies unilaterally breaking with traditional norms of social dialogue. Romania for example, 
received €20 billion in March 2009 and in compliance with its loan conditions reduced public 
employment and wages by 25% (Glassner & Watt, 2010; Guardiancich, 2012, p.15). The 
domestic reaction was so bad that the implementing government had to resign; however, even 
when the new administration sought ways to strengthen social dialogue, the Troika intervened 
once again demanding further restrictions (ITUC, 2013, p.65) – specifically by removing 
sectoral extensions. According to ITUC, IMF advice denied one million workers freedom of 
association in Romania (ITUC, 2018, p.43) and similar dynamics can be seen in Bulgaria 
(Guardiancich, 2012, p.14) Portugal (ITUC, 2018, p.43) Ireland (ITUC CSI IGB, 2013, p.10) 
Spain (ITUC CSI IGB, 2013, p.19) Latvia (EPSU, 2009) and Greece (ITUC, 2013, pp.62-3). 
In all of these cases, ILO violations regarding collective bargaining in the public sector were 
raised as a direct result of participation in these IFI loan programmes.120  In regard to Greece 
and Romania, two ILO officials recalled this period and during research interviews in Geneva 
they noted:  
“the IMF came to the ILO and informed us of what they advised the government [of Greece], clearly 
they see the ILO standards (interviewee makes air quote hand gesture) ‘as a constraint to the 
optimisation of effective resource allocation’ [laughs]…. There was ‘optimisation under constraints’ or 
‘optimisation without constraints’ – they were going for the second…In Greece, they cut the minimum 
wage, they slashed the pensions and stuff…” (ILO Staff Interviewee, P, 2019).   
“these institutions put a lot of pressure on the country and then the ILO goes in afterwards and tries to 
improve it again…the Troika put a lot of pressure on Greece to dismantle their right to collective 
bargaining and to dismantle labour law…same happened in Romania… we spend a lot of time and 
funds…now to work with them to improve labour law” (ILO Staff Interviewee, V, 2018).   
 
120 See Greece (ILO Normlex Database, 2011c; 2012a); Spain (ILO Normlex Database, 2012b); Portugal (ILO 
Normlex Database, 2010e); Latvia (ILO Normlex Database, 2010f); Romania (ILO Normlex Database, 2010g); 
Bulgaria (ILO Normlex Database, 2011d)  
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At the 2010 ILC session, workers representatives had had enough as individuals from 
each of the aforementioned countries addressed the conference calling out the CIOs and 
specifically the IMF for the harsh conditions workers faced as a result of Article IV 
recommendations (ILC Record of Proceedings, 2010).121   
Czechia. Despite not taking loans from the IFIs, similar dynamics can be observed in 
Czechia. Conservative party ODS had been re-elected two years prior to 2008 and would 
remain in office until 2013. Throughout this period and especially during its second term (2010 
– 2013), the government modelled its crisis response on CIO advice which continued to 
undermine public sector social dialogue and create blowback from both domestic and 
international labour organisations.   
On the back of OECD advice in April of 2008 (OECD, 2008, pp.14; 50; 57-8; 70), the 
government announced cuts to public and health sector wages and employment to which 
CMKOS and OS KOVO responded with planned strikes and protests (IndustriAll, 2008). Their 
international affiliates IndustriAll (a global union representing over 50 million workers who 
support the ILO’s work alongside other global federations e.g. ITUC and PSI) (IndustriAll, 
2020; IndustriAll, 2018)  expressed solidarity with the national unions in a statement that read 
“the unions warn that the present Czech government, fully in accord with the International 
Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organisation policies, is for full liberalization, 
deregulation and ultimately…single market rules over social and trade union rights” 
(IndustriAll, 2008).  
Despite this pressure, the government remained undeterred: in early 2010, IMF staff 
again met with interim Prime Minister Jan Fischer, the governor of the Czech National Bank 
and two deputy finance ministers to discuss more public sector and health reforms (IMF, 2010, 
p.7; 34) and following ODS’ re-election in June 2010, the new administration (led by Petr 
Nečas) announced further cuts (See Glassner, 2010, pp.21-23; Glassner & Watt, 2010). 122   
In an effort to convince the government to reconsider, domestic unions – CMKOS and 
OSZaSP ČR (the country’s largest health sector union) – joined together with their international 
 
121 These comments can be viewed on the following pages of ILC Record of Proceedings 2010 - Romania (PDF. 
613) Greece (PDF. 665) Portugal (PDF. 941) Spain (PDF. 945).  
 
122 The OECD also recommended cuts to public sector wages and health care sector reforms (OECD, 2010, p.56) 
despite the government already having cut staff based on OECD advice for the 2010 budget (OECD, 2010, p.70)  
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allies – ITUC and EPSU – and lambasted the Nečas administration for ignoring social dialogue 
(CMKOS, 2010; Žitníková & Břeňková, 2010). EPSU expressed their dismay in a letter 
addressed to the Minister of Labour Jaromír Drábek in which they condemned the 
government’s “systems of bargaining” (EPSU, 2010a) while both the ITUC and EPSU lent 
support to the upcoming demonstrations planned for September (EPSU, 2010; ITUC, 2010). 
During the same week that the demonstrations were taking place, Nečas was being 
challenged in parliament over the recent cuts to which he responded by shifting the blame. 
Here, Nečas claimed that his government’s budget was based on the previous government’s 
‘Convergence Programme’ which had already been approved prior to his election  (Czech 
Parliament, September 23, 2010). However, evidence suggests that external actors had 
influence here too:  just a couple of months prior to the Nečas’ election victory, the IMF stated 
“The new government will need to propose a credible and durable plan for medium-term fiscal 
consolidation in order to achieve debt sustainability… the new plan should draw and expand 
on the recently approved Convergence Program” (IMF, 2010, PDF.52). During these meetings 
with the IMF, Jan Fischer (the interim prime minister prior to Nečas) assured staff that their 
recommendations in this regard would serve as a guideline for the next administration (IMF, 
2010, p.27; PDF.58).  
It was not just the public sector budget which the IMF and OECD were advising on; 
changes to the labour code which further chipped away at trade union power were being made 
e.g. to fixed term contracts, reducing notice and severance and making dismissals more flexible 
for employers (See Appendix 4A, Cells 86-88 and Appendix 5A, Cells 58; 62-64). Another 
amendment pushed through by Nečas (proposed March, 2009) blocked unions from extending 
collective bargaining agreements to the wider sector involved (CMKOS, 2009) – a move which 
the OECD in particular had pushed for on multiple occasions (see OECD, 2000; p.108; OECD, 
2003, p.145; OECD, 2004, p.12;155) and which according to CMKOS, undermined collective 
bargaining and was in direct conflict with ILO C098 (CMKOS, 2009).  
While the issue of extensions would not reach the ILO, the problems surrounding 
collective bargaining and social dialogue were transmitted to the Committee via ITUC who, on 
behalf of Czech unions,  noted that there was now “little scope for negotiations on pay in the 
public sector and obstacles to collective bargaining in the healthcare service” (ILO Normlex 
Database, 2010c). The government not only ignored ITUC’s concerns (ILO Normlex Database, 
2010c); but several months later (December) in the face of international criticism (EPSU, 
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2010b) and large scale strikes and protests, Nečas decided to press ahead with the cuts claiming 
that “the cabinet would not give into pressure” (Tribune Business News, 2010) – in 2011, 
employers were told to lay off staff or reduce wages by 10% (Agostini, 2016). 123    
Pressure was indeed being applied by an alliance of external and domestic actors e.g. 
by ITUC, ETUC, PSI and the ILO along with CMKOS, OSZaSP ČR and OSSOO. However, 
this was not enough to deter Nečas.  In early 2011, further cuts in the health sector were made 
particularly to hospital beds – a decision encouraged by the OECD (OECD, 2011, PDF.73) but 
which outraged the country’s largest health union (TUHSSC CR) (EPSU, 2011; EPSU, 2011a). 
Several months later, TUHSSC CR together with CMKOS staged mass protests in Prague’s 
Wenceslas Square (EPSU, 2011b) with support from international allies EPSU, ETUC, and 
even the VP of Slovakia’s largest trade union OZ KOVO (Klírová, 2011). Together, they called 
on the Czech government to reverse its decisions and to “get involved in a proper process of 
social dialogue” (EPSU, 2011c).124  
When the government did respond to the ILO’s and ITUC’s concerns regarding the 
issues above, it claimed that sufficient “collective bargaining takes place before finalizing the 
draft state budget” (ILO Normlex Database, 2011a). However, huge gaps exist between this 
statement and events as they were on the ground because evidence suggests that social dialogue 
was persistently being undermined at this time (Glassner, 2010, pp.17-22; Agostini et al, 2016, 
p.12).  As a lawyer from the country’s largest public sector union commented “the government 
doesn’t take the trade unions seriously…they just don’t negotiate with us” (Public Sector Union 
OSSOO Interviewee R, 2020).  
In 2010, the government did negotiate with unions and came to an agreement on ways 
of navigating the financial crisis; however, shortly afterwards, it reversed its position and 
refused to implement the agreement allowing instead many of the unions’ proposals to be 
unilaterally overwritten by the Ministry of Finance (Guardiancich, 2012, p.14) – of whom 
appear to have been taking advice from the CIOs. The Minister of Finance at this time was in 
 
123 The government responded to other concerns but not ITUC’s - the Committee had to request once again that 
the government respond to ITUC in its next report (ILO Normlex Database, 2010c). The cuts to the public sector 
however resulted in a deterioration of employee protection, salaries (Agostini et al, 2016, p.42) the loss of 22, 500 
public sector jobs and an overall decrease of real wages by 7% in the public sector as compared with 2% across 
the entire economy (Martišková & Kahancová, 2016, pp.486-7).  
124 More complaints regarding obstacles to collective bargaining were reported in health care services in 2012 – 
see CGWR, Czechia, Violation 83, 2012 (CGWR, n.d.) and in the spring of that same year, unions with the support 
EPSU began calling for the government to resign (EPSU, 2012). 
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fact Miroslav Kalousek who, we can recall from earlier put forth proposals to undermine 
collective bargaining during negotiations surrounding the 2002 CSA (see the beginning of this 
section and chapter V section 5.1). As Minister of Finance, Kalousek met with the IMF (see 
IMF, 2008, p.2; IMF, 2011, p.2) to discuss post 2008 crisis strategies and was instrumental in 
designing and implementing the government’s fiscal response during this period (Štucbartová, 
2020).125  
Further evidence that the government was actively avoiding social dialogue with its 
employees at this time is illustrated by its refusal to ratify ILO convention 151 (C151). C151 
protects the collective bargaining rights of public servants specifically involved with the 
“administration of the state” (ILO, 1949). Between 2009-2013, CMKOS had been urging the 
government to adopt the convention but was repeatedly ignored during tripartite consultations 
– see violations of C144 on ILO Normlex Database between 2009 -2013 (ILO Normlex 
Database, n.d.). 
Overall, the post crisis years were managed by a conservative government and guided 
by policies being diffused from the CIOs at that time. This resulted in a further erosion of public 
sector collective bargaining, processes of social dialogue and created conflict with core ILO 
conventions. Both the Committee and the ITUC called attention to the issue on several 
occasions but to no effect; nor were the public displays of condemnation by national and 
international unions and NGOs successful in steering the government to the negotiating table.  
The CIOs (IFIs and OECD), together with their domestic allies, (e.g. finance ministers, 
bank presidents) much more effectively dominated the policy sphere. The impact of the CIOs 
was not achieved via their institutional capacity for enforcement; their influence was instead 
mediated by external circumstances (e.g. the financial crisis), a responsive incumbent 
government and a weakened labour movement – as noted by a staff member at a major public 
sector union  “ODS as a party is more accepting per say of the [CIOs] it something that is closer 
to their heart” (Public Sector Union OSSOO Interviewee R, 2020). When asked whether the 
CIOs had influence on the government during this time, the same interviewee responded: 
 “yeah back then they did…maybe also there is a strong role by the national bank…it depends on who 
is the leader of the national bank [but] I would think back then they were receptive…they did some 
 
125 For these actions, Kalousek was named “Minister of Finance of the Year’ by Emerging Markets Journal 
(Štucbartová, 2020). 
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reorganising…that we really haven’t gotten over yet. I do actually remember that you know when they 
started adopting these recommendations…in 2010 and 2011…back then was one of the few years where 
the wages were not increased, they were decreased even, and there was these huge organisations letting 
a lot of people go” (Public Sector Union OSSOO Interviewee R, 2020). 
The 2014 CSA and the Strengthening of Public Sector Collective Bargaining. The EU to the 
Rescue?   
 The EU is an important ally of the ILO both within and beyond Europe (see chapter I 
section 1.3). Not only does it seek to uphold the organisation’s conventions, but as noted by 
staff from both CMKOS and OSSOO, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and 
the European Public Service Union (EPSU) in particular serve as important channels of 
influence to affect change both on the regional and national scales. The importance of the EU 
in this regard was expressed by individuals from two of the largest union confederations in 
Czechia:  
“if we are a member of the EU it is important to have influence, tripartite social dialogue on the EU 
level, it is a useful and important vehicle, we are very interested in having a good position at the ETUC 
in relation to all politics prepared at the level of the EU because there is a chance to influence those 
politics before they are approved and implemented in the national countries…There are many 
meetings…the meetings are important…there are official online meetings and a chance to have 
unofficial ones too e.g. with a glass of wine where you get information you wouldn’t get in the official 
meetings…(CMKOS Interviewees H & J, 2020).  
 “yeah well, our trade union OSSOO is a member of EPSU, and it’s one of the more active 
members…we’ve been supported by the chairman of EPSU on many occasions” (Public Sector Union 
OSSOO Interviewee R, 2020). The same staff members also noted the importance of ETUC on a more 
personal level: “I am a member of the ETUC’s women’s committee, part of the agenda is gender 
equality and in this field I find it extremely helpful, really inspiring lots of cooperation and good data 
and information exchange…for this part of the work I do find it very useful (Public Sector Union 
OSSOO Interviewee R, 2020).  
 While it is important to recognise the EU as a powerful organisation with real influence 
in the economic and social spheres, there are sometimes limits to its ability to affect change. 
CMKOS for example note that while the ETUC is a valuable platform, the organisation 
(particularly the Commission and ECJ) can often favour business interests over that of workers: 
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 “in the EU there are many problems...there is a priority of economic rights before social rights…there 
are people from the EU Commission keen on having good support for social dialogue, but in practice, 
the ECJ is very clearly part of decision making and economic rights have a clear advantage over social 
rights” (CMKOS Interviewees H & J, 2020).    
The limits of the EU in this regard are represented well by events surrounding the CSA 
beginning in 2013. During this period, the EU pressured Czechia into finally implementing a 
CSA and in doing so, helped push the country towards better compliance with C098. However, 
as the proceeding paragraphs will illustrate, the organisation acted merely as a catalyst for 
change and the extent to which it contributed to the ILO’s work (thus making it more central in 
the network) is questionable. While legislative tweaks appeared on the surface to alleviate 
issues of collective bargaining in the public sector, changes to behaviour in practice were 
minimal.  
In 2013, a second, and this time successful attempt at drafting and implementing a civil 
service act (adopted November 2014) opened new opportunities for collective bargaining in the 
public sector (Eurofound, 2016) creating the potential to diffuse the issue with the ILO. After 
years of haggling with successive Czech governments, the EU finally decided to put its foot 
down over the issue of the CSA and threatened to withhold funding if the government did not 
quickly implement its requests (Gardner, 2014; Frank Bold, 2015). Indeed, Czechia was the 
only remaining member without a CSA (Frank Bold, 2015) and according to several 
interviewees, this strong arm tactic by the Union was the real motivation for finally getting it 
over the line e.g. Czech economist and researcher notes: “the EU eventually began to apply 
pressure, they conditioned it with the next EU structural funding period, and they required to 
have it implemented, I don’t know how serious was the threat, it somehow forced the 
government to go for implementation” (Regional Labour Law Expert Interviewee A, 2020). 
According to two staff members at the Ministry of Finance “it was a sensitive political issue 
and there wasn’t any government able to implement it…willing, but in the end, they were forced 
by the EU” (Czech Ministry of Finance Interviewees Q & Y, 2020).  
The 2014 CSA made it possible to conclude higher level sectoral collective bargaining 
agreements (Eurofound, 2016) and set in motion the development of a new remuneration system 
that would engage to a greater extent unions in the process of wage negotiations (Martišková 
& Kahancová, 2016, p.474; 480). As noted by staff members at CMKOS: 
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 “the 2014 Act… introduces the specific term “kolektivní dohoda”, literally “collective agreement” 
which describes a specific kind of collective agreement that applies for collective bargaining in the civil 
service. Most notably the fact that the salaries of public servants are [determined] by law…still doesn’t 
prohibit dialogue between civil servant representatives and Czech government” (CMKOS Interviewees 
H & J, 2020).  
By December of 2015, the amendments to the CSA had facilitated the creation of a 
higher-level agreement in which unions were able to negotiate topics such as sick leave, 
bonuses and pay scales (Eurofound, 2016). The changes had an impact: a year later, public 
sector wages rose by 4% (LABREF Database, n.d., Czechia, 2016; 2017) despite objections by 
both the IMF (IMF, 2016, p.8) and OECD (OECD, 2018, p.32). As noted by a lawyer at a public 
sector union, one of the main benefits from the CSA was that it centralised bargaining 
processes:  
“the Czech social security office has many regional branches, before the CSA, if you wanted to 
collectively bargain with them you would previously have to negotiate with each director (I think there 
is 12 of them) there was no coordination…Some of them refused to adopt flexible working hours, so 
social security offices in one town would have flexible working hours and in another town they wouldn’t 
have it…After the CSA they now have a central director, and with him it is now possible to negotiate 
flexible working hours for all Czech social security offices around the Czech Republic” (Public Sector 
Union OSSOO Interviewee R, 2020).  
In light of the progress illustrated above, the ILO acknowledged the new CSA and the 
opportunities it opened up for public sector collective bargaining (specifically section 143 – see 
Law for People, 2014), ‘with interest’ and requested the government to provide information in 
regard to implementation  (ILO Normlex Database, 2019c).126 However, while the EU’s strong-
arm tactics pushed the government to get the CSA done, and while the Commission may have 
had some impact depoliticising the civil service (Jančařík, 2013), its influence on the changes 
to collective bargaining were minimal calling into question the utility of enforcement as a tool 
to elicit compliance and raising doubts about the degree to which the EU contributed to the 
 
126 “The Committee notes with interest the Government’s indication that workers in all sectors of economic 
activity can participate in collective bargaining through trade unions, and that the Civil Service Act regulates in 
its section 143 the procedure for concluding a collective agreement applicable to public servants. The Committee 
requests the Government to provide information on the number of collective agreements concluded and in force 
in the public service, the sectors concerned and the number of workers covered by these agreements” (ILO 
Normlex Database, 2019c).  
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ILO’s impact in this instance. 127  When asked whether the EU was able to shape the CSA in 
order to improve workers’ rights, a staff member at a major public sector union responded – “I 
wouldn’t say it had anything to do with the EU…this particular thing…the legislators didn’t 
feel forced by the EU to do anything with collective bargaining (Public Sector Union OSSOO 
Interviewee R, 2020). 
The new opportunities for social dialogue which, in-turn appeared to boost the ILO’s 
influence are better explained by a unique configuration of domestic factors during this time: 
the re-election of CSSD (and particularly the new PM Bohuslav Sobotka) in combination with 
a more active trade union movement. As noted by a staff member at a large public sector union: 
“the PM [Bohuslav Sobotka] was open to collective bargaining and social dialogue…during that 
[time]…the chairman of the CMKOS he was also a strong leader and was pushing and pushing…there 
was a more willing social democratic PM and shall we say more aggressive trade union confederation 
so that was a good arrangement for getting anything of this sort done” (Public Sector Union OSSOO 
Interviewee R, 2020).  
CMKOS also noted the existence of effective dialogue between them and the 
government during this period “we had important arguments with the government at this time” 
(CMKOS Interviewees H & J, 2020).  
Not only did the EU have little to do with the changes made to collective bargaining 
but, despite the presence of a more socially democratic oriented PM and active trade union 
confederation, the extent to which real change occurred in this regard is also questionable. 
Although reforms occurred in law, violations in practice continued to be raised between 2015- 
2019 – see CGWR Czechia violation #66 2016; 2017 (CGWR, n.d.).  Overall, the EU may have 
acted as a catalyst for change but the character that the change took was – as has been illustrated 
throughout this section and in chapter IV – reminiscent of Czechia’s penchant for ‘mock 
compliance’. In conversation with a public sector union staff member, the interviewee noted 
how the CSA’s provisions regarding collective bargaining fell short of expectation:  
“in 2014, there was pressure from the EU Commission that we have to have the Act in force otherwise 
the Czech Republic would get no further EU funding…very quickly an act of legislation was prepared, 
 
127 The idea that IOs can act as catalysts for change but have less influence over the character that the change takes 
is borrowed from Judith Kelley – see Kelley (2004). Also see Miroslav Beblavy who looks at the EU’s 
involvement with civil service reform in the Czech and Slovak Republics prior to EU accession (Beblavy, 2002, 
p.64).  
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they were trying to make it as cheap as possible…i.e. it is no way more expensive than the legislation 
that was in force…What we found very problematic when the legislation came into force in 2015 was 
that…much of the text…was copied from the labour code, and for some reason, some of the text about 
trade unions’ rights that was (or is) in the labour code didn’t make it into the CSA…We [now have] to 
work our way around that…” (Public Sector Union OSSOO Interviewee R, 2020).  
Overall, the dynamics surrounding collective bargaining in the public sector highlight 
well the conflicting external pressures Czech authorities faced and the ways in which domestic 
and international alliances form in opposition to each other over legislative decisions. As this 
section has illustrated, CIO pressure to cut spending was embraced by successive governments 
(whether conservative or social democrat) and resulted in the undermining of social dialogue 
as well as several violations of C098. Throughout, the ILO together with its international and 
domestic allies could do little to reverse this course. The ways in which competing IOs have 
been mediated are reflective of the diverging policy spaces sketched out in chapter III – 
Czechia’s tendency to lean right regardless of incumbent government combined with an 
increasingly fragmented domestic labour movement unable to affect change. As a result, the 
CIOs together with their international allies (governments, finance ministers, bank presidents) 
much more successfully dominated the policy sphere. While the next section upholds these 
observations regarding the formation of competing networks and the ways in which they are 
mediated, it also sheds light on how a different outcome for the ILO can be achieved.  
6.2 Policy Fragmentation and ILO Impact in Slovakia 
Slovakia’s compliance with the ILO’s conventions is among the highest in the region 
and yet, policy fragmentation emanating from the international realm nevertheless impacted its 
domestic legislative processes and outcomes. As will be illustrated throughout, the ILO and 
CIOs hold competing policy positions regarding higher level collective bargaining agreements; 
the issue is equally divisive across Slovakia’s domestic political spectrum where there are 
diverging preferences between employers’ and workers’ organisations. As a result, a fierce 
battle erupted which saw the legislation go back and forth several times over a two-decade 
period. Throughout, the CIOs have persistently sided with employers’ groups and the 
conservative party SDKU while the ILO has done similar with its domestic allies (trade unions 
and left-wing party SMER). What especially stands out here is the degree to which these IOs 
are mobilised in arguments during parliamentary debates – the CIOs and ILO pitched against 
each other by opposite sides of the political spectrum. 
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This section clearly highlights the domestic impacts and zero-sum nature that 
competing policy positions at the international level can have. However, in line with the 
diverging policy space sketched out in chapter III, Slovakia has managed to correct the 
violation in a manner that appears to have appeased both sides of the debate. The ILO itself 
was influential in this process providing legal/technical advice and mediating between 
conflicting parties – its impact explained by the managerial version of rationalism. Section 6.2 
traces these dynamics and is organised temporally based on successive government elections.  
Collective Bargaining Extensions: Fragmentation and the Violation of C098 
Disagreements over whether to allow extensions of collective agreements erupted into 
a major policy battle beginning in 2003 (Eurofound, 2015) when, as part of an overhaul to the 
labour code, such extensions became possible only if the firm in question gave written consent 
(LABREF Database, 2003, cell, 19). As with several other amendments being made at this 
time, the move on extensions followed explicit CIO advice from 2002 -  “eliminate the 
extension of collective agreements reached at a…sectoral level” (OECD, 2002, p.88). Here, 
staff argued that Slovakia’s highly centralised system of bargaining stifled employers’ ability 
to calibrate wages and other employment costs in response to market fluctuations (OECD, 
2002, p.83).  
While the CIOs praised the changes being made (World Bank, 2005; World Bank, 
2007, p.20) the issue itself was heated on the domestic front. Recalling conclusions from 
chapter III (section 3.2), collective bargaining is an important aspect of Slovakia’s political-
economic culture; not only is it governed in law through Act 2/1991, it is also protected through 
Article 37 of the Constitution: echoing the ILO’s constitutional preamble (ILO Constitution, 
1919) the country defines collective bargaining as “an instrument [for]…achieving social 
peace” (Filadelfi, 2017, p.8).  
The ability to extend collective agreements to the wider sector has been an important 
tool for Slovak  unions (Martišková & Kahancová, 2016, pp.484-5) helping them to secure 
wages, balance regional disparities, standardise the workplace and avoid unfair competition by 
employers (Eurofound, 2015).128 The legislation however is controversial (Visser, 2016) with 
employers’ groups arguing that the binding of firms to wage agreements and working 
 
128 Overall, the legislation is viewed by Slovak labour as “[making] the working environment more human” 
(Eurofound, 2015)  
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conditions which they did not agree to is a violation of human rights  (Filadelfi, 2017, p.5). 
These conflicting domestic views are supported by different sets of international actors: 
whereas the ILO works to uphold collective bargaining in general through C098 and extensions 
of agreements specifically through Recommendation 91 (R091) (ILO, 1951), the CIOs share 
employers’ concerns and have labelled the practice as economically dangerous.  
Domestic conflict therefore is exacerbated by incoherencies emanating from the 
international realm and vice versa (Sengenberger, 2005). This is perhaps best illustrated not 
just by looking at policy outcomes, but also the processes of deliberation between left (SMER) 
and right (SDKU) wing parties in parliament. Prior to the amendment being approved on May 
21, 2003 (ILO Natlex, 2003); intense discussion between the two sides took place in which IOs 
featured heavily – the CIOs  (IMF, OECD and World Bank) were used as a rationale to change 
the policy whereas the conventions of the ILO were cited in opposition.  
For example, in November 2002 those supporting a more flexible approach to collective 
bargaining argued that it was necessary to address the EU’s and OECD’s concerns regarding 
unemployment – see Slovak Parliament November 12, 2002 p.27; 138 (Slovak Parliament, 
2002-2006). A month later, Ivan Mikloš (Minister of Finance and member of SDKU) 
confirmed that the country was following IMF and OECD advice on job creation through a 
more flexible labour code and that this strategy was also the reason why outside investors were 
becoming interested in Slovakia – see Slovak Parliament, December, 11, 2002, p.51-52; 54-57 
(Slovak Parliament, 2002-2006). An opposition MP (Mr. I. Hopta) called on the government 
to withdrawal the proposals and to “not…be blackmailed further by the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank” – see Slovak Parliament, January 14, 2003, pp.8-9 (Slovak 
Parliament, 2002-2006).  The Minister of Labour Ľudovít Kaník (member of coalition 
‘Democratic Party’ – centre right) responded to these criticisms in April by noting that the 
amendments, including the one on extensions, had not only been decided through tripartite 
dialogue (which had taken place in January and February) but that the ILO itself had also been 
consulted in the process – Slovak Parliament, April 9, 2003, pp.8-9 (Slovak Parliament, 2002-
2006).  
While the ILO’s advice was indeed solicited as the labour minister proclaimed, it 
appears as though the organisation was side-lined by the SDKU government in preference to 
the suggestions of employers’ groups and the CIOs. The tripartite sessions which Kaník was 
referring to were so intense that the ILO was called in as a mediator between unions and 
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employers towards the end of those negotiations in February (Eurofound, 2003). Recalling 
these meetings, MP Mr. Weaver explained to parliament how the ILO had effectively been 
“inserted into a battle between employers and trade unions”  - see Slovak Parliament, May 21, 
2003, p.26 (Slovak Parliament, 2002-2006), and because the government had chosen to ignore 
the organisation’s advice, there were contradictions between the new labour code and 
Slovakia’s ability to comply with several of the ILO’s conventions – see Slovak Parliament, 
May 21, 2003, p.26 (Slovak Parliament, 2002-2006). These dynamics were echoed by an ILO 
official who noted: “often we deal with legislative amendments and it’s not always easy… they 
have to pass different houses… it takes time, sometimes there is disagreement between 
different social partners and domestic actors…” (ILO Staff Interviewee Y, 2019).  
This dispute did not remain at the domestic level as warring parties spilled over into the 
ILO’s annual conference the following month (June 2003). While Kaník stood in the 
conference thanking the Committee for its assistance on the recent amendments (ILC Record 
of Proceedings, 2003, PDF.263), a Slovak workers’ delegate – directly contradicting Kaník’s 
statements – told attendees that the reality of the new labour code was that it went against the 
very principles of social justice that the ILO stood for and also that tripartite social dialogue 
had been ignored in the process (ILC Record of Proceedings, 2003, PDF.299).  
Domestically, the reforms were not popular; they had a negative effect on peoples 
standard of living and the government faced continued criticism not only from political 
opposition but also trade unions (Eurofound, 2004) and even members of the public of whom 
sent a petition to parliament with over 200,000 signatures protesting the changes – see Slovak 
Parliament, June, 25th, 2003, pp.102-3 (Slovak Parliament, 2002-2006). Towards the end of 
2003, Robert Fico (leader of SMER and future PM) attacked the Dzurinda administration for 
having followed a path laid out by the IFIs and OECD – institutions, he noted, which do not 
have the Slovak people’s best interest in mind – see Slovak Parliament, November 11, 2003, 
pp.59-66 (Slovak Parliament, 2002-2006).  
Despite this backlash, the CIOs applauded the government: The World Bank named the 
country top reformer (World Bank, 2005a, p.1) while the OECD noted how the reforms had 
helped keep Slovak wages competitive when compared with other EU members (OECD, 
2005a, p.23). In fact, the CIOs were so satisfied with government’s response that across several 
areas of the labour code (e.g. on changes to working time; reducing the “excessive” power of 
trade unions in management and compliance issues) they informed Slovak authorities that  “no 
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further action was required” (OECD, 2004a, p.98). In regard to the issue of extensions of 
collective bargaining agreements however, both the IMF and OECD saw the changes as a 
positive but pushed the government to decentralise collective bargaining even further (IMF, 
2005a, pp.21-25) or to remove the possibility of extensions altogether (OECD, 2004a, p.98).  
The ILO and its Allies Strike Back 
Although the CIOs together with the conservative government and employers’ groups 
were successfully dominating the policy sphere at this time, things began to shift towards 2006 
on both the domestic and international fronts. In regard to the latter, while the CIOs were 
heaping praise on the Slovak government, the ITUC had reported to the ILO in August that the 
changes to the labour code had weakened collective bargaining as agreements now only applied 
to employers who gave written consent (ILO Normlex Database, 2006a). The ITUC’s 
comments were not made based solely on ideological difference: since the amendment, most 
employers did not give their written consent and as a result, collective bargaining coverage 
began to fall below the average (Eurofound, 2007).  
The Committee took the ITUC’s concerns seriously by raising an observation and 
requested the government to respond (ILO Normlex Database, 2006a). On the domestic front, 
unions and opposition parties were also planning a counter strategy: unions had been opposing 
the new labour code for years on the basis that it skewed the rules in favour of employers 
(Golias & Zachar, 2010, p.16). By spring of 2006, they organised mass rallies where thousands 
of participants were called upon to vote for Robert Fico and SMER in the upcoming June 
elections (Slovak Spectator, 2006). According to regional expert and labour law specialist, 
trade unions had also signed a memorandum of cooperation with SMER agreeing not to strike 
in exchange for wage increases (Regional Labour Law Expert Interviewee B, 2020) and policy 
influence (Golias & Zachar, 2010, p.16).  
This strategy was successful: in June, SMER won the elections and immediately began 
the process of reversing the reforms. These changes were adopted by parliament in November 
and among them was the reintroduction of sectoral extensions of collective agreements 
(Eurofound, 2007). Employers groups were infuriated that the firms they represented could no 
longer block extensions by withholding written consent (effective September 2007 – LABREF 
Database, n.d. Slovakia, 2007) and they immediately filed a complaint with the Constitutional 
Court (Eurofound, 2007).  
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These employers’ groups were soon joined in an alliance with conservative members 
of parliament as well as the IFIs and OECD who all united around the issue to try and block 
the changes. Shortly after the amendments were announced, the IMF communicated to Slovak 
authorities that the changes did not have the backing of employers’ groups and FDI supported 
enterprises; in regard to extensions specifically, they described the move as “worrisome” (IMF, 
2007a, p.16) citing the possibility for unstable wage rises and the negative impact on small 
businesses (IMF, 2007a, pp.11-16; PDF.47). The OECD also cautioned against the re-
introduction of extensions on the grounds that it would exacerbate regional unemployment 
disparities (OECD, 2007a, p.58) while the World Bank’s response was to drop Slovakia in the 
rankings of its top destinations for doing business – see Slovak Parliament, May 16, 2007, p.28 
(Slovak Parliament, 2006-2010).   
The CIOs concerns were echoed in parliament by the opposition while the government 
defended its decisions with justification from the ILO.  In addition to accusing SMER of buying 
the votes of KOZ SR – Slovak Parliament, February 8, 2007, p.23 (Slovak Parliament, 2006-
2010) – and ignoring social dialogue with employers’ groups over the issue of extensions – see 
Slovak Parliament, May 15, 2007 pp.19-24 (Slovak Parliament, 2006-2010); opposition MPs 
argued that increasing the rigidity of the labour code would result in unemployment and make 
the country less attractive to foreign investors. MP Mr. Brocka noted how these were not just 
his words but the words of the OECD and EU Central Bank – organisations which Fico was 
ignoring – see. Slovak Parliament, May 15, 2007 p.127 (Slovak Parliament, 2006-2010). Other 
MPs lamented the country’s declining World Bank ratings and the OECD’s observation that 
over half of its members had less stringent labour laws than Slovakia  - Slovak Parliament, 
May 16, 2007 (Slovak Parliament, 2006-2010).  
Throughout, the government appears to have mobilised its alliance with the ILO to 
defend its choices in parliament. On multiple occasions. Viera Tomanová (then Minister of 
Labour) quoted verbatim parts of the ILO’s R091 related to extensions of collective agreements 
(See Article IV ILO, 1951) and then added that if the previous Minister of Labour (Kaník) had 
listened to the ILO during those meetings in 2003, collective bargaining rates would not have 
dropped so drastically – see Slovak Parliament, February 8, 2007 (Slovak Parliament, 2006-
2010).129 MP M. Číž spoke more broadly about neoliberalism and globalisation noting how the 
 
129 Also see similar comments made by MP Jana Vaľová  - Slovak Parliament, May 15, 2007, pp.19-24 -  and 
Viera Tomanová - Slovak Parliament, May 15, 2007, pp.29-32 (Slovak Parliament, 2006-2010).  
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CIOs had hijacked the language of the labour code presenting ‘flexible’ as good, and ‘rigid’ as 
bad but that such insistence on flexibility was eroding collective bargaining in the country. The 
MP called for a reinjection of values based on ILO principles and reminded parliament that 
multinational companies and the CIOs had not only influenced policy in the past, but they were 
currently trying to prevent the changes – those favoured by the ILO – from taking place – see 
Slovak Parliament, May 16, 2007, pp.2-12 (Slovak Parliament, 2006-2010).130  
The government was not deterred by the opposition’s criticism nor were they heeding 
the warnings of the CIOs during this time. In reference to both Fico and SMER, a staff member 
at the Ministry of Finance commented on this period noting: “the less progressive parties 
prevailed in the election, and they pulled some of the reforms, they didn’t solicit the World 
Bank so much, it was actually quite the opposite.” (Slovak Ministry of Finance Interviewee D, 
2020). On the other hand, Fico’s government’s interactions with the ILO at this time were both 
active and positive. Shortly after the parliamentary sessions noted above, government and 
workers representatives attended that year’s ILC session (June 2007) in which they spoke 
reaffirming the country’s commitment to the ILO and the current government’s progress on 
rebuilding collective bargaining (see ILC Record of Proceedings, 2007, PDF.693; 695).  
The following year (2008), Slovakia responded to the Committee’s observation on the 
issue of extensions which the country had received in 2006 when SDKU had been in office. In 
their reply, they informed ILO staff that Section 7 of Act No. 2/1991 on collective bargaining 
had now been amended and as a result, employer consent was no longer needed to legally 
extend collective agreements. While the Committee acknowledged the changes, it could not do 
so ‘with satisfaction’ (signalling that the case was closed) because employers had lodged the 
issue with the Constitutional Court – the issue was therefore still ‘live’ (ILO Normlex Database, 
2008). However, the ILO had nevertheless made a significant impact: the Fico government 
appears to have embraced interacting with the ILO and as a result, the law on extensions had 
not only been guided by the ILO’s R091 (ILC Record of Proceedings, 2008, PDF.705); but, it 
was written with direct assistance from ILO staff – see Slovak Parliament, October 20, 2010, 
p.64 (Slovak Parliament, 2010-2012).   
 
 
130 Note* after these parliamentary sessions, the labour code amendments passed through parliament on June 29th 
2007 (ILO Natlex, 2007).  
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SDKU and the Post 2008 Environment 
Following the financial crisis of 2008, SDKU were elected back into office (2010) and 
the labour code – including regulation on extensions of collective agreements – was once again 
made more flexible. What is interesting during this period is that IOs remained so salient 
throughout the debates that ensued – having been an EU member for more than six years, the 
country’s reliance on IOs for policy guidance was diminishing. Nevertheless, as the battle for 
policy space regarding extensions was reignited, IOs with competing mandates were mobilised 
into domestic arguments – SDKU making explicit reference to the OECD’s 2002 
recommendation on collective bargaining – Slovak Parliament, October 20, 2010, p.58 (Slovak 
Parliament, 2006-2010) – while SMER MPs cited the ILO’s C098 and R091 in opposition – 
see Slovak Parliament, October 20, 2010, p.60-8 (Slovak Parliament, 2006-2010).  
What appears to be occurring during these sessions is contestation between parties over 
which IOs were more legitimate. For example, Tomanová (Minister of Labour) argued that 
when employers complained in 2007, she listened to their concerns and re-wrote the legislation 
with the ILO in 2009 – Slovak Parliament, October 20, 2010, pp.60-68 (Slovak Parliament, 
2006-2010); Clauwaert, S. and Schömann, 2013a). In response, Miroslav Beblavy 
(conservative MP) highlighted that Tomanová was being too selective in her reference to IOs, 
and that the OECD (to which the most advanced countries belong) have repeatedly advised the 
country to abolish the extension mechanism – see Slovak Parliament, October 20, 2010, pp.70-
72 (Slovak Parliament, 2010-2012) . When Tomanová highlighted how the proposal to bring 
back consent for extensions was antithetical to the protection of workers’ rights and to the 
values of the ILO, particularly C098 – see Slovak Parliament, December 14 2010, pp.62-7 
(Slovak Parliament, 2010-2012) – the closing argument made by SDKU was that the OECD 
was a representative organisation too and had been clearly recommending this since 2002, not 
just to Slovakia but to other countries as well – Slovak Parliament, December 14 2010 p.90 
(Slovak Parliament, 2010-2012).  
The bill passed on December 14th and as a result, the amendment made by SMER in 
2006 (Section 7 of Act 2/1991) and which was written with the ILO in an effort to alleviate the 
issues raised with C098 was abolished in favour of the OECD’s recommendation – see Slovak 
Parliament, December 14 2010 p.167 (Slovak Parliament, 2010-2012; LABREF Database, n.d. 
Slovakia, 2010; ILO Natlex, 2010).  
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The above highlights issues of conflictive policy fragmentation particularly well 
(Bierman et al, 2009): competitive policy between IOs becomes animated on the domestic 
realm by each side’s relative allies within a zero-sum context i.e. while the adoption of CIO 
policy is done so at the expense of ILO C098; the reverse is also true – when the violation of 
C098 was fixed, it presents a threat to the mandates of the OECD and IMF who view strong 
collective bargaining as harmful to sound economic policy.  
Indeed, after SMER made extensions possible again in 2006, the CIOs soon interjected 
encouraging the government to abolish their position so that wages could be more responsive 
(OECD, 2009a, p.8; IMF, 2009a, pp.14-15). In 2010 while the ILO was asking Slovak 
authorities for an update on the situation (ILO Normlex, 2010), the OECD was commending 
the new government for plans to revert the legislation on extensions back to its 2002 
recommendation – allowing firms to opt out (OECD, 2010, pp.11; 31; 40). This was not the 
only amendment which SDKU made during its short time in office (July 2010 – April 2012) 
that had been influenced by the CIOs and which caused issues with the ILO. Other changes 
were made e.g. the easing of regulation concerning notice and severance (making dismissals 
more flexible); the amount of overtime an employer can demand; and the empowering of work 
councils over trade unions – here, the government introduced a 30% representativeness quota 
for unions which they had to meet before being allowed to operate within a firm (See 
Clauwaert, S. and Schömann, I, 2013, pp.1-3).131   
Throughout the process, the government did consult with IOs – the ILO in April 2011 
(Clauwaert, S. & Schömann, I. 2013, p.1) and the IMF two months later who urged authorities 
to focus on making wage negotiations more flexible (IMF, 2011, p.24). However, the reforms 
fell in favour of policies advocated by both employers (Clauwaert, S. & Schömann, I. 2013, 
p.1) and the CIOs despite conflicting with at least three of the ILO’s conventions: (1) the 
changes to working time with  C001 ‘Hours of Work’ – Slovak Parliament, July 8 2011, pp.96-
7; July 11, 2011, pp.19-20 (Slovak Parliament, 2010-2012). (2) Amendments to notice and 
severance with C158 ‘Termination of Employment’ – Slovak Parliament, July 11, 2011, pp.1-
9; p.16 (Slovak Parliament, 2010-2012). (3) The introduction of the union representativeness 
threshold with C098 – Slovak Parliament, July 11, 2011, pp.23; July 12, pp.4-5 (Slovak 
Parliament, 2010-2012).  Prior to the reforms passing, the ILO warned the government that 
 
131 Note on Work Councils - they are weaker because they don’t have the legal personality or third-party oversight 
that unions have; unlike work councils, unions can bound employers - see Slovak parliament 2011, July 11, p.23 
(Slovak Parliament, 2010-2012). 
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such problems existed and made suggestions on how to better align the amendments with its 
conventions, but this advice was not taken on board – Slovak Parliament, July 11, 2011, p.14; 
19-20 (Slovak Parliament, 2010-2012). As noted by a senior official at the Slovak Ministry of 
Labour:  
“in 2011…I was there with trade unions and employers to have a consultation on this amendment which 
was effective September 2011. It was consulted with the ILO but whether it’s in line with the ILO is 
another story. That was the last time ILO was consulted by the new government” (Slovak Ministry of 
Labour Interviewee Z, 2020).  
Indeed, the changes appear instead to have been inspired by the CIOs: e.g. the relaxing 
of notice and severance was an issue both the IMF and OECD had been pressing Slovakia on 
for years (See Appendix 5B cells 14; 15; 21; 22; 27) and the empowering of work councils 
responded to the IMF’s requests to make wage negotiations more flexible for employers (IMF, 
2011a, p.24; also see Palinkas, 2018).132 While these reforms were both encouraged by the 
CIOs (OECD, 2010, pp.22-24) and praised by employers (Clauwaert, S. and Schömann, I. 
2013, p.1), several violations were raised by the ILO in relation to them.133 For example, in 
2012, the country received a direct request on C158 regarding issues with notice and severance 
(ILO Normlex Database, 2012c). The same year, Slovakia received an observation on C001 
regarding working time  (ILO Normlex Database, 2012d); and in addition to the issue of 
extensions, another direct request was raised on C098 to do with the issue of trade union 
representativeness (ILO Normlex Database, 2012).  
Upholding Tripartism 
In a landslide election, SMER regained power in March 2012 (BBC, 2012) and a month 
later set about reversing the 2010/11 reforms (Clauwaert, S. and Schömann, I. 2013, pp.3-6) 
which once again opened space for direct impact by the ILO. According to Jan Richter 
(Minister of Labour at the time) and Jana Laššáková (SMER MP) , all of the changes were 
guided by ILO conventions (particularly those on union representativeness, notice and 
severance, working time and extensions of sectoral agreements) – Slovak Parliament, 
September, 13, 2012, pp.1-4 (Slovak Parliament, 2012-2016) – with staff providing technical 
 
132 These reforms are categorised by LABREF under the heading ‘wages’ because they allow more flexibility for 
employers and have the potential to reduce costs in this regard. Palinkas (2018) notes that the restrictions on 
unions during this time resulted in a decline in collective bargaining coverage rates at a time when countries were 
being pressed to reduce wages (Palinkas, 2018) 
133 Note these reforms came into effect September, 1, 2011 (Clauwaert, S. and Schömann, I. 2013, p.1)   
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assistance throughout the process – Slovak Parliament, September, 13, 2012, pp. 6-11 (Slovak 
Parliament, 2012-2016).134  
Once again, IOs featured heavily in parliamentary debates: the ILO was mentioned ten 
times on the first day in parliament – Slovak Parliament, September 13, 2012 (Slovak 
Parliament, 2012-2016) – with Richter pointing out how his government was fixing the 
previous government’s actions which had been ‘reproached’ by the ILO – Slovak Parliament, 
September, 14, 2012, pp.29-30 (Slovak Parliament, 2012-2016). The reintroduction of 
extensions and other reforms were opposed by SDKU who accused SMER of (1) not consulting 
properly with social partners (employers) – Slovak Parliament September, 13 2012, pp.6-11 
(Slovak Parliament, 2012-2016) (2) risking high levels of unemployment and (3) going against 
the OECD’s 2002 recommendation. In opposition to the ILO inspired reforms, MP Ivan 
Štefanec  stated  “clearly such laws will lead to more and more rows of unemployed…by the 
way, international organisations are also commenting on this subject…I would like to draw 
attention to the OECD recommendations of 2002…so much for the OECD recommendation” 
– Slovak Parliament, October 25, 2013, pp.49-51 (Slovak Parliament, 2012-2016).  
Employers groups were outraged that on issues where decisions couldn’t be made via 
tripartite dialogue (e.g. on union representativeness and dismissals) the proposals of the 
Ministry of Labour (i.e. Richter who had consulted with the ILO) were adopted instead 
(Clauwaert, S. and Schömann, I. 2013, p.3). Despite the CIOs also siding with employers and 
applying pressure to SMER (see IMF, 2012a, p.19; OECD, 2012a, p.33), the government 
pressed ahead and the reforms were adopted October 25th 2012 (Clauwaert, S. and Schömann, 
I. 2013, p.3).   
While SMER’s changes led to better compliance across several of the ILO’s 
conventions, the issue of extensions persisted; not only was the Committee awaiting the 
decision of the Constitutional Court; but, they appear to have become concerned that the 
legislation had swung too far in favour of unions (ILO Normlex Database, 2013). Here, they 
requested, and promptly received, detailed assurances from the government regarding the ways 
 
134 At the ILC session in 2014 Mr. Ondruš (a government representative of Slovakia) announced to the plenary 
that the 2012 reforms were done based on EU Directives and ILO Conventions of which social partners are 
involved “We consider cooperation with the ILO to be of crucial importance when amending labour and social 
protection policies and we thank the International Labour Office for the valuable expertise it has shared with the 
Slovak Republic” (ILC Record of Proceedings, 2014, PDF.1040) 
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in which employers were consulted as equal partners in the processes of extending collective 
agreements (ILO Normlex Database, 2014).  
That the ILO intervened on behalf of employers in this way highlights the 
organisation’s commitment to tripartism – ensuring fairness between employers and workers. 
However, the CIOs continued to hold firm to their previous position – insisting the government 
remove the possibility of extensions altogether (see IMF, 2014a, pp.12-13; OECD, 2014a, 
pp.34-35). Aware that such a request was unlikely to materialise whilst SMER were in office, 
the OECD suggested that the government should at least follow Portugal’s example and 
introduce a representativeness threshold i.e. employers involved in the negotiations should 
account for at least 50% of the sector before extensions can be made to other firms (OECD, 
2014a, pp.34-35).   
The government did not take this advice on board; however, it is important to note here 
that had they done so, it would have also caused a violation of C098. Portugal only introduced 
this policy in 2012 because the Troika imposed it on the country as a loan condition (See 
OECD, 2012b, pp.30-1; Visser, 2016). Shortly after the Troika’s advice was implemented, the 
ILO raised an observation on C098 which read “[agreements] can only be extended if the 
signatory employers represent at least 50 per cent of the workers in the sector of activity” (ILO 
Normlex Database, 2015a). At the ILC session in June 2014, a Portuguese workers 
representative lambasted the CIOs for the poor working conditions the country was facing. He 
stated:  
 “over the last three years, Portugal has been living through a completely new situation as a result of 
the economic adjustment programme that was negotiated between the Portuguese Government and 
various international bodies (the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF). 
Since June 2011, a wide range of rights have been blocked at the behest of these organizations now 
known as the Troika, including the right to collective bargaining between employers and trade unions” 
(ILC Record of Proceedings, 2014, PDF.1064). 
The issue of extensions would see several more phases before settling into what appears 
to be its final form. In the years following SMER’s amendment, the ILO and CIOs continued 
offering conflicting advice: the former requesting information on how well social dialogue was 
working ‘in practice’ (ILO Normlex Database, 2014; 2015) while the latter continued 
pressuring the government to abandon the policy altogether (IMF, 2015, p.37). However, in 
2016 the Constitutional Court finally made its decisions ruling in favour of employers and 
Page 222 of 369 
 
deeming the extensions of collective agreements as unconstitutional (LABREF Database, n.d. 
Slovakia, 2016; Filadelfi, 2017). This would only be temporary:  SMER quickly re-worked the 
legislation in line with the ruling and passed it through parliament once again – the court had 
given the government six months to amend the law before it was to become void (CMS, 2016). 
Since this final amendment, the CIOs have not raised the issue while the ILO continues to 
request information on the implementation of the new system in order to ensure tripartism is 
being upheld in practice (ILO Normlex Database, 2018). 
Overall, Slovakia’s political cycle matters and this is reflected by the extent to which 
the legislation on extensions of collective agreements has gone back and forth. However, while 
the catalyst for reform was very much driven by the country’s internal dynamics, the case of 
Slovakia has shown that IOs were directly involved supporting both sides. This highlights well 
the ways in which policy conflict at the international realm exacerbates competition between 
domestic groups who function as both gates and bridges to external actors depending on the 
domestic power configuration at a given point in time. Slovakia’s domestic conditions diverge 
from those of Czechia’s allowing the ILO to influence decision making in the country. 
6.3 Explaining Fragmentation and the Impact of the ILO 
Policy fragmentation emanating from the external realm manifests within and across 
states and can turn domestic legislative spaces into a battlefield where competing international 
and domestic groups vie for influence. To what extent does such policy fragmentation impede 
or facilitate the ILO’s work? Following on from the within case analyses in sections 6.1 and 
6.2, this section provides a theoretically guided cross-case comparison; in doing so, it asks 
what commonalities were present between Czechia and Slovakia which led to both countries 
violating C098 and what differences can be identified which allowed the ILO to make an 
impact in the latter but fail to do so in the former. 
By identifying these key international and domestic variables (eliminating those that 
were neither necessary nor sufficient), further theoretical light is shed not only on the 
consequences of policy fragmentation but also on the conditions under which the ILO makes 
an impact when faced with competitive international and domestic forces. Overall, the section 
argues that when domestic conditions such as labour friendly governments and active unions 
are present, the ILO can overcome conflictive fragmentation (Bierman et al, 200) and make an 
impact by providing technical/legal advice and mediating between social partners. Here, 
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international allies such as ITUC, the EU’s ETUC and PSI all facilitated its work, the former 
acting as a direct link between domestic actors and the ILO’s supervisory bodies while the 
latter two agencies helped raise the profile on the ILO’s work more generally. Where domestic 
opposition sufficiently outweighs the organisation’s proponents in a particular country, there 
is little the ILO can do to change behaviour and it is here where the CIOs tend not only to 
dominate the policy space but do so in ways that further undermine the ILO’s work. As noted 
by an official at the Czech Ministry of Finance:  
“I think the ILO conventions are translated into the labour code…but in terms of other 
recommendations, we have some from the IFIs, and sometimes we give more attention to them. It 
depends on what is going on in the country then we decide which recommendations to give attention 
to…When we had a right-wing government 2006 – 2010 they were very reluctant towards any new 
commitments to ILO” (Czech Ministry of Labour Interviewee C, 2020).  
The section begins by first recalling the regime sub-constellation graphs from chapter 
II; whilst their applicability has been touched on throughout, it is only now at this stage of the 
analysis that this thesis can step back to confirm the relevancy of these graphs to real-world 
events. As previously noted, part of the purpose of this thesis’ attempt to empirically map and 
measure fragmentation is to develop a diagnostic tool which can be applied not only on a large-
N scale in regard to the ILO but also across other issues where problems of complex global 
governance exist. Following on from this assessment, the remainder of the section compares 
and contrast the events in sections 6.1 and 6.2 to identify the necessary and sufficient variables 
that lead to ILO impact.  
Social Network Analysis: A Useful Method?  
Recalling chapter II, social network analysis can be a useful tool to map and measure 
the relative influence of different actors within a network structure. Two country specific 
graphs were built representing the configuration of international influences across Czechia and 
Slovakia with the intention that the associated metrics would be representative of empirical 
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Figure 6.1 Czechia’s Regime Sub-Constellation for Labour Rights 
 
 
                                               Source: (Hayes, 2017, p.38) 
 
Figure 6.2 Slovakia’s Regime Sub-Constellation for Labour Rights 
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Table 6.1 – Social Network Analysis Output 
ILO and Network 
Cohesion 
Czechia Slovakia Difference Significance  Confidence 





62.05% 72.89% 10.84% T = 4.18  






76.92% 88.46% 11.54% T = 4.456  




2.04% 0.82% 1.22% T = -0.126 





21.87% 1.21% 20.66% T = -2.13 
P < 0.05 
1.63:39.69 
Sources: Network Centralisation and ILO Closeness Centrality generated by UCINET - see appendices 
8 & 9 (Borgatti et al, 2002) (also see Hayes, 2017). IMF and World Bank Betweenness Centrality by 
Node XL – see appendices 10-13. See appendix 14 for t-test and confidence interval calculations.  
As table 6.1 illustrates, the CIOs should be more influential in Czechia than Slovakia 
whereas the reverse is true for the ILO (see chapter II for metric definitions); these predictions 
were upheld in chapters IV and V which not only provided sufficient empirical evidence to 
support this model but also outlined the ways in which IOs make an impact – influencing the 
timing and content of reforms. Because the policy prescriptions of the organisations within 
these networks conflicts, the impact of one can negatively impede the impact of another; the 
first two sections of this chapter have illustrated the consequences of such conflictive 
fragmentation (Bierman et al, 2009) and the ways in which it manifests onto the domestic 
realm. While the research has provided sufficient evidence to uphold the graphs’ predictions, 
a question nevertheless emerges in regard to whether the relative numerical differences 
illustrated in table 6.1, translate into quantifiable differences of IO impact. I.e. the table predicts 
the ILO’s influence to be greater in Slovakia by approximately 10-15%; but, what does a 10-
15% greater impact in one country versus another mean? Chapter IV demonstrated that 
Czechia’s adoption of CIO policy was 6% higher, and its ILO violations 1.5 times higher than 
Slovakia’s. Conversely, Slovakia’s response rate to the ILO exceeds Czechia’s by as much as 
28% on C087 & C098. However, such observations are not directly relatable to the differences 
found in table 6.1 nor could they be used as benchmarks to make inferences to other cases e.g. 
a higher centrality score of 10-15% cannot be said to translate into a higher country response 
rate of 28%. Answers to such questions may become clearer in future research where SNA is 
used in a regression on a large-N scale – a method with the potential to reveal meaningful 
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patterns in this regard. Nevertheless, observable and measurable differences correlate with the 
direction that the table predicts results should go providing some support for the application of 
SNA to other case studies.  
While the graphs have been helpful in predicting the dynamics uncovered thus far, they are 
less representative in regard to whether and how conflicting policies will be mediated or 
resolved. To better understand this, the following paragraphs illustrate that such variation is 
determined by the diverging policy spaces sketched out in chapter III. 
Fragmentation or Domestic Politics: What Drives Non-Compliance?  
What driving forces led to the initial violations of C098 in Czechia and Slovakia? This 
shared outcome is best explained by several similarities that were present across both countries: 
the motivation of political decision makers; the context within which they were operating in; 
and the ways in which external actors were mediated. For example, issues of collective 
bargaining first arose in 2002 at a time when the two republics were considered to be in a 
transitionary phase following the Velvet Revolution and Divorce; both were preparing for EU 
accession and  - like other CEE countries - concerned about the credibility of the reform process 
and the consequences for international investment. The CIOs played a key role in this regard 
and as illustrated in the previous two sections, governments in both countries chose to adopt 
and implement CIO policy despite domestic and international backlash from organised labour.  
Although Czechia and Slovakia differed across two key variables determining compliance 
– capacity and government type; neither of these appear to have played a decisive role in 
bringing about the violations. With regards to the former, the issue of sectoral extensions in 
Slovakia was the subject of fierce political and ideological debate rather than one of capacity 
(see section 6.2). On the latter, while there were differences in regime type during this time 
(Slovakia right wing SDKU and Czechia’s social democrats), both governments chose to adopt 
CIO policy to the determinant of the ILO conventions despite these differences. These 
dynamics challenge previous literature’s conclusions regarding the significance of government 
type in this regard and are instead reflective of the diverging policy spaces sketched out in 
chapter III - in Slovakia, political cycle matters whereas Czechia tends more to the right 
regardless of whether there is a conservative or social Democratic Party incumbent.  
Violations in both countries therefore resulted from deliberate and informed decision- 
making by country authorities within a context in which veto players (unions) had been 
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weakened and where governments assigned greater legitimacy to the CIOs than the ILO. It is 
important to note however that neither domestic factors nor the CIOs are sufficient variables 
on their own to explain this outcome. An interaction between them was necessary - domestic 
factors acting as the catalyst for reform whereas the CIOs guided the shape and content of the 
policies which were adopted, and which eventually led to the violation of ILO C098.  
The ILO: Manager or Enforcer?  
The institutionalist theory reviewed in chapter II, and which has been applied throughout, 
predicts that IOs make an impact when the tools used to respond to instances of non-compliance 
match the reasons for why the violation occurred i.e. where non-compliance is deliberate, 
strong powers of monitoring and enforcement are required; where its origin lie with capacity 
issues, a managerial approach such as technical advice is more appropriate (Thomann, 2011, 
p.44). That non-compliance in both cases originated as a matter of political will would suggest 
therefore that without powers of enforcement, the ILO’s ability to make an impact in this regard 
would be limited. While this holds true for Czechia, the organisation nevertheless managed to 
achieve impact in Slovakia.  
Despite these different outcomes, the ILO’s initial approach to correcting the issues across 
both countries did not vary too drastically. Through its monitoring and supervisory 
mechanisms, the Committee was able to draw authorities’ attention to the problems and did so 
by issuing observations and direct requests. In both cases, the organisation deployed its 
managerial tools of legal expertise to interpret the ways in which the countries’ laws and 
practices were out of step with the convention and offered advice and technical assistance in 
an effort correct for the inconsistencies. One major (although ineffective) difference between 
the Committee’s approach with Czechia to that of Slovakia arose out of the former’s initial 
unresponsiveness to the violations raised; here, staff found it necessary to issue a footnote in 
addition to an observation in order to signal to authorities the seriousness of the situation and 
the organisation’s willingness to escalate the matter towards naming and shaming in the ILC – 
the closest tool to enforcement that the ILO has (Koliev & Lebovic, 2018). Throughout, the 
organisation’s efforts were supported by other international actors. Chief among these is the 
ITUC who gathers information from its domestic affiliates and whose reports are officially 
recognised and used by the Committee - in both cases, staff began their observations by citing 
the ITUC asking the government to comment on them in return. Other organisations 
contributing to the ILO’s centrality are ETUC, EPSU, PSI and IndustriAll; here, and to a 
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greater extent in Czechia, they lent support to domestic unions, raising the awareness of the 
issue e.g. the public sector, and expressing their solidarity with domestic unions through written 
letters to government officials and helping to organise protests and rallies.  
ILO Impact: Overcoming the Challenger IOs in Slovakia 
 As illustrated above, Czechia was subjected to more pressure from the ILO and its allies 
than Slovakia was and yet the organisation’s impact was greater in the latter. Czechia made 
progress ‘in law’ with the CSA but de facto changes were minimal, and the ILO was not 
influential in the outcome - either as a catalyst for reform nor did it have input into the content 
of the new legislation. Often, the government’s responses to the ILO were defiant and 
reminiscent of the patterns sketched out in chapter IV - vague, non-committal and reflective of 
mock compliance (Walter, 2008 cited in Woodward, 2016). In Slovakia, not only did the 
organisation’s conventions serve as both an inspiration and technical guide for change, but ILO 
staff were directly involved e.g. writing legislation, mediating between tripartite discussions 
and providing technical assistance. In doing so, the organisation managed to help reverse the 
CIO inspired reform which initially caused the violation. What, facilitated ILO impact in 
Slovakia but not in Czechia?  
The ILO was able to make an impact in Slovakia because it was not impeded to the same 
extent as it was in Czechia by an opposing configuration of international and domestic forces. 
In Slovakia, domestic conditions functioned as both a bridge and a gatekeeper - letting the ILO 
in while keeping the CIOs out; the reverse can be observed in Czechia. Because the ILO gained 
access to Slovakia’s policy making and implementation processes in this way, it was able to 
serve as an important ally both for unions and members of parliament while at the same time, 
its technical/legal expertise played a role in bringing about changes not only to legislation but 
also in the de facto number of higher-level agreements that were made (Palinkas, 2018; ILC 
Record of Proceedings, 2013). Czechia’s left-wing party and union confederation are not 
present in the same way and therefore nothing effectively facilitates the ILO’s influence while 
impeding that of its rivals. As such, the IFIs and OECD had a clearer path to affect change: 
despite domestic backlash from labour regarding issues of collective bargaining in the public 
sector, the CIOs repeatedly received assurances from both conservatives and social democrats 
that their advice regarding public spending was being taken on board.  
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Conclusions 
IOs make an impact influencing the timing and content of legislative reforms, where 
multiple IOs with competing mandates exist, their relative impact is mediated according to the 
balance of power between domestic groups. As such, conflict at the national level is reinforced 
by competing international norms where the legislative wins of one side often occur as a result 
of the other side’s loss. The ILO is not equipped with the same powers of enforcement as are 
other IOs such as the IMF or World Bank; while this can be to its disadvantage, conflictive 
policy fragmentation (Bierman et al, 2009) manifests onto the domestic realm undermining the 
ILO’s impact regardless of whether enforcement is being used. While the ILO makes an 
important contribution to global governance serving as the custodian of international labour 





























The aim of this thesis has been to demonstrate the ILO’s necessity and effectiveness and to 
call attention to the ways in which fragmentation within local-national settings mediates the 
organisation’s work. The ILO was born in the aftermath of the Great War to rising social and 
economic tensions. Over a century later, it stands not only as one of the oldest IO’s in existence 
but also one whose mandate remains profoundly relevant. Like all creatures of 
intergovernmental cooperation, its capacity to affect change reflects the preferences of the 
organisation’s founding member states and their ability to overcome differences in order to 
effectively coordinate policy. For the ILO, this has meant a reliance on powers of persuasion 
and technical advice rather than the kinds of enforcement mechanisms accorded to bodies such 
as the WTO or Bretton Woods organisations. While this has created challenges, it also confers 
a unique legitimacy on the organisation: the ILO does not achieve its goals via the threat or 
imposition of material sanctions; rather, it works with countries to overcome challenges of 
implementation or to persuade governments of the reasons why adopting ILS is in their best 
interest (ILO Staff Interviewee Kari Tapiola, 2018). In this way, the ILO is a successful 
custodian of labour rights norms; its influence cannot simply be measured by compliance rates 
but instead by a deeper and longer lasting form of impact produced by its ability to change 
minds and behaviours.  
The extent to which the ILO is successful in this regard is mediated by the ways in which 
other actors - both domestic and international - configure to facilitate or impede its work. The 
ILO operates in an increasingly complex and fragmented governing structure where multiple 
actors come together to form alliances and then vie for domestic policy influence. Here, 
domestic factors function as a gate determining whether and which IOs get to influence national 
policy making and implementation processes. Once IOs have gained access however, the 
consequences of fragmentation begin to play out as competing norms that are present at the 
international level, get reinforced by the same competition that exists domestically and vice 
versa (Sengenberger, 2005). Any assessment of the ILO must take this dynamic into account 
because it is in this scenario where the success of the CIOs can result in undermining the ILO’s 
work.  
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The following section addresses the initial questions set out at the beginning of this thesis 
- how and when does the ILO make an impact and to what extent does policy fragmentation 
facilitate or impede its goals? In doing so, section 7.2 reprises the main themes discussed with 
consideration for the related evidence produced by the empirical chapters; it assesses how well 
these findings have answered the questions and asks to what extent this research’s methods 
contributed to this result. Section 7.3 revisits broader questions of global governance; after 
asking whether and what the conclusions made here have contributed to these higher order 
issues, section 7.4 identifies several weaknesses of this research and offers some considerations 
on how future work can both benefit and improve upon it. 
 7.2 Policy Fragmentation and the Impact of the ILO 
 The ILO operates within networks of international and domestic actors, the character of 
these networks varies across states and mediates the organisation’s impact to different degrees. 
This is the dissertation’s central finding which was arrived at via the engagement of several 
thematic debates related to whether and how IOs make an impact. This section briefly revisits 
these themes in light of the evidence produced by the preceding chapters.  
 Firstly, there are diverging opinions over what constitutes ‘impact’. As chapter I (section 
1.2) illustrated, any assessment of IO influence must look beyond the issue of compliance and 
to instead observe desired changes in behaviour for example to legislation or implementation 
practices (Raustiala, 2000): compliance may occur as an outcome, but its realisation is not 
necessary for impact to be achieved (Chayes & Chayes, 1993). Whether such changes can be 
attributed to an IO is another major point of contention. Here, discussion tends to centre around 
institutional design and on whether non-compliance is best dealt with as an ‘enforcement’ or a 
‘management’ problem (see debates by Chayes & Chayes, 1993 and Downs et al, 1996; Chapter 
I section 1.2). Alongside this primary debate, two further considerations affecting whether and 
how IOs make an impact were discussed: the first focuses on socialisation and the reshaping 
of state preferences rather than incentives; the second, examines whether staff are sufficiently 
autonomous to drive changes from within (Haas, 1964, p.139; Barnett & Finnemore, 2005; 
1999).  
Through an investigation into the ILO’s creation, design, survival and influence, chapters I 
and II applied the above themes to the ILO. Chapter I argued that governments have, 
throughout the organisation’s history, maintained tight control: staff might engage in 
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entrepreneurial endeavours, but members states have ensured that these are kept within 
acceptable bounds.135 The political controversies created by Kucera and Sari’s (2019) labour 
rights indicators is a recent example; here, member states were uncomfortable with yet another 
institutional mechanism which made publicly available their compliance patterns and 
behaviours (see chapter II section 2.3). Perhaps most importantly however, chapter I provided 
a theoretical, historical and empirical explanation for why an enforcement mechanism as 
applied to the ILO is neither desirable nor possible (chapter I section 1.3). Had the 
organisation’s founders designed it with one, achieving globally recognised standards would 
have been difficult: governments would either have been deterred from joining the organisation 
- leaving them free to engage in unfair competition  - or, they would have bargained ILS down 
to the lowest common denominator (Maupain, 2013, p.15). The ILO’s legitimacy is derived 
instead from its tripartism and ability to provide technical assistance and as such, its impact is 
best explained by managerialism and constructivism.  
However, work assessing the ILO’s influence on states continues to perpetuate the 
argument that the organisation needs an enforcement mechanism because much of it finds no 
association between the ILO and the labour standards of the countries within which it operates 
(see chapter II section 2.1). As a result, scholars conclude that external factors do not play a 
role and that all variation in this regard can instead be explained solely by differences in 
domestic politics (see Stallings et al, 2010; chapter II section 2.1). Chapter II however found 
two major shortcomings with this work: firstly, the authors use compliance as a dependent 
variable and therefore overlook some major aspects of the ILO’s work. Secondly, the studies 
quantify their domestic level explanations and in doing so, miss some key differences between 
the same variables across different countries. For example, as chapter III revealed, union 
density may be the same across Czechia and Slovakia, but unions are significantly more 
influential in the latter (see chapter III section 3.3). Such differences are crucial to identify 
because they determine the ways in which states respond to IOs. 
In seeking to overcome the problems with the literature noted above, sections 2.2 and 2.3 
developed a framework in order to better identify whether and how the ILO has an influence. 
Firstly, section 2.3 illustrated exactly how this thesis’ definition of impact could be 
operationalised in relation to the ILO: by creating a dependent variable that captures how the 
 
135 See dynamics surrounding the ‘Declaration of Philadelphia’ and ‘the Declaration’ for further examples - chapter 
I section 1.3.  
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organisation responds after a violation has been uncovered. This approach allowed chapter IV 
to investigate the ILO’s impact across Czechia and Slovakia where compliance and response 
levels were identified and compared. In doing so, the chapter was able to establish patterns of 
behaviour for both countries as well as identify when and how the ILO makes an impact. For 
example, while the diverging domestic factors sketched out in chapter III explained the extent 
of the ILO’s impact - allowing for greater success in Slovakia than Czechia; chapter IV revealed 
that the organisation nevertheless has a significant influence on labour legislation (both its 
content and implementation) and functions as an effective mediator during conflicts between 
unions and employers (see chapter IV sections 4.2 and 4.3). Overall, the chapter illustrated how 
and when the ILO matters: by altering outcomes from what they would have been in the 
organisation’s absence (Downs et al, 1996, p.380) via the rationalist managerial pathway. 
In addition to developing a method to more effectively identify instances of ILO impact, 
chapter II sought to broaden our perspective regarding the system level influences mediating 
the organisation by introducing the issue of policy fragmentation. Borrowing from the literature 
on regime complexes, the ways in which networks of public and private international actors 
configure to impede or facilitate the ILO’s work were mapped, measured and compared across 
Czechia and Slovakia. Chapter II proposed that across countries, there exists unique 
configurations of international actors; these ‘country specific networks’ vary in two significant 
ways: (1) levels of fragmentation (2) the character of fragmentation i.e. to what extent are the 
networks competitive or cooperative (Bierman et al, 2009). Variation in this regard was 
hypothesised to be associated with variation in the ILO’s impact - a theory which was tested 
through the conceptualisation of the ‘regime sub-constellation’ (see section 2.2) and 
operationalised using SNA and process tracing (see chapters VI). In doing so, the work here 
contributed to research concerned with the impact of the ILO firstly by applying the issue of 
policy fragmentation to the labour rights regime and secondly, by developing and 
conceptualising a unit of analysis to compare fragmentation across countries.136  
When this framework was applied to the case studies, several dynamics emerged regarding 
the ways in which IOs make an impact and the role that policy fragmentation plays. In order to 
assess the extent to which policy fragmentation impacts the ILO’s work, it was first necessary 
to identify whether and how the ILO and CIOs made an impact as well as to illustrate the degree 
 
136 As noted in chapter II section 2.2, the application of SNA to the issue of policy fragmentation was inspired by 
Widerberg (2014; 2016).  
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to which their impact varied across the two countries. In doing so, chapters IV and V revealed 
that the ILO had a greater influence in Slovakia than Czechia whereas the reverse was true for 
the CIOs. This finding lent support to the SNA outputs (see chapter II section 2.2) and 
illustrated how the diverging policy spaces sketched out in chapter III mediated the competing 
IOs differently. Moreover, not only did the two chapters reveal that IOs matter, but by 
identifying exactly how these organisations made an impact (influencing policy content and 
implementation practices), it helped shed light on what kinds of evidence to look for when 
examining the consequences of policy fragmentation in chapter VI. For example, chapter V 
provided sufficient evidence that the CIOs influenced very specifically the content of policy 
reforms; because the core norms of the CIOs conflict with that of the ILO’s, relative impact 
matters i.e. where CIO impact is greater (more policy suggestion adopted), there is a higher 
possibility that international conflict (between the CIOs and the ILO) gets replicated into 
domestic legislation or implementation practices.   
 Chapter VI illustrated these dynamics in-depth and in doing so, successfully demonstrated 
the ways in which CIO impact directly undermines the ILO’s work. The chapter examined how 
the regime sub-constellations (which varied in terms of their levels and character of 
fragmentation) interacted with the diverging policy spaces sketched out in chapter III. What 
the chapter found was that international conflict exacerbates domestic conflict; here, competing 
actors at the external level (e.g. the ILO and ITUC versus the CIOs) ally with domestic partners 
(e.g. unions, ministries of labour and employers’ groups) and then battle for policy space. 
Across both Czechia and Slovakia, several violations of C098 were found to be directly linked 
to CIO policy adoption - while the issues were effectively corrected in the latter, problems in 
this regard continue in the former. This result reflects both the regime sub-constellation outputs 
- which suggested that policy fragmentation would be more of a problem in Czechia (see 
chapter II)  - and the findings from chapters III - V: here, it was demonstrated that Slovakia’s 
domestic conditions facilitate the ILO’s impact whereas Czechia’s provide a clearer path for 
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7.3 Globalisation and Global Governance 
The themes discussed above are applicable not just to the ILO but are an example of broader 
challenges related to globalisation and the necessity and effectiveness of global governance. 
Contemporary international politics is characterised by an increasing number of transnational 
issues but a decreasing supply of effective institutions with which to tackle them (Hale et al, 
2013, p.226).  As such, whether and how the impact of regimes governing issues such as the 
environment, nuclear proliferation and global health can be accurately assessed and improved 
upon should be an urgent focus of researchers and policy makers alike.  
 Global governance is necessary because of the ways in which globalisation alters the 
international and domestic political landscapes. Globalisation escalates the “extensity, 
intensity, velocity and impact…” (Held et al, 1999, p.16) of complex interdependencies 
between states (see Keohane & Nye, 1977); driven by advancements in communication and 
transportation technology (Keohane & Nye Jr, 2000, p.108), it increases the thickness and 
speed with which networks of activity (intercontinental flows of goods, people, money, 
information etc…) allow for events in one part of the world to quickly and significantly affect 
distant parts of the globe (Held et al, 1999, p.15; McGrew, 2017, p.18). While these flows can 
be regularised e.g. India delivers services in ‘real-time’ to the rest of the world; they can also 
be unexpected (Keohane & Nye Jr, 2000, p.117) - the 2008 financial crash was not predicted 
and also spread with an unprecedented speed and impact when compared with previous crises 
(McGrew, 2017, p.18).  
 These effects blur the traditional lines of state sovereignty and therefore necessitate 
coordination on a regional or global scale (Zürn, 2012; McGrew, 2017, p.24). For example, the 
mobility of multinational companies creates downward pressures on policy areas such as taxes 
and protective social, environmental and labour laws. These races to the bottom’ challenge the 
state’s regulative authority; calls into question its ability to ensure the wellbeing of its citizens; 
and further exacerbates globalisation’s negative impact on domestic politics (Held & McGrew, 
2003, p.13). Under these conditions, global coordination becomes a necessity not just to tackle 
transnational issues but to accomplish domestic goals too (McGrew, 2017, p.27). Indeed, 
ungoverned interdependence helped to create the disasters of the first half of the 20th century 
(Keohane & Nye Jr, 2002, p.203) and, in the aftermath of world war two, governments worked 
to avoid future disruptions through the construction of a rules based international order (Nye 
Jr, 2017, p.11). Institutions such as Bretton Woods, GATT and the United Nations sought to 
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manage interdependence across several areas (e.g. economic, security and human rights) and 
over time, the liberal international order has been credited with securing peace among great 
powers (Colgan & Keohane, 2017, pp.36-7) and generating levels of wealth that far surpass 
previous systems (Ikenberry, 2017, p.3).137 
 Recent years however have witnessed a backlash to globalisation, a distrust in international 
institutions, a revival of nationalism and trade policies reminiscent of the 1930s (Amaral, 
2016). During an interview in Geneva, a now retired senior ILO official commented: 
“the prospects for the ILO and its standards depend overwhelmingly on the global political 
situation…and this of course has not improved it has gotten worse; with these autocratic governments 
now, the US is a declining imperial power, China is a rising power, there are tensions between the two. 
If you look at the most powerful nations in the world, US, China, Russia, they are not friends of the 
ILO…The autocratic governments, the shrinking multilateralism and rising unilateralism…The UN 
system as a whole is in difficulties times I would say” (ILO Staff Interviewee S, 2019).  
 Another significant threat to the institutions of global governance today can be found not 
only in the form of rising hostile powers (Ikenberry, 2017, p.3) but as a result of reactionary 
populist domestic politics – the most visible examples being the 2016 election of Donald Trump 
and the U.K’s vote to leave the European Union (Held & McGrew, 2003, p.4). This backlash 
against globalisation and its institutions has itself been fuelled by a lack of effective global 
governance and the uneven distribution of globalisation’s benefits (Colgan & Keohane, 2017, 
p.36; Held & McGrew, 2007, pp.2-3).138  
 Anti-globalist sentiments will not only intensify domestic unrest but exacerbate a range of 
transnational issues too – e.g. climate change, nuclear proliferation and global security – with 
serious consequences for future generations (Lamy, 2013). The rejection of multilateralism by 
the US is of particular concern; as a provider of public goods, its leadership is essential to 
effective coordination. During Donald Trump’s single term in office, he pulled out of the Paris 
Agreement, the Iran Nuclear Deal, TPP/TTIP, placed tariffs on key allies and threatened to 
withdraw funding from the UN and NATO (Ikenberry, 2017; 2018; Colgan & Keohane, 2017).  
 
137 Note* while globalisation has produced wealth, its impact is highly uneven and inequality has increased (See 
Ikenberry, 2017, p.3-4; McGrew, 2017, pp.28-9). Moreover, the democratic values of the liberal order are 
frequently undermined by Washington through wars and support for dictators and authoritarian regimes (See Nye 
Jr, 2017, pp.11-12).  
138 For economic explanations regarding the recent shift to right wing populism, see Colgan & Keohane, 2017; 
Ikenberry, 2017; Falk, 2018; Neville, 2016; Best, 2018; Neville, 2016; Amaral, 2016; Bremmer, 2016.  
For cultural explanations see Kaufmann, 2019; Card et al, 2012; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014.  
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Joe Biden has promised to return ‘America to the World Stage’  (Economic Times, 2020) but 
support for Trump’s politics of isolationism has not wavered despite his losing the 2020 
election - the recent storming of Congress on January 6 and broad support for his re-election 
in 2024 are cases in point.  
If the issues mentioned above are not enough to illustrate the urgency with which effective 
global cooperation needs to occur, the disastrous impacts of Covid-19 over the past year (2019 
– present) should. This pandemic illustrates well the speed and systemic impact that events in 
one part of the world can have on societies and economies all over the globe (Held et al, 1999; 
Keohane & Nye Jr., 2000). Not only does the Covid-19 crisis underscore the necessity for 
improved coordination of preparedness, response and accountability mechanisms in regard to 
global health, but it has severe implications for the world of work too. In a recent report, the 
ILO highlighted how the crisis will impact the demand and supply sides of the labour market 
creating downward pressures on wages and other forms of workplace protection. The knock on 
effects could in-turn lead to social tensions, undermine development and threaten peace and 
stability (ILO Policy Brief, 2020) – issues which speak to the very core of the ILO’s raison 
d'être and which were responsible for its creation in 1919.  
7.4 Directions for Future Research 
The findings produced by this research have applicability to the broader issues discussed 
above. First, the work here perhaps most importantly illustrates that IOs, even those that are 
considered less influential, do matter i.e. under certain conditions, IOs can and do influence 
the policy choices and implementation practices of states. However, in order to assess this, it 
is crucial that observers go beyond the issue of compliance (Raustiala, 2000) and instead seek 
to identify the ways in which IOs change behaviour (see chapters I and II). Another finding in 
this regard is the extent to which IOs can have an impact without using enforcement 
mechanisms (see chapters IV and V). As cooperation problems between states persist, and 
delegation to supranational institutions remains low, understanding the institutional levers of 
influence absent their ability to apply material sanctions will be crucial for tackling future 
problems.   
Further to the above, a major contribution emerged regarding the forces mediating IO 
impact and did so because of the attention paid to the issue of policy fragmentation. Through 
this research’s conceptualisation of the ‘regime sub-constellation’ and deployment of SNA, it 
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became possible to map, measure and compare varying configurations of international actors 
across states. IOs matter because they are important ‘agents of global governance’ but, 
fragmentation also matters because it can significantly mediate the impact of those agents and 
therefore the effectiveness of global governance overall. When assessing the impact of a regime 
or IO within the regime therefore, determining (1) to what degree fragmentation exists and (2) 
whether it is of a conflictive or cooperative nature (Bierman et al, 2009) is important for 
identifying the influences that facilitate or impede the regime’s work. The causes and 
consequences of fragmentation is a growing concern across several issue areas and has already 
attracted the attention of scholars and policy researchers alike. For example, Han et al (2018) 
investigate the effects of multiple aid agencies concerned with global health; Breen et al (2019) 
examine the impacts of conflicting policies on international economic surveillance in the 
European Union; Nye Jr (2014) engages the ‘regime complex for global cyber activities’ (Nye, 
Jr, 2014) and finally, Hoffmann & Gonçalves (2020) consider the issue of regime complexity 
as it relates to new migration and refugee patterns driven by Covid-19.  
While the findings here help move beyond the previous literature by illustrating very 
specifically the ways in which the ILO makes an impact, questions remain in regard to what 
the organisation can do to improve its influence when its operating environment is hostile 
(Downs et al, 1996). As the case of Czechia revealed, there is little the ILO can do when states 
exert their authority (see chapter IV section 4.1 and VI section 6.1). Because this research has 
linked the policies of the CIOs (IFIs and OECD) directly to violations of ILO conventions, one 
direction in this regard would be to advocate for more cooperation between the competing 
organisations. Better policy coordination beginning at the international level could improve the 
ILO’s impact independent of domestic level factors e.g. if domestic factors are such that 
country A is likely to adopt CIO policies at a higher rate than country B, this would not 
undermine the ILO more in country A if policy was coordinated first at the international level.  
Indeed, scholars have already called for the ILO to be included as a multilateral partner 
alongside the CIOs when discussing states’ economic policies (Blanton et al, 2015, p.332). This 
notion of policy coherence is also nothing new to ILO staff, long aware of the detrimental 
impact that the policies of institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and OECD (See Hagen, 
2003; Tapiola, 2018) have on their work, the ILO set up the Multilaterals Department to help 
promote international policy coherence. More recently, the importance of inter-agency 
cooperation was raised by Director General Guy Ryder in a speech commemorating the ILO’s 
centenary in 2019 (Ryder, 2019). 
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Such cooperation however is unlikely, as noted by the ILO’s former Deputy-Director 
General, the WTO refuses to allow so much as even a friendly football match between the two 
organisations (Tapiola, 2018, p.29). Moreover, the idea of policy coordination raises an 
irreconcilable tension - on whose terms does such coordination occur. Should the IMF and 
World Bank tailor their policies to be more in line with the ILO’s? If the ILO expects the 
financial institutions to respect its expertise on labour standards, should the ILO not do likewise 
and recognise their jurisdiction with regard to the global economy? Is there an acceptable 
middle ground both sets of organisations would approve of? (ILO Staff Interviewee L, 2019; 
ILO Staff Interviewee Kari Tapiola, 2018).   
These questions lead to another issue that the scope of the current research did not allow 
to explore effectively because they illustrate the ways in which some norms diffuse more 
successfully than others - see work by Cox (1983) and Phillips (2020). As was demonstrated 
throughout, the ILO’s challengers (the IFIs and OECD) were able to make a significant impact 
in both countries without the need to impose loan conditionality indicating that these 
institutions already benefit from a high degree of domestic legitimacy.  While the research here 
has been concerned mainly with understanding and explaining state behaviour as driven by 
rational incentive based motives, the analysis could benefit by adding a more ‘critical lens’ 
explaining state behaviour and global political-economic change as a consequence of ideational 
power i.e. understanding why the neoliberal globalisation narrative diffuses more effectively 
than norms of social protection - see work by Cox, 1983 and Phillips, 2020 - could go some 
way in explaining why some IOs are more effective than others.  
Finally, future research should apply the regime sub-constellation SNA outputs as well as 
the concept of ‘impact’ developed here to a broader sample. For example, the ILO centrality 
measurement could be included as an independent variable into a large-N regression along with 
other relevant control variables. Rather than using compliance as an outcome, the variable 
‘impact’ could be mobilised in this regression by calculating cases of 
progress/observations*100 for each country included.139 Such a project would help identify 
broader regional and global patterns as well as provide further evidence for the proposition that 
the ILO’s impact is associated with varying institutional configurations across states.  
 
139 This formula is taken from Weisband (2000) 
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 Work could also be done to improve the methodological approach taken here. Currently, 
the SNA graphs mainly capture fragmentation at the international level; but as illustrated 
throughout, these fragmented networks are significantly mediated by the domestic 
constituencies they interact with. Researchers will need to carefully consider how such 
domestic variables could be quantified and effectively mobilised in this regard. The issues 
raised in chapter II surrounding the quantification of variables such as union density and 
government type highlight well the challenges presented by such a task (see chapter II section 
2.3).  
 One possible solution would be to determine how ‘domestically connected’ some IOs are 
relative to others within the same network; here, researchers could consider measuring 
communications (or some form of interaction) between ministries of finance or employers’ 
groups and the CIOs on the one hand; versus the number of interactions between unions or 
ministries of labour and the ILO on the other. However, it is not necessarily the case that ‘more 
interactions’ can be associated with greater levels of influence (e.g. one-hundred ineffective 
meetings do not necessarily make a greater impact than one that is meaningful) (ILO Staff 
Interviewee L, 2019). Moreover, this type of ‘meaningful communication’ is often not 
documented, as one ILO staff member commented:  
“I don’t think you’ll be able to measure it...particularly the IMF and the World Bank, they will keep 
everything confidential. There are formal channels and there are informal channels, what really matters 
are the informal…There is constant communication between IMF officials and the finance ministry, but 
they’ll never tell you…they publish some things e.g. the Article IV reports but I’m sure there is probably 
hundreds of emails everyday between the IMF and them…what they do publish is highly sanitised. 
Often in many countries, IMF officials sit inside the finance ministry, how can you measure every time 
they communicate there? (ILO Staff Interviewee L, 2019).   
 Interesting work in this regard however is underway; Han et al (2018) ask whether a state’s 
centrality measurement within the regime complex for aid improves aid outcomes. Here, 
centrality - the authors argue - is best depicted by capturing levels of ‘communicative 
interaction’ between agency staff and country authorities; but, in recognition of its unfeasibility, 
the authors choose monetary flows as a proxy (Han et al, 2018, p.70). Future work seeking to 
incorporate domestic level factors into the labour rights regime SNA network will need to 
identify similar proxies to better capture these dynamics.  
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To conclude, the ILO’s impact is best explained via its ability to monitor compliance, 
provide technical/legal support and mediate between social partners. Its legitimacy is derived 
not from its ability to enforce its mandate but through inclusive decision-making procedures 
encompassing governments, employers and workers associations from 187 countries. While 
the ILO is a forum to achieve cooperation between states, it is also one that facilitates dialogue 
between non-state actors and competing factors of production too. Competition between capital 
and labour exists not just on the domestic level but also as competing international ideologies 
embodied into the mandates of agencies such as the ILO, the Bretton Woods institutions, the 
OECD, international unions, employers’ confederations, NGOs and MSHIs. Different 
combinations of these actors configure into country specific networks across states producing 
varying levels of fragmentation which can impede or facilitate the ILO’s impact. Any 
assessment of the ILO must go beyond the conventional issues of compliance and enforcement 
and seek instead to identify the ways in which the organisation changes behaviour within an 
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Appendix 1. Mapping Fragmentation by Abbott and Snidal  
Zone 1  
IECA The Employment of Children Act (India), 
1938 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 
1976 
BM WHO Code of Marketing for Breastmilk 
Substitutes, 1981 
Zone 2  
GAP Labour rights scheme of Gap, Inc., 1992 
BS The Body Shop, "Trade Not Aid" initiative, 
1991 
RC Responsible Care, 1987 
GG Global GAP, agricultural products standard 
on 
safety, environment, labour, 1997 (as 
EUREPGAP) 
SQF SQF 1000, 2000 food safety standards, 
optional 
social, environmental standards, 1994 
WDC World Diamond Council warranty system 
for 
conflict diamonds, 2004 
WRAP Worldwide Responsible Apparel 
Production, 
industry labour code, 2000 
BSC Business Social Compliance Initiative; 
European 
supplier labour standard, 2004 
Zone 3  
AI Amnesty International Human Rights 
Guidelines 
for Companies, 1997 
CCC Clean Clothes Campaign Code of Labour 
Practices 
for apparel, 1998 
RUG Rugmark labelling scheme to control child 
labour in 
carpets, 1994 
GSULL Global Sullivan Principles on economic and 
social 
justice, 1999 
WRC Worker Rights Consortium, 2000 
Zone 4  
UNGC United Nations Global Compact, 2000 
Zone 5  
PRI Principles for Responsible Investment, 
UN institutional investor scheme, 2006 
Zone 6  
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FLA Fair Labour Association; apparel industry 
scheme, 1999 
FLO Fairtrade Labelling Organization, “fair 
trade” 
umbrella scheme, 1997 
FTO World Fair Trade Organization; standard for 
fair 
trade organizations, 2004 
GRI Global Reporting Initiative standards for 
social, 
environmental reports, 1997 
SAI Social Accountability Int’l standard for 
supplier 
labour practices, 1997 
ETI Ethical Trading Initiative, worker rights 
scheme, 1998 
AA Accountability AA1000 framework for 
ethical 
business practices, 1999 
Zone 7  
AIP Apparel Industry Partnership; Clinton 
Administration stakeholders’ scheme, 
1996–97 
ILO International Labour Org. Declaration on 
Multinational Enterprises, 1977 

















Page 288 of 369 
 
Appendix 2. Labour Rights Organisational Links – Issue Crawler Data 
 Crawl Title:  Labour Rights Organisations 4 
Author Name:  Simon Hayes 
Author Email: simonpaulhayes@gmail.com 




adb.org =>  
addthis.com =>  
aflcio.org => 
 
aidtransparency.net =>  
amrc.org.hk =>  laborrights.org 
ar.wfp.org =>  addthis.com - cn.wfp.org - es.wfp.org - fr.wfp.org - it.wfp.org - ja.wfp.org - nl.wfp.org - twitter.com - wfp.org 
asiafloorwage.org =>  
bangladeshaccord.org => cleanclothes.org - industriall-union.org - laborrights.org - maquilasolidarity.org - workersrights.org 
cleanclothes.org =>  
cn.wfp.org =>  addthis.com - ar.wfp.org - es.wfp.org - fr.wfp.org - it.wfp.org - ja.wfp.org - nl.wfp.org - ungm.org - wfp.org 
ctbto.org =>    iaea.org - opcw.org - un.org 
documents.un.org =>  
en.unesco.org =>    un.org - unesco.org 
entwicklung.at => 
   fao.org - preventionweb.net - un.org - uncdf.org - undp.org - unep.org - unfccc.int - unicef.org - unido.org - 
unisdr.org - unocha.org - unrwa.org - wfp.org - worldbank.org 
es.wfp.org =>    addthis.com - ar.wfp.org - cn.wfp.org - fr.wfp.org - it.wfp.org - ja.wfp.org - nl.wfp.org - wfp.org 
ethicaltrade.org => 
   amrc.org.hk - asiafloorwage.org - bangladeshaccord.org - fairtrade.org.uk - ilo.org - industriall-union.org - ituc-
csi.org - iuf.org - laborrights.org - labourbehindthelabel.org - maquilasolidarity.org - ohchr.org - ranaplaza-
arrangement.org - un.org 
europa.eu =>  
fairtrade.org.uk =>  
fao.org => 
   ar.wfp.org - cn.wfp.org - es.wfp.org - fr.wfp.org - ifad.org - un.org - undp.org - ungm.org - unjiu.org - wfp.org - 
worldbank.org 
fr.wfp.org =>    addthis.com - ar.wfp.org - cn.wfp.org - es.wfp.org - it.wfp.org - ja.wfp.org - nl.wfp.org - twitter.com - wfp.org 
global-unions.org =>  
globalmigrationgroup.org => 
   fao.org - ilo.org - iom.int - ohchr.org - un.org - unctad.org - undp.org - unep.org - unesco.org - unfpa.org - 
unhcr.org - unicef.org - unitar.org - unodc.org - unwomen.org - wfp.org - who.int - worldbank.org 
iaea.org =>    
icao.int =>    
ifad.org =>    
ilo.org =>    es.wfp.org - fao.org - fr.wfp.org - ituc-csi.org - twitter.com - unisdr.org - wfp.org 
imf.org =>    
imo.org =>    
industriall-union.org =>    
iom.int => 
   adb.org - en.unesco.org - europa.eu - fao.org - globalmigrationgroup.org - icao.int - ilo.org - imo.org - ituc-csi.org - 
ochaonline.un.org - ohchr.org - preventionweb.net - state.gov - un.org - unctad.org - undp.org - uneca.org - unep.org 
- unescap.org - unesco.org - unfccc.int - unfpa.org - unhabitat.org - unhcr.org - unicef.org - unido.org - unisdr.org - 
unitar.org - unocha.org - unodc.org - unrisd.org - unv.org - unwomen.org - upu.int - usaid.gov - wfp.org - who.int - 
wipo.int - worldbank.org - worldwewant2015.org 
it.wfp.org => 
   addthis.com - ar.wfp.org - cn.wfp.org - es.wfp.org - fao.org - fr.wfp.org - ifad.org - ja.wfp.org - nl.wfp.org - 
twitter.com - un.org - wfp.org 
ituc-csi.org =>    bangladeshaccord.org - global-unions.org - ilo.org - un.org 
iuf.org =>    global-unions.org 
ja.wfp.org =>    addthis.com - ar.wfp.org - cn.wfp.org - es.wfp.org - fr.wfp.org - it.wfp.org - nl.wfp.org - wfp.org 
laborrights.org =>    aflcio.org - bangladeshaccord.org - ethicaltrade.org - ohchr.org - ranaplaza-arrangement.org - un.org 
labourbehindthelabel.org =>    bangladeshaccord.org - ethicaltrade.org 
maquilasolidarity.org =>    bangladeshaccord.org - industriall-union.org - laborrights.org - ranaplaza-arrangement.org 
miga.org =>    
nl.wfp.org => 
   addthis.com - ar.wfp.org - cn.wfp.org - es.wfp.org - fao.org - fr.wfp.org - ifad.org - it.wfp.org - ja.wfp.org - 
wfp.org 
ochaonline.un.org =>    unocha.org 
ohchr.org =>    documents.un.org - iom.int - ituc-csi.org - twitter.com - un.org - uneca.org - unescap.org - unicef.org - unv.org 
opcw.org =>    
preventionweb.net =>    
ranaplaza-arrangement.org =>    ilo.org 
state.gov =>    
twitter.com =>    
un.org => 
   ar.wfp.org - cn.wfp.org - ctbto.org - documents.un.org - en.unesco.org - fao.org - fr.wfp.org - iaea.org - icao.int - 
ifad.org - ilo.org - imf.org - imo.org - iom.int - miga.org - ochaonline.un.org - ohchr.org - opcw.org - twitter.com - 
unaids.org - uncdf.org - unctad.org - undp.org - uneca.org - unece.org - unep.org - unescap.org - unesco.org - 
unfccc.int - unfpa.org - ungm.org - unhabitat.org - unhcr.org - unicef.org - unido.org - unisdr.org - unitar.org - 
unjiu.org - unocha.org - unodc.org - unops.org - unrisd.org - unrwa.org - unv.org - unwomen.org - upu.int - wfp.org - 
who.int - wipo.int - worldbank.org - wto.org 
unaids.org => 
   en.unesco.org - ilo.org - twitter.com - un.org - undp.org - unfpa.org - unhcr.org - unicef.org - unodc.org - 
unwomen.org - wfp.org 
uncdf.org =>    ifad.org - ilo.org - un.org - undp.org - uneval.org - unhcr.org - unops.org - unwomen.org 
unctad.org => 
   fao.org - ifad.org - ilo.org - undg.org - undp.org - uneca.org - unep.org - unescap.org - uneval.org - worldbank.org - 
wto.org 
undg.org =>    
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undp.org => 
   adb.org - aidtransparency.net - documents.un.org - europa.eu - fao.org - ilo.org - preventionweb.net - twitter.com - 
un.org - unaids.org - uncdf.org - undg.org - unep.org - unfccc.int - ungm.org - unhabitat.org - unisdr.org - unocha.org 
- unv.org - unwomen.org - worldbank.org - worldwewant2015.org 
uneca.org =>    undp.org 
unece.org => 
   europa.eu - imf.org - un.org - undp.org - uneca.org - unescap.org - uneval.org - unfpa.org - unido.org - who.int - 
worldbank.org - wto.org 
unep.org =>    
unescap.org =>    
unesco.org => 
   en.unesco.org - europa.eu - globalmigrationgroup.org - preventionweb.net - un.org - unaids.org - ungm.org - 
unrisd.org 
uneval.org => 
   ctbto.org - iaea.org - icao.int - imo.org - ochaonline.un.org - opcw.org - un.org - unaids.org - uncdf.org - undp.org - 
uneca.org - unece.org - unido.org - unitar.org - unjiu.org - unocha.org - unrwa.org - unv.org - who.int - wto.org 
unfccc.int =>    
unfpa.org =>    
ungm.org =>    
unhabitat.org =>    
unhcr.org => 
   fr.wfp.org - iom.int - ochaonline.un.org - unaids.org - undp.org - unfpa.org - ungm.org - unicef.org - unocha.org - 
unrwa.org - unv.org - wfp.org - who.int 
unicef.org =>    
unido.org =>    fao.org - ifad.org - twitter.com - un.org - undp.org - unep.org - ungm.org - unjiu.org 
unisdr.org =>    
unitar.org => 
   en.unesco.org - fao.org - globalmigrationgroup.org - ohchr.org - un.org - undg.org - undp.org - uneca.org - 
unep.org - unescap.org - unesco.org - unfccc.int - ungm.org - unhabitat.org - unhcr.org - unicef.org - unocha.org - 
unwomen.org - wfp.org - worldbank.org 
unjiu.org =>    
unocha.org =>    fao.org 
unodc.org => 
   entwicklung.at - globalmigrationgroup.org - iom.int - state.gov - twitter.com - un.org - uneval.org - unjiu.org - 
who.int 
unops.org =>    
unrisd.org =>    ilo.org 
unrwa.org =>    
unv.org =>    
unwomen.org => 
   documents.un.org - ohchr.org - preventionweb.net - un.org - undg.org - uneval.org - ungm.org - unisdr.org - 
worldwewant2015.org 
upu.int =>    
usaid.gov =>    
wfp.org => 
   ar.wfp.org - cn.wfp.org - es.wfp.org - fao.org - fr.wfp.org - ifad.org - it.wfp.org - ja.wfp.org - nl.wfp.org - 
ungm.org 
who.int =>    fao.org - ilo.org - un.org - unep.org - unhabitat.org - unhcr.org - wto.org 
wipo.int =>    iaea.org - un.org 
workersrights.org =>    
worldbank.org => 
   adb.org - entwicklung.at - fao.org - ifad.org - imf.org - miga.org - state.gov - twitter.com - undg.org - unicef.org - 
usaid.gov 
worldwewant2015.org =>    
wto.org =>    
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Appendix 3. The Regime Complex for Labour Rights Network Outputs  
The Regime Complex for Labour 
Rights (Global Metrics) 










fairtrade-advocacy.org 1 0 1 0.000 1.000 
Wfto.com 1 1 0 0.000 1.000 
chicagofairtrade.org 7 0 7 21.000 0.143 
globalhandmadehope.com 1 1 0 0.000 0.077 
friendsofthethirdworld.org 1 1 0 0.000 0.077 
foodchainworkers.org 1 1 0 0.000 0.077 
fairtradecampaigns.org 1 1 0 0.000 0.077 
canaanfairtrade.com 1 1 0 0.000 0.077 
graciasfairtrade.com 1 1 0 0.000 0.077 
sandpiperimports.com 1 1 0 0.000 0.077 
un.org 42 19 34 1691.843 0.007 
ilo.org 18 13 6 1176.791 0.006 
ituc-csi.org 15 9 7 787.924 0.006 
ethicaltrade.org 14 3 13 520.230 0.005 
undp.org 19 10 10 163.072 0.005 
laborrights.org 8 4 6 184.949 0.005 
ohchr.org 11 5 7 80.367 0.005 
globalmigrationgroup.org 12 2 12 63.587 0.005 
unctad.org 12 2 10 52.074 0.005 
worldbank.org 16 9 8 263.701 0.005 
uneca.org 9 7 2 21.865 0.005 
uncdf.org 7 4 6 25.602 0.005 
sa-intl.org 3 0 3 255.000 0.005 
iom.int 7 4 3 45.445 0.005 
opcw.org 9 3 7 43.217 0.005 
unitar.org 16 3 15 40.116 0.005 
documents.un.org 6 5 2 31.808 0.005 
uneval.org 15 2 14 35.590 0.004 
imf.org 3 3 0 39.475 0.004 
fairlabor.org 11 0 11 726.284 0.004 
old.tuac.org 7 2 5 238.638 0.004 
unece.org 9 1 9 24.427 0.004 
entwicklung.at 9 0 9 14.739 0.004 
unesco.org 8 4 6 20.235 0.004 
unido.org 9 4 6 7.350 0.004 
undg.org 6 4 2 2.361 0.004 
ifad.org 7 6 1 2.283 0.004 
unep.org 7 7 0 1.461 0.004 
unescap.org 6 6 0 2.170 0.004 
ungm.org 6 6 0 1.367 0.004 
unocha.org 5 5 0 0.333 0.004 
miga.org 2 2 0 0.000 0.004 
wto.org 4 4 0 0.367 0.004 
unhabitat.org 3 3 0 0.000 0.004 
en.unesco.org 3 3 0 0.000 0.004 
unrwa.org 3 3 0 0.167 0.004 
unaids.org 3 3 0 0.167 0.004 
ctbto.org 3 2 2 0.000 0.004 
unjiu.org 3 3 0 0.000 0.004 
unodc.org 2 2 0 0.000 0.004 
bangladeshaccord.org 8 5 5 159.116 0.004 
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icao.int 2 2 0 0.000 0.004 
imo.org 2 2 0 0.000 0.004 
unops.org 2 2 0 0.000 0.004 
unrisd.org 1 1 0 0.000 0.004 
wipo.int 1 1 1 0.000 0.004 
unicef.org 6 6 0 3.643 0.004 
fair-wage.com 2 0 2 0.000 0.004 
masquilasolidarity.org 5 3 4 60.352 0.004 
fao.org 2 2 0 3.193 0.004 
unisdr.org 1 0 1 0.000 0.004 
betterwork.org 1 1 0 0.000 0.004 
fr.wfp.org 1 1 0 0.000 0.004 
unglobalcompact.com 1 1 0 0.000 0.004 
state.gov 3 2 1 75.846 0.004 
industriall-union.org 3 3 0 0.000 0.004 
asi.is 4 0 4 173.000 0.004 
global-unions.org 4 4 0 11.417 0.004 
iuf.org 2 1 1 3.536 0.004 
gsee.gr 2 0 2 0.000 0.004 
cgt.fr 1 0 1 0.000 0.004 
old.tuac.org.org 1 1 0 0.000 0.004 
workerscapital.org 1 1 0 0.000 0.004 
sustainlabour.org 1 1 0 0.000 0.004 
labourbehindthelabel.org 2 1 1 0.000 0.004 
amrc.org.hk 2 1 1 0.000 0.004 
asiafloorwage.org 1 1 0 0.000 0.004 
fairtrade.org.uk 1 1 0 0.000 0.004 
europa.eu 3 3 0 0.500 0.004 
cleanclothes.org 2 2 0 12.393 0.004 
alfcio.org 1 1 0 0.000 0.003 
usaid.gov 1 1 0 0.000 0.003 
wfto.com 1 0 1 0.000 0.003 
bsci-intl.org 2 2 1 172.000 0.003 
globalfairness.org 2 1 1 87.000 0.003 
adidas-group.com 1 1 0 0.000 0.003 
nikeinc.com 1 1 0 0.000 0.003 
stopchildlabour.eu 1 1 0 0.000 0.003 
http://pvh.com/ 1 1 0 0.000 0.003 
socialresponsibility.fruit.com 1 1 0 0.000 0.003 
hanesbrandscsr.com 1 1 0 0.000 0.003 
tuc.org.uk 1 1 0 0.000 0.003 
ictu.ie 1 1 0 0.000 0.003 
workersrights.org 1 1 0 0.000 0.003 
lo.dk 1 1 0 0.000 0.003 
sak.fi 1 1 0 0.000 0.003 
fta-intl.org 2 1 2 87.000 0.003 
aflcio.org 1 1 0 0.000 0.003 
saasaccreditation.org 1 1 0 0.000 0.002 
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Appendix 4. Czechia Regime Sub-Constellation Linkages  
  
Regime Sub-Constellation Data  
The Czechia: Undirected Connections 
Note*links made here are accompanied with 
references tied to the bibliography  
                                                                                         
EUROUFOUND (Eurofound, 2017c)  
 
 
ILO, TUAC (Eurofound, 2017c) 
 
ETUC (Eurofound, 2017c) 
 
The Social platform  
(Eurofound, 2017c) 
 
IndustriAll - Global Union (Eurofound, 2017d) 
IndustriAll – EU (Eurofound, 2017d) 
 
 
OS TOK (Czech textile labour union) (Eurofound, 
2017d) 
 
ILO, IRBD/World Bank, IMF, OECD, WTO 
ITUC (UIA, 2017) 
ETUC (EU Trade Union Confederation) (ETUC, 2017) 
 
Council of Europe (ETUC, 2017) 
 ITUC, TUAC; ILO; UNGC  
(TUAC, 2017a)  
 
CMKOS (CMKOS, 2017a) 
OECD (TUAC) (TUAC, 2017a)  CMKOS (CMKOS, 2017a) 
 
ETUC; ETUI; ITUC (UIA, 2017)  
IMF; (Issue Crawler, 2017)  
ITUC (ITUC, 2017a)  CMKOS (CMKOS, 2017a)  
 
 
Council of Europe: ILO; TUAC; UNDP; 
IBRD/World Bank; IMF; ETUC; IndustriAll; 
(UIA, 2017)  
 
 
Global Unions (PSI) (PSI, 2017a)  
 
BS - The Body (note*Loreal owns BS and operates in 
Czech (Transnationale, 2017)  
ETI (ETI, 2017a)  
BSCI – (BSCI, 2017a)  
 
 
ILO; TUAC; UNGP (BSCI, 2017b)  
 
FTA (Issue crawler, 2017)  
 
Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC, 2017a)  
 
 




UNGC (UNGC, 2017a)  UNIDO; ILO (UIA, 2017) 
 
 
SAI8000 (UIA, 2017) 
 
Volkswagen (Transnationale, 2017; UNGC, 
2017b)  
SAI8000 – (SAI8000, 2017a)  ILO (SAI8000, 2017a)   
 
BSCI; UNGC (Issue Crawler, 2017) 
Fair Labor Association (FLA, 2017a)  ILO CLS, (FLA, 2017a)  
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CCC; ETI; SAI; WRC [JO-IN] (FLA, 2017b)  
 
World Fair Trade Organization (WFTO)  ILO; EU-Commission; UNCTAD; WTO; (UIA, 
2017)   
 
World Bank (Issue Crawler, 2017)  
ETI (ETI, 2017)  ITUC; IndustriAll; TUC (ETI, 2017b)  
 
 
Body Shop (i.e. Loreal) (Transnationale, 2017) 
 
ILO (Issue Crawler, 2017)  
ILO (ILO, 2017c)  UNDP; UNIDO; EU; IOM; TUAC; AI; ETUC; 
WB; IMF; G20 (UIA, 2017) 
 
 
UNGC   ITUC (Issue Crawler, 2017)   
World Bank ILO (Murphy, 2014)  
 
 




IMF   
ILO EU; TUAC/OECD (UIA, 2017)  
 
 
WTO (WTO, 2017a)  ILO; IMF; OECD; WB; (WTO, 2017a)  
Global Unions (PSI) (PSI, 2017b) ILO; WB; IMF; TUAC (PSI, 2017b) 
 
Works with ITUC (PSI, 2017b)  
FTA BSCI (Issue Crawler, 2017)  
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Appendix 4A. LABREF Labour Market Reforms in the Czech Republic  
Legend: I = Increasing Labour Standards. D = Decreasing Labor Standards  
1.  Year Policy Domain Policy Field Title  
2.  
2000 I 









costs…”                                                                                                                            
3.  
2000 I 
Active labour market 
policies 
Special schemes 
for the disabled 
“Introduction of 
the obligation for 
employers with at 
least 20 
employees to…”                                                                                                                      
4.  
2000 I Early Withdrawal Early retirement 
“New programme 
to facilitate the 
early retirement 
of older workers 
in the...”                                                                                                                              
5.  







and work permit 
of...”                                                                                                                             
6.  









EU...”                                                                                                                        
7.  








of time are the 
norm but fixed-











limited to two 
months as before; 
additional 
severance pay can 
be provided by 





2000 I Wage Setting 

















agreements”.                                                                                                                              
10.  





parental leave”.                                                                                                                                                                            
11.  




the basic annual 
paid-leave period 
from three to four 
weeks…”                                                                                                                                
12.  





working hours; 2) 
Limiting 
involuntary over-
time work to 150 
hours per year 
and voluntary 
overtime to 416 
hours per year; 3) 
Scheduling 
working hours at 
40 hours per 
week" 
13.  
2001 D Early Withdrawal Early retirement 
“Reducing early-
retirement 
benefits in an 
actuarially fair 
manner for 
those...”                                                                                                                            
14.  
2001 I Job Protection (EPL) 







employees”.     
 
                                                                                                                      










nominal level of 
the basic cash-
welfare benefit 
(known as the 
minimum living 
standard, MLS), 
so a s to reduce 
its attractiveness 
in real terms”. 
 
16.  
2002 I  












Active labour market 
policies 
Special schemes 
for the disabled 
“Reducing the 
state subsidies for 
employment of 
workers with 
disabilities....”                                                                                                                            
18.  
2003 D Early Withdrawal Early retirement 











2003 I Labour Taxation Income tax 
“Introduction of 
minimum tax for 
self-employed 
persons who have 
business...”                                                                                                                            
21.  








self-employed...”                                                                                                                                
22.  
2003 D Wage Setting EPL 














void the Act on 
Collective 
Bargaining...”                                                                                                                             
23.  
2004 I 




















“Provision of new 












“Expansion of the 
2002 pilot project 
of Individual 
Action Plans 
(IAP)to all labour 
offices”.                                                                                                             
26.  
2004 I 









tightening of the 
conditions for 
labour mediation 
by...”                                                                                                                            
27.  
2004 I 










agencies…”                                                                                                                       
28.  
2004 I 
Active labour market 
policies 
Special schemes 





in protected...”                                                                                                                           
29.  
2004 I 
Active labour market 
policies 
Special schemes 




workers”.                                                                                                                                                    
30.  
2004 I Job Protection (EPL) 
Collective 
dismissals 
“Introduction of a 
legal definition of 
collective 
dismissal”.                                                                                                                                              
31.  




“Introduction of a 
limit of two years 
to the maximum 
total duration 
of...”                                                                                                                             
32.  
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married couples 
with...”                                                                                                                          
33.  
2004 D Labour Taxation Income tax 
“Replacement of 
the child tax 
deduction with a 

















benefits  Sickness schemes 
“Persons with a 
changed work 















useful jobs or 
low-wage jobs for 
those on social 

























benefits for older 







“The amount of 
unemployment 
benefits after first 
three months is 
increased”.                                                                                                                             
40.  
2005 I 
Active labour market 
policies 
Special schemes 






2005 I Early Withdrawal 
Disability 
schemes 
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42.  











2005 D Labour Taxation Income tax 
“Decrease in 
average income 












2.2%. This will 
affect a wide 
range of...”      
 
                                                                                                                
46.  
2005 I Wage Setting EPL  









of social partners, 
etc.) 
“Possibility to 
broaden the scope 






prevailingly in the 














qualifications…”                                                                                                                                
48.  











Czech...”                                                                                                                              
49.  
2006 I  Job Protection (EPL) 
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“Changes in the 
system of social 
benefits in order 
to make work 
pay...”                                                                                                                                   
52.  










































2007 Labour Taxation Income tax 
“Introduction of a 
























benefits  Sickness schemes 
“Lower rates for 
sickness 
benefits”.                                                                                                                                                                        





benefits  Sickness schemes 
“Sickness 
benefits no longer 
provided in the 
first three days of 




benefits  Sickness schemes 
“Stricter penalties 
for sick leave 











people…”                                                                                                               
64.  




younger than 18 
years are allowed 
to work 40 hours 
per week...”                                                                                                                             
65.  








by employees…”                                                                                                                                    
66.  




“Changes in rates 
of social security 
contributions for 
employers”.                                                                                                                                         
67.  
2008 Labour Taxation Income tax 
“New deductions 
for the spouse…”                                                                                                                                                                           
68.  




“New rates of 
social security 
contributions for 
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participation in 
public works”.                                                                                                                                                    
73.  
2008 D Wage Setting EPL 

















union in case of 
disagreement”.                                                                                      
74.  
2008 D Wage Setting EPL  
Wage setting - 
Other  
“Reducing trade 
unions' right to 
carry out 
inspections in 
companies”.                                                                                                                                      
75.  
2009 I 







“New Institute of 
Public Service to 
stimulate work 
activity of benefit 
recipients”.                                                                                                                         
76.  




“Increase in SSC 











working hours”.                                                                                                                                              
78.  
2010 I 











2010 I Job Protection (EPL) 
Procedural 
requirements  
“Written form for 
Employment 
Agreements”.                                                                                                                                                                  
80.  




















benefits and job 
earnings”.                                                                                                                            










reduction of some 
social support 






























level for those 




2011 D Job Protection (EPL) 
Definition of fair 
dismissal  
“New reason for 
fair termination of 
the employment 
relationship”.                                                                                                                                          
87.  







extended”.                                                                                                                                                       
88.  






reduced”.                                                                                                                                                                              
89.  
2011 I Job Protection (EPL) 
Permanent 
contracts - Other  




2011 D Job Protection (EPL) 
Procedural 
requirements  
“Trial period for 
managerial 
positions 
increased”.                                                                                                                                                         
91.  
2011 D Job Protection (EPL) 
Temporary 
agency work 
“Agency work by 
direct agreement 
between 
employers”.                                                                                                                                                       
92.  
2011 Labour Taxation 
Employees' social 
security 
contributions Tax reform 
93.  
2011 Labour Taxation 
Employers' social 
security 
contributions Tax reform 
94.  2011 Labour Taxation Income tax Tax reform 
95.  
2011 Labour Taxation 
Self-employed 
social security 
contributions Taw reform 
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96.  
2011 D Wage Setting EPL 









of social partners, 
etc.) 





in the firm”.                                                                                                                   
97.  
2012 I 







2012 D Early Withdrawal 
Disability 
schemes 
“Ten benefits for 
the disabled 
merged into two 
new benefits”. 
99.  
2012 I Early Withdrawal Early retirement 
“Pre-pensions for 
those who lose 





2012 Labour Taxation Income tax 
“Introduction of 
solidarity tax: 
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106.  















2013 D Job Protection (EPL) 
Definition of 
valid reasons for 
fixed-term 
contracts 




















2013 D Working Time 
Working hours 
management 






Active labour market 
policies 
Special schemes 
for the disabled 
“Reintroduction 




2014 Labour Taxation Income tax 
“Increase in the 





2014 Labour Taxation Income tax 
“Reinstatement of 





2014 Labour Taxation Income tax 









“Extension of the 
birth grant to 









“New type of 
childcare services 
on a non-profit 
basis…” 
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118.  
2015 I  








from 12 to 24 
months”. 
119.  




















































2016 Immigration/Mobility Internal mobility 
“Contribution to 
the commuting to 
work…” 
125.  
2016 Immigration/Mobility Mobility - Other 
“Facilitate access 











prepare a social 























2016 D Job Protection (EPL) 
Temporary 





2016 Labour Taxation Income tax 
“Increase of the 
tax relief for 
nursery school 
fees to CZK 
11,000”. 
131.  
2016 Labour Taxation Income tax 
“Reduced 










“Increase of the 























2016 I Wage Setting Public wages 
“Wage increase 





2016 D Wage Setting 




deductions in case 
of debt from an 
employee’s wage 
or public sector 
pay”.  
137.  





an obligatory year 
of pre-school 
education and a 
right to a place in 
kindergarten for 
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138.  
2016 I Working Time 
Working Time - 
Other 
“Change in the 




2016 D Working Time 
Working hours 
management 
“Introduction of a 






Active labour market 
policies 
Special schemes 
for the disabled 
“Improving the 
regulatory 





Active labour market 
policies 
Special schemes 
for the disabled 






















are permitted to 
be posted through 
temporary work 









2017 Labour Taxation Income tax 
“Increase of tax 





2017 Labour Taxation Income tax 
“Increased tax 
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149.  




scheme for health 
care workers”. 
150.  
2017 I Wage Setting Public wages 
“Amendments to 
the public salary 
system to increase 


































paternity leave”.  
155.  
2017 I Working Time 
Working hours 
management 
“New method for 
calculating the 
entitlement to 
annual leave”.   
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Appendix 4B. LABREF Labour Market Reforms in Slovakia  









wal Disability schemes 
“Definition of the persons eligible 
for the programme of social 




Taxation Income tax 
“Cutting to 12% the lowest 
personal income tax (from 15%) 





benefits Net replacement rate 
“Cutting the replacement rate for 
the first 3 months of unemployment 







“Regulation of the practical training 















“Provisions for the terms of entry 





Employers' social security 
contributions 
“The obligatory contribution to the 







“Maximum working hours are set 




Taxation Income tax 
“Cutting to 10% the lowest 
personal income tax, with large 







“Reduction of the hours of work 
per week from 42,5 to 40 hours”.                                                                                                                                         






wal Disability schemes 
“New definition of disability status 





wal Early retirement 
“Early retirement pensions are 
allowed but full pension benefits 





n (EPL) Collective dismissals 
“Relaxing the valid reasons to 
terminate a working contract and 






Definition of valid reasons 
for fixed-term contracts 
“Increasing the valid cases for 






Maximum duration of 
fixed-term contracts 
“Increasing the maximum overall 






Maximum number of 
renewals of fixed-term 
contracts 
“Increasing the number of possible 




Taxation Income tax 
“Employers, self-employed and 
employees will pay a flat of 19% 






to EPL  
Regulation by the 
Government of the wage 
bargaining framework 
(e.g. extension of 
collective agreements, 
representativeness of 
social partners, etc.) 
“Making the ministerial extension 
of sectoral wage settlement 
agreements to firms that did not 
participate in the bargaining 
process conditional upon written 







“Yearly overtime limit raised from 
150 to 400 hours”.                                                                                                                                                       
 
 















policies Employment subsidies 
“Introduction of subsidies to 
employers”.                                                                                                                                                                   
23.  2004 
I 
Early 
Withdrawal Disability schemes 
“Invalidity benefit may be 










benefit or tax credit) 
“Unemployed people become 
entitled to an 'activation 







Coverage and eligibility 
conditions 
“Simplification of the situation of 






benefits Net replacement rate 
“Reduction of the level of 
unemployment benefits and other 







Search and job 
availability requirements 
“Stricter conditions for getting 








“Regulating the provision of 
contributions to childcare services 









Services (job assistance, 
job-counselling etc.) 
“Tightening of the system for 
proving active job search by 





Taxation Labour Taxation - Other 
“Creating better conditions for 
performance of control and 
prevention in the sphere of 







Unemployment benefits - 
Other 
“Introduction of a State 
intervention to pay health 





Withdrawal Disability schemes 
“Recipients of the disability 
pension may now apply for a 





Withdrawal Early retirement 
“Abolishing the possibility to 
retroactively apply for early old-







Coverage and eligibility 
conditions 
“workers with fixed-term contract 







Services (job assistance, 
job-counselling etc.) 
“Reinforcing the focus on 
disadvantaged job seekers…”                                                                                                                                              
 
 








n/Mobility Immigration control 
“Removing the inconvenient 
regulation of employment of 






(EPL) Collective dismissals 
“If an employee is entitled to a 
redundancy payment, he or she is 
also entitled to receive a wage 








Definition of fair 
dismissal  
“When the working time of part-
time workers is shorter than 15 
hours a week, rather than the 20 
hours specified up to now, the 
employment contract can be 








Definition of valid 
reasons for fixed-term 
contracts 
“Making again possible to sign an 
‘Agreement on working activity’ 
with the employer for occasional 
jobs of up to a maximum of 10 








Maximum number of 
renewals of fixed-term 
contracts 
“Limiting the renewal of fixed-







Permanent contracts - 
Other  
“Defining more precisely the term 







benefits  Family-related benefits 
“…increase of social allowances 








Regulation by the 
Government of the wage 
bargaining framework 
(e.g. extension of 
collective agreements, 
representativeness of 
social partners, etc.) 
“…allowing companies to 
conclude collective agreements 
with one or more trade union 
bodies, as long as they represent 





Setting Statutory Minima 
“New indexation mechanism, 
giving social partners room to 








“Allowing employees to perform 
telework at places agreed with the 






Employees' social security 
contributions 
“State pays pension and disability 
insurance during maternity 
leave…”                                                                                                                                     
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47.  2008 
D 
Labour 
Taxation Income tax 
“Making performance-related pay 
exempt from income tax…”                                                                                                                                                    
48.  2008 
D 
Labour 
Taxation Income tax 
“Deductions for dependent 








“State pays pension and disability 
insurance during maternity 







benefits  Family-related benefits 
“Reform of parental leave 
allowances and childcare 








Direct job creation 
schemes 
“Easing the legislative 
requirements for creation and 
functioning of social 







policies Employment subsidies Subsidies for new jobs                                                                                                                                                                                   
53.  2009 
D 
Immigratio
n/Mobility Internal mobility 
“Increasing the work commuting 





Taxation Income tax 
“Increasing the non-taxable part of 
the tax base in personal income 
tax…”                                                                                                                                  
55.  2009 
D 
Labour 
Taxation Income tax 
“Employee tax credit for low-








“Decrease in the rate of 
contribution to the Social 
Insurance Agency for self-
employed…”                                                                                                                   






“Supporting jobseekers becoming 


















Short time working 
scheme 
“Subsidies to employers for 
retention of workers under short-








Short time working 
scheme 
“Introduction of possibility to use 
flexible work-time accounts in 








Direct job creation 
schemes 
“New subsidies for natural 
disaster-related jobs for 
unemployed…”                                                                                                                                          
 
 










Services (job assistance, 
job-counselling etc.) 
“Temporarily relaxed access of 
young unemployed to PES”.                                                                                                                                                   
63.  2010 
D 
Early 
Withdrawal Early retirement Restrictions on early retirement                                                                                                                                                                         
64.  2010 
D 
Labour 
Taxation Income tax 
“Simplification of deductible 
expenses for the self-employed…”                                                                                                                                              
65.  2010 
I 
Labour 
Taxation Income tax 
“Abolition of tax exemption for 













Regulation by the 
Government of the wage 
barganing framework 
(e.g. extension of 
collective agreements, 
representativeness of 
social partners, etc.) 
“Return to previous legislation on 
extension of coverage”.                                                                                                                                                 






“Extension and increased 








Active labour market 
policies - Other  
“Job creation support in form of 








Direct job creation 
schemes “Provision of activation works”. 
71.  2011 
I 
Early 
Withdrawal Disability schemes “Care allowance”.  













(EPL) Collective dismissals 








Maximum duration of 
fixed-term contracts 
“Maximum duration of fixed-term 







Maximum number of 
renewals of fixed-term 
contracts 
“Maximum number of renewals of 
fixed-term contracts increased to 3 







Notice and severance 
payments “Reduction of dismissal costs”.                                                                                                                                                                       
 
 








Notice and severance 
payments 







(EPL) Procedural requirements  
“Longer probation period for 







benefits  Family-related benefits 
“The replacement rate on maternity 
was increased from 60% to 65% of 






Regulation by the 
Government of the wage 
bargaining framework 
(e.g. extension of 
collective agreements, 
representativeness of 
social partners, etc.) 
“Setting trade union's 
representativeness criteria in the 
workplace…”                                                                                                                                      
81.  2011 
D 
Working 
Time Part-time work “Job sharing” 






“Change in paid holiday for 
employees aged 33 or over”.                                                                                                                                              






“Creation of working time 
accounts…”                                                                                                                                                                     





management “Increase in overtime limit”.                                                                                                                                                                          








Direct job creation 
schemes 
“Creation of jobs in regional self-








policies Employment subsidies 
“Employers offered a subsidy if 
they create a full-time job for 
under 29 years old and over 50 







policies Special schemes for youth 
“Measures to tackle youth 
unemployment and intensify 















Withdrawal Early retirement 
“Reassessment of early old age 








Maximum number of 
renewals of fixed-term 
contracts 
“Restriction of maximum duration 












Notice and severance 
payments 
“Reintroduction of the concurrent 
claims for a salaried notice period 






(EPL) Procedural requirements  
“Probationary periods may no 








Temporary contracts - 
Other  








Temporary contracts - 
Other  







Employers' social security 
contributions 
“Work performed outside an 
employment relationship 
(contractual work) liable to full 
SSC…” 




Employers' social security 






Employers' social security 
contributions 
“Maximum assessment bases for 






Taxation Income tax 
“Limiting the existing lump sum 






Taxation Income tax 
“The 19 % flat income tax on 









“A change in the construction of 









“Increasing the minimum 












“Income disregard of 25 % from 
earnings from contractual work 











“Minimum and maximum amount 












“Underage dependents not entitled 






benefits Net replacement rate 
“The maximum base for 
unemployment benefit will be 











Regulation by the 
Government of the wage 
bargaining framework 
(e.g. extension of 
collective agreements, 
representativeness of 
social partners, etc.) 
“Employees Representatives regain 
more negotiation and decision-
making powers (e.g. in firing 
decisions or use of flexi-accounts), 
receive higher protection 
(provision of paid time-off for 
performing their activities). Trade 
Unions must no longer prove that 
they represent at least 30 % of 
employees”. 






“Extended hours-bracket for night 
work”. 






“Extension of balance period - 







policies Employment subsidies 
“Contribution supporting the 









Services (job assistance, 






Measure to facilitate 
labour market integration 
of immigrants 
“Long-term residence permit for 
refugees and asylum seekers, 
beneficiaries of subsidiary 
protection as disadvantaged job-
seekers”. 











(EPL) Temporary agency work 
“Limitation on temporary Agency 
work”. 




Employers' social security 
contributions 











benefit or tax credit) 












“Introducing stricter qualifying 
conditions and requiring any 
employable beneficiary to take part 












“Participation in activation 












Coverage and eligibility 
conditions 







Regulation by the 
Government of the wage 
bargaining framework 
(e.g. extension of 
collective agreements, 
representativeness of 
social partners, etc.) 
“…the employer's consent is no 
longer a condition for extension of 






Social pacts, bipartite or 
tripartite framework 
agreements on wage 
setting 
“New framework for cross-








policies Employment subsidies 
“Subsidies for employers of people 









Services (job assistance, 















(EPL) Temporary agency work 
“Maximum temporary assignments 








Temporary contracts - 
Other  
“Maximum one-year duration for 







Employers' social security 
contributions 
“Reduction of health insurance 
contributions for low-wage 
earners”. 




Employers' social security 
contributions 
“Raise of the student limit on 










benefit or tax credit) 







Regulation by the 
Government of the wage 
bargaining framework 
(e.g. extension of 
collective agreements, 
representativeness of 
social partners, etc.) 
“Extension of the binding character 
of higher collective agreements, 
that apply automatically to any 
company employing more than 20 
people, regardless of whether the 
company has consented to the 
agreement or not”. 
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“Implementation of EU regulation 







policies Employment subsidies 
“Employment subsidies for 
employment of disadvantaged 







policies Employment subsidies 
“Wage subsidies offered to 
companies who employ women 










Services (job assistance, 
job-counselling etc.) 
“The introduction of mentorship to 








policies Special schemes for youth 
“Broadening of the definition of 
employers who may take up young 
job seekers to carry out graduate 
practice or who may apply for the 
contribution to support job creation 








“Access to non-accredited training 
programs has improved…” 
137.  2015 
D 
Immigratio
n/Mobility Internal mobility 







(EPL) Temporary agency work 
“Changes in temporary agency 
employment including maximum 







Employers' social security 
contributions 
“Employers exempted from social 
and health contributions when they 
hire long-term unemployed with a 
permanent residence in one of the 
least developed districts…” 
140.  2015 
D 
Labour 
Taxation Income tax 
“Introduction of a tax exemption 







benefits  Family-related benefits 
“Increase in the replacement rate of 














Search and job 
availability requirements 
“Reasons for deregistration of a 













“Subsidies for childcare in the 
employer's premises or specialised 








Active labour market 
policies - Other  
“Financial support for temporary 










Services (job assistance, 
job-counselling etc.) 
“Development of the Long-term 
Unemployed Action Plan”.  
147.  2016 
D 
Immigratio
n/Mobility Internal mobility 
“Extending allowances supporting 







benefits  Family-related benefits 








benefits  Family-related benefits 













Regulation by the 
Government of the wage 
bargaining framework 
(e.g. extension of 
collective agreements, 
representativeness of 
social partners, etc.) 
“Revoked possibility for Minister 
of Labour to extend branch 
collective agreement to all 
companies within a sector...” 















Active labour market 
policies - Other  
“Project: Placement of long-term 
unemployed jobseekers into the 









Direct job creation 







policies Employment subsidies 
“Project: Restart - Opportunity for 
long-term unemployed to return 
into the labour market…” 
156.  2017 
I 
Active 
labour Special schemes for youth 





















benefits  Family-related benefits 








Coverage and eligibility 
conditions 
“Stricter income and behavioural 








Coverage and eligibility 
conditions 
“Modification of rights and 







Regulation by the 
Government of the wage 
bargaining framework 
(e.g. extension of 
collective agreements, 
representativeness of 
social partners, etc.) 
“Reinstating the principle of 
extension of higher collective 
agreements (HCA)”.  






“Expanded access to childcare to 
unemployed parents…”. 






“Restriction of working hours on 
holidays”. 
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Appendix 5A. Czechia CIO Impact Correlation Table  
Cell# IO and Year Policy Suggestion Adopted? 
 
Year/Party   
Policy Description/Type of Evidence  
1 
 












“Freezing the nominal level of the basic cash-
welfare benefit (known as the minimum living 
standard, MLS), so as to reduce its 
attractiveness in real terms” (LABREF 
Database, Appendix 4A, Cell 15)   
 
2 OECD 1998 Tighten access to 
disability pension 
(preserving for 










“The government has responded by tightening 
provisions for full-time disability” 
(OECD,2000, p.112) 





























“Subsidies for job creation and partial 
reimbursement of retraining costs” (LABREF 
Database, Appendix 4A Cell, 2  
 
“Introduction of the obligation for employers 
with at least 20 employees to employ at least 
5% of its workforce among people with 
disabilities” (LABREF, Database, Appendix 4A 
cell 3)                                                                                                                           
 














8 OECD 2000 Moderate better 













Government lays off 9000 public sector workers 
with the purpose of moderating the wage bill 
(IMF, 2004, p.3 of Executive Directors 
Statements) 












“Incentives to accept publicly useful jobs or 
low-wage jobs for those on social assistance” 
adopted (LABREF Database, Appendix 4A, cell 
36) 












Several Active Labour Market Policies 
(ALMPs) aimed at employing those disabilities 
(LABREF Database, Appendix 4A, Cell 40) 













“Introduction of private employment agencies; 
expansion of the activities of employment 
mediation, including retraining and individual 
plans for job seekers and inspection activities” 
… (LABREF Database, Appendix 4A, Cell 27) 



















The OECD noted in 2001 that the government 
had taken steps in the right direction regarding 
this issue (OECD, 2001, p.158).  
14 IMF 2001 Pension 
reform/increase 
retirement age) 







IMF notes within the report that the government 
is proposing changes in line with the IMF’s 
suggestions (IMF, 2001, p.24) 








16 OECD 2001 Make working 









“Introduction of the possibility of adjustment of 
unevenly (irregularly) scheduled working hour 
(working hours account; [working time 
accounts] … A use of working hours account 
 
 




and the length of a period hasn’t required a prior 
consent of individual employees to whom such 
schedule of working hours will apply” 
(LABREF Database, Appendix 4A, Cell 64)  
 
OECD notes that the current government is 
critical of 2006 labour code passed by CSSD 
and have made some welcome changes “greater 
flexibility…for weekend and shift work…more 
scope for employers to alter working hours 
without consulting employees…[some] 
overtime restrictions… removed” (OECD, 
2008, p.70) 
 















“Restriction in the possibility to early retire 
abolition of the temporarily reduced early 
retirement scheme…” (LABREF Database, 
Appendix 4A, Cell 18)   






20 OECD 2001 Reduce emphasis 
of job security in 




21 IMF 2002  Increase pension 
age (IMF, 2002, 





22 IMF 2002 Reduce social 
welfare and public 
spending (IMF, 
2002, see pp.3-4 




23 IMF 2002 Make Severance 




24 OECD 2003  Reduce welfare 
benefit system to 
incentivise work – 









“Incentives to accept publicly useful jobs or 
low-wage jobs. In the case of refusal, social 
assistance benefits are not provided” (LABREF 
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“Introduction of…stricter conditions for 
provision of unemployment benefits. In 
particular, school-leavers…” (LABREF 
Database, Appendix 4A, Cell 37) 










“Restriction in the possibility to early retire: 
abolition of the temporarily reduced early 
retirement scheme” (LABREF Database, 
Appendix 4A, Cell 18) 
26 OECD 2003 Make more 
flexible hiring and 
firing (OECD, 
2003, p.145)  
No  
27 OECD 2003 Reduce Sickness 
benefit (OECD, 






Persons with a changed work capacity that are 
preparing for employment are excluded from 
sickness insurance” (LABREF Database, 
Appendix 4A, Cell 35)  


















The Constitutional Court declared void the Act 
on Collective Bargaining which included 
provision for the Minister of Labour to 
unilaterally decree administrative extensions of 
collective agreements” (LABREF Database, 
Appendix 4A, Cell 22) 







31 IMF 2003 Lower public 
sector wage bill 
and employment 






Czech executive director assures IMF staff that 
public sector wage bill has been reduced 
through mass layoffs (IMF, 2004, Statement by 
Executive Directors, p.3) 
32 IMF 2003 Cut social 
spending (IMF, 






Sickness, social assistance and unemployment 
benefits reduced (LABREF Database, Appendix 
4A, Cell 35)  
33 IMF 2003 Pensions (increase 
age and minimum 
contributory 
period) (IMF, 







“Restriction in the possibility to early retire 
abolition of the temporarily reduced early 
retirement scheme” (LABREF Database, 
Appendix 4A, Cell 18) 
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sickness benefit 
(IMF, 2003, p.16)  
“Persons with a changed work capacity that are 
preparing for employment are excluded from 
sickness insurance” (LABREF Database, 
Appendix 4A, Cell 35) 
35 IMF 2003 Reduce non-wage 
labour costs (IMF, 
2003, p.21) 
No  
36 IMF 2003 Provide retraining 
opportunities 
through ALMPs 






Provision of investment incentives to employers 
subsidising the creation of new jobs or 
retraining employees in districts where 
unemployment rate is at, or above, the national 
average” (LABREF Database, Appendix 4A, 
Cell 23) 
37 OECD 2004 Reduce welfare 










“Changes in the system of social benefits in 
order to make work pay…” (LABREF 
Database, Appendix 4A, Cell 51)  















OECD notes in its ‘follow-up Review’ “Steps 
are taken to make early retirement less 
attractive…” (see OECD, 2012a, p.2,8) 












OECD notes “The flexibility of labour relations 
was increased by a new Labour Code in 2007, 
and by new measures that 
will enter into force from 2012. Changes are 
aimed at reducing the administrative burden, 
mainly in favour 
of small and medium-sized enterprises. Changes 
include decreasing severance pay when the term 
of 
employment is less than two years, and 
increasing flexibility in working arrangements 
and working hours” (OECD, 2012a, p.3) 
 
“Introducing flexible working-time accounts; 
regulating working hours and rest periods” 
(LABREF Database, Appendix 4A, Cell 53) 
 
 










“Persons with a changed work capacity that are 
preparing for employment are excluded from 
sickness insurance” (LABREF Database, 
Appendix 4A, Cell 35) 
 
The IMF notes “It is encouraging to note that 
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brought some positive -though limited- results. 
Tightening of eligibility for sickness benefits 
contributed to a decline of these benefits in 
January-May 2004…” (IMF, 2004, Statement 
by Executive Director, p.3)  
 
With direct reference to its suggestion made in 
2004, the OECD noted in 2012 that steps have 
been taken in line with its advice see ‘Reform 
Sickness Benefits’ at (OECD, 2012a, p.2) 
 
Five legislative changes to sickness made in 
2007 illustrated on LABREF Database 
(LABREF Database, Appendix 4A, Cells 58-63)  


















OECD notes in 2012 with reference to its 
suggestion made in 2004 that the appropriate 
steps have been taken (OECD, 2012, p.2)  
43 OECD 2004 Introduce more 
ALPs  e.g. hiring 
disabled, under 










“(IAPs) in 15 local employment for the 
unemployed over 25 years of age. Participation 
in the programme is voluntary” (LABREF 
Database, Appendix 4A, Cell 25)  
 
“Introduction of wage subsidies for disabled 
workers” (LABREF, Database, Appendix 4A, 




“Introduction of new support measures for 
employers employing over 50% of people with 
disabilities” (LABREF Database, Appendix 4A, 
Cell 50) 
 
44 OECD 2004 Make dismissals 









“New reason for fair termination of the 
employment relationship” (LABREF Database, 
Appendix 4A, Cell 86)                                                                                                                                         
 











Czech executive director assures IMF staff that 
public sector wage bill has been reduced 
through mass layoffs (IMF, 2004, Statement by 
Executive Directors, p.3) 






“Incentives to accept publicly useful jobs or 
low-wage jobs. In the case of refusal, social 
 
 




assistance benefits are not provided” (LABREF 
Database, Appendix 4A, Cell 36) 
46 IMF 2004 Reduce non-wage 




47 IMF 2004 Make labour 
regulation flexible 









OECD Notes “The flexibility of labour 
relations was increased by a new Labour Code 
in 2007, and by new measures that 
will enter into force from 2012. Changes are 
aimed at reducing the administrative burden, 
mainly in favour 
of small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Changes include decreasing severance pay 
when the term of 
employment is less than two years, and 
increasing flexibility in working arrangements 
and working hours” (OECD, 2012a, p.3).  
 
 










OECD commends progress on pensions 
(OECD, 2004, p.134) 
49 IMF 2006 Reduce/reform 
social welfare 
(IMF, 2006, p.4) 
No  








Refer to (OECD, 2012, p.3).   
51 IMF 2007 Reduce 
employment 
protection (IMF, 







“The possibility for employers to sign a 
collective agreement with a trade union with the 
highest number of members in case of a 
disagreement among trade unions was 
abolished” (LABREF Database, Appendix 4A, 
Cell 73)  
 
“Eliminating trade union organisations' right to 
carry out inspections of companies’ observance 
of the Labour Code” (LABREF Database, 
Appendix 4A, Cell 74) 








Social protection cut across several spheres e.g. 
“Tightening of eligibility conditions for 
unemployment benefits; Shortening of 
unemployment benefits duration; Steeper 
replacement rates for unemployment benefits; 
Reduced benefits unless participation in public 
works” (LABREF Database, Appendix 4A, Cell 
69).   
 
“Termination of partial concurrence of 
unemployment benefits and job earnings;                                                                                                                           
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Cancellation or reduction of some social support 
allowances;                                                                                                                                          
Non granting unemployment benefits to workers 
with severance pay;                                                                                                                                       
Terminating the partial unemployment policy; 
Decreasing UB level for those who have left 
their job voluntarily” (LABREF Database, 
Appendix 4A, Cell 81)  
                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                        














“New Institute of Public Service to stimulate 
work activity of benefit recipients” (LABREF 
Database, Appendix 4A, Cell 75)                                                                                                                      
 
54 IMF  
2007 









“New reason for fair termination of the 
employment relationship” (LABREF Database, 





















10% reduction in public sector wages; layoffs 









Reduce notice and 
severance pay – 
link to length of 
service (OECD, 






Severance payments reduced (LABREF 












See several EPL reforms improving labour 
market flexibility at (LABREF Database, 




















Definition of fair dismissal (LABREF Database, 
















“Trial period for managerial positions 
increased” (LABREF Database, Appendix 4A, 




Reduce notice and 
severance pay – 








“New severance pay rules: 30 days if tenure 
below 1 year; 60 days if tenure between two and 
three years; 90 days if tenure equal or above 
three years. (previously - 90 days, non-tenure 
related)” (LABREF Database, Appendix 4A, 













Maximum duration of fixed-term contracts 
extended                                                                                                                                                        
(LABREF Database, Appendix 4A, Cell 87) 











During discussions, authorities agreed to 
accelerate e.g. increasing labour market 
flexibility (IMF, 2011, p.9) 
66 OECD 
2011 







OECD notes in 2018 survey that action has been 
taken on its previous recommendations 
















“New rules for fixed-term employment 
relationships: the employer does not have to 
adhere to 2 rules (a. The length of the 
employment law relationship may not exceed 3 
years; and b. The employment law relationship 
for a definite term may be repeated / extended 
only twice” (LABREF Database, Appendix 4A, 













OECD notes in 2018 survey that action has been 
taken on its previous recommendations 















“More flexibility for juvenile employment” 
(LABREF Database, Appendix 4A, Cell 129) 
 
70 IMF  
2016 
Do not increase 
public sector 




























via disability and 
pension benefits 










Appendix 5B. Slovakia CIO Impact Correlation Table  
Cell# IO and Year Policy Suggestion Adopted? 
 
Year/Party   
Policy Description/Type of Evidence  




















“parliament has passed a law to reform the 
current system…” (OECD, 2002a, p.13) 

















Increased retirement age for women from 
53-57 to 60 (OECD, 2002a, p.13) 
5 IMF 2001 Incentivise job 
search (relieve 
unemployment) 
through cuts to 
social welfare 
(tighten eligibility) 






6 IMF 2001 Increase labour 
market flexibility 




2004 SDKU  
Correlation  
 
The government made hiring more flexible 
for employers (OECD, 2004a, p.96)  
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7 IMF 2001 Reform pension 
system (introduce a 
private system) 











2002 SDKU  
Direct 
 
“Parliament passed a ‘Social Insurance Act’ 
in May 2002…The act is a first step toward 
a full reform of the pension system, and 
prepares the ground for introducing a 
second pillar …” (IMF, 2002a, see 
‘Statement by Executive Director, p.3)  
 
*Note. The Second pillar introduces 
privatisation (see IMF, 2001a, P.19)  
















“A reform of the sickness benefit system 
shifts the cost of the first ten days of sick 
leave to employers…No further action 
required” (OECD, 2004a, p.97)  









focuses on putting 































“Job-seeking activity of registered 
unemployed was subjected to regular 
checks in 2003, while the benefits of able-
bodied working age citizens…were cut” 
(OECD, 2004a, p.97)  
 
Also see LABREF Database  
 
“Reduction of the level of unemployment 
benefits and other social benefits” 
(LABREF Database, Appendix 5B cell 26)  
 
“Stricter conditions for getting 
unemployment benefits” (LABREF 
Database, Appendix 5B, Cell 27)                                                                                                                           
10 OECD 2002 Raise retirement 




11 OECD 2002 “Lower the tax 














“Employers, self-employed and employees 
will pay a flat of 19% tax on profits or 
income. Previously self-employed, 
freelancers etc were subject to progressive 
taxation of up to 38%”  
 
(LABREF Database, Appendix 4B, Cell 18)  
12 OECD 2002  “Eliminate the 














“Government policy is to exten[d] 
agreements only upon written consent by 
 
 









2003 SDKU  
the firms concerned…the new policy is a 
positive step but should be made permanent 
though legislation” (OECD, 2004a, p.98)  
 
Also see LABREF Database, Appendix 4B, 
Cell 19.  
14 OECD 2002 Relax EPL 
specifically 
regarding hiring 
and firing (OECD, 
















“The amended legislation relaxes 
employment protection rules...no further 
action required (OECD, 2004a, p.98) 
 
Note* see LABREF Database 2003 and 
Appendix 4B cells 14, 15, 16, 17 for more 
detail.  
 
Note* not ‘Direct’ because it is not policy 
specific. EPL could encounter several areas.  
15 OECD 2002  “Ease regulations 
















“The amended labour code eases regulation 
on working time…no further action 
required” (OECD, 2004a, p.98) 
 
Also see LABREF Database – “Yearly 
overtime limit raised from 150 to 400 
hours” (LABREF Database, Appendix 4B, 
Cell 20) 
 
16 OECD 2002 “Improve public job 
services, while 
increasing the use 
of private job 
placement 
agencies” (OECD, 










“The new welfare legislation…should 
improve both public and private placement 
services when implemented” (OECD, 
2004a, p.97) 
17 OECD 2002 “Revise the new 
labour code to 
reduce the 
excessive power of 
trade unions in 
management issues 
and their role in 
inspecting the 
compliance of firms 


















“Accomplished by the amendment to the 
labour code…no further action required” 
(OECD, 2004a, p.98) (also see OECD, 
2005a, p.76-7)  
 
 
18 OECD 2002 Move from 
















“Extension…of financial benefits for those 
unemployed who decide to act as self-
employed entrepreneurs…In 2005 these 
financial benefits will be provided to all 
unemployed who fulfil given 
criteria…[e.g.]…having completed a special 
training programme devoted to acquiring 
competences for entrepreneurship, 
 
 









submitting a business project)” (LABREF 
Database, Appendix 4B, Cell 21) 
 
“Introduction of subsidies to employers 
(depending on the regional unemployment 
rate) who create new jobs for long-term 
unemployed people” (LABREF Database, 
Appendix 4B, Cell 22) 
19 OECD 2002 “Monitor closely 









“Implemented” (OECD, 2004a, p.97) 
20 OECD 2002 Increase the 













“Increasing the maximum overall duration 
of fixed term contracts” (LABREF 
Database, Appendix 4B, Cell 16) 
 
 
21 OECD 2002  Reduce severance 
and eliminate the 




















“the government took a very important 
step…with the introduction of the new 
labour code in 2003. Changes include…a 
cut in severance pay; and a considerable 
easing of the conditions under which 
workers can be dismissed…” (OECD, 
2005a, p.76)  
 
“Relaxing the valid reasons to terminate a 
working contract and the regulations for 
collective dismissals” (LABREF Database, 
2003; Appendix 4B, Cell 14) 
















“The amended labour code eases 
regulations on working time…No further 
action required” (OECD, 2004a, p.98) 
 
“Yearly overtime limit raised from 150 to 
400 hours” (LABREF Database, Appendix 
4B, Cell 20)                                                                                                                                                      
 
23 IMF 2003 Improve incentives 
to work by 
decreasing benefits 






“Introduction of stricter conditions for 
getting unemployment benefits and other 
social benefits. Financial support is now 
linked to unemployed people's effort to find 
a job” (LABREF Database, Appendix 4B, 
Cell 27)     
 
The IMF notes in 2004 that the government 
has accelerated the reform process in line 
with its policy requests (IMF, 2004a, p.6) 
24 IMF 2003 Increase retirement 







The IMF notes that the government has 
implemented its requests (see IMF, 2004, 
pp.5-6) the organisation made further 
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commented that changes to retirement and 
pensions will increase savings 
(Brooksbank, 2003)  
 
25 IMF 2003 Tighten eligibility 











The IMF notes in 2004 that the government 
has accelerated the reform process in line 
with its policy requests (see IMF, 2004a, 
pp.5-6) 
26 IMF 2003 Reduce number of 
government 
employees in the 
health and education 








2004 SDKU  
Direct 
 
“In 2003, the Fund recommended 
streamlining health sector 
and welfare spending” (IMF, 2004a, pp.5-
6)  
 
Slovakia participates in two World Bank 
technical assistance programmes designed 
to guide the health sector towards more 
efficient spending and to build capacity. 






















In 2004, the IMF listed reforms adopted by 
Slovakia in 2003 which have been in line 
with its advice: “in 2003, an inflexible 
labour code (introduced under the previous 
government) was amended to remove 
many restrictions on overtime and work 
practices” (IMF, 2004a, p.5) (also see 
OECD, 2005a, p.76-7)  
28 OECD 2004 Cut social 
contribution from 
employers/employees 














“Introduction of a State intervention to pay 
health insurance on behalf of job seekers 
who have an earned income not exceeding 
half of the official minimum wage” 
(LABREF Database, Appendix 4B, Cell 
31) 







30 OECD 2004 Reduce paid vacation 
time (OECD, 2004a) 
No  
31 IMF 2005 “Moderate wage 
growth and enhance 
wage flexibility” 
(IMF, 2005a, p.5) 
No  
32 OECD 2005 Reduce cost of low 
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social security or by 
reducing minimum 
wage (OECD, 2005a, 
p.86) 
 
33 OECD 2005 Cut payroll taxes 
(OECD, 2005a, p.81) 
No  
34 OECD 2005 Raise retirement age 
or reform pensions 









2006 SDKU  
Correlation  
 
“Abolishing the possibility to retroactively 
apply for early old-age pension…Also 
cancelling a possibility to get reduced early 
old-age pension sum for the 12-month 
period before reaching retirement age” 
(LABREF Database, Appendix 4B, Cell 
33) 










37 IMF 2007 Make labour markets 
more flexible IMF, 
2007a, pp.16-17) 
No Opposite – FTCs 36 to 24 months (WB, 
2011, PDF.103) 
38 OECD 2007 Do not increase 
minimum wage 
(OECD, 2007a, p.12) 
No  
39 OECD 2007 Reduce social 
security contributions 
made by employers 
(OECD, 2007a, p.12) 
No  
40 OECD 2007 Reforms pensions, 
make pensions 
subject to tax 
(OECD, 2007a, p.13) 
No  

























“Temporary relaxed conditions for access 
of young unemployed to certain 
employment services (ALMP programs): 
contribution to self-employment (start-up 
incentive); subsidy for graduates in work 
experience programs in firms; contribution 
for the creation of a new job in an 
enterprise. Temporarily relaxed 
requirement to be registered as a jobseeker 
at labour office for at least 3 months before 
being able to apply for the ALMP 
programs for under 26-year olds”  
(LABREF Database, Appendix 4B,  Cell 
62) 
42 OECD 2007 Raise retirement age 
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43 OECD 2007 Shorten duration of 
parental leave 
(OECD, 2007a, p.14) 
No  
44 OECD 2009 Increase wage 
flexibility (OECD, 
2009a, p.8, 30) 
No  



















“Return to previous legislation… Making 
collective agreement of a higher-level 
binding also for the employer who is not 
member of the employers’ 
organization which had concluded this 
agreement, only if that employer agreed 
with the extension of collective agreement 
on a higher degree (Article 7/2 of the 
Act).1” (LABREF Database, Appendix 4B, 
Cell 67)  
46 OECD 2009 Increase flexibility of 
EPL (OECD, 2009a, 












OECD Notes in 2010 that the new 
government has embarked on an 
ambitious reform agenda and will adjust 
the labour code to the lower level of 




47 OECD 2009 Remove incentives 
to retire early 













“Persons currently receiving early 
retirement pension or applying for early 
retirement have to choose between 
receiving early retirement pension and 
income from work (dependent work or 
self-employment), as the possibility of 
combining the two is discontinued from 
1.1.2011.0” (LABREF Database, 
Appendix 4B, cell 63) 
48 OECD 2010 Increase spending on 
ALMPs e.g. public 
employment 
subsidies (OECD, 
















“Job creation support in form of 
investment subsidies” (LABREF 
Database, Appendix 4B, Cell 69) 
 
“The reform enables to provide activation 
works not only by local, but also by 
district municipalities and their 
organisations (active labour market 
measure according to § 52)” (LABREF 
Database, Appendix 4B, Cell 70) 
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50 IMF 2011 Increase flexibility of 







Government passes ‘Big Labour Code 
Reform’ shortly after talks with IMF (talks 
ended in April and new labour code 
passed in September) increasing flexibility 
across several areas particularly hiring and 
firing (see Fabo & Sedláková, 2017, 
pp.129-30; LABREF Database, Appendix 
4B, Cells 73-80) 
51 IMF 2011 Reform pensions and 
increase retirement 
age (IMF, 2011a, 
p.15) 
No  
52 IMF 2011 Enhance flexibility 
of wage negotiations 






Government introduces representativeness 
threshold for trade unions to be met before 
the can operate within a firm (LABREF 
Database, Appendix 4B, Cell 80) 
 
As noted by (Palinkaš, 2018), the attack 
on unions reduced the collective bargaining 
role with regards wage negotiations 
further.  
 
 53 IMF 2011 Decrease hiring and 












In 2011, the government made changes to 
fixed term contracts, probationary periods, 
notice and severance and dismissals which 
favoured employers (Fabo & Sedláková, 
2017; pp.129-30; LABREF Database, 
Appendix 4B, Cells 73-78).  























“Project to support the creation of jobs in 
regional self-governments and their 
organisations” (LABREF Database, 
Appendix 4B, Cell 86) 
 
“The government’s first project is 
intended to create jobs for young people 
under 29…” (LABREF Database, 
Appendix 4B, Cell 87) 
 
“Facilitated the access of adults to new 
qualifications based on their previous 
experience or after undergoing educational 
programmes” (LABREF Database, 
Appendix 4B, Cell 89) 
55 OECD 2014 Reverse decision on 
allowing for the 
extension of 
collective bargaining 
(OECD, 2014a, p.98) 
No  







Page 340 of 369 
 
i.e. do not allow it 
(IMF, 2014a, p.12) 
57 IMF 2014 Reform pensions 
(IMF, 2014a, p.19) 
No  














Several ALMPs enacted in line with this 
request in 2017 – see LABREF Database, 
Appendix 4B, Cells 153-158 




















“Revoked possibility for Minister of 
Labour to extend branch collective 
agreement to all companies within a 
sector…Decision of Constitutional Court” 
(LABREF Database, Appendix 4B, Cell 
151)  
 
BUT SMER reintroduced the possibility 
in 2017 (LABREF Database, Appendix 
4B, Cell 161)  
60 IMF 2015 Increase retirement 
age (IMF, 2015a, 
p.37) 
No  
61 IMF 2017  Make EPL more 
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Appendix 5C. CIO Impact Divergences Across Czechia and Slovakia 
  Czechia  Slovakia 
1 CIO Total Suggestions  73 61 
2 Number of Adoptions 47 35 
3 Adopted by Left Wing 28 3 
4 Adopted by Right Wing 20140  31141 
5 Direct Impact 10 16 
6 Correlation* Impact 10 6 
7 Correlation 27 13 
8 EPL 14 14 
9 Adopted by Left Wing 1 0 























140 Note the total left and right wing equal more than the overall total owing to instances where both parties have 
adopted the same reform and where a decision by the constitutional court has been left out – see Appendix 5A 
cells 47, 39, 29 
141 Note there is a difference of 1 between combined total and overall total owing to a constitutional court decision 
which has been classed as a ‘correlation’ - see Appendix 5B cell 59  
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Appendix 6. Slovakia Regime Sub-Constellation Links 
Appendix 6  
Regime Sub-Constellation Data  
Slovakia: Undirected Connections 
Note*links made here are accompanied with 
references tied to the bibliography  
                                                                                                                                    
Eurofound (Eurofound, 2017c)     
 
ILO, TUAC (Eurofound, 2017c)  
 
IOZ (Slovakian Union); ETUC; The Social platform 
(Eurofound, 2017e) 
 
IndustriAll Global (Eurofound, 2017f) 
 
IndustriAll EU (Eurofound, 2017f) 
 
 
KOZ SR; OZ KOVO; IOZ; ECHOZ (Slovakian 
Unions) (IndustriAll, 2017a) 
ILO, IRBD/World Bank, IMF, OECD, WTO, ITUC 
(UIA, 2017a)  
ETUC (ETUC, 2017)  Council of Europe; ITUC; TUAC; ILO; UNGC 
(TUAC, 2017a) 
 
KOZ SR (ETUC, 2017b)  
OECD (TUAC) (TUAC, 2017a) KOZ SR; ETUC; ETUI; ITUC (UIA, 2017)   
 
 
IMF (Issue Crawler, 2017)  
ITUC (PSI, 2017a)  KOZ SR 
Council of Europe: ILO; TUAC; UNDP; 
IBRD/World Bank; IMF; ETUC; IndustriAll (UIA, 
2017) 
 
Global Unions (PSI) (Issue Crawler, 2017)  
BSCI (BSCI, 2017a) ILO; TUAC; UNGP (BSCI, 2017b)  
 
FTA (BSCI/FTA 2017a) 
UNGC (UNGC, 2017a)   UNIDO (UIA, 2017) 
 
 Volkswagen (Transnationale, 20170029 
Fair Labor Association (FLA, 2017)  ILO; CLS; FTA (UIA, 2017)   
 
 
ETI (JO-IN) (FLA, 2017b) 
 
ETI (2017b)  
  
ITUC; IndustriAll (ETI, 2017b) 
 
  
ILO (Issue Crawler, 2017)  
ILO  UNDP (UNDP, 2017a) 
 
 





UNGC; ITUC (Issue Crawler, 2017)  
 
 
KOZ SR (ILO, 2017d) 
 











ILO (ILO, 2017e)  
 
 
EU; OECD/TUAC (UIA, 2017)  
 
Source: (Hayes, 2017) 
 
 
Appendix 6.1. ILO Direct Requests for Czechia  
1996 C087 - Freedom of Association  
C155 - Occupational Safety and Health  
C100 - Equal Remuneration 
C122 - Employment Policy  
General Direct Request 
C111 - Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Direct Request on Submission to Competent Authorities 
 
1997 C155 - Occupational Safety and Health  
C161 - Occupational Health Services 
Direct Request on Submission to Competent Authorities 
C100 - Equal Remuneration 
C087 - Freedom of Association 
 
1998 C123 - Minimum Age (Underground Work) 
C155 - Occupational Safety and Health 
C005 Minimum Age (Industry)  
Submission to Competent Authorities 
C010 - Minimum Age (Agriculture)  
C019 - Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) 
C029 - Forced Labour Convention 
C087 - Freedom of Association  
C100 - Equal Remuneration Convention 
C111 - Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)  
C120 - Hygiene (Commerce and Offices)  
C123 - Minimum Age (Underground Work)  
C155 - OSH 
 
1999 C105 - Abolition of Forced Labour 
C099 - Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery (Agriculture) 
C001 - Hours of Work (Industry) 
C130 - Medical Care and Sickness Benefits 
C132 - Holidays with Pay Convention 
C026 - Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery  
C155 OSH 
C159 - Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons) 
C160 - Labour Statistics 
C161 - Occupational Health Services 
 
2000 General Direct Request 
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C164 - Health Protection and Medical Care (Seafarers)  
C163 - Seafarers' Welfare Convention 
C161 - Occupational Health Services 
C160 - Labour Statistics 
C159 - Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons)  
C155 0SH 
C132 - Holidays with Pay Convention 
C130 - Medical Care and Sickness Benefits  
C122 - Employment Policy Convention 
C089 - Night Work (Women)  
C087 - Freedom of Association 
C042 - Workmen's Compensation 
C029 - Forced Labour Convention 
C027 - Marking of Weight (Packages Transported by Vessels) 
C014 - Weekly Rest (Industry)  
 
2001 C095 - Protection of Wages 
C161 - Occupational Health Services 
C124 - Medical Examination of Young Persons (Underground Work)  
C105 - Abolition of Forced Labour 
C100 - Equal Remuneration 
C098 - Right to Organise 
C171 - Night Work 
C087 - Freedom of Association  
C078 - Medical Examination of Young Persons (Non-Industrial Occupations) 
C077 - Medical Examination of Young Persons (Industry)  
C019 - Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) 
C017 - Workmen's Compensation (Accidents)  
C010 - Minimum Age (Agriculture)  
 
2002 C122 - Employment Policy  
C163 - Seafarers' Welfare Convention, 
C140 - Paid Educational Leave  
C132 - Holidays with Pay  
C130 - Medical Care and Sickness  
C128 - Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors' Benefits  
C164 - Health Protection and Medical Care (Seafarers)  
111 - Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)  
C108 - Seafarers' Identity Documents  
C102 - Social Security (Minimum Standards) 
C100 - Equal Remuneration Convention 
C087 - Freedom of Association  
C029 - Forced Labour Convention 
 
2003 C105 - Abolition of Forced Labour  
C150 - Labour Administration 
C144 - Tripartite Consultation 
C132 - Holidays with Pay Convention 
C123 - Minimum Age (Underground Work)  
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C120 - Hygiene (Commerce and Offices)  
C181 - Private Employment Agencies 
C099 - Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery 
C090 - Night Work of Young Persons 
C087 - Freedom of Association 
C026 - Minimum Wage-Fixing  
C014 - Weekly Rest (Industry)    
2004 C135 - Workers' Representatives  
C171 - Night Work  
C150 - Labour Administration 
C140 - Paid Educational Leave  
C139 - Occupational Cancer 
C182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour  
C115 - Radiation Protection  
C100 - Equal Remuneration 
C087 - Freedom of Association 
C001 - Hours of Work (Industry)  
 
2005 C120 - Hygiene 
C161 - Occupational Health Services  
C160 - Labour Statistics 
C159 - Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons)  
C155 0SH 
C139 - Occupational Cancer Convention 
C176 - Safety and Health in Mines Convention 
C111 - Discrimination  
C105 - Abolition of Forced Labour 
C087 - Freedom of Association 
C045 - Underground Work (Women) 
C029 - Forced Labour  
C013 - White Lead (Painting)  
 
2006 C026 - Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery 
C181 - Private Employment Agencies  
C167 - Safety and Health in Construction  
C155 0SH 
C148 - Working Environment (Air Pollution, Noise and Vibration) 
C124 - Medical Examination of Young Persons (Underground Work)  
C123 - Minimum Age (Underground Work)  
C100 - Equal Remuneration  
C099 - Minimum Wage Fixing  
C095 - Protection of Wages  
C090 - Night Work of Young Persons (Industry)  
C087 - Freedom of Association 
C078 - Medical Examination of Young Persons (Non-Industrial Occupations)  
C077 - Medical Examination of Young Persons (Industry)  
C042 - Workmen's Compensation (Occupational Diseases)  
C182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour  
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C017 - Workmen's Compensation (Accidents)  
 
2007 C087 - Freedom of Association 
C111 - Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
C100 - Equal Remuneration Convention 
C027 - Marking of Weight (Packages Transported by Vessels) 
 
   
2008 C140 - Paid Educational Leave 
C029 - Forced Labour  
C171 - Night Work 
C001 - Hours of Work (Industry) 
C132 - Holidays with Pay 
C105 - Abolition of Forced Labour 
C182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour  
C111 - Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
C014 - Weekly Rest (Industry) 
General Direct Request 
 
2009 C014 - Weekly Rest (Industry)  
C029 - Forced Labour 
C087 - Freedom of Association 
C100 - Equal Remuneration 
C105 - Abolition of Forced Labour 
C122 - Employment Policy  
C132 - Holidays with Pay  
C140 - Paid Educational Leave  
C144 - Tripartite Consultation  
C150 - Labour Administration 
C160 - Labour Statistics 
C171 - Night Work  
C182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour 
C001 - Hours of Work (Industry) 
 
2010 C014 - Weekly Rest (Industry) 
C001 - Hours of Work (Industry) 
C187 - Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health 
C087 - Freedom of Association  
C105 - Abolition of Forced Labour  
C108 - Seafarers' Identity Documents  
C132 - Holidays with Pay 
C138 - Minimum Age  
C139 - Occupational Cancer  
C148 - Working Environment (Air Pollution, Noise and Vibration)  
C155 - Occupational Safety and Health  
C161 - Occupational Health Services  
C167 - Safety and Health in Construction 
C171 - Night Work 
C176 - Safety and Health in Mines  
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2011 C181 - Private Employment Agencies  
C130 - Medical Care and Sickness Benefits  
C128 - Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors' Benefits 
C124 - Medical Examination of Young Persons (Underground Work)  
C123 - Minimum Age (Underground Work)  
C111 - Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
C029 - Forced Labour  
C077 - Medical Examination of Young Persons (Industry)  
C078 - Medical Examination of Young Persons (Non-Industrial Occupations) 
C140 - Paid Educational Leave  
C017 - Workmen's Compensation (Accidents) 
C150 - Labour Administration 
C087 - Freedom of Association  
C159 - Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons)  
C160 - Labour Statistics  
C095 - Protection of Wages  
C163 - Seafarers' Welfare  
C100 - Equal Remuneration 
C102 - Social Security (Minimum Standards)  
C026 - Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery  
C042 - Workmen's Compensation (Occupational Diseases)  
C105 - Abolition of Forced Labour  
 
2012 C111 - Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
C100 - Equal Remuneration 
C099 - Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery (Agriculture) 
C027 - Marking of Weight (Packages Transported by Vessels) 
 
2013 C128 - Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors' Benefits  
C144 - Tripartite Consultation  
C142 - Human Resources Development  
C140 - Paid Educational Leave  
C129 - Labour Inspection (Agriculture) 
General Direct Request 
C098 - Right to Organise 
C087 - Freedom of Association 
C081 - Labour Inspection 
C014 - Weekly Rest (Industry) 
C001 - Hours of Work (Industry)  
 
2014 C029 - Forced Labour  
C122 - Employment Policy  
C105 - Abolition of Forced Labour  
C138 - Minimum Age  
C182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour 
C171 - Night Work 
C150 - Labour Administration 
 
2015 C100 - Equal Remuneration 
 C122 - Employment Policy  
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C111 - Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
C135 - Workers' Representatives  
C181 - Private Employment Agencies  
C161 - Occupational Health Services  
C160 - Labour Statistics 
 
2016 C148 - Working Environment (Air Pollution, Noise and Vibration)  
C144 - Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards)  
C139 - Occupational Cancer  
C129 - Labour Inspection (Agriculture) 
C115 - Radiation Protection 
C111 - Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)  
C100 - Equal Remuneration  
C098 - Right to Organise 
C088 - Employment Service 
C087 - Freedom of Association 
C081 - Labour Inspection 
Direct Request on Submission to competent Authorities 
C187 - Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health  
C181 - Private Employment Agencies 
C161 - Occupational Health Services 
C159 - Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons) 
C155 - Occupational Safety and Health  
 
2017 C105 - Abolition of Forced Labour 
C128 - Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors' Benefits  
C130 - Medical Care and Sickness Benefits 
C102 - Social Security (Minimum Standards)  
C029 - Forced Labour  
 
2019 C154 - Collective Bargaining Convention 
C098 - Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 
C087 - Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention 
C140 - Paid Educational Leave Convention 
C142 - Human Resources Development Convention 
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Appendix 6.2. ILO Direct Requests for Slovakia  
1996 100 - Equal Remuneration 
Direct Request on Submission to Competent Authorities 
087 - Freedom of Association 
034 - Fee-Charging Employment Agencies  
 
1997 111 - Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
164 - Health Protection and Medical Care (Seafarers)  
122 - Employment Policy  
029 - Forced Labour 
155 - Occupational Safety and Health  
010 - Minimum Age (Agriculture) 
Direct Request on Submission to Competent Authorities 
123 - Minimum Age (Underground Work)  
163 - Seafarers' Welfare  
148 - Working Environment 
 
1998 128 - Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors' Benefits 
130 - Medical Care and Sickness Benefits C 
General Direct Request 
Direct Request on Submission to Competent Authorities 
012 - Workmen's Compensation (Agriculture) 
017 - Workmen's Compensation (Accidents)  
026 - Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery 
034 - Fee-Charging Employment Agencies 
099 - Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery 
102 - Social Security (Minimum Standards)  
 
1999 160 - Labour Statistics  
089 - Night Work (Women) 
088 - Employment Service  
155 - Occupational Safety and Health  
012 - Workmen's Compensation (Agriculture)  
159 - Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons)  
029 - Forced Labour  
Direct Request on Submission to Competent Authorities 
General Direct Request 
148 - Working Environment 
017 - Workmen's Compensation (Accidents) 
105 - Abolition of Forced Labour  
142 - Human Resources Development  
122 - Employment Policy 
 
2000 122 - Employment Policy  
042 - Workmen's Compensation (Occupational Diseases) 
090 - Night Work of Young Persons (Industry)  
115 - Radiation Protection 
095 - Protection of Wages 
138 - Minimum Age  
155 - Occupational Safety and Health  
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144 - Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards)  
159 - Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons)  
019 - Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation)  
148 - Working Environment (Air Pollution, Noise and Vibration)  
130 - Medical Care and Sickness Benefits  
111 - Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)  
Direct Request on Submission to Competent Authorities 
General Direct Request 
160 - Labour Statistics  
 
2001 090 - Night Work of Young Persons (Industry)  
095 - Protection of Wages 
155 - Occupational Safety and Health  
173 - Protection of Workers' Claims (Employer's Insolvency)  
111 - Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)  
115 - Radiation Protection  
122 - Employment Policy Convention 
123 - Minimum Age (Underground Work)  
128 - Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors' Benefits 
102 - Social Security (Minimum Standards)  
100 - Equal Remuneration 
130 - Medical Care and Sickness Benefits  
142 - Human Resources Development 
144 - Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards)  
148 - Working Environment (Air Pollution, Noise and Vibration) 
012 - Workmen's Compensation (Agriculture)  
019 - Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation)  
029 - Forced Labour 
 
2002 130 - Medical Care and Sickness Benefits  
115 - Radiation Protection 
102 - Social Security (Minimum Standards)  
140 - Paid Educational Leave  
144 - Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) 
111 - Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)  
105 - Abolition of Forced Labour 
136 - Benzene 
159 - Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons)  
128 - Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors' Benefits  
029 - Forced Labour  
138 - Minimum Age  
 
2003 123 - Minimum Age (Underground Work)  
115 - Radiation Protection  
183 - Maternity Protection 
182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour  
173 - Protection of Workers' Claims (Employer's Insolvency)  
089 - Night Work (Women)  
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078 - Medical Examination of Young Persons (Non-Industrial 
Occupations)  
077 - Medical Examination of Young Persons (Industry)  
052 - Holidays with Pay  
029 - Forced Labour 
026 - Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery  
014 - Weekly Rest (Industry) 
001 - Hours of Work (Industry)  
140 - Paid Educational Leave  
138 - Minimum Age  
105 - Abolition of Forced  
102 - Social Security (Minimum Standards) 
100 - Equal Remuneration 
099 - Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery (Agriculture)  
 
2004 034 - Fee-Charging Employment Agencies  
124 - Medical Examination of Young Persons (Underground Work) 
173 - Protection of Workers' Claims (Employer's Insolvency)  
155 - Occupational Safety and Health 
045 - Underground Work (Women) 
128 - Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors' Benefits  
142 - Human Resources Development 
140 - Paid Educational Leave 
130 - Medical Care and Sickness Benefits  
102 - Social Security (Minimum Standards)  
 
2005 105 - Abolition of Forced Labour 
111 - Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)  
184 - Safety and Health in Agriculture 
182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 
171 - Night Work  
164 - Health Protection and Medical Care (Seafarers)  
163 - Seafarers' Welfare  
161 - Occupational Health  
160 - Labour Statistics  
156 - Workers with Family Responsibilities  
098 - Right to Organise  
088 - Employment Service  
087 - Freedom of Association 
029 - Forced Labour  
138 - Minimum Age 
120 - Hygiene (Commerce and Offices)  
100 - Equal Remuneration  
 
2006 087 - Freedom of Association  
176 - Safety and Health in Mines  
156 - Workers with Family Responsibilities 
155 - Occupational Safety and Health 
088 - Employment Service 
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115 - Radiation Protection 
042 - Workmen's Compensation (Occupational Diseases)  
034 - Fee-Charging Employment Agencies  
017 - Workmen's Compensation (Accidents) 
139 - Occupational Cancer  
136 - Benzene  
 
2007 078 - Medical Examination of Young Persons (Non-Industrial 
Occupations) 
111 - Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)  
182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour 
161 - Occupational Health Services 
156 - Workers with Family Responsibilities 
095 - Protection of Wages 
088 - Employment Service 
124 - Medical Examination of Young Persons (Underground Work)  
077 - Medical Examination of Young Persons (Industry)  
027 - Marking of Weight (Packages Transported by Vessels) 
026 - Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery  
138 - Minimum Age  
100 - Equal Remuneration  
099 - Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery (Agriculture) 
 
2008 167 - Safety and Health in Construction 
173 - Protection of Workers' Claims (Employer's Insolvency)  
182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour  
029 - Forced Labour 
105 - Abolition of Forced Labour  
 
2009 136 - Benzene 
115 - Radiation Protection  
111 - Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)  
General Direct Request 
184 - Safety and Health in Agriculture 
183 - Maternity Protection 
182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour  
176 - Safety and Health in Mines 
171 - Night Work  
167 - Safety and Health in Construction 
161 - Occupational Health Services  
155 - Occupational Safety and Health  
052 - Holidays with Pay 
014 - Weekly Rest (Industry)  
001 - Hours of Work (Industry) 
148 - Working Environment (Air Pollution, Noise and Vibration) 
140 - Paid Educational Leave 
139 - Occupational Cancer  
120 - Hygiene (Commerce and Offices)  
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2010 105 - Abolition of Forced Labour  
102 - Social Security (Minimum Standards) 
100 - Equal Remuneration 
098 - Right to Organise  
088 - Employment Service C 
148 - Working Environment (Air Pollution, Noise and Vibration) 
139 - Occupational Cancer  
130 - Medical Care and Sickness Benefits  
128 - Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors' Benefits 
122 - Employment Policy  
120 - Hygiene (Commerce and Offices)  
115 - Radiation Protection 
184 - Safety and Health in Agriculture 
182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour  
176 - Safety and Health in Mines 
167 - Safety and Health in Construction 
164 - Health Protection and Medical Care (Seafarers)  
163 - Seafarers' Welfare  
161 - Occupational Health Services  
 
2011 154 - Collective Bargaining 
100 - Equal Remuneration 
081 - Labour Inspection  
042 - Workmen's Compensation (Occupational Diseases)  
139 - Occupational Cancer  
135 - Workers' Representatives 
130 - Medical Care and Sickness Benefits 
129 - Labour Inspection (Agriculture)  
128 - Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors' Benefits  
122 - Employment Policy  
120 - Hygiene (Commerce and Offices) 
111 - Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)  
General Direct Request 
182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour 
176 - Safety and Health in Mines 
167 - Safety and Health in Construction 
164 - Health Protection and Medical Care (Seafarers) 
163 - Seafarers' Welfare  
161 - Occupational Health Services 
160 - Labour Statistics  
156 - Workers with Family Responsibilities  
105 - Abolition of Forced Labour 
148 - Working Environment (Air Pollution, Noise and Vibration) 
 
2012 187 - Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health  
182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour  
181 - Private Employment Agencies 
176 - Safety and Health in Mines  
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173 - Protection of Workers' Claims (Employer's Insolvency)  
167 - Safety and Health in Construction 
164 - Health Protection and Medical Care (Seafarers)  
163 - Seafarers' Welfare  
161 - Occupational Health Services  
159 - Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons)  
158 - Termination of Employment  
156 - Workers with Family Responsibilities 
151 - Labour Relations (Public Service) 
148 - Working Environment (Air Pollution, Noise and Vibration)  
139 - Occupational Cancer  
120 - Hygiene (Commerce and Offices)  
105 - Abolition of Forced Labour  
099 - Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery (Agriculture)  
098 - Right to Organise  
095 - Protection of Wages  
042 - Workmen's Compensation (Occupational Diseases)  
026 - Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery 
017 - Workmen's Compensation (Accidents) 
 
2013 105 - Abolition of Forced Labour 
139 - Occupational Cancer 
171 - Night Work  
130 - Medical Care and Sickness Benefits  
148 - Working Environment (Air Pollution, Noise and Vibration) 
General Direct Request 
014 - Weekly Rest (Industry)  
156 - Workers with Family Responsibilities  
182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour  
129 - Labour Inspection (Agriculture)  
183 - Maternity Protection 
042 - Workmen's Compensation (Occupational Diseases)  
052 - Holidays with Pay 
001 - Hours of Work (Industry)  
081 - Labour Inspection  
098 - Right to Organise  
159 - Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons) 
140 - Paid Educational Leave  
128 - Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors' Benefits 
 
2014 144 - Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards)  
148 - Working Environment (Air Pollution, Noise and Vibration) 
151 - Labour Relations (Public Service)  
156 - Workers with Family Responsibilities  
161 - Occupational Health Services  
167 - Safety and Health in Construction 
176 - Safety and Health in Mines 
183 - Maternity Protection  
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184 - Safety and Health in Agriculture  
187 - Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health  
052 - Holidays with Pay 
081 - Labour Inspection  
098 - Right to Organise  
100 - Equal Remuneration  
111 - Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
120 - Hygiene (Commerce and Offices) 
129 - Labour Inspection (Agriculture)  
135 - Workers' Representatives  
136 - Benzene  
139 - Occupational Cancer 
 
2015 163 - Seafarers' Welfare 
159 - Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons) 
181 - Private Employment Agencies  
158 - Termination of Employment  
122 - Employment Policy 
115 - Radiation Protection  
088 - Employment Service 
140 - Paid Educational Leave 
098 - Right to Organise 
164 - Health Protection and Medical Care (Seafarers) 
 
2016 158 - Termination of Employment  
160 - Labour Statistics 
182 - Worst Forms of Child  
 
2017 144 - Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) 
140 - Paid Educational Leave 
 
2018 081 - Labour Inspection 
140 - Paid Educational Leave  
129 - Labour Inspection (Agriculture)  
156 - Workers with Family Responsibilities  
098 - Right to Organise  
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Appendix 7. Czechia and Slovakia World Bank Reforms  
Year  Czech Slovakia 
2006  4 reforms (World Bank, 
2006 p.2)  
2007  3 reforms (World Bank, 
2007, p.75)  
2 reforms (World Bank, 
2007, p.75) 
2008 3 Reforms (World Bank, 
2008, p.83)  
0 reforms (World Bank, 
2008, p.83) 
2009 4 reforms (World Bank, 
2009, p.81)  
1 reform (World Bank, 
2009, p.81) 
2010 3 reforms (World Bank, 
2010, p.98)  
1 reform (World Bank, 
2010, p.98) 
2011 2 reforms (World Bank, 
2011, pp.136-143) 
0 reforms (World Bank, 
2011, pp.136-143) 
2012 2 reforms (World Bank, 
2012, p.68) 
1 reform (World Bank, 
2012, p.74) 
2013 4 reforms (World Bank, 
2013, p.135) 
5 reforms (World Bank, 
2013, p.135) 
2014 3 reforms (World Bank, 
2014, p.162) 
3 reforms (World Bank, 
2014, p.169) 
2015 3 reforms (World Bank, 
2015, pp.155-6)  
2 reforms (World Bank, 
2015, PDF.163) 
2016 0 reforms  2 reforms (World Bank, 
2016, p.180) 
2017 2 reforms (World Bank, 
2017, p.174)  
1 reform (World Bank 2017, 
p.184) 
2018 2 reforms (World Bank, 
2018, p.129)  
1 reform (World Bank, 
2018, p.138) 
2019 0 1 reform (World Bank, 
2019, p.148) 
Note* Reforms are noted in Doing Business in reference to legislation changes that took 
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Appendix 10 – 
Node XL Output 









ILO 21 218.490 0.026 0.100 
ITUC 12 46.096 0.020 0.077 
INDUSTRIALL 10 10.596 0.019 0.074 
TUAC 10 38.317 0.019 0.068 
ETUC 8 14.471 0.018 0.062 
FLA 8 59.105 0.018 0.028 
WB 9 21.879 0.018 0.062 
EUROFOUND 8 34.917 0.018 0.055 
ETI 6 33.700 0.018 0.038 
IMF 8 2.036 0.018 0.064 
CCC 5 5.286 0.017 0.040 
BSCI 6 19.033 0.017 0.030 
WTO 6 3.036 0.017 0.048 
WFTO 5 30.186 0.016 0.032 
SAI 4 3.883 0.016 0.021 
PSI 5 0.536 0.016 0.045 
UNDP 2 0.000 0.015 0.021 
UNIDO 2 1.983 0.015 0.014 
UNGP 2 0.000 0.015 0.016 
IOM 1 0.000 0.015 0.012 
AI 1 0.000 0.015 0.012 
G20 1 0.000 0.015 0.012 
UNGC 4 4.417 0.014 0.015 
USDS 2 1.333 0.014 0.011 
COE 1 0.000 0.013 0.009 
FTA 2 0.700 0.013 0.007 
ETUI 1 0.000 0.012 0.008 
TSP 1 0.000 0.012 0.007 
WRC 1 0.000 0.012 0.003 
BS 1 0.000 0.012 0.005 
UNCTAD 1 0.000 0.011 0.004 
Graph Density 0.165591398    
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Appendix 11 – Node XL ‘screen capture’ Czechia 
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Appendix 12 – 
Node XL 
Output Table 








ILO 20 137.660 0.038 0.103 
TUAC 11 14.478 0.029 0.080 
ETUC 10 14.376 0.027 0.074 
ITUC 11 19.493 0.028 0.076 
INDUSTRIALL 11 7.848 0.028 0.083 
IMF 7 0.821 0.024 0.059 
WB 7 1.206 0.024 0.059 
PSI 6 0.310 0.024 0.055 
EUROFOUND 7 22.000 0.025 0.057 
BSCI 6 14.172 0.024 0.032 
WTO 5 0.143 0.023 0.046 
ETI 5 3.139 0.024 0.038 
UNGC 5 3.611 0.024 0.035 
FLA 5 9.744 0.023 0.025 
UNDP 2 0.000 0.022 0.021 
UNIDO 2 0.000 0.021 0.016 
IOM 1 0.000 0.021 0.012 
AI 1 0.000 0.021 0.012 
G20 1 0.000 0.021 0.012 
COE 2 0.000 0.018 0.018 
ETUI 6 0.000 0.024 0.056 
FTA 2 0.000 0.016 0.007 
TSP 1 0.000 0.016 0.007 
UNGP 2 0.000 0.022 0.016 
Graph Density 0.246376812    
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Appendix 13 – Node XL ‘screen capture’ Slovakia 
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